UMESH CHANDRA SINGH vs UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of order: 24th April, 2024
+ REVIEW PET. 172/2024 in W.P.(C) 14754/2023
UMESH CHANDRA SINGH ….. Petitioner
Through: Mr.Murari Tiwari, Mr.Rahul Kumar, Ms.Nimisha Gupta and Ms.Kavita Saini, Advocates
versus

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ….. Respondents
Through: Mr.Farman Ali, Ms.Usha Jamnal and Mr.Krishan Kumar, Advocates for R- 1
Mr.Chetan Sharma ASG with Mr.Adarsh Tripathi, Mr.Amit Gupta, Mr.Vinay Yadav, Mr.Saurabh Tripathi, Mr.Vikram Singh Baid and Mr.Ajitesh Garg, Advocates for NTPC/R-2 and 3
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE CHANDRA DHARI SINGH

ORDER

CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J (Oral)
CM APPL. 23530/2024 (Exemption)
Exemption allowed subject to just exceptions.
The application stands disposed of.
CM APPL. 23531/2024 (Delay)
1. This is an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for condonation of delay in filing the review petition.
2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents vehemently opposed the instant application.
3. Heard and perused the contents of the application.
4. For the sufficient cause being shown in the application, the delay of 100 days in filing the review petition is condoned.
5. The application is disposed of.
REVIEW PET. 172/2024
1. The instant review petition under Order XLVII Rule 1 read with Sections 114 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has been filed on behalf of petitioner seeking the following reliefs:-
“I. Review the Order dated 22.11.2023 passed in W. P. (C) No. 14754 of 2023 titled as “Umesh Chandra Singh vs Union of India & Ors.”
II. Award cost of litigations in favour of the Petitioner and against respondents No. 2 and 3; and
III. Pass any order or such further orders/directions as this Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper in the interest of justice.”

2. The petitioner had filed the captioned writ petition challenging the transfer of the petitioner vide order dated 8th February, 2023, passed by the respondent no.3, by virtue of which, the petitioner was transferred to a non-scientific post.
3. In the said judgment, this Court had passed the judgment dated 22nd November, 2023 (‘impugned judgment’ hereinafter), thereby, dismissing the petition, being devoid of any merit.
4. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has filed the instant review petition.
5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner submitted that despite recording the contentions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, specifically in paragraph 26 of the order/judgment dated 22nd November, 2023, the same has not been considered appropriately while deciding the captioned writ petition.
6. It is submitted that this Court erred in not appreciating that the respondent no. 2 and 3 have been transferring the petitioner to non-commensurate work without providing explanation for the same, therefore, the acts committed by the respondent require judicial intervention as the same are done with malafide intention.
7. It is submitted that this Court erred in relying upon the misconstrued, selective and untenable reading of clause 8 & 9 of the standard terms and conditions of appointment, where the correct interpretation of the said clauses would make it clear that change in the post of the petitioner is outside the mandate of clause 8 of the said terms and conditions.
8. It is submitted that this Court erred in not taking into consideration the violations made by the respondents as per their free will and under the garb of the ‘discretion’ granted to them in transferring its employees, the respondents misused the powers conferred to them.
9. It is further submitted that this Court erred in considering or dealing with the crucial submissions made by the petitioner and therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside under the review jurisdiction of this Court.
10. Per Contra, Mr. Chetan Sharma learned ASG appearing on behalf of respondents No.2 and 3 vehemently opposed the instant review petition submitting to the effect that the same is not maintainable as the petitioner has repeated the earlier grounds already adjudicated upon by this Court in the captioned petition.
11. In support of his arguments, he has placed a list of litigations which reflects that there have been 9 rounds of litigations by the petitioner and therefore, the learned ASG submitted that the present review petition is gross abuse of the process of law.
12. It is submitted that the grounds taken by the petitioner cannot be taken at the stage of review, rather the same can be done by filing an appeal against the impugned judgment.
13. Hence, in view of the foregoing submissions, it is prayed that the instant review petition, being devoid of any merit, is liable to be dismissed with costs.
14. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.
15. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment, it is made out that this Court had passed the judgment after taking the material facts as well as the settled law into consideration. Furthermore, this Court had categorically held that the transfer order as challenged by the petitioner does not suffer from any illegality and therefore, cannot be set aside by this Court under its writ jurisdiction.
16. Therefore, the limited question for adjudication before this Court is whether the impugned judgment warrants review of this Court or not.
17. Before coming to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, this Court deems it imperative to deal with the question of scope of review of its own judgment.
18. It is a well settled principle that the power of review is exercised in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the record and in such an event the order or judgment can be corrected. A Court cannot act as an appellate Court for its own judgments, nor can it allow the petitions for review based only on the claim that one of the parties believes the judgment proven bane for them. If the matters that the Court has already adjudicated upon could be reopened and reheard, the same would be detrimental to the public interest.
19. As reiterated by this Court time and again, the powers of review has been carved out by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a catena of judgments, whereby, the Hon’ble Court laid down the essential principles qua review.
20. In Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, (2013) 8 SCC 320, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the position regarding the same and held as under:
14. Review of the earlier order cannot be done unless the court is satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in a miscarriage of justice. This Court in Col. Avtar Singh Sekhon v. Union of India held as under: (SCC p. 566, para 12)
“12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in a miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib this Court observed: (SCC p. 675, para 1)
1. A review of a judgment is a serious step and a reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality.”
15. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error. This Court in Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devil held as under: (SCC pp. 718-19, paras 7-9)
“7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P, this Court opined: (AIR p. 1377, para 11)
“11. What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an “error apparent on the face of the record”. The fact that on the earlier occasion, the court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order Itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an “error apparent on the face of the record”, for there is a distinction which is real, though It might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterized as vitiated by “error apparent”. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error.
8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury while quoting with approval a passage from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v Aribam Pishak Sharmail this Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC
9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alla if there is a mistake or an error apparent onk the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be ‘reheard and corrected’. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be ‘an appeal in disguise.”
(emphasis in original)
16. Error contemplated under the Rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. The power of review can be exercised for the correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. This Court, in Lilv Thomas v. Union of Indiaia held as under: (SCC pp. 250-53. paras 54, 56 & 58)
“54. Article 137 empowers this Court to review its judgments subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court Rules made in exercise of the powers under Article 145 of the Constitution prescribe that in civil cases, review lies on any of the grounds specified in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides:
1. Application for review of judgment.- (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved-
(a) by decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small
Causes,
and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order.’
Under Order 40 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules no review the except on the grounds of error apparent on the face of the record in criminal cases. Order 40 Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules provides that after an application for review has been disposed of no further application shall be entertained in the same matter.
56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute desling with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised. However, this Court in exercise of its powers under Artide 136 or Artide 32 of the Constitution and upon satisfaction that the earlier Judgments have resulted in deprivation of fundamental rights of a citizen or rights created under any other statute, can take notwithstanding the earlier judgment different view
58. Otherwise also no ground as envisaged under Order 40 of the Supreme Court Rules read with Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been pleaded in the review petition or canvassed before us during the arguments for the purposes of reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal casell, It is not the case of the petitioners that they have discovered any new and important matter which after the exercise of due diligence was not within their knowledge or could not be brought to the notice of the Court at the time of passing of the judgment. All pleas raised before us were in fact addressed ed for and on behalf of the petitioners before the Bench which, after considering those pleas, passed the judgment in Saria Mudgal case. We have also not found any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record requiring a review. Error contemplated under the rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. No such error has been pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the parties seeking review of the judgment. The only arguments advanced were that the Judgment interpreting Section 494 amounted nted to violation of some of the fundamental rights. No other sufficient cause has been shown for reviewing the judgment. The words ‘any other sufficient reason appeaning in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC must mean ‘a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule’ as was held in Chhajju Ram v. Nekill and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Mast Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius E??? apparent on the face of the proceedings is an error which is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In 7.C. Basappa v T. Nagappa, this Court held that such error is an error which is patent error and not a mere wrong decision. In Mari Vishnu Kamath Ahmad Ishaque, it was held: (AIR p. 244, para 23)
‘23…. [1]t is essential that it should be something more than a mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. The real difficulty with reference to this matter, however, is not so much in the statement of the principle as in its application to the facts of a particular case. When does an error cease to be mere error, and become an error apparent on the face of the record? The learned counsel on either side were unable to suggest a clear-cut rule by which the boundary between the two classes of errors could be demarcated.
Mr Pathak for the first respondent contended on the strength of certain observations of Chagla, C.J. in-Batuk K. Vyas v. Surat Borough Municipality, that no error could be said to be apparent on the face of the record if it was not self-evident and if it required an examination or argument to establish it. This test might afford a satisfactory basis for decision in the majority of cases. But there must be cases in which even this test might break down, because judicial opinions also differ, and an error that might be considered by one Judge as self-evident might not be so considered by another. The fact is that what is an error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of each case.’
Therefore, it can safely be held that the petitioners have not made out any case within the meaning of Article 137 read with Order 40 of the Supreme Court Rules and Order 47 Rule 1 CPC for reviewing the judgment in Saria Mudgal case. The petition is misconceived and bereft of any substance.”
17. In a review petition, it is not open to the Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. Conclusion arrived at on appreciation of evidence cannot be assailed in a review petition uniess it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. This Court in Kerala SEB v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. held as under: (SCC p. 656, para 10)
10. In a review petition it is not open to this Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. The learned counsel for the Board at best sought to impress us that the correspondence exchanged between the parties did not support the conclusion reached by this Court. We are afraid such a submission cannot be permitted to be advanced in a review petition. The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court. If on appreciation of the evidence produced, the court records a finding of fact and reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. It has not been contended before us that there is any error apparent on the face of the record. To permit the review petitioner to argue on a question of appreciation of evidence would amount to converting a review petition into an appeal in disguise.”
18. Review is not rehearing of an original matter. The power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. This Court in Jain Studios Ltd. v. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd., held as under: (SCC pp. 504-505, paras 11-12)

11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned, the learned counsel for the opponent is right in submitting that virtually the applicant seeks the same relief which had been sought at the time of arguing the main matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer had been refused, no review petition would lie which would convert rehearing of the original matter. It is settled law that the power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. It is not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. The power of review can be exercised with extreme care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases.
12. When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the applicant herein had been made at the time when the arbitration petition was heard and was rejected, the same relief cannot be sought by an indirect method by filing a review petition. Such petition, in my opinion, is in the nature of ‘second innings’ which is impermissible and unwarranted and cannot be granted.”
19. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction.
Summary of the principles
20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
(iii) Any other sufficient reason.

The words “any other sufficient reason” have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd.

20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.

21. Upon perusal of the above cited paragraphs, it is crystal clear that while dealing with the issue of review of their own judgment, the Court cannot set aside the same until and unless there is an error apparent on the face of record.
22. Perusal of paragraph 20.2 of the above said judgment also makes it evident that the review of its own judgment cannot be permissible only if one of the parties to the dispute is dissatisfied with the reasoning provided by the Court in the judgment impugned.
23. With regards to the fact of the instant case, the petitioner has argued that despite recording the contention raised by the petitioner in paragraph no. 26, this Court has failed to adjudicate the same. The said paragraph and the subsequent paragraphs are reproduced hereinbelow:-
“… 26. Another contention strenuously urged and labored upon by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Transfer Order is in violation of Clause 7 of the Job Rotation Policy dated 30″ September 2017, which categorically excludes Scientists at NETRA from provisions of job rotation, due to their specialized qualifications and skills. Clause 7 provides a list of various functions which are excluded from job rotation and despite the said stipulation, vide the impugned order NTPC has erroneously excluded the petitioner from deriving benefit under the said Policy, on the ground that petitioner has been working at E5 level…”
27. In rival contentions, it has been submitted on behalf of the respondents that there has been no violation of any fundamental or legal rights of the petitioner and that he has been transferred as per the settled law and service rules of NTPC. Furthermore, the issue of transferability of the petitioner in the background of him being a Scientist has already attained finality in view of the orders passed by the Courts in the previous round of litigations between the parties.
28. It has been further contended that the petitioner’s initial order of transfer to Bihar was unsuccessfully challenged by him in a writ petition bearing W.P.(C) no.738/2016. LPA as well as the SLP against the said order were dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court and also by the Hon?ble Supreme Court, respectively. Writ Petition seeking direction for being transferred to NETRA in view of the Job Rotation Policy dated 30th September 2017, was dismissed vide order dated 22nd October 2018. In writ petition W.P. (C) no. 1289/2019, the petitioner again sought directions to be transferred to NETRA and the grounds raised covered the aspect that petitioner being a Scientist could not have been transferred. This said petition was also dismissed by order dated 6th February 2020, and the Contempt Petition alleging violation of the said order was dismissed as withdrawn. In view of these orders, it is not open to the petitioner to assail the impugned order on the same grounds, yet again. Moreover, the plea of the petitioner was also decided again in LPA bearing LPA no. 139/2021, wherein, the Division Bench of this Court dismissed the appeal of the petitioner since it found the same to be meritless, thereby, holding that no employee has a vested right to be posted at a particular place.

24. Upon perusal of the above, the said contention of non-adjudication of the submissions recorded at paragraph 26 of the impugned award is wrong as the subsequent paragraphs of the impugned judgment, i.e. paragraph nos. 27 and 28 clearly explains the reasons for non-acceptance of the said contention of the petitioner.
25. In the said paragraphs, this Court had duly noted that the issue regarding his transferability has already been dealt with by this Court in another petition bearing no. 1289/2019, therefore, the said contention did not warrant deliberation from this Court as the issue had already been settled earlier.
26. Therefore, this Court does not find any force in the contentions made by the petitioner in this regard.
27. Now, coming to the other contentions raised by the petitioner, i.e. non-appreciation of the settled position of law regarding interference with the transfer orders impugned by the petitioner in the captioned petition.
28. With regard to the same, this Court is of the opinion that the arguments and contentions advanced by him clearly seem to be the grounds for appeal and the said contentions cannot be entertained under the review jurisdiction of this Court.
29. In Sanjay Kumar Agarwal v. State Tax Officer, (2024) 2 SCC 362, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the principles regarding the review of a judgment and drew a distinction with the grounds of appeal. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced herein:
8. Before adverting to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, let us regurgitate the well-settled law on the scope of review as contemplated in Order 47 of the Supreme Court Rules read with Order 47 CPC.
9. In the words of Krishna Iyer J., (as his Lordship then was) “a plea of review, unless the first judicial view is manifestly distorted, is like asking for the Moon. A forensic defeat cannot be avenged by an invitation to have a second look, hopeful of discovery of flaws and reversal of result. A review in the counsel’s mentation cannot repair the verdict once given. So, the law laid down must rest in peace.”
10. ?It is also well-settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so.®
11. ?In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, this Court made very pivotal observations : (SCC p. 719, para 9)
“9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”.”
12. Again, in Shanti Conductors (P) Ltd. v. Assam SEB, a three-Judge Bench of this Court following Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi dismissed the review petitions holding that the scope of review is limited and under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided.
13. ?Recently, in Shri Ram Sahu v. Vinod Kumar Rawat, this Court restated the law with regard to the scope of review under Section 114 read with Order 47 CPC.
14. In Arun Dev Upadhyaya v. Integrated Sales Service Ltd. 12 , this Court reiterated the law and held thal: (SCC p. 21, para 35) “35. From the above, it is evident that a power to review cannot
be exercised as an appellate power and has to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.”
15. It is very pertinent to note that recently the Constitution Bench in Beghar Foundation v. K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar Review-5 J.), held that even the change in law or subsequent decision/judgment of coordinate Bench or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review.
16. The gist of the aforestated decisions is that:
16.1. A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record.
16.2. A judgment pronounced by the court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so.
16.3. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record justifying the court to exercise its power of review.
16.4. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”.
16.5. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”.?
16.7. An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.
16.8. Even the change in law or subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review.

30. The perusal of the above said paragraphs make it evident that the position of law regarding the limited scope of review of a judgment has been reiterated by the Constitutional Courts of this country time and again, where, the parties are not permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions already addressed and decided in the original petition.
31. This Court is of the considered view that the petitioner by way of the present review petition seems to repeat his old and overruled arguments which is not enough to re-open a concluded case. There is neither any discovery of new evidence nor there is any error apparent on the face of the record. The factual errors as contended on behalf of the petitioner are also absent and any argument thereto is baseless.
32. Furthermore, even if it is presumed that there is any error in the impugned judgment, the same cannot be considered hereunder given the limited scope of intervention imposed upon this Court under its review jurisdiction and in light of the settled law, review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.
33. The present review petition is an appeal in disguise, whereby, the petitioner is attempting to make out a case for rehearing of the issues raised by him in the captioned writ petition which already stands decided and therefore, the present review petition is liable to be dismissed.
34. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the view that a detailed judgment was passed on 22nd November, 2023 after considering the contentions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as pleadings of the parties and therefore, the same does not invite interference of this Court under its review jurisdiction.
35. Accordingly, the instant review petition stands dismissed along with pending applications, if any.
36. The order be uploaded on the website forthwith.

CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J
APRIL 24, 2024
dy/av/ryp
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