delhihighcourt

JAGJIT SINGH BHATIA  Vs ROOP RANI MEHRA -Judgment by Delhi High Court

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on : 06 December 2023
Judgment pronounced on : 10 January 2024

+ RC.REV. 621/2015 & CM APPL. 28537/2015, CM APPL. 36519/2019, CM APPL. 12755/2020, CM APPL. 16626/2020

JAGJIT SINGH BHATIA ….. Petitioner
Through: Mr. Sonal Anand and Ms. Surbhi Singh, Advs.
versus
ROOP RANI MEHRA ….. Respondent
Through: Mr. Awijit Paliwal, Adv. with respondent in person.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DHARMESH SHARMA
J U D G M E N T

1. The present Revision Petition is preferred under Section 25-B (8)1 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 19582 by the petitioner, assailing the impugned order dated 23.05.2015 passed by learned CCJ-cum- ARC-I (Central), Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi3 in the Eviction Petition titled �Smt. Roop Rani Mehra, (Sr. Citizen) v. Sh. Jagjit Singh Bhatia�, bearing No. E-342/2013, whereby the application of the petitioner, who was tenant in respect of the premises in question, seeking leave to defend under Section 25-B (4 )& (5) of the DRC Act was dismissed and an eviction order was passed. It is pertinent to mention that the respondent/landlady expired on 25.05.2018 and her legal heirs now represent her legal interests in the matter.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND:

2. Briefly stated, eviction petition u/s 14(1)(e) r/w Section 25-B of the DRC Act was filed by the respondent in the present revision4, seeking eviction of the petitioner/tenant from one shop measuring 8′ x 18′ in property No. 820, Katra Neel Chandni Chowk, Delhi-110006 (hereinafter referred to as the �tenancy premises�), which was stated to have been let out vide rent note dated 01.04.1982. The petitioner therein claimed that she was the owner and landlady of the tenancy premises, which was jointly owned by herself and her husband; and that her husband left for his heavenly abode on 13.04.2010. Thereafter, all her children, i.e., three sons and one daughter, executed a Relinquishment Deed dated 12.05.2011 in her favour in respect of the entire property including the tenancy shop.
3. It was stated that during the lifetime of Shri Satya Narain Mehra, husband of respondent/landlady, he was the Karta of HUF M/s. Roop Rani Mehra Bal Kishan Dass but after his demise, the HUF was abandoned. She claimed that the tenancy shop was required for her bonafide requirement and to satisfy the need of more accommodation for the members of her family i.e., her children and grandchildren to give them an opportunity to have their own avocation, business and augment the family income. It was stated that the petitioner has three grown up sons and one married daughter and whereas eldest son namely Sh. Satish Mehra, aged about 64 years has been doing small scale business of Ayurvedic medicine from rented shop No. 226-E, Tisra Pushta, Jagjit Nagar, Shahdara, Delhi, having one married son namely Sh. Amit Mehra aged about 34 years and one unmarried daughter Ms. Nidhi Mehra aged about 31 years; her second son namely Sh. Anil Mehra was at that time aged 59 years was employed with Union Bank and was due to retire in around 6 months time and having two sons, namely Sh. Vineet Mehra aged 33 years who is married and dealing in share and stock from basement shop bearing No. 501, Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk, Delhi belonging to her late husband while her second grandson namely Sh. Sumit Mehra was aged about 29 years, then unemployed after completing his MBA (finance) from MIT, Ghaziabad; as regards third son namely Sh. Sunil Mehra, he was stated to be 51 years of age and in the business of cloth from window counter in the side wall of shop bearing No. 817, Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk, Delhi; having two sons namely Rahul Mehra aged about 26 years who was running cloth business from shop bearing No. 817/8, Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk, Delhi, which is also a window shop while his second son Sh. Sharad Mehra aged about 25 years was awaiting completion of supplementary examination of his graduation; it was further stated that her daughter namely Smt. Savita Seth was married and her husband is engaged in the business of medicine from a rented shop and were having two sons, one Nimit Seth employed with HCL and the other was a student.
4. Succinctly put, the petitioner wanted her sons and grandsons to get settled in their respective businesses and therefore she claims that she has decided to provide accommodation to them. It was her case that one shop is required for her son Sh. Anil Mehra and grandson Sh. Sumit Mehra as they decided to start their consultancy business in finance, investment, securities, after retirement of her son Sh. Anil Mehra from the Union Bank; and that one shop was required for her grandson Sh. Amit Mehra son of Sh. Satish Mehra since there was no independent place available and Sh. Satish Mehra had been carrying on business of ayurvedic medicine from a rented accommodation in Jagjit Nagar, Pushta, Shahdara, Delhi. She also desired one shop for grandson Sh. Sharad Mehra besides one shop with adequate storage space for her son Sh. Sunil Mehra who was facing paucity of accommodation and running business from a window counter of shop No. 817, Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk, Delhi-110006 which was in a passage, thereby making it inconvenient. She also spelled out that her grandson Sh. Amit Mehra wanted to start his independent business of fabric and cloth from the shop No. 812, Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk, Delhi, in respect of which the petitioner filed an eviction petition against the tenant therein.
5. It was also stated that she had filed an eviction petition against another tenant Vijay Kumar Aggarwal as she wanted to accommodate her grandson Sh. Rahul Mehra son of Sh. Sunil Mehra; and that she wanted to settle her son namely Sh. Sunil Mehra, Sh. Anil Mehra, grandson Sh. Sumit Mehra and Sh. Sharad Mehra and so on.
6. Suffice to point out that the first floor of the property in question was meant for residential purposes. It was not suitable for being used for commercial purposes and it was claimed that there were two shops bearing No. 818 and 819, Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk, Delhi in the name of grand-daughter-in-law Smt. Neha to avoid uncongenial environment created by the grandson and his wife.
7. Upon service of summons to petitioner/tenant in the prescribed form the application for leave to defend was filed contesting the claim of the respondent /landlady inter alia on the ground that (i) there was no relationship of landlord – tenant between the parties as the tenant was the tenant under the firm M/s Roop Rani Mehra Bal Kishan Dass, a Hindu Joint Family through its Karta and the petitioner/tenant claimed that the HUF5 was abandoned. The same was disputed based on letter dated 18.05.2011 and 17.02.2012 written by Sh. Anil Kumar wherein the respondent/landlady had informed that she would receive rent from tenant through her son Anil Kumar while she would be working as Karta. The petitioner/tenant disputed the claim of the ownership of the property in question by the respondent/landlady; and it was alleged that joint family properties bearing Nos. 818 and 819, Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk, Delhi had been illegally and malafidely transferred in the name of Smt. Nehal Bahal, daughter in law of Sh. Anil Mehra, so as to depict a sale of the said property to outsiders and that Smt. Neha Bahal had already executed registered sale deed in favour of other persons.
8. In short, it was claimed by the petitioner/tenant that respondent/landlady was in ownership of property bearing No. 501, Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk, Delhi and having 8 shops on the ground floor of property No. 817, out of which 4 shops were in possession of the respondent/landlady, besides the portion in occupation of Sh. Sunil Mehra; one shop behind shop No. 812, Katra Neel and one shop behind shop No. 813, Katra Neel in favour of respondent/landlady, which had not been disclosed and it was also claimed that the site plan of the first floor of the property in question has not been intentionally filed so as to create a false ground for eviction.
9. In reply to the application for leave to defend moved by the petitioner/tenant, the respondent/landlady denied the contents of the same. Furthermore, she denied that any letters dated 18.05.2011 and 17.02.2012 were written by her son. It was stated that sale of two shops bearing Nos. 818 and 819, Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk, Delhi to Neha Bahal on 16.07.2008 was valid and binding as it was created way back in the year 2008, i.e., much prior to filing of the present eviction petition. It was denied that there were existing 8 shops in the property No. 817 stating that the shop No. 817 was divided into 5 shops and two almirahs with the depth of around 1 � feet, which were not regular shops, rather one of the shops was a toilet turned into a store with 2.5’x4′ of size used for storing cloth by Sh. Sunil Mehra, and out of 5 shops, 4 shops were in occupation of tenants, vis., Savita Kapoor Family Trust, Sukhbir Singh and Co., Om Prakash Varinder Kumar and Anil Kapoor and Sahil Kapoor. It was further stated that shop No. 817/8 was got vacated from the tenant Vijay Kumar and she has accommodated her grandson Sh. Rahul Mehra in the shop.
IMPUGNED ORDER
10. Suffice to state that the learned ARC in the impugned eviction order referred to the essential ingredients attracting Section 14(1)(e) and as regards the issue of the bonafide requirement it referred to decision in the case of Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal6. Learned ARC found no substance in the plea of the petitioner/tenant that he was tenant under the HUF M/s Roop Rani Mehra Bal Kishan Dass as there was no evidence that HUF remained in existence till the date of filing of the eviction petition, for which reliance was placed on the decision in Shri Gulab Singh v. Dal Chand Lowadia & Ors.7 and Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur & Ors v. Chander Sen & Ors8. Further, the plea of the petitioner/tenant that eviction petition was not maintainable for non -joinder of LRs of deceased Sh. Amar Singh Bhatia and other remaining LRs was found to be untenable for which reliance was placed on the decision in Kanji Manji v. Trustees of Port of Bombay9.
11. The learned ARC then went on to appreciate the material on record to determine the bonafide requirement of alternative suitable accommodation and held as under :-

�18. The petitioner has sought vacation of the tenanted premises on the ground of bonafide requirement stating that the tenanted premises is required by the petitioner for her sons and grandsons to get them settled in their respective businesses and the petitioner has decided to provide sufficient space in the property to them as per their bonafide requirement. Per contra, it is averred by the respondent that all the children and grand children of the petitioner are very well settled in more space than the requirement of the children of the petitioner for that purpose. The respondent has also averred that the petitioner has alternative suitable accommodation available with the petitioner in order to accommodate her sons and grandsons for their requirement.

(a) Property No. 501, Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk, Delhi:
It is averred by the respondent that the petitioner is already is occupation of property no. 501, Katra ‘Neel, Chandni Chowk, Delhi. However, the petitioner has clearly stated that the said shop is used by her grandson Sh. Vinit Mehra for running his business of share and stocks and thus the said shop is not in occupation of the petitioner to make available the said shop to her other sons and grandsons.

(b) Property No 817, Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk, Delhi:
It is averred by the respondent that there are 8 shops on the ground floor of property bearing No. 817, out of which 4 shops are in possession of the petitioner besides the portion in the occupation of Sh. Sunil Mehra. Per contra, the petitioner has denied that there are 8 shops in the property No. 817 stating that the shop No. 817 is divided into 5 shops and two almirah with the depth of around 1 � feet which are not regular shops. One of the shop is a toilet turned store with 2.5’x4′ of size which is used for storing cloth by Sh. Sunil Mehra son of the petitioner. Out of these 5 shops, 4 shops are in occupation of tenants, i.e., Savita Kapoor Family Trust, Sukhbir Singh and Co., Cm Prakash Varinder Kumar and Anil Kapoor and Sahil Kapoor. That the shop No. 817/8 was got vacated from the tenant Vijay Kumar and the petitioner has accommodated her grandson Sh. Rahul Mehra in the said shop. The shops no. 817/2 and 817/3 are the two window / almirah shop and the same are in occupation of Sh. Sunil Mehra and the last Shop No. 817/4 is toilet turned store which is being used as store room by Sh. Sunil Mehra. It is further stated by the petitioner that the entire first floor over the shops is under the ownership of the petitioner which is being used as residence by the petitioner and her family members. It is further stated by the petitioner that it is very difficult for her son Sh. Sunil Mehra to run his business from window counter as he is running the business of selling ladies suits but the almirah is having depth of only I’-b” in the side wall of the property No 817, Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk, Delhi. He faces extreme difficulty as he has no place to sit and has no place to keep his stock of cloth except the small toilet measuring 2′-6″x4′ which is converted into store by him and the said window counter is in the common passage and the son of the petitioner does not have a proper and convenient place to properly run his business or make any expansion to the same. The set-up of the shop is not congenial for lady customers who visit the shop as the shop is in open passage and he and his customers have to rub shoulder with each other to show article from the shop. The respondent has failed to produce any documentary proof that shop No. 817/8, Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk is lying vacant under the possession of the petitioner and thus, the contention of the respondent seems to be a mere bald allegation. That the shop No. 817/8 was got vacated from the tenant Vijay Kumar and the petitioner has accommodate her grandson Sh. Rahul Mehra in the said shop is not disputed by the respodent. The shops no. 817/2 and 817/3 are the two window / almirah shop and the same are in occupation of Sh. Sunil Mehra from where he is carrying on his business with great difficulty and thus proper space is required for Sh. Sunil Mehra to run his cloth shop in a proper manner. It cannot be denied that the window shop is not a proper shop for the son of the petitioner to run his business when the petitioner has several suitable shops which can be used by her sons to run their business suceessfully. The petitioner cannot be denied of her right to make her son independent and start his business from a well situated shop having sufficient space just because at one point of time she decided to let out the said shop. The respondent has averred that the entire first floor over the shops is under the ownerships of the petitioner in property no. 812, 813 and 817, Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk. Per contra, it is stated by the petitioner that the first floor is used as residence of the petitioner and her family members and no portion of the first floor is being used by the petitioner as commercial space. Per contra, it is averred by the respondent that there are commercial shop even on the first floor but the respondent has failed to substantiate the fact by way of any documentary or other proof. Even otherwise, the respondent failed to mention as to if the first floor is not used as residence by the petitioner then what is the residential address of the petitioner and her family members. Thus, it is proved that first floor over the shops in property no. 812, 813 and 817, Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk is being used by by the petitioner for residential purposes.

(c) Shop No. 812 and 813, Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk, Delhi:
It is averred by the respondent that one shop behind shop No. 812, Katra Neel and one shop behind shop No. 813, Katra Neel are in occupation of the petitioner. Per contra, it is averred by the petitioner that the said shops are not the shop but a wooden Khokha with tin roof and is in the occupation of tenant. The said wooden Khokha is not a shop nor suitable for the petitioner or her sons to run their business or trade. The said Khokha (wooden cabin) was kept as guard’s cabin but later on the same was used as tea stall by the tenant. The respondent has failed to file any document to substantiate that shop behind shop No. 812, Katra Neel and one shop behind shop No. 813 is a proper shop and the same is lying vacant which can be used by the petitioner or her family members. In these circumstances, the contention of the respondent is nothing but a mere bald allegation which cannot be relied upon.

(d) Shop No. 818 and 819, Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk, Delhi:
It is averred by the respondent that alleged sale deed dated 16.07.2008 executed by the petitioner in favour of her grand daughter in law Smt. Neha Bahal was a forged and fabricated document just to create the false scarcity of accommodation. It is further averred that the said premises is in occupation of the son of the petitioner Sh. Anil Mehra and grandson Sh.Vinit Mehra who are using the said premises for their business purposes. Per contra, it is averred by the petitioner that sale of these two shops to Neha Bahal on 16.07.2008 is valid and binding. Even otherwise the said sale had taken place way back in the year 2008 in respect of the shops which were in the occupation of the tenants and the vacant possession of these shops were never available with the petitioner. It is further stated that the sale deed of these shops was executed by the petitioner and her husband as co-owners of the property and not as HUF property. That the shops bearing No. 818 and 819 were transferred in the name of the grand daughter in law of the petitioner under compelling family circumstances to avoid conflict and disharmony which was brewing up due to the temperamental differences of the petitioner and her family on the one hand and the grandson Sh. Vinit Mehra and his wife, Ms. Neha on the other hand. The contention of the respondent that these two shops were sold malafidely by the petitioner to her granddaughter in law just to create false scarcity of accommodation and these two shops are lying vacant for commercial requirement does not hold any substance. These two shops were transferred by the petitioner by way of registered sale deed. Further selling of these two shops by Smt. Neha Bahal by way of registered sale deed in favour of Baldev Raj Kapoor and Sh. Ghanshyam Dass has not been disputed by the respondent. Further these two person to whom these shops were sold by Smt. Neha Bahal were in the occupation / the original tenants of the shops No. 818 and 819, Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk, Delhi. The said shops were sold way back in the year 2008 and that time the petitioner had no bonafide requirement of her family members which was raised in the year 2013. Thus, this averment of the respondent is without any substance.

19. It is further averred by the respondent that the petitioner has got vacated one shop recently from one tenant namely Sh.Hari Ram. However, the said fact has not been substantiated by the respondent by way of any documentary proof and thus the said contention of the respondent remains to be mere bald allegation wiihout any substance. Thus, the respondent has failed to prove that the bonafide requirement of the sons and grandsons of the petitioner is a mere desire. The petitioner has clearly established that her son namely Sh. Sunil Mehra is presently carrying on business of cloth from window counter in the side wall of shop bearing No. 817, Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk, Delhi which is inadequate space to run his business smoothly. It is further averred by the petitioner that the son and the grandson of the petitioner Sh. Sunil Mehra are having no shop in their possession to start their business. The respondent has also failed to prove that grandson of the petitioner namely Vinit Mehra is presently carrying on his business from any shop. In these circumstances, bonafide requirement of Sh. Sunil Mehra, Sh. Anil Mehra, grandson Sh. Sumit Mehra and Sh. Sharad Mehra stands duly proved.

20. The respondent has failed to prove availability of alternative suitable to accommodate sons and grandsons of the petitioner to start their own independent business. Even the respondent in his entire leave to defend application as well as rejoinder has nowhere mentioned about alternative suitable accommodation available with the petitioner to settle her sons and grandsons in their own independent business. Further the respondent has disputed the site plan filed by the petitioner stating that the petitioner has intentionally not filed the site plan of the first floor of the suit property and that the said first floor is totally commercial whereas in their turn, the respondent failed to file any site plan in order to contradict the site plan filed by the petitioner and thus the site plan filed by the petitioner is deemed to be admitted. Even, first floor is not suitable to be termed as alternative commercial accommodation as same is used by the petitioner and her family members for residential purposes.�

12. Hence, it was found that the petitioner/tenant has failed to demonstrate any triable issues, and accordingly, the application for leave to defend was dismissed and the impugned eviction order was passed except for debarring the respondent landlady from initiating execution proceedings before the expiry of six months from the date of impugned judgment.
GROUNDS FOR REVISION:
13. The impugned order, dismissing the application for leave to defend, has been assailed in the present revision inter alia on the grounds that learned ARC failed to appreciate various triable issues which were raised including non-existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, rent receipt evidencing payment to the HUF even after the death of husband of respondent/landlady and overlooking the contents of letter dated 18.05.2011 and 17.02.2012; and that the learned ARC failed to appreciate that it was concealed that the property No. 501, Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk, Delhi was not only owned but also in possession of respondent/landlady and there were 8 shops on the ground floor which were in use and occupation of the family members of the respondent/landlady and that shop no. No. 817/8, Karta Neel, Chandni Chowk, Delhi was lying vacant and was under possession of the respondent/landlady.
LEGAL SUBMISSIONS AT THE BAR:
14. Learned counsel for the petitioner/tenant vehemently urged that the entire concoction of requiring the premises for bonafide need of more commercial space for her family members was bogus and moonshine as evidently respondent/landlady has a large family and a deliberate situation is sought to be brought about that each of the family member needs one or more premises owned by her, whereas all of them have been happily settled having their own businesses and being financially independent, and that none of the family member has been solely dependent upon the respondent/landlady for more accommodation.
15. It was reiterated that there were eight shops in possession of the respondent/landlady on the ground floor and two halls on the first floor. It was strongly urged that two shops handed over on 16.07.2018 to Smt. Neha Bansal wife of Sh. Vineet Mehra, grand-daughter-in-law of respondent/landlady was not a bonafide decision but to create artificial scarcity of accommodation, which could only have been tested during the trial; and that the respondent/landlady falsely claimed that the first floor portion of the property was not suitable for commercial purposes whereas it was her own case that there were two shops/ halls on the first floor under tenancy of other persons.
16. Learned counsel for the petitioner/tenant in their submissions relied on decisions in the following judgements:-
(i) (2017) 3 SCC 194; Richard Lee vs. Girish Soni & Anr.
(ii) (2001) 1 SCC 706; Inderjeet Kaur vs. Nirpal Singh
(iii) (2009) 16 SCC 740; Ramesh Kumar Aggarwal vs. Rani Ravindran & Ors.
(iv) (1994) 1 SCC 1; S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs vs. Jagannath (dead) by LRs & Ors.
(v) (2012) SCC Online Del 1643; Harcharan Singh vs. Neeraj Sahu.
(vi) (2015) SCC Online Del 13472; Ashok Kumar Gupta vs. Rajesh Kumar & Anr.

17. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/landlady took the Court through the pleadings and the documents on the record and it was urged that the respondent/landlady has a large family and she has categorically and bonafidely spelled out requirement for more accommodation so as to cater to the urgent and demanding need of her family members for more commercial space. It was urged that the petitioner/tenant has no business to dictate her as to how she should use her own resources in order to serve the interests of her family members. The case law cited at the Bar on behalf of the petitioner/tenant was sought to be distinguished.
ANALYSIS AND DECISION:
18. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the parties at the Bar and I have gone through the entire record of the matter.
PROPOSITION OF LAW:
19. Avoiding a long academic discussion on the subject, it would be expedient to refer to a few cases cited at the Bar. In the case of Inderjeet Kaur�v.�Nirpal Singh (supra)� it was held :-
�9. Chapter III-A deals with summary trial of certain applications expressly stating that every application by a landlord for recovery of possession on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act, or under Section 14-A or 14-B or 14-C or 14-D shall be dealt with in accordance with the special provisions prescribed in Section 25-B of the Act. As per the broad scheme of this Chapter a tenant is precluded from contesting an application filed for eviction on the grounds mentioned in the aforementioned provisions unless he obtains leave from the Controller to contest the eviction petition. In default of obtaining leave to defend or leave is refused to him an order of eviction follows. It appears recourse to summary trial is adopted having due regard to nature of the grounds on which the eviction is sought with a view to avoid delay so that the landlord should not be deprived or denied of his right to immediate possession of premises for his bona fide use.
10. At the same time, it is well settled and accepted position in law that no one shall be subjected to suffer a civil consequence like eviction from a premises resulting in hardship to him without providing adequate and effective opportunity to disprove the case against him and establish his case as pleaded.
11. As is evident from Sections 25-B(4) and (5) of the Act, burden placed on a tenant is light and limited in that if the affidavit filed by him discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of the possession of the premises on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act, with which we are concerned in this case, are good enough to grant leave to defend.
12. A landlord, who bona fide requires a premises for his residence and occupation should not suffer for long, waiting for eviction of a tenant. At the same time a tenant cannot be thrown out from a premises summarily, even though prima facie he is able to say that the claim of the landlord is not bona fide or untenable and as such not entitled to obtain an order of eviction. Hence the approach has to be cautious and judicious in granting or refusing leave to defend to a tenant to contest an eviction petition within the broad scheme of Chapter III-A and in particular having regard to the clear terms and language of Section 25-B(5).
13. We are of the considered view that at a stage when the tenant seeks leave to defend, it is enough if he prima facie makes out a case by disclosing such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction. It would not be a right approach to say that unless the tenant at that stage itself establishes a strong case as would non-suit the landlord, leave to defend should not be granted when it is not the requirement of Section 25-B(5). A leave to defend sought for cannot also be granted for mere asking or in a routine manner which will defeat the very object of the special provisions contained in Chapter III-A of the Act. Leave to defend cannot be refused where an eviction petition is filed on a mere design or desire of a landlord to recover possession of the premises from a tenant under clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14, when as a matter of fact the requirement may not be bona fide. Refusing to grant leave in such a case leads to eviction of a tenant summarily resulting in great hardship to him and his family members, if any, although he could establish if only leave is granted that a landlord would be disentitled for an order of eviction. At the stage of granting leave to defend, parties rely on affidavits in support of the rival contentions. Assertions and counter-assertions made in affidavits may not afford safe and acceptable evidence so as to arrive at an affirmative conclusion one way or the other unless there is a strong and acceptable evidence available to show that the facts disclosed in the application filed by the tenant seeking leave to defend were either frivolous, untenable or most unreasonable. Take a case when possession is sought on the ground of personal requirement, a landlord has to establish his need and not his mere desire. The ground under clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 enables a landlord to recover possession of the tenanted premises on the ground of his bona fide requirement. This being an enabling provision, essentially the burden is on the landlord to establish his case affirmatively. In short and substance, a wholly frivolous and totally untenable defence may not entitle a tenant to leave to defend, but when a triable issue is raised a duty is placed on the Rent Controller by the statute itself to grant leave. At the stage of granting leave the real test should be whether facts disclosed in the affidavit filed seeking leave to defend prima facie show that the landlord would be disentitled from obtaining an order of eviction and not whether at the end defence may fail. It is well to remember that when leave to defend is refused, serious consequences of eviction shall follow and the party seeking leave is denied an opportunity to test the truth of the averments made in the eviction petition by cross-examination. It may also be noticed that even in cases where leave is granted provisions are made in this very Chapter for expeditious disposal of eviction petitions. Section 25-B(6) states that where leave is granted to a tenant to contest the eviction application, the Controller shall commence the hearing of the application as early as practicable. Section 25-B(7) speaks of the procedure to be followed in such cases. Section 25-B(8) bars the appeals against an order of recovery of possession except a provision of revision to the High Court. Thus a combined effect of Sections 25-B(6),(7) and (8) would lead to expeditious disposal of eviction petitions so that a landlord need not wait and suffer for a long time. On the other hand, when a tenant is denied leave to defend although he had fair chance to prove his defence, will suffer great hardship. In this view a balanced view is to be taken having regard to competing claims.� {Bold sentences emphasized}

20. In a later case, titled Anil Bajaj�& Anr. v.�Vinod Ahuja10, it was held that :-
�6. In the present case it is clear that while the landlord (Appellant 1) is carrying on his business from a shop premise located in a narrow lane, the tenant is in occupation of the premises located on the main road which the landlord considers to be more suitable for his own business. The materials on record, in fact, disclose that the landlord had offered to the tenant the premises located in the narrow lane in exchange for the tenanted premises which offer was declined by the tenant. It is not the tenant’s case that the landlord, Appellant 1, does not propose to utilise the tenanted premises from which eviction is sought for the purposes of his business. It is also not the tenant’s case that the landlord proposes to rent out/keep vacant the tenanted premises after obtaining possession thereof or to use the same is any way inconsistent with the need of the landlord. What the tenant contends is that the landlord has several other shop houses from which he is carrying on different businesses and further that the landlord has other premises from where the business proposed from the tenanted premises can be effectively carried out. It would hardly require any reiteration of the settled principle of law that it is not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord as to how the property belonging to the landlord should be utilised by him for the purpose of his business. Also, the fact that the landlord is doing business from various other premises cannot foreclose his right to seek eviction from the tenanted premises so long as he intends to use the said tenanted premises for his own business.� {Bold sentences emphasized}

21. In a recent case decided by the Supreme Court titled �Abid-Ul-Islam�v.�Inder Sain Dua,11 it was emphasised that the scope of interference in revisional jurisdiction is very restricted, and except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, this court would not proceed to disturb the findings rendered by the Rent Controller. It would be expedient to refer to the following observations in the said judgment:-
�23. The proviso to Section 25-B (8) gives the High Court exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature.�
22. Further, the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case also laid emphasis on the object of Section 14(1)(e) vis-�-vis Section 25-B of the DRC Act and has observed that the object of these provisions is to facilitate a speedy possession to the landlord. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under:-
�18.�For availing the leave to defend as envisaged under Section 25-B(5), a mere assertion per se would not suffice as�Section 14(1)(e) creates a presumption subject to the satisfaction of the learned Rent Controller qua bona fide need in favour of the landlord�which is obviously rebuttable with some material of substance to the extent of raising a triable issue. The satisfaction of the Rent Controller in deciding on an application seeking leave to defend is obviously subjective. The degree of probability is one of preponderance forming the subjective satisfaction of the Rent Controller.�Thus, the quality of adjudication is between a mere moonshine and adequate material and evidence meant for the rejection of a normal application for eviction.
19.�Before a presumption is drawn, the landlord is duty-bound to place prima facie material supported by the adequate averments. It is only thereafter, the presumption gets attracted and the onus shifts on the tenant. The object of Section 14(1)(e) vis-�-vis Section 25-B has to be seen in the light of yet another provision contained under Section 19. Section 19 gives a right to the dispossessed tenant for repossession if there is a non-compliance on the part of the landlord albeit after eviction, to put the premises to use for the intended purpose. Such a right is available only to a tenant who stood dispossessed on the application filed by the landlord invoking Section 14(1)(e) being allowed. Thus, Section 19 inter alia throws more light on the legislative objective facilitating a speedy possession. The object is also reflected in the proviso to Section 25-B(8), denying a right of appeal.��
{Bold sentences emphasized}

ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP:
23. In view of the aforesaid proposition of law, reverting back to the instant matter, first things first, insofar as the plea by the learned counsel for the petitioner/tenant that the deceased respondent/landlady was not the owner of the premises is concerned, it is not only misconceived but also does not hold any water. Indeed the tenancy was created by the HUF M/s. Roop Rani Mehra Bal Kishan Dass through its Karta, but at the same time it has been categorically stated on affidavit by the respondent/landlady that after the death of her husband, the right, title or interests in the property in question devolved upon her by way of �Relinquishment Deed� dated 12.05.2011, executed by the remaining legal heirs in her favour. Learned Trial Court rightly observed that there was no evidence to suggest that the HUF business continued after the death of the original Karta i.e., the husband of the respondent/landlady. A bare perusal of the averments made in the eviction petition supported by an affidavit of the respondent/landlady would show that each of the three sons besides their children have been engaged into different kinds of business, occupation or profession. There was never any HUF business as such in existence. Assuming for the sake of convenience that the letters dated 18.05.2011 and 17.02.2012 were written at the behest of deceased respondent/landlady raising an inference that HUF was in existence and thenceforth her son Sh. Anil Mehra would continue to receive rent as a Karta, and/or for that matter mere fact that rent was received vide printed copy of the receipt dated 17.02.2012 showing the title at the top of the HUF, are not conclusive materials to demolish the entire edifice of the case of the respondent/landlady that she was not the owner of the premises in question and thereby inter alia having right or the entitlement to demand, receive or collect rent from the petitioner/tenant. Therefore, there is no legal flaw in the decision by the learned ARC that there exists relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties.
BONAFIDE REQUIREMENT
24. It is well ordained in law that in order to succeed in a petition for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, the landlord/landlady is required to show:-
(a) That the premises is bonafidely required either for himself/herself or any of his/her family members;
(b) That the landlord/landlady and /or any of the family members has no other reasonable suitable accommodation available.
25. Needless to state that both the conditions are to be satisfied conjointly. It is also well settled that the bonafide requirement must be shown to exist in praesenti and must be manifested in actual need and not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. Without further ado, coming to the issue of spelling out bonafide requirement for more accommodation by the respondent/landlady, it is evident that the respondent/landlady was having and rather has left behind a large family consisting of three sons, one daughter, seven grand-sons and one grand-daughter. There is no merit in the plea that artificial scarcity of accommodation was created by the respondent/landlady merely because two shops on the ground floor, bearing Nos. 818-819, Katra Neel, Chandani Chowk Delhi were transferred in favour of Smt. Neha Bahal/daughter-in-law, wife of grandson Sh. Vineet Mehra, way back on 16.07.2008, and/or if the said shops ultimately came to be sold by Smt. Neha Bahal. The window shops bearing Nos. 817/2 and 817/3 were sold by Smt. Neha Bahal in favour of Sh. Devraj Kapoor and Sh. Ghanshyam Dass, who were in occupation as a well tenants in shop Nos. 818 and 819, Katra Neel, Chandani Chowk, Delhi.
26. The respondent/landlady stated that the said decision was made under compelling circumstances due to some family disputes with her grand-daughter-in-law. Be that as it may, the said transfer had been affected much prior to the filing of the eviction petition which was evidently instituted on 26.04.2013. We need to constantly remind ourselves that we are living in a world which is changing by the fraction of minutes and equations in the family situations are no exceptions. It is inconceivable that the respondent/landlady thought of creating artificial scarcity of accommodation five years prior to the institution of the eviction petition.
27. This Court finds that the respondent/landlady in the eviction petition has made a full and fair disclosure of existing accommodation available with her and her family members and by the very nature of the averments, has successfully established that she had a genuine and bonafide requirement of more accommodation for the commercial needs of her one or the other family members. She categorically spelled out that property No. 501, Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk, Delhi was exclusively in possession of her grand-son Sh. Vineet Mehra, who has been running his business of share and stocks.
28. Further, the respondent/landlady in her eviction petition categorically brought out that she was in possession of four shops out of eight shops in property No. 817, besides specifically stating that the property No. 817 was divided into five shops and two almirahs with the depth of around 1� feet, which were not regular shops as such. She categorically brought out that one of the shops was a toilet turned into store measuring 2.5’x4′ which was being used for storage for stocks of clothes by her son Sh. Sunil Mehra. A mere bald assertion that whether or not the fifth shop which was in the nature of two almirahs and not regular shops with the depth of 1.5′ and one shop is a toilet turned and store, is a triable issue, does not cut much ice.
29. Much mileage was sought to be taken from the fact that during the pendency of the present revision petition, one more shop has come to the possession of the landlady consequent to compromise affected in RC Revision No. 389/2018 titled �Savita Kapoor Family Trust vs. Roop Rani Mehra (now deceased)� on 26.07.2019. It is not the case that the said shop in property No. 817 has been let out, parted with or assigned in favour of any third person. Evidently, it is in the use and occupation of the family members of the deceased landlady. It is also brought on an affidavit dated 10.12.2015 by Sh. Sunil Kumar, son of the deceased respondent landlady, has also in the reply dated 24.09.2019 to the CM APPL. No. 36519/2019 moved on behalf of the petitioner/tenant that the said shop would be utilized by Sh. Sharad Mehra s/o Sh. Sunil Mehra who has completed his MBA. It is but obvious that when her son Sh. Sunil Mehra is well entrenched into the garment business, it would be more beneficial for him commercially so as to accommodate his customers. There is no material on the record brought by the petitioner/tenant that two shops behind shop Nos. 812 and 813, Katra Neel, Chandani Chowk, Delhi are in a possession of landlady and/or in possession, use or occupation by any of her sons and grand-sons. Insofar as shop No. 812 is concerned, the position was explained that it was a wooden khokha with tin roof, in the occupation of a tenant and not suitable for occupation by her and her sons to run their business or trade.
30. Further, there is no iota of material on record to bring out that there are two shops or halls on the first floor or that the same has been put to any commercial use. There is a categorical averment by the respondent/landlady that she has been residing on the first floor and there is no challenge to the aspect that the access to the floor is from the rear portion, making it perhaps unviable to be used for commercial purposes. The aforesaid aspect rather fortifies the averment by the landlady that out of five shops in property No. 817, one of the shop was occupied by Savita Kapoor Family Trust. At the cost of repetition, there has been full and frank disclosure that shop Nos. 817/8 was got vacated from the another tenant Sh. Vijay Kumar and the landlady accommodated her son Sh. Rahul Mehra in the said shop. The landlady clearly spelled out that her son Sh. Sunil Mehra was facing insurmountable problems in running business of selling ladies suit from the said almirahs, which cannot be faulted on any grounds.

31. Before parting with this revision petition, it may also be stated that in terms of directions of this Court in order dated 30.11.2015, at the time of admission of instant revision petition, a direction was issued to the three sons of the deceased respondent/landlady to file their respective affidavits about extent of accommodation available with them and whether or not they are owning and/or in possession of any other commercial accommodation. In compliance thereof, each of the three sons of deceased respondent/landlady filed their respective affidavits and it is categorically brought out by each one of them that except of the properties in question belonging to their mother in terms of Relinquishment Deed dated 12.05.2011, none of them owns and/or is in possession any other commercial accommodation. The affidavit of Sh. Satish Kumar Mehra dated 10.12.2015 clearly spells out that he does not own any commercial or residential properties and more accommodation is required for his children, so as to run their business in a more commercially viable manner. Likewise, Sh. Anil Mehra also filed an affidavit dated 10.12.2015 deposing that neither he nor his wife are owners of any other commercial and residential accommodation and same is the deposition of Sh. Sunil Mehra, the third son of the respondent landlady in his affidavit dated 10.12.2015.
32. Insofar as the issue that is racked up with regard to property No. 820, it is a matter of record that the shop under tenancy of petitioner herein i.e., Mr. Jagjit Singh Bhatia, is required for the son of Sh. Anil Mehra and grandson Sh. Sumit Mehra as per their reply dated 24.09.2019 supported by an affidavit. Lastly, insofar as the bald assertion of the petitioner/tenant that the LRs of deceased respondent/landlady are occupying adjoining Shop No. 817 and have created a new tenancy in favour of M/s. R.M. Creations, is categorically refuted in the reply filed on behalf of the three sons of the deceased respondent/landlady and it is categorically stated that the same is in possession of grandson, namely Sh. Sharad Mehra of the deceased respondent/landlady.
33. In view of the foregoing discussions, this court finds no illegality, perversity or incorrect approach adopted by the learned ARC in holding that the petitioner/tenant has made bald assertions about the respondent/landlady having more suitable accommodation and/or her need being fanciful or moonshine without proving availability of reasonable suitable accommodation with the landlady and her family members. Although, the landlady has since expired, the need of the family members for more accommodation is writ large and it is upon her legal heirs to decide as to how they wish to use and occupy the four shops in question. It is does not lie in mouth of the petitioner/tenant to dictate terms to the landlady or to her family members after her death, as to how they should be using the tenancy shops. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the landlady has established her bonafide requirement for more accommodation for commercial needs of her family members. Accordingly, the present revision is a bereft of any merits.
34. Before finally drawing down the curtains in the instant revision petition, there is left an issue as to the payment of user and occupation charges during the pendency of this revision petition. It is borne out from the record that this Court vide order dated 22.07.2016 had directed the petitioner/tenant to pay user and occupation charges at market rate @ Rs. 45,000/- per month from the date of eviction order till further orders.
35. In the interregnum, an application has been moved on 21.03.2022 for enhancement of such charges in terms of the decision in Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. v. Federal Motors Pvt. Ltd.12, @ Rs. 92,880/-. The tenancy shop in question is admittedly measuring 8�x18� sq. ft. and the market rent of such premises, which was initially considered @ Rs. 450 per sq. ft. must have escalated by now. Taking a reasonable assumption that the market rent would be about Rs. 600 per sq. ft. given the dominantly commercial area in question, it is directed that the petitioner/tenant shall pay user and occupation charges @ of Rs. 60,000/- per month w.e.f. the date of application i.e., 21.03.2022 till the vacation of the property in question.
36. The revision petition is accordingly dismissed. The petitioner/tenant shall remain bound to make payment of user and occupation charges @ Rs. 60,000/- per month to the LRs of deceased respondent/landlady within six months from today. The petitioner/tenant shall vacate the premises within six months from today in terms of Section 14 (7) of the DRC Act. All pending applications are disposed of accordingly.

DHARMESH SHARMA, J.
JANUARY 10, 2024/sp
1 Section 25-B (8) – No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made by the Controller in accordance with the procedure specified in this section:
Provided that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller under this section is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit.
2 DRC Act
3 ARC
4 Respondent/landlady, also the petitioner in the eviction petition
5 Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) and Hindu Joint Family have been used interchangeably.
6 (2001) 5 SCC 705
7 2014 (141) DRJ 203
8 AIR 1986 SC 1753
9 AIR 1963 SC 468
10 (2014) 15 SCC 610
11 (2022) 6 SCC 30
12 2005 (1) SCC 705
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