SATYAPAL SINGH vs PRESIDING OFFICER P.O.L.C.& ANR.

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of order: 13th October, 2023
+ W.P.(C) 6862/2002
SATYAPAL SINGH ….. Petitioner
Through: Appearance not given

versus

PRESIDING OFFICER P.O.L.C.& ANR. ….. Respondents
Through: None
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE CHANDRA DHARI SINGH

ORDER

CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J (Oral)
CM APPL. 20146/2019 (Condonation of delay in filing the restoration application)

1. The instant application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, has been filed on behalf of the petitioner/applicant seeking condonation of delay of 1880 days in filing the accompanying restoration application.
2. The captioned writ petition was filed against the impugned order dated 4th April 2001, passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court No. V, Room No. 54, Karkardooma Court, Delhi, whereby, the respondent has held that 17 workmen failed to prove that they had completed 240 days or more in the service of the management in one calendar year immediately preceding the date of their termination and hence, they are not entitled for any relief.
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant/petitioner submitted that the instant application has been filed seeking condonation of delay of 1880 days in filing the accompanying restoration application.
4. It is submitted that the captioned writ petition bearing W.P(C) no. 6862/2002 was dismissed in default vide order dated 27th November 2013.
5. It is submitted that the applicant came to know regarding the said dismissal order only when he received the copy of the order from the registry of this Court by way of applying for a certified copy.
6. It is submitted that in the instant circumstance, the petition was dismissed in default and the same is the fault of the petitioner’s earlier counsel who had failed to appear before this Court diligently and also failed to inform the applicant/petitioner regarding his non-appearance or any other update.
7. It is submitted that the applicant/petitioner could not connect with the previous counsel since his contact details and even the office address of the said counsel got changed, and the petitioner was unaware about the same.
8. It is submitted that as soon as the petitioner came to the knowledge that the petition has been dismissed for default, he immediately approached this Court seeking the relief of restoration.
9. Hence, in view of the foregoing submissions, the petitioner seeks that the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the application seeking restoration of the petition to its original stage and number be allowed.
10. Heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and perused the material available on record.
11. To condone the delay of 1880 days in filing the application seeking restoration of the petition, it is imperative to discuss the nature of the said delay, and whether such delay can be condoned based on the grounds raised by the petitioner.
12. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter “Act”) provides for extension of prescribed period for filing an application under any provision except Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, thereby, giving powers to the Court to admit such application by condoning the delay after the prescribed period of limitation, and the said power is to be exercised if “sufficient cause” has been shown thereto.
13. The aforesaid provision makes it clear that the phrase “sufficient cause” is a necessary condition for the extension of the prescribed period under the Act. Therefore, the petitioner/applicant needs to satisfy this Court that there is “sufficient cause” for delay in not preferring the petition/application within the prescribed time.
14. The term “sufficient cause” as per the provision has been interpreted by different Courts and it is well settled that the question as to what constitutes sufficient delay cannot be rigid, rather the same is to be decided by the courts on facts and circumstances of each case.
15. In the instant application, the petitioner has urged that the previous counsel of the petitioner had failed to appear before this Court and had also failed to inform the petitioner regarding his non-appearance. It has been submitted that the petitioner could not contact the previous counsel due to the change in his contact details and the change in the office address. The same led to the miscommunication about the status of the instant writ petition ultimately leading to the dismissal of the matter due to non-appearance.
16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, observed what constitutes as “sufficient grounds”. The relevant portion in extracted as under:
“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose…”

17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basawaraj (Supra) held that while establishing “sufficient cause” for delay in filing, the parties to the matter should not have acted in a negligent manner or remained inactive. The parties must satisfy the Court that it was the sufficient cause so pleaded that prevented them from perusing their case.
18. Hence, from the foregoing discussions it is evident that the Court cannot condone a delay unless there are sufficient reasons provided by the parties that are bonafide and do not constitute inaction or negligence on behalf of either party.
19. It is a settled principle of the law of limitation, that it may have a negative impact on a specific party to the case, however, it must be applied with meticulousness when the Statute so provides. The statute of limitations cannot be extended on equitable grounds by the court.
20. Adverting to the matter in hand, the instant application has been filed seeking condonation of delay in filing the application seeking restoration of the petition, which was dismissed vide order dated 27th November 2013, on the ground of non appearance of the parties. The relevant portion of the said order is reproduced as under:
“No one appears for the parties.

Writ petition is dismissed in default.”

21. Upon, a bare perusal of the above mentioned order, the casual approach of the parties as well as their lack of action and negligence in pursuing the case altogether is evident and apparent on the face of the record. As per the settled principles of law, the Court can only condone a delay if there is a “sufficient cause” behind such delay. Non-appearance of the parties after moving several early hearing applications constitutes behavior that can only be termed as lax and negligent.
22. Even though the petitioner claims to have no knowledge of the dismissal of the said petition due to the non-appearance, the petitioner failed to file the application seeking restoration on time and chose to do so only after the lapse of 6 years, as per his own convenience which tantamount to a huge delay on his part. The said situation can only be termed as non-seriousness of the petitioner and the other party cannot be left to suffer and desolated.
23. Therefore, this Court cannot accept the reasons provided for delay in filing the application seeking restoration of the petition when it is evident that there was dereliction of duty by the petitioner to comply with the orders of this Court on earlier occasions as well. Thus, the averments made in the application qua the delay of 1880 days cannot be classified as a reasonable delay in any manner.
24. Therefore, in light of the above facts and circumstances and application of law, this Court does not find any merit in the instant application as the petitioner has failed to satisfy that there exists sufficient cause for delay in filing the application seeking restoration, a condition necessary for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Act.
25. In view of the foregoing discussions, this Court does not find cogent reasons to condone the inordinate delay of 1880 days in filing the application seeking restoration of the petition
26. Accordingly, the instant application, being devoid of any merit, stands dismissed.
CM APPL. 20145/2019 (Restoration)
1. The instant application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has been filed on behalf of the petitioner/applicant seeking restoration of the captioned writ petition.
2. In terms of the order of even date passed in CM APPL. 20146/2019, it is held that since the application seeking condonation of delay stands dismissed, the application seeking restoration of the petition also stands dismissed.
3. The order be uploaded on the website forthwith.

CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J
OCTOBER 13, 2023
gs/ryp

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CM APPL. 20146/2019 & CM APPL. 20145/2019 in W.P.(C) 6862/2002 Page 1 of 7