SHRIVATS RATHI & ANR.  Vs ANIL RATHI & ORS.

FAO(OS) (COMM) Nos.119/2020 & 122/2020 Page 1 of 17
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision: 4th January , 202 1
+ FAO(OS) (COMM) 119/2020

SHRIVATS RATHI & ANR. ….. Appellants
Through: Mr. Rajeev Virmani and
Mr.Sanjeev Sindhwani, Sr. Advs.
with Mr. Tanmay Mehta & Mr.
Subhash Chawla, Adv ocates
Versus

ANIL RATHI & ORS. ….Respondents
Through: Mr. Sudhir Chandra & Mr.
Sandeep Sethi, Sr. Advs. with Mr.
Sagar Chandra, Ms. Srijan Up pal,
Ms. Mehek Dua & Mr. R.K.
Rajwanshi, Advs. for R -1.

+ FAO(OS) (COMM) 122/2020

SHRIVATS RATHI & ANR. ….. Appellants
Through: Mr. Rajeev Virmani and
Mr.Sanjeev Sindhwani, Sr. Advs.
with Mr. Tanmay Mehta & Mr.
Subhash Chawla, Adv ocates
Versus

ANIL RATHI & ORS. ….Respondents
Through: Mr. Sudhir Chandra & Mr.
Sandeep Sethi, Sr. Advs. with Mr.
Sagar Chandra, Ms. Srijan Uppal,
Ms. Mehek Dua & Mr. R.K.
Rajwanshi, Advs. for R -1

CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE ASHA MENON
2021:DHC:2-DBFAO(OS) (COMM) Nos.119/2020 & 122/2020 Page 2 of 17
[VIA VIDEO CONFERENCING]

JUSTICE ASHA MENON

FAO(OS) (COMM) 119/2020, CM Nos.24330/2020 (for stay),
24331/2020 & 25167/2020 (both for placing on record additional facts
& documents) AND FAO(OS) (COMM) 122/2020, CM
Nos.24341/2020 (for stay), 24342/2020 & 25183/2020 (both for placing
on record additional facts & documents)

1. These are two first appeals filed against a common judgment of the
learned Single Judge dated 15th September, 2020 disposing o f two interim
applications under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 ( CPC ), in two suits filed against the defendants for
infringement of trademark of the plaintiff. The appellants are two of the
defendants in the suits, whereas the respondent No.1 is the plaintiff. Vide
the impugned judgment , the learned Single Judge restrained all the
defendants, including the present appellants, from issuing licenses,
manufacturing, exporting, marketing, offering for sale, selling ,
advertising or in any manner dealing in TMT Bars, Steel Bars, common
metals, their alloys, metal building materials and several other products
and goods of common metal under the trademark “RATHI” or adopting
any other mark or label which is identical or deceptively similar to the
registered trademark “RATHI” amounting to infringement of registered
trademark, passing off, dilution and unfair competition, during the
pendency of the suits.
2. On 30th September, 2020 , after hearing counsel, we directed as
under: –
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“11. It is therefore ordered that the appellants /
defendants which are members of the Rathi family, during
the pendency of these appeals, shall not renew, alter or
change in any way any existing licence / licensee and
shall not grant any new licences. A list of lic ences
already granted along with copies thereof be also
furnished to the counsels for the respondent / plaintiff and
be filed in this Court.
12. On request of counsel for the appellants, instead of
tomorrow, list on 5th October, 2020.
13. However it is m ade clear that the compensation in
monetary terms in respect whereof undertaking would be
required to be given, would be effective from tomorrow
i.e. 1st October, 2020.”

3. On 6th October, 2020, the CM Application Nos.24330/2020 and
24341/2020 for stay were dismissed and the following order was passed -:
“9. Having considered the controversy, we are of the
view that once the appellants/defendants, on the basis of
their books of accounts, have computed the profits earned
by them in the preceding three months at the rate of
Rs.6.33 lakhs per month and have also put the rider that
owing to the prevalent pandemic, the profits in the
ensuing months are likely to be less, the offer of the
respondent/ plaintiff will more than compensate the
appellants/defendants for t he losses suffered from non
stay of the operation of the impugned judgment till the
decision of the appeal.
10. As observed in the order dated 30th September 2020,
once the Single Judge of this Court has granted an
interim injunction, merely because the a ppeal is
preferred, will not ipso facto lead to stay of the operation
of the order of the Single Judge during the pendency of
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the appeal.
11. We thus accept the undertaking on behalf of the
respondent / plaintiff Anil Rathi in his personal individual
capa city, to, in the event of the appeal being allowed,
within 15 days, deposit in this Court, an amount
computed at the rate of Rs.20 lakhs per month including
for the days of a month less than the complete month on
pro rata basis, with effect from the order dated 29th
September, 2020 and till the decision of the appeal. The
disbursement of the said amount to the FAO (OS)
(COMM) Nos. 119/2020 & 122/2020 Page 6 of 6
appellants/defendants shall however be subject to the
orders, if any, in the further remedies, i f any taken
against the decision in the appeal.
12. The said undertaking of the respondent/plaintiff Anil
Rathi is accepted and respondent/plaintiff Anil Rathi
ordered to be bound with the said undertaking and has
been explained through counsel the conseq uences of
breach of undertaking given to this Court.
13. C.M. Appl. Nos. 24330/2020 & 24341/2020 for stay
are dismissed and the order of the Single Judge shall
continue to operate during the pendency of the appeal.”

BACKGROUND FACTS
4. Gordhan Das Rathi and his brother Kanhiya Lal Rathi along with
their late brother Chuttan Rathi’s son Hari Kishan Rathi set up in 1942 a
steel rolling mill in the name of “Rathi Steel s Rolling Mills ” (RSRM) and
in 1968 , started manufacturing cold twisted d eformed bars i.e. TOR Steel
Bars, under the trademark “RATHI”. However, in 1969, both the brothers
split RSRM into two units which continued to roll TOR steel bars under
the name of “RATHI”. M/s G.D. Rathi Steels Ltd. was owned by the sons
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of late G.D. Rat hi, while M/s . K.L. Rathi Steel s Ltd. was owned by C.R.
Rathi, the son of late K.L. Rathi and his family and H. K. Rathi and his
family. As the business grew, the sons of late G.D. Rathi established in
1970 M/s . Rathi Ispat Ltd. and in 1972 , M/s. Rathi Udyo g Ltd., both at
Ghaziabad. Similarly, C.R. Rathi and H.K. Rathi established a steel plant
under the name of Rathi Super Ltd. in Ghaziabad and Rathi Alloy Steel
Ltd. in Alwar, Rajasthan.
5. In October 1975, M/s . K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd. applied for and
obtained the registration of the trademark “RATHI” under registration
number 309435 in class 6 for certain products. M/s . G.D. Rathi Steels
Pvt. Ltd. also obtained a registered trademark “RATHI” in October 1980
under the registration number 367635. In 1986 , there w as a split in the
G.D. Rathi family. M/s G.D. Rathi Steels Ltd. came to be owned by P.R.
Rathi and his sons and K.K. Rathi and his sons and M/s . Rathi Ispat Ltd.
and M/s . Rathi Udyog Ltd. came to be owned by P.C. Rathi and family,
Arun Kumar Rathi and family, and Anil Rathi and family.
6. Things continued in this fashion till the members of the Rathi
family felt the need to come together to protect and safeguard the interest
of the family in the trademark “RATHI” against outsiders. They were
also keen to maintain the standards of the products manufactured and sold
under the trademark “RATHI”. With this objective in mind, a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was executed on 24th June, 1995
to ensure a consistent quality of the products manufactured in their own
rolling mills under the trademark “RATHI”. As per this MOU, it was also
agreed that the Rathi family would create two trusts, being Rathi
Foundation and Rathi Research Ce ntre.
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7. For the purposes of the Trust , named , Rathi Foundation, on 28th
June, 1995, vide the Trust Deed executed, the entire family was divided
into three groups – A, B and C with the Group C being further divided into
C1, C2 and C3 with twelve Lifetime Trust ees. The same is reproduced in
a tabulated form for ready reference as under: –
GROUP A GROUP B GROUP C
1.Shanta Bai Lakhotiya
(In place of deceased
erstwhile trustee Late
Harikishan Rathi)
Rathi.
[Deceased]
Mr. C.R. Rathi)

2. Rajesh Rathi
(S/o Late Mr. C.R.
Rathi

3. Gaurav Rathi (S/o
Mr. Rajesh Rathi)

4. Lila Devi Rathi 1.Deepak Rathi
(S/o Late Mr.
Harikishan Rathi)

2. Dhananjay Rathi
(S/o Mr. Deepak
Rathi)

3. Kshitij Rathi
(S/o Mr. Deepak
Rathi)

4. Rekha Rathi GROUP C1
1.P.C Rathi, S/o Late
Mr. G.D. Rathi,
(Deceased)

2.Raj Kumar Rathi
(S/o Mr. P.C. Rathi)

3.Pradeep Rathi
(S/o Mr. P.C Rathi)

GROUP C2
1.Arun Kumar Rathi
(S/o Late Mr. G.D.
Rathi)
GROUP C3
1.Anil Rathi
(S/o Late Mr. G.D.
Rathi)

8. The trademark bearing number 309435 obtained by M/s .K.L. Rathi
Steels Ltd. was assigned to Rathi Foundation through Assignment Deed
dated 29th June, 1995. The senior -most trustee of each group and sub –
group i.e. A, B, C1, C2 and C3, were granted power to issue licenses to
use the trademark subject to certain conditions in the Trust Deed read
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with the MOU under information to the Rathi Foundation. The Licensees
were also required to file with the Rathi Foundation, acceptance of all
terms and conditions of the Trust Deed.
9. The present dispute has commen ced as a result of the appellant
No.1 allegedly granting licenses to outsiders without adherence to the
terms of the Trust Deed and the MOU. It may be mentioned here that the
appellant no.1 is the son of the r espondent No.6 who , being the head of
the sub -group C -2, has the right to issue two licenses to two entities in
which the family had a majority interest. However it is alleged that the
appellant No.1 who had no right whatsoever, either under the Trust Deed
or the MOU, during the lifetime of the r espond ent No.6, illegally issued
eight licences to entities which were not connected to the family. The
respondent No.1, being a Lifetime Trustee of the Rathi Foundation ,
instituted the two suits seeking an injunction against the defendants in the
suits from usi ng the registered trademark of the Foundation in
infringement thereof and to restrain the appellant s herein from wrongly
issuing any further licences against the terms of the MOU and Trust
Deed. Pending trial, he sought interim injunction which was granted .

SUBMISSIONS IN APPEAL
10. The focus of the arguments of Sh. Virmani and Sh. Sindhwani ,
senior counsel and Sh. Tanmay Mehta , Advocate, as advanced on behalf
of the appellants , was that the respondent No.1 had himself sought the
registration of the trademark “RATHI” by filing a number of
applications, claiming use of “RATHI” “as a surname” and could not
have taken a contrary stand to oppose a similar claim by the a ppellant
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No.1. Relying upon S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath & Ors.
AIR 1994 SC 853, it was also urged that having come to the conclusion
that the respondent No.1 as plaintiff had willfully suppressed facts
relating to such attempt to obtain registration, the learn ed Single Judge
ought not to have granted the injunction as the respondent No.1 had not
come to the court with clean hands and had no equities in his favour. The
locus standi of the respondent No.1 to file the suit was also questioned
since all the trustees had not passed a Resolution in his favour and as the
plaint was actually signed by a Power of Attorney.
11. The case put forth by the learned senior counsel for the appellants
is that the appellant No.1 was a lineal male descendant of l ate G.D. Rathi
and like all family members, had the right to use the family name as a
trademark under Section 35 of the Trademarks Act, 1999. The learned
senior counsel has relied upon the judgements in S.K. Sachdeva v. Shri
Educare Ltd ., 2016 SCC OnLine D el 473 and Shri Ram Education
Trust v. SRF Foundation , 2016 SCC OnLine Del 472 to put forth his
argument that goodwill in the registered mark “RATHI” of the
Foundation is not exhaustive of the goodwill and entitlement in Rathi
family name. It was submitted that the trademark “RATHI” had been in
existence since 19 42 and that goodwill had remained with the family and
when M/s . K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd. registered the said trademark in its
name in 1975, it created goodwill from that date which was transferred to
the Foundation but it did not include all of the goodwill generated in the
family name and which several other family members continued to use
despite such registration. It was also argued that the subsequent
registration in the name of M/s . G.D. Rathi Ste els Ltd. was improper and
2021:DHC:2-DBFAO(OS) (COMM) Nos.119/2020 & 122/2020 Page 9 of 17
the very fact of it getting another trademark registered in its name
reflected the fact that “RATHI” was not an exclusive trademark. Finally,
it was argued that the appellant No.1 was not a party to the MOU and
therefore none of its terms were binding upon him. It was suggested that
the entire game plan of the r espondent No.1 was to monopolize the
issuance of licenses for the use of the trademark “RATHI” in the hands of
the trus tees, including himself.
12. Sh. Sandeep Sethi , senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent No.1 submitted that the suit had been filed as a trustee on
behalf of the trust and as per the express authority given in para 11.3 of
the Trust Deed, in orde r to protect the interest of the trust in the registered
trademark. All allegations of concealment were against the r espondent
No.1 Sh. Anil Rathi as a person and there were no allegations against the
Trust. In any case, the consequences of the mistake of the lawyer cannot
be visited upon the respondent No.1 as observed by the Delhi High Court
in Insecticides (India) Limited vs. Parijat Industries (India) Pvt. Ltd.
2018 SCC OnLine Del 9748 and there could be no estoppel against him
even if it was to be beli eved that he had himself sought to register the
name “RATHI” on the plea that it was also his surname though it was
argued that what was sought to be registered was “ EUROTHERM by
RATHI ”.
13. It was pointed out by Sh.Sudhir Chandra , senior counsel that the
very purpose of the MOU was to protect the standard and quality of
RATHI TOR S which had gained high acceptability as a brand signifying
high quality, so much so that per metric tonne RATHI TOR S sold at a
rate that was higher than for other brands by more than INR 2000/ – and
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that it was because of the large margin that outsiders desired to use the
trademark “RATHI” for their TOR S. In order to have control over the
quality of products manufactured by various rolling mills , the MOU
provided that no rolling mill without a 51% holding in the company of
the family member would be allowed to use the trademark “RATHI” for
their products. According to the learned senior counsel, the appellant
No.1 was tra fficking in the trademark to all and sundry for profit without
caring for the quality or the fair name of the family. Sh. Sethi also
contended that for 25 years, the MOU and the Trust Deed had played out
well with no one having any problems till the appell ant No.1 began
indulging in dilution of the trademark.
DISCUSSION
14. It is well settled that there are limitations on the powers of the
appellate court while dealing with an appeal arising out of a discretionary
order . The appellate court will not reassess the material on which the
court of first instance has decided to grant or refuse an interim protection.
As held by the Supreme Court in Wander Limited and Anr. Vs. Antox
India P Ltd. 1990 Suppl. SCC 727, the appellate court would normally
not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion particularly
on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage , it
would have come to a contrary conclusion. Only where the discretion has
been shown to hav e been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or
perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law
regulating grant or refusal of interim relief in the form of an injunction
will the appellate court be justified in interfering with the decision.
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15. Interim relief of injunction is granted at a time when all facts have
yet to be proved in trial. At the same time , the court will consider whether
the party seeking such injunction pending trial has a “prima facie case ”
in its favour. If no prima facie case exists, in other words, the party
seeking the interim injunction discloses no right in its favour, no interim
injunction will be granted as it would not be justified. However, even
where a party discloses a prima facie case, interim relief wi ll not
automatically follow. The party would have to establish that the absence
of such relief would cause it “irreparable injury and damage ” which
would not be compensated by money and that the “balance of
convenience ” lies in its favour. The existence of all these three conditions
alone will justify the grant of interim injunction. Reference in this regard
can be made to Dalpat Kumar vs. Prahlad Singh , (1992) 1 SCC 719 ,
as follows: –
“5. Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence
aliunde by affidavit or otherwise that there is “a prima
facie case” in his favour which needs adjudication at the
trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction
of the enjoyment of his pr operty or the right is a condition
for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is
not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be
established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie
case is a substantial question raised, bona fide , which
needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction
that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to
grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that
non-interference by the Court would result in
“irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and that
there is no other remedy available to the party except one
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to grant injunction and he needs protection from the
consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession.
Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there
must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but
means only that the injury must be a material one, namely
one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of
damages. The third condition also is that “the balance of
convenience” must be in favou r of granting injunction.
The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction
should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the
amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to
be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and
compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the
other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing
competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of
injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the
subject matter should be maintained in status quo, an
injunction would be issued. Thus the Court has to
exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or
refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the
suit.”

16. The observations made in Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi So rab
Warden , (1990) 2 SCC 117 may be profitably reproduced here –
“16. The relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are
thus granted generally to preserve or restore the status
quo of the last non -contested status which preceded the
pending controversy until the final hearing when full
relief may be granted or to compel the undoing of those
acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of
that which was wrongfully taken from the party
complaining. But since the granting of such an injunction
to a party who fails or would fail to establish his right at
the trial may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to
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the party against whom it was granted or alternatively
not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would
succeed may equally cause great i njustice or irreparable
harm, courts have evolved certain guidelines. Generally
stated these guidelines are:
(1) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it
shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that
is normally required for a prohibitory injunction.
(2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury
which normally cannot be compensated in terms of
money.
(3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one
seeking such relief.”

These cardinal principles for grant of interim injunction have been
reiterated in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Sriman Narayan ,
(2002) 5 SCC 760 , M. Gurudas and Ors. v. Rasaranjan and Ors ., AIR
2006 SC 3275 , Best Sellers Retail (India)(P) Ltd. v. Aditya Birla Nuvo
Ltd. (2012) 6 SCC 792 and Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprise Ltd. v. KS
Infraspace LLP Ltd. (2020) 5 SCC 410 .
17. In this background, it may be seen whether any interference in the
impugned judgment is called f or or not. We may determine this on the
basis of the arguments advanced.
18. There is no strength in the arguments advanced on behalf of the
appellant s that the appellants are not bound by the MOU or the Trust
Deed because they were not a party thereto. The Rathi family chart filed
by the respondent No.1 reflects the fact that except for P.R. R athi and
K.K. Rathi, sons of Late G.D. Rathi, all other famil y groups are parties to
the MOU as also the formation of the Trust. From the family chart, these
two persons are connected to the Rathi Research Centre which is the
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second foundation created by the family and to which the registered
trademark in favour of M/s. G.D. Rathi Steels Ltd. was assigned. The
MOU include s all male lineal descendants of the parties who are
signatories to the MOU. In other words, the appellant No.1 being the
lineal male descendant of respondent No.6, who has signed the MOU, is
also go verned by the terms and conditions of the MOU as well as the
Trust Deed. Merely because he did not sign the document would not
result in his being excluded from such terms as such an interpretation
would undo the very intent of the elders of the family whe n they had
entered into the arrangement encapsulated in the MOU and cemented by
the Trust Deed.
19. The claim that other family members have carried out business
under the trademark “RATHI” for the steel TORS and common metal
products even after the creation of the Trusts and assignment of the
trademark to them, would be a matter of evidence as rightly observed in
the impugned judgment .
20. The facts as noticed hereinbefore would also give us a reason why
M/s. K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd. and subsequently M/s . G.D. Rathi Steels had
obtained separate registrations for the trademark “RATHI” in their
names. The original company RSRM was formed and run by two brothers
and the son of a deceased brother. When the split took place, it was
between G.D. Rathi and K.L. R athi groups of companies, with the
nephew H.K. Rathi choosing to go with K.L. Rathi. But what is more
important is that after f unctioning separately from 1975/ 1980, all of them
thought it appropriate to take concrete steps to preserve the quality of the
products being manufactured and sold in the family name of “RATHI ” by
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the various constituents of the family through their independent
units/companies. Their idea was obviously to preserve the brand value
and ensure that the expansion of the family and the b usiness does not
result in a fall in quality and thus the disappearance of the goodwill that
the name “ RATHI ” had acquired over a long period of time. Each branch
of the family, through the eldest member was authorized to grant licenses
to their individual units, either existing or to be formed, subject to
conditions noticed in the impugned judgement and therefore not required
to be reproduced herein.
21. The courts generally give effect to such family arrangements
unless there was no bonafides or there was f raud and undue influence
which facts require to be proved during trial. Apart from the fact that no
such plea has been taken in the present case, it has also to be noticed that
this arrangement has worked well from 1995 till now when the appellant
No.1 has sought to assert a right independent of the MOU and the Trust
Deed by claiming a right under Section 35 of the Trademarks Act, 1999.
It is in connection with this plea that the appellant No.1 highlighted the
pleas taken by the respondent No.1 while seekin g registration of certain
trademarks including the name of “ RATHI ” by claiming it as a family
name/surname. However it is for the appellant No .1 to independently
establish his bonafide in using the name “ RATHI ” irrespective of what
plea the respondent No.1 had taken before the registration authorities in
respect of some other trademarks. The appellant No.1 is clearly seeking
to enforce rights outside the MOU and the Trust Deed by claiming a
vested right in a name the goodwill of which was not created by him but
created by his predecessors since 19 42 and specifically for TORS since
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1968 . The name “ RATHI ” in respect of TORS evokes a certain brand
quality and this has been established not by a proprietor, being the
grandfather of appellant No.1, but by all m embers of the family over a
period of time, including his grand uncles.
22. The learned Single Judge was right, in concluding that on the basis
of the MOU and the Trust Deed, the respondent No.1 had disclosed a
prima facie case whereas the appellant No.1 had not disclosed any right
to issue licen ses for use of the trademark “RATHI” by outsiders. In view
of the goodwill and brand value of the trademark “RATHI”, the injury
caused by the widespread unregulated and unlawful use of this trademark ,
which admittedly had been registered in the name of M/s. K.L. Rathi
Steels Ltd. and which was thereafter duly assigned to the Rathi
Foundation, would be irreparable as it would be a loss to the family
represented by the Rathi Foundation through the respon dent No.1. The
balance of convenience lies in favour of the Rathi family and the Rathi
Foundation and not with the appellant No.1.
23. The contention that the respondent No.1 was not authorized to file
the suits by other trustees also has no force since the T rust Deed itself
authorizes each Trustee to initiate legal action against any other
Trustee/family member if they were found violating the terms of the
Trust. It is a specious plea that without a hundred percent unanimity
amongst the Trustees no legal acti on can be initiated, because if a Trustee
is found violating the terms of the MOU/Trust Deed, he would not be
agreeable to a Resolution against him and in absence of such absolute
unanimity , the terms of the Trust Deed would not be enforceable.
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Therefore, placing such an interpretation on the terms of the MOU/Trust
Deed before the filing of suits cannot be accepted.
24. The impugned judgment does record an observation that the
respondent No.1 had not made full disclosure. But that need not result in
a deprivat ion of relief to the Trust which is seeking to protect interest of
all family members in the trademark “RATHI” against unauthorized
usage. The r espondent No.1 has not sought an injunction against the
appellants and other respondents to this appeal in his personal capacity
after violating terms and claiming a privilege over other violators. He is
in a representative capacity and the acts of one Trustee cannot predicate
the rights that can be enforced by the Trust.
25. We therefore find no reason to interfere with the reasoning and the
conclusions in the impugned judgement as no perversity or illegality has
been disclosed or is evident.
26. Appeal s dismissed.

ASHA MENON , J.

RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
JANUARY 04, 2021
manjeet
2021:DHC:2-DB