ROHIT SINGH RATHORE & ORS. vs UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Judgment delivered on: February 05, 2024

+ W.P.(C) 7476/2023 & CM APPL. 65445/2023

ROHIT SINGH RATHORE & ORS.
….. Petitioners
Through: Mr. Vivek Sheel, Adv.

versus

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
….. Respondents
Through: Mr. Anshuman, Sr. PC with
Mr. Rahul K. Sharma, GP for UOI with Mr. Mrinal Upadhyay,
Dy. Commandant (ITBP)
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE V. KAMESWAR RAO
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SAURABH BANERJEE
J U D G M E N T
V. KAMESWAR RAO, J
1. The present petition has been filed by 44 petitioners, who are serving personnel of the Indo Tibetan Border Police (‘ITBP’, for short)/respondents, with the following prayers:-
“It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that your Lordships may graciously be pleased to issue directions or writ more than one in nature including Certiorari and Mandamus against the Respondent and that:-
(i) This Hon’ble Court may graciously be pleased to quash and set aside impugned order I.2101/28/2022 (E-13229)/Estt-2298 dated 24.02.2023 as unconstitutional and ultra vires the ITBP Act & Rules; and
(ii) This Hon’ble Court may further be pleased to quash and set aside order No. I-21017/28/Afghanistan/ 2022/ Estt-8701-99 dated 27.02.2023 and direct the Respondents to draw a fresh list of empanelled personnel on the basis of Standing Order No. 04/2017 as it stood prior to amendment dated 24.02.2023.”

2. It is the case of the petitioners and as contended by Mr. Vivek Sheel, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners that the petitioners are in common aggrieved with administrative actions of the respondents which have caused the petitioners injustice, as they are being placed below their juniors in the selection panel for deputation at Indian Mission in Afghanistan. It is further his case that the impugned actions of the respondents are in defiance of their own standing orders, policies and settled principles of administrative law. He has also submitted that the petitioner No. 1 has been duly authorized to pursue the present petition on behalf of all the other petitioners.
3. He further submits that ITBP is primarily a border guarding force. It is entrusted with the task to provide security cover to Indian Embassy & Consular missions in Afghanistan. For the aforesaid purpose, ITBP prepares a panel of its best serving personnel across the ranks of Constable, Head Constable, Subordinate officers and Officers, for their deployment to the Indian Missions Abroad, (‘IMA’, for short), Afghanistan. In order to streamline the process of selection of ITBP troops for security of IMA at Afghanistan on deputation basis and deployment with UN Mission etc., ITBP had issued a Standing Order No. 04/2017 (‘SO-I’, for short) dated June 07, 2017, laying down the eligibility and other terms of selection. The said SO-I, is the standing policy document, which exhaustively lays down the eligibility criteria, process of selection of personnel, their induction and de-induction from the selected panel of personnel.
4. He submits that the respondent No. 2/ Director-General, ITBP, has also issued ‘General Guidelines for Posting/Transfer of ITBP Personnel’ in the form of a Standing order No. 02/2020 (‘SO-II’), dated October 15, 2020. In terms of SO-II, the ITBP formations are classified as ‘Soft Areas’ (‘SA’, for short), Hard Areas (‘HA’, for short) and Extreme Hard Areas (‘EHA’, for short). As per the aforesaid guidelines, the transfer & posting of ITBP personnel are based on exigencies of service and done by software based system and as such, a force personnel cannot pick and chose as to where he has to be posted and the same is a matter of administrative decision of the respondents. However, an exception has been made in terms of para 05 (d) of the transfer policy, whereby personnel hailing from, Ladakh and North East regions, are given preference in posting in their respective regions.
5. He submits that on July 11, 2022, ITBP had issued an e-mail signal calling for ‘nominations of willing and eligible’ ITBP personnel for preparation of panel for deputation to Indian Mission at Afghanistan in accordance with the SO-I. Therefore, applications from eligible Inspector (GD), Head Constable (GD) & other trades, Constable (GD) & other trades, were invited and the last date was fixed as July 25, 2022.
6. It is his case that in response to the aforesaid opportunity, the petitioners applied against their respective positions. Out of hundreds of applications, a total of 936 eligible ITBP personnel, the applicants across various ranks & trades, were shortlisted by the respondents. In accordance with SO-I, the shortlisted personnel were detailed for 02 weeks ‘Pre-selection’ training at Basic Training Centre (‘BTC’, for short) at Bhanu (Panchkula), from November 09, 2022 to December 14, 2022 in two batches. Upon completion of the aforesaid ‘Pre-Section Training’, the BTC administration conducted a ‘Pre-selection Final Test’ and sent the final result to the respondent No. 3/ Deputy Inspector General –Establishment, Directorate General, ITBP, in accordance with e-mail dated November 02, 2022 issued by DIG (Trg.), Dte. General, ITBP.
7. He also submits that the ‘Pre-Selection Training’ and the final result were completed by December 14, 2022. The ‘Consolidated Result/Bard Proceeding’ of the final test was also prepared by December 14, 2022, being the last day of training & final test. However, the respondents did not release the final select list or panel, immediately, but kept the outcome pending from December 14, 2022 onwards.
8. It is his case that as per respondents’ own policy i.e., SO-I, the order of merit amongst the selected personnel after final the test had to be fixed as per their seniority. Hence, the panel of the selected candidates ought to have been prepared in order of seniority of service in accordance with their present rank.
9. His primary grievance is, as the selection criteria was in public domain in the form of SO-I, the petitioners were hopeful of securing high order in the final merit after being declared successful in the ‘pre-selection test’ held at BTC, Bhanu. However, the respondent No. 2 through a highly irrational and arbitrary administrative action issued the impugned amendment dated February 24, 2023, by which the ‘criteria’ of order of selection was changed from ‘Seniority’ to ‘longest period of stay in EHA / HA in entire service’.
10. He submits that within three days of amendment of the provisions of SO-I, the respondents issued the impugned order dated February 27, 2023, with selection list containing the names of 570 personnel, in accordance with the ‘amended’ criteria of ‘seniority of tenure’, spent in EHA/HA in determining inter-se order of precedence in the selection panel. The petitioners were also shocked to notice that in the impugned select list, their names were figured below their juniors. It is his case that the impugned list has been drawn in a non-transparent manner and even the names of the personnel who have been stated to have spent their tenure in EHA and HA, were not disclosed in the select list.
11. He further submits that the petitioners are aggrieved by midway change of criteria in order of their selection and the resultant change in order of selection reflected in the impugned list dated February 27, 2023. The petitioners have also represented against the impugned amendment dated February 24, 2023 and the order of select panel dated February 27, 2023, inasmuch as, a representation dated March 01, 2023 was also submitted to the respondent No. 2 through a proper channel for redressal of grievances. However, till date, that representation has not been adjudicated upon.
12. It is his case that on May 12, 2023, the respondents issued an office order cum e-mail signal and approved deployment of 79 personnel for mission abroad in Afghanistan in accordance with the order of seniority reflected in the impugned select panel dated February 27, 2023. The 79 personnel were ordered to be imparted a 08 weeks Pre-Induction Training at ITBP Central Training College, Alwar. Moreover, the respondents have also issued directions for commencement of training w.e.f. May 29, 2023 for the aforesaid 79 personnel at CTC, Alwar.
13. It is also the case of Mr. Sheel that due to the impugned amendment, double benefits have been granted to the personnel of Ladakh and North-East region, as on one hand, ITBP transfer policy ensures home area posting to the aforesaid personnel and on the other hand, the said personnel also get seniority for ‘staying a longer tenure at EHA / HA. Thus, in this manner, the impugned amendment dated February 24, 2023 creates injustice rather than alleviating the same.
14. On law, it is the submission of Mr. Sheel that the impugned amendment is unconstitutional for the reason that by amendment of para 1 of SO-I, Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution, gets violated, as it unreasonably differentiates between force personnel who have no role to play in their posting in EHA & HA. Apart from this, he submits that the impugned amendment is also bad in law for the following reasons:-
i. It creates a bigger mischief rather than addressing one and has no nexus to any alleviating factor for any ‘disadvantage’ suffered by the personnel having longer tenure at EHA & HA postings;
ii. It operates by making a sub-class of ITBP personnel with greater EHA & HA tenure within a class of selected personnel who already have mandatory length of EHA & HA service;
iii. It is also colourable inasmuch as the notion of seniority in its plain grammatical meaning embodies only length of service in present rank. Moreover, if the impugned notification/amendment dated February 24, 2023, which is an ‘executive instruction’, is allowed to operate in the manner it operates, the same would violate Rules 7, 8 and 9 of the ITBP Rules 1994, besides other provisions of ITBP Act & Rules in general;
iv. The impugned determinative factor of longer stay in EHA/HA locations is not a fair criteria, inasmuch as, the personnel hailing from Leh-Ladakh & North–East are granted posting in the same regions as per the ITBP policy contained in SO-II and earlier policy documents. Thus, the amended rule is lopsided in favour of such personnel. Moreover, the EHA / HA posting is not a matter of choice for the petitioners as rotational transfer is done randomly by ‘software’ used by ITBP. Hence, the amended criteria to fix inter se seniority amongst the selected panelists on specific tenures at EHA/HA, is unknown to law;
v. It is a settled law that the rules of the game cannot be changed after the commencement of the game. In the present case, the ITBP having invited nominations/application from the petitioners for selection process on July 11, 2022 with closing date of July 25, 2022 and thereafter conducting the ‘Pre-Selection Tests’ from November 09, 2022 to December 14, 2022 cannot at a much later stage, amend the selection criteria on February 24, 2023. The impugned amendment takes away the fairness and impartiality from the selection process. The vacancies for deputation having arose much before in time i.e., in July 2022, than the impugned amending order dated February 24, 2023, and as such the same cannot be filled in accordance with the amended rules. The action of the respondents, thus, unlawfully confers ‘retrospective application’ to the amended rules and on this score alone, the impugned select panel is liable to be quashed;
vi. Due to the impugned amendment, which is done after conducting the final selection test and preparation of results, the petitioners have been placed below the personnel who are junior to them. The seniority for the purpose of empanelment has been assigned a different meaning and the respondents have brought incoherence to their own policy, inasmuch as, the Clauses (iii) and (iv) of the amended para 1(C), are in direct conflict with each other. Moreover, because of the aforesaid acts of arbitrarily amending the rules of selection and determination of seniority in the select panel for deputation to Afghanistan, the petitioners are facing injustice and humiliation for being placed below their juniors. The petitioners would have secured deputation in the first batch of deputationists but due to the last minute and post selection amendment dated February 24, 2023, the personnel junior to the petitioners have been ranked above them.
15. It is also his submission that the respondents have failed to follow even the amended criteria in letter & sprit inasmuch as the ‘seniority’ of the petitioners in terms of clause (iv) para 1(C) of the SO-I, pertaining to the present rank, has been ignored by the respondents.
16. He submits that the columns of the impugned list dated February 27, 2023 do not disclose the tenure in EHA & HA of the respective candidates on the basis of which the respondents have arranged the order of selection of the candidates. The petitioners are also unaware about the tenures of other personnel in the list and it would have been in the interest of transparency, if the list had divulged the tenure of the candidates in EHA / HA as the data related to tenure is neither personal nor classified in nature and as such non-revelation of the same, points towards suppression of material information from the candidates.
17. He submits that the amendment notification is also devoid of any consultative process undertaken by the respondent No. 2 with the MHA/respondent No. 1.
18. On the other hand, at the outset, it has been submitted by Mr. Anshuman, Sr. PC, appearing on behalf of the respondents that the petitioners have not approached this Court with clean hands, inasmuch as, in the present petition, the petitioners have mentioned that “the vacancies for deputation arose much before in time in July, 2022, than the impugned amending order dated 24.02.2023 cannot be filed in accordance with the amended Rules”, whereas, there is no such vacancy list, which has been drawn by the respondents as the respondents only maintains a list of eligible personnel.
19. He submits that ITBP/respondent Force, is at liberty to device its own mechanism, yardsticks, criteria etc., for sending personnel on deputation for deployment in sensitive and high risk duties like deployment in Afghanistan.
20. It is his case that the petitioners are primarily aggrieved by the amendment notification dated February 24, 2023 by stating that the rules of the game cannot be changed after the commencement of the game, whereas, the principles governing ‘changing the rules of the game’ shall have no applicability, specially, when the change is with respect to selection process but not the qualification or eligibility. In other words, after shortlisting of the eligible candidates, the rules may not be changed disqualifying a person to participate in the selection process. (Ref: State of U.P. v. Karunesh Kumar, 2022 SCC Online SC 1706).
21. He further submits that due to change in political and security scenario in Afghanistan, the Embassy of India and 4 Consulates, have been shut down and as such, ITBP had to pull back its deployment. Thereafter, the mission was re-established as ‘Technical Mission of India’, at Kabul, (Afghanistan) in the year 2022. As a result, 79 personnel of ITBP were sent on deputation to serve the Technical Mission in Afghanistan. As the replacement of the personnel had to be done in a phased manner, it was incumbent upon ITBP to provide their substitutes / reliever in July, 2023, failing which unimaginable consequences were in the offing.
22. It is his submission that in order to replace the troops, the ‘Pre-Selection Test’ was conducted as per SO-I. A total of 570 applicants/ candidates were shortlisted for the final selection. He submits that mere shortlisting does not confer any indefeasible right upon the petitioners for the said deputation, and at most, it only confers a right to be considered for deputation.
23. He further submits that during the visit of the respondent No.2 to forward areas, the troops present therein had raised a genuine grievance that those who have served a longer tenure in EHA and HA should be given priority in deputation to ‘Technical Mission of India’ at Kabul (Afghanistan) and also in similar kinds of deputation(s). There was another equitable and noble logic for prioritising the personnel served in EHA and HA for the Technical Mission i.e., to boost the morale of the troops serving in EHA and HA and to motivate the personnel serving in SA / HA to serve in EHA with more enthusiasm. Therefore, it is only after considering the abovementioned aspects, the SO-I was amended, which is, very much in accordance with equity and fair play.
24. It is his submission that the impugned list dated February 27, 2023, is nowhere arbitrary or infringes any legitimate expectation or rights, much less any fundamental rights of the petitioners. Moreover, the petitioners have no legitimate right or expectation for deputation as the impugned list can generate nothing more than anticipation. It is a trite law that writ petitions cannot be filed on anticipation and apprehension. The induction and the de-induction process have already been initiated and 23 personnel have also been inducted in the Technical Mission and the remaining personnel will be inducted shortly.
25. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Karunesh Kumar (supra) to submit that the principle governing ‘changing the rules of the game’ would not have any applicability, when the change is with respect to selection process but not the qualification or eligibility. He has also relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of Dharam Singh v. Director General, Indo Tibetan Border Police and Anr., W.P.(C) No. 1501/2016 decided on July 12, 2016, to submit that it is a settled law, if there is a change of policy, the same has to be considered by the Court at the time of deciding the case and specially when it relates to a foreign posting of a Force personnel to perform security duties. Similarly, reliance has also been placed on the judgment of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in the case of Mohan Singh & ors. v. Union of India and Ors., W.P.(C) 2871/2011 decided on August 09, 2011 to contend the same.
26. It is his submission that the petitioners have suppressed the material fact that the competent authority has also issued a corrigendum order to SO-I vide Order No. 2298, dated February 24, 2023. The aforementioned corrigendum dated February 24, 2023, has sought to boost the morale of the personnel who have maximum postings in extremely harsh conditions, inclement weather and in the line of fire of the enemy, naxals, insurgents etc. by giving them preference over the personnel who were having comparatively cozy postings like the petitioners herein.
27. He further submits that the ‘Pre-Selection Process’ was not the final selection and it only sought to shortlist the eligible candidates. Moreover, the process of shortlisting does not confer any legitimate right, much less legitimate expectation of deputation on the petitioners. The deputation, specially, deputation for such duties, that too from a Central Armed Police Force, like the respondent force cannot be claimed as a matter of right as to depute or not, is the sole prerogative of concerned Force.
28. It is his case that it cannot be said that the actions of the respondents are bereft of transparency, inasmuch as, the last Head Constable (GD) in the impugned list, who underwent the ‘Pre-Induction Training’, has served 151 months in EHA and HA in his entire service. Whereas, the petitioner No.13, who has the maximum tenure of EHA and HA, in his rank, amongst the petitioners, has served only 119 months in EHA and HA. As regards the last Constable (GD) in the impugned list, who underwent the ‘Pre-Induction Training’, has served 143 months in EHA and HA in his entire service and whereas, petitioner No.43 who has the maximum tenure of EHA and HA, in his rank, amongst the petitioners, has served only 139 months in EHA and HA. Thus, there is no cherry picking done by the respondents.
29. He has highlighted the fact that the petitioners have approached this Court whilst their representation was pending consideration before the respondents. However, the said representation has now stands disposed of, by issuance of speaking order No.581, dated June 14, 2023. Moreover, the petitioner No.1 has also been given the personal audience of the respondent No.3, on June 09, 2023, and has also been explained the objects and reasons of the impugned amendment / corrigendum. He submits that the ‘Pre-Induction Training’ of the personnel who have finally been selected for the said mission got commenced on May 29, 2023 and has also been completed and any delay or hiatus in the deployment of troops would lead to irreparable and grave consequences.
30. It is his submission that more than 50% of the deployment of ITBP is in Ladakh and North-East. These areas are characterized by rugged snowbound mountains, inclement weather, treacherous mountain passes and rarefied air. The physical build and conditions of the local population are better suited and adapted to survive in such conditions and hence, they are better options, when it comes to posting in such places. By no stretch of imagination, it can be reckoned as a home posting for them, as these are the operational areas and they remain deployed along the borders, far away from their home. Moreover, this type of policy also brings respite to others who are not domiciled in such places.
31. He submits that giving preference to personnel who have remained in EHA and HA does not tantamount to the creation of a sub-class within a class, as alleged by the petitioners. Giving preference to such personnel is only a yardstick, along with seniority, for sending troops on deputation to ‘Technical Mission of India’ at Kabul (Afghanistan). The ITBP adopts various yardsticks for deputation to various departments. For example, in deputation to CBI, NCRB, IB etc., preference is given to personnel who are of “Low Medical Category” and the same would not mean that personnel who are medically fit are at liberty to make a claim that they are not being given a level playing field. The petitioners’ claim regarding their postings, being similar to this example, deserves to be discarded at the threshold. Moreover, the impugned amendment, even if tested on the touchstone of “intelligible differentia”, shall come out with flying colours.
32. It is his submission that it has been wrongly stated by the petitioners that the vacancy for deputation had arisen in July, 2022 as the same had arisen only in July, 2023, when the troops, presently deployed in Technical Mission, had completed their tenure and were due for repatriation. He also submits that it is wrong to aver that the accrued rights of the petitioners have been infringed by the retrospective operation of the impugned amendment as the petitioners have no such accrued right for deputation and the only right, they have is, the right to be considered for the deputation and the same has not been violated.
33. So, on the basis of the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Anshuman, has prayed for the dismissal of the present petition.
34. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, at the outset, we may state here that this writ petition was disposed of by this Court vide order dated May 26, 2023, wherein in paragraphs 7 to 9, the following has been stated:-
“7. Learned counsel accepts notice on behalf of the respondents and submits that the impugned amendment order dated 24.02.2023 will be applicable on future candidates and with regard to the petitioners in question, the list will be prepared strictly in terms of SO 4/2017.

8. In view of aforesaid submission made on behalf of the respondents, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the present petition can be disposed of directing to prepare a fresh list strictly in terms of SO 4/2017.
9. Petition is disposed of with direction to consider the petitioner’s case in terms of SO 4/2017.”

35. A review petition was filed by the respondents herein. The same was dismissed by this Court on July 21, 2023. The respondents had filed an SLP(C) Nos.22790-22791/2023, before the Supreme Court, which was finally decided by the Supreme Court on December 01, 2023, wherein the Supreme Court has passed the following order:-
“1. Leave granted.

2. Union of India and ITBP Authorities have challenged the order dated 26.05.2023 whereby the High Court of Delhi disposed of the Writ Petition filed by the respondents on the basis of statement made by counsel for the Union of India to the effect that the amended order dated 24.02.2023 will be applicable to future candidates and so far as the private respondents are concerned, the list for deployment of the personnel to the Indian Mission Afghanistan shall be prepared strictly in terms of S.O. No.04/2017.

3. The appellants also assail the order dated 21.07.2023 whereby their Review Petition has been dismissed by the High Court.

4. The primary contention is that the statement made by the counsel for the Union of India before the High Court on 26.05.2023 was a bona fide mistake and a Review Petition was filed without any delay inter alia pointing out that such a statement was made due to communication gap.

5. Since, we do not have the advantage of a reasoned order from the High Court, learned senior counsel for the private respondents has no objection if the impugned orders passed by the High Court are set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court to decide the same on merits at the earliest.

6. In this view of the matter, the appeals are allowed in part. The impugned orders dated 26.05.2023 and 21.07.2023 passed by the High Court are set aside; Writ Petition (Civil) No. 7476 of 2023 is restored to its original number and file before the High Court. The parties are directed to appear before the High Court on 18.12.2023. Having regard to the nature of urgency, the High Court is requested to decide the Writ Petition expeditiously.

7. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.”
36. Pursuant to the order of the Supreme Court, as stated above, we have heard the counsel for the parties. The issue which arises for consideration is whether the corrigendum dated February 24, 2023, issued pursuant to SO-I, is unconstitutional and ultra vires to the ITBP Act and Rules. Also, whether the consequential relief as sought by the petitioners that on quashing of the corrigendum dated February 24, 2023 can the respondents be directed to draw a fresh list of empanelled personnel on the basis of SO-I, as it stood prior to amendment dated February 24, 2023, should be granted to them.
37. At the outset, we may state here that SO-I, primarily relates to selection of ITBP Troops for security of Indian Missions abroad (Afghanistan) on deputation basis and deployment with FPU on UN Mission (D.R. Congo). The standing order insofar as the eligibility is concerned, states as under:

38. The submission of Mr. Sheel, primarily is that the fact the applications having been invited on July 11, 2022, based on the standing order as existed on that date, i.e., SO-I and which had the stipulation that the selection of eligible candidates will be based on seniority and the same having been amended in terms of the corrigendum dated February 24, 2023 i.e., just three days before the issuance of the impugned list containing the names of the selected personnel to be sent on deputation to the Technical Mission in Afghanistan, would have the effect of changing the rules of the game midstream, specially, once the process of selection had already been initiated and as such, the impugned amendment/corrigendum is bad in law.
39. Whereas the case of the respondents, as noted from above is, that the corrigendum was issued with an objective to boost the morale of the personnel, who have maximum posting in extremely harsh conditions, inclement weather and in the line of fire of the enemy, naxals, insurgents, etc. by giving them preference over the personnel, who were having comparatively cozy postings and also to motivate the personnel serving in SA / HA to serve in EHA with more enthusiasm. Moreover, it has been stated that the effect of the corrigendum is though that the selection of the personnel shall be based on seniority, however, on selection, the personnel having longest period of experience in EHA / HA, in their entire service, shall be sponsored/given preference.
40. Suffice to state though, the plea as raised by Mr. Sheel that the issuance of the corrigendum, just three days before the issuance of the impugned list, amounts to change in the rules of the game after the game has commenced, is appealing on a first blush, but considering the fact that the reason for which the personnel are sent on deputation for a specific purpose, i.e., to man the Indian Mission abroad in a place like Afghanistan, wherein, the weather conditions/topography are extremely harsh, adding such a stipulation in the corrigendum, only justifies the object which is sought to be achieved by the respondents.
41. It is stated that the purpose for issuing the corrigendum has also been justified by Mr. Anshuman, by submitting that during the visit of the respondent No.2 to forward areas, the troops present therein had raised a grievance that those who have served a longer tenure in EHA/HA, should be given priority in deputation to ‘Technical Mission of India’ at Kabul (Afghanistan) and as such, their grievance was also considered by the respondents by issuing the impugned corrigendum.
42. It is also stated that it is not a case of the petitioners that by issuance of impugned corrigendum dated February 24, 2023, they have been ousted altogether from the zone of consideration. In fact, we have been told that the names of the petitioners find mention in the list issued on February 27, 2023 and surely, they can be sent on deputation to Afghanistan as and when their turn would come.
43. It is also the plea of Mr. Sheel that the tenure of deputation being for two years and there being a list consisting of around 441 personnel, it is highly unlikely, that the petitioners herein would get an opportunity to go on deputation. We are afraid that such a plea would not warrant quashing the corrigendum, specially, when the ITBP has issued it with specific objective sought to be achieved as per its requirements, i.e., to give preferences to those personnel, who have much more experience of being posted in EHA / HA for manning the technical mission in Afghanistan. In any case, the petitioners must endeavour to gain experience in EHA / HA so that they may also get preference for being posted on deputation to ‘Technical Mission of India’ at Kabul (Afghanistan).
44. Another submission which has been canvassed by Mr. Anshuman is that due to change in political and security scenario in Afghanistan in 2022, the Embassy of India and 4 consulates have been shut down. Consequently, the respondents’ Force had to pull back its employees and as such the requirement of personnel to be sent on deputation in Afghanistan has also been reduced.
45. Now, coming to the plea of Mr. Sheel of the rules of the game have been changed in the midstream, the said principle may not be applicable in the facts of this case, when a larger public interest is sought to be served by the respondents by sending those personnel on deputation to Afghanistan, who have an experience of being deployed in EHA / HA like Leh, Ladhak and North-East, from the perspective of weather conditions / topography in Afghanistan.
46. Additionally, we may state here, that SO-I, though stipulate that personnel in order to be eligible for being deputed to Indian Mission in Afghanistan, must have minimum three years of service in EHA / HA, but, the said stipulation did not give preference to the personnel, who may have put in more service in EHA / HA, resulting in personnel meeting the eligibility criteria of having minimum three years of service in EHA/HA and having the seniority, getting selected, as against those, who may have more years of service in EHA / HA.
47. In other words, by way of the amendment/corrigendum, the preference is sought to be given to those personnel, who have more necessary service in EHA / HA. In this regard, we may refer to the paragraph 28 above, wherein the respondents have stated that as against personnel (petitioner No.13 herein) having served 119 months in EHA / HA, preference has been given to a personnel who has served 151 months in EHA / HA. Similarly, as against a personnel i.e., (petitioner No. 43, who has the highest number of experience amongst the petitioners, having served 139 months in EHA/HA), a personnel having 143 months of experience in EHA/HA, who is also the last selected Constable (GD) in the impugned list, has been given preference. Therefore, we do not see any illegality in the impugned action of issuing the corrigendum by the respondents, more so, as it has rightly been pointed out by Mr. Anshuman, that the deputation cannot be sought as a matter of right.
48. In any case, the impugned corrigendum does not completely exclude the consideration of petitioners for deputation. Moreover, when a larger public interest is involved, the same must give way to personal/individual interest. In this regard, a reference could be made to the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority v. Shakuntla Education & Welfare Society, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 655, wherein, in paragraphs 59, 60, 61, 62, 63 and 65, it has been held as under:-
“59. The law with regard to interference in the policy decision of the State is by now very well crystalized. This Court in the case of Essar Steel Limited v. Union of India had an occasion to consider the scope of interference in the policy decision of the State. After referring to various decisions of this Court, the Court observed thus:
“43. Before we can examine the validity of the impugned policy decision dated 6-3-2007, it is crucial to understand the extent of the power vested with this Court to review policy decisions.
44. In DDA [DDA v. Allottee of SFS Flats, (2008) 2 SCC 672 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 684] on issue of judicial review of policy decisions, the power of the Court is examined and observed as under : (SCC pp. 697-98, paras 64-65)
“64. An executive order termed as a policy decision is not beyond the pale of judicial review. Whereas the superior courts may not interfere with the nitty-gritty of the policy, or substitute one by the other but it will not be correct to contend that the court shall lay its judicial hands off, when a plea is raised that the impugned decision is a policy decision. Interference therewith on the part of the superior court would not be without jurisdiction as it is subject to judicial review.
65. Broadly, a policy decision is subject to judicial review on the following grounds:
(a) if it is unconstitutional; (b) if it is dehors the provisions of the Act and the Regulations;
(c) if the delegatee has acted beyond its power of delegation;
(d) if the executive policy is contrary to the statutory or a larger policy.”
45. Thus, we will test the impugned policy on the above grounds to determine whether it warrants our interference under Article 136 or not. Further, this Court neither has the jurisdiction nor the competence to judge the viability of such policy decisions of the Government in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. In Arun Kumar Agrawal v. Union of India [Arun Kumar Agrawal v. Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 1], this Court has further held as under : (SCC p. 17, para 41)
“41. … This Court sitting in the jurisdiction cannot sit in judgment over the commercial or business decision taken by parties to the agreement, after evaluating and assessing its monetary and financial implications, unless the decision is in clear violation of any statutory provisions or perverse or taken for extraneous considerations or improper motives. States and its instrumentalities can enter into various contracts which may involve complex economic factors. State or the State undertaking being a party to a contract, have to make various decisions which they deem just and proper. There is always an element of risk in such decisions, ultimately it may turn out to be a correct decision or a wrong one. But if the decision is taken bona fide and in public interest, the mere fact that decision has ultimately proved to be wrong, that itself is not a ground to hold that the decision was mala fide or taken with ulterior motives.”
(emphasis supplied)
46. In Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India [Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India, (2009) 7 SCC 561], it was held as under : (SCC p. 605, para 169)
“169. It is neither within the domain of the courts nor the scope of judicial review to embark upon an enquiry as to whether a particular public policy is wise or whether better public policy can be evolved. Nor are the courts inclined to strike down a policy at the behest of a petitioner merely because it has been urged that a different policy would have been fairer or wiser or more scientific or more logical. Wisdom and advisability of economic policy are ordinarily not amenable to judicial review. In matters relating to economic issues the Government has, while taking a decision, right to “trial and error” as long as both trial and error are bona fide and within the limits of the authority. For testing the correctness of a policy, the appropriate forum is Parliament and not the courts.”
(emphasis supplied)
47. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India [Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC 664] cautioned against courts sitting in appeal against policy decisions. It was held as under : (SCC p. 763, para 234)
“234. In respect of public projects and policies which are initiated by the Government the courts should not become an approval authority. Normally such decisions are taken by the Government after due care and consideration. In a democracy welfare of the people at large, and not merely of a small section of the society, has to be the concern of a responsible Government. If a considered policy decision has been taken, which is not in conflict with any law or is not mala fide, it will not be in public interest to require the court to go into and investigate those areas which are the function of the executive. For any project which is approved after due deliberation the court should refrain from being asked to review the decision just because a petitioner in filing a PIL alleges that such a decision should not have been taken because an opposite view against the undertaking of the project, which view may have been considered by the Government, is possible. When two or more options or views are possible and after considering them the Government takes a policy decision it is then not the function of the court to go into the matter afresh and, in a way, sit in appeal over such a policy decision.”
(emphasis supplied)
48. A similar sentiment was echoed by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. v. RBI [Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. v. RBI, (1992) 2 SCC 343], wherein it was observed as under : (SCC p. 375, para 31)
“31. … Courts are not to interfere with economic policy which is the function of experts. It is not the function of the courts to sit in judgment over matters of economic policy and it must necessarily be left to the expert bodies. In such matters even experts can seriously and doubtlessly differ. Courts cannot be expected to decide them without even the aid of experts.”
49. A perusal of the abovementioned judgments of this Court would show that this Court should exercise great caution and restraint when confronted with matters related to the policy regarding commercial matters of the country. Executive policies are usually enacted after much deliberation by the Government. Therefore, it would not be appropriate for this Court to question the wisdom of the same, unless it is demonstrated by the aggrieved persons that the said policy has been enacted in an arbitrary, unreasonable or mala fide manner, or that it offends the provisions of the Constitution of India.”
60. It is trite law that an interference with the policy decision would not be warranted unless it is found that the policy decision is palpably arbitrary, mala fide, irrational or violative of the statutory provisions. We are therefore of the considered view that the High Court was also not right in interfering with the policy decision of the State Government, which is in the larger public interest.
61. It will also be apposite to refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of APM Terminals B.V. v. Union of India9:
“67. It has been the consistent view of this Court that a change in policy by the Government can have an overriding effect over private treaties between the Government and a private party, if the same was in the general public interest and provided such change in policy was guided by reason. Several decisions have been cited by the parties in this regard in the context of preventing private monopolisation of port activities to an extent where such private player would assume a dominant position which would enable them to control not only the berthing of ships but the tariff for use of the port facilities.”
62. It could thus be seen that it is more than settled that a change in policy by the Government can have an overriding effect over private treaties between the Government and a private party, if the same was in the general public interest. The additional requirement is that such change in policy is required to be guided by reason.
63. Insofar as the reliance placed by the respondents on the judgment of this Court in the case of ITC Limited (supra) is concerned, in our considered view, the said judgment would not be of any assistance to the case of the respondents. This Court in the said case in paragraph 107.1 has clearly observed that in the case of conflict between public interest and personal interest, public interest should prevail.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
65. We have hereinabove elaborately discussed that when a policy is changed by the State, which is in the general public interest, such policy would prevail over the individual rights/interests. In that view of the matter, we do not find it necessary to refer to the said judgments. The policy of the State Government as reflected in the said G.O. was not only in the larger public interest but also in the interest of the respondents.”
(emphasis supplied)

49. That apart, we must note that in the case in hand, what has been sought to be included in the criteria of selection process is the component of the preference to be given to personnel having longest period of stay in EHA/HA. The same does not have any effect on the eligibility of the petitioners for being considered for deputation. In fact, as stated above, the names of the petitioners are also in the list prepared by the respondents for sending the personnel on deputation to Afghanistan.
50. A reference in this regard could also be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Karunesh Kumar (supra), wherein, in paragraph 32, the lordships while referring to the judgment in the case of K Manjusree v. State of A.P., (2008) 3 SCC 512, has stated as under:-
“32. The respondents have also placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of K. Manjusree (supra). However, in our considered view, the facts of the aforesaid decision are quite different from the present case. A change was introduced for the first time after the entire process was over, based on the decision made by the Full Court qua the cut off. Secondly, it is not as if the private respondents were nonsuited from participating in the recruitment process. The principle governing changing the rules of game would not have any application when the change is with respect to selection process but not the qualification or eligibility. In other words, after the advertisement is made followed by an application by a candidate with further progress, a rule cannot be brought in, disqualifying him to participate in the selection process. It is only in such cases, the principle aforesaid will have an application or else it will hamper the power of the employer to recruit a person suitable for a job.”
(emphasis supplied)

51. We have also seen the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sivanandan C.T. v. High Court of Kerala, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 994, which has been relied upon by Mr. Sheel. The said judgment primarily related to the appointments of District and Sessions Judges in the Kerala State Higher Judicial Services by direct recruitment. The plea of the petitioner therein was that on 30 September 2015, a notification was issued by the High Court of Kerala by which applications were invited from qualified candidates for appointment as District and Sessions Judges in the Kerala State Higher Judicial Services by direct recruitment from the Bar. The Paragraph 5 of the notification provided for the mode of selection. It stipulated that the selection would be on the basis of a competitive examination consisting of a written examination and a viva-voce. The total marks assigned for the written examination were 300 comprising of two papers, each carrying maximum of 150 marks. General candidates and candidates belonging to the OBC category who secure 50% and the SC/ST candidates who secure 40% aggregate minimum marks for both the written papers together were to be declared as qualified for the viva-voce. The maximum marks prescribed for the viva-voce were fifty. Paragraph 5 also stipulated that “the merit list of successful candidates will be prepared on the basis of the total marks obtained in the written examination and viva voce. The written test was conducted on March 12 and 13, 2016. On December 17, 2016, the notification regarding candidates who had qualified in the written test came to be published. Following this, between January 16 and 24, 2017, the viva-voce for all the qualified candidates was conducted. On February 27, 2017, after the viva-voce was conducted, the Administrative Committee of the High Court passed a resolution by which it decided to apply the same minimum cut-off marks which were prescribed for the written examination as a qualifying criterion in the viva-voce. In coming to this conclusion, the Administrative Committee was of the view that since appointments were being made to the Higher Judicial Service, it was necessary to select candidates with a requisite personality and knowledge which could be ensured by prescribing a cut-off for the viva-voce in terms similar to the cut-off which was prescribed for the written examination. On March 6, 2017, the Full Court of the High Court of Kerala approved the resolution of the Administrative Committee. The final merit list of the successful candidates was also published on the same day.
52. In the above stated facts and circumstance, the Supreme Court in paragraph 14, held as under:-
“14. The decision of the High Court to prescribe a cut-off for the viva-voce examination was taken by the Administrative Committee on 27 February 2017 after the viva-voce was conducted between 16 and 24 January 2017. The process which has been adopted by the High Court suffers from several infirmities. Firstly, the decision of the High Court was contrary to Rule 2(c)(iii) which stipulated that the merit list would be drawn up on the basis of the marks obtained in the aggregate in the written examination and the viva-voce; secondly, the scheme which was notified by the High Court on 13 December 2012 clearly specified that there would be no cut off marks in respect of the viva-voce; thirdly, the notification of the High Court dated 30 September 2015 clarified that the process of short listing which would be carried out would be only on the basis of the length of practice of the members of the Bar, should the number of candidates be unduly large; and fourthly, the decision to prescribe cut off marks for the viva-voce was taken much after the viva-voce tests were conducted in the month of January 2017.”

53. Suffice to state that from the above, it is clear that the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case has held that the prescribing cut off of marks for the viva-voce was in violation of the statutory rules concerned therein, which was being Rule 2(c)(iii) of the Kerala State Higher Judicial Services Special Rules, 1961. Whereas, in the case in hand, we are not concerned with statutory rules but standing orders which have been issued by the respondents. In that case, the decision of the High Court to prescribe a cut off for viva-voce examination after the same was conducted, was held to be contrary to the rules concerned therein. However, it is not such a case here and in fact, it is the case of the petitioners only that the standing orders are in the nature of executive instructions and the impugned corrigendum was issued before the impugned list was finalized. The only plea of Mr. Sheel qua this is, that the impugned corrigendum of February 24, 2023, even though an executive instruction, violates rules 7, 8 and 9 of the ITBP Rules. The said rules are reproduced as under for ready reference:-
“7. Constitution of the Force.-(1) The Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force shall consist of :
(a) Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force (Regular)
(b) Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force (Auxiliary)
(2) Officers, subordinate officers and enrolled persons appointed to or enrolled into the Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force (Regular) shall be liable for continuous service for the term mentioned in their enrolment form, letter of appointment or in the rules made in this behalf.
(3) Officers, subordinate officers and enrolled person appointed to or enrolled into the Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force (Auxiliary) shall serve as and when they are called out for service by the Director General with the consent of the Central Government or for training under the orders of the Director General.
8. The task of the Force and Command and Control thereto.-(l) For the purpose of sub-section (1) of section 4, the Force shall :
(i) safeguard the security of borders of India and promote sense of security among the people living in border areas;
(ii) prevent trans-border crimes, smuggling, unauthorised entry into or exit from the territory of India .and any other illegal activity;
(iii) provide security to sensitive installations, banks, persons of security risk;
(iv) restore and preserve order in any area in the event of disturbance therein.
(2) In discharging the functions under sub-rule (1), the responsibility for the command, discipline, administration, morale and training shall,
(a) in the case of Additional Director-General extend to all battalions; units, headquarters, establishments and Force Personnel placed under him and within the area that may be assigned to him;
(b) in the case of Inspector-General extend to all battalions, units, headquarters, establishments and the Force Personnel placed under him and withil1 the area that may be assigned to him ;
(c) in the case of Deputy Inspector General and Additional Deputy Inspector General extend to battalions, units and other personnel placed under him and within the area that may be assigned to him
(d) in the case of Commandant extend to the battalion or unit placed under him and within the area assigned to him.
(3) During hostilities, the Inspector General, the Deputy Inspector General, Additional Deputy Inspector General and the Commandant shall discharge such functions as may De assigned by their respective superiors.
(4) The command, discipline, administration, morale and training of battalion, units and establishment not placed under an Additional Deputy Inspector General, Deputy Inspector General or an Inspector General shall be carried. out by such officers and in such manner as may be laid down by the Director General from time to time.
(5) Any member of the Force shall be liable to perform any duties in connection with the task pf the Force mentioned in rule 8(1), the administration, discipline, training and welfare of the Force and such other duties as he may be called upon to perform in accordance with any law for the time being in force. Any order given in this behalf by a superior officer shall be a lawful command for the purpose of the Act.
9. Command.- (l) An officer appointed to command shall have the power of command over all officers and men, irrespective of seniority placed under his command.
(2) (a) In the contingency of an officer being unable to exercise the command, to which he has been appointed, due to any reason, the command shall devolve on the second-ill-command, if one has been so appointed.
(b) If no second-in-command has been appointed, it shall devolve on the officer who may be appointed to officiate by the immediate superior of the officer unable to exercise command.
(c) If no such officer has been so appointed, command shall devolve on the senior most officer present.
(d) The inability of an officer to exercise command and its assumption by any other officer in accordance with this sub-rule shall be immediately reported to the next higher authority by the officer who has assumed such command.
(3) If persons belonging to different units are working together :
(i) in regard to the specific task on which they are engaged, the officer appointed to command or in his absence the senior most officer present shall exercise command over all such persons,
ii) in all other matters the senior officer belonging to each unit shall exercise command over persons belonging to his unit.
(4) When officers and other persons belonging to the Force are taken prisoner by an enemy the existing relations of superior and subordinate and the duty of obedience shall remain unaltered and any person guilty of indiscipline or insubordination in this behalf shall, After his release, be liable for punishment.
(5) Subject to the provisions of the Act, discip1innry powers over a person subject to the Act shall be exercised by the Officer not below the rank of Commandant of the battalion or unit to which such a person belongs or the officer on whom command has devolved in accordance with sub-rule (2).
(6) Where such a person is doing detachment duty, including attendance at a course of instruction an officer not below the rank of Commandant of the unit, centre or establishment with which he is doing such duty shall also have all the disciplinary powers of a Commandant.
(7) The Director-General the Additional Director General, the Inspector General, the Deputy Inspector General and the Additional Deputy Inspector General may specify one or more officers of the staff who shall exercise the powers of the Commandant respectively in respect (of persons belonging to or doing detachment duty at his Headquarters.
(8) The Director General may also specify officers who shall exercise the disciplinary powers of an Inspector General, and Deputy Inspector General or Additional Deputy Inspector General respectively in respect of persons belonging to or doing detachment duty at his Headquarters.
(9) An Inspector General may specify an officer who shall exercise the disciplinary powers of a Deputy Inspector General or Additional Deputy Inspector General in respect of persons belonging to or doing detachment duty at his Headquarters Explanation.-In sub-rules (1), (2) and (3) word “officer” shall include a subordinate officer and an under officer.”

54. We find there is nothing in the aforementioned Rules which shows that the impugned corrigendum dated February 24, 2023, violates any of the above Rules as contended by Mr. Sheel. In fact, we are of the view that the petitioners cannot argue that the stipulation / impugned corrigendum providing a personnel having longest period of stay in EHA/HA to be sent on deputation as against such personnel having lesser period of stay in EHA/HA, is bad in law. In fact, perusal of the said stipulation would clearly reveal that the same also contemplates that personnel having special achievements like Gallantry Medals, summiteers, winner of gold/silver/bronze medals in the National Games/ International Sports, personnel having multi-talent such as knowledge of driving, technical knowhow like plumbing, electrical, cooking, computer, motor mechanic, painting, etc. may also be given preference by the unit/concerned formation commanders while recommending/forwarding nominations. So, in that sense, seniority was not the sole criteria for the unit / concerned formation commanders for recommending personnel for deputation. Thus, such a stipulation, in fact, gives discretion to the authority concerned to give preference to personnel having certain qualities/talent for sending them on deputation overlooking the criteria of seniority for selection.
55. Suffice to state, in the Civil Appeal No(s) 2634/2013, Tej Prakash Pathak & Ors. v. Rajasthan High Court & Ors., the Supreme Court vide its order dated March 20, 2013, by noting the fact that the judgment in the case of State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha and Ors., MANU/SC/0400/1973, does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the Supreme Court in K Manjusree (supra) and as such the principle of ‘rules of the game’ in the context of whether such a principle should be applied in the context of the ‘rules of the game’ stipulating the procedure for selection, has directed the listing of the Civil Appeal viz. Tej Prakash Pathak & Ors. (supra) before the Larger Bench. The appeal has been listed before the Constitution Bench consisting of Five Hon’ble Judges and the same has been reserved for the judgment.
56. Even otherwise, the judgment in the case of K Manjusree (supra) has no applicability in a case where the court is concerned only with deputation and not with substantive rights of a personnel such as appointment/promotion. If the concept of deputation is understood in the facts of this case, it is in the context of temporary posting/deployment of personnel outside their cadre, where on completion of the posting/deployment, they shall be required to come back to join their original post. Hence, unlike the facts in the case of K Manjusree (supra), where the challenge was basically to the impugned action of the concerned High Court of changing the rules of the selection criteria to the post of District and Sessions Judge substantially by amending the rules after the selection process had been initiated, thereby affecting the substantive right of appointment of the candidates selected therein. In other words, the very appointment of the petitioners in K Manjusree (supra) was affected due to change in the selection criteria and such is not a case here.
57. It is also a settled law that deputation is not a matter of right. A reference could be placed on the judgment of the coordinate bench of this Court in the case of Kamlesh Kumar Jha v. Directorate General Border Roads and Ors., MANU/DE/0368/2022, wherein, in paragraphs 9 to 12, it has been held as under:
“COURT’S REASONING
AN EMPLOYEE OF THE BORDER ROADS ORGANISATION HAS NO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO CLAIM A DEPUTATION TO ANY OTHER ORGANISATION OR DEPARTMENT LIKE NHAI. HE HAS ONLY A RIGHT OF FAIR CONSIDERATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POLICY AND NEEDS OF THE ORGANISATION.
9. This Court is of the view that an employee of Border Roads Organisation has to work primarily in the said Organisation. An employee of the Border Roads Organisation has no fundamental right to claim a deputation to any other Organisation or Department like NHAI. The employee has only a right of fair consideration in accordance with the policy and needs of the organisation.
THE ORGANISATIONAL INTEREST OF BORDER ROADS ORGANISATION IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE AND IF ITS SUPERIOR OFFICERS ARE OF THE OPINION THAT THE PETITIONER IS A ‘SUITABLE OFFICER’ TO BE POSTED IN A HIGH ALTITUDE AREA, THEN THE COURT WOULD NOT SUBSTITUTE ITS OWN JUDGMENT FOR THE JUDGMENT OF THE MANAGEMENT.
10. In the present case, the Petitioner’s application for deputation has not been rejected by the Border Roads Organisation on the grounds that he did not satisfy the eligibility criteria for deputation or that if he proceeded on deputation, there would be a deficiency in the cadre strength of Executive Engineers, but on the ground “….that numerous posts of EE(Civ) have been lying vacant in Project/Fmns located in HAA due to non availability of suitable officer. The officer has completed his cooling off period for posting to HAA and his next posting will be issued to HAA. Therefore, due to Organizational interest request for deputation of the officer has not been granted to by the ‘Competent Authority”. (See: the impugned letter dated 18th February, 2021).
11. It is settled law that if the senior management of the organisation is of the opinion that the organisation’s interest would be better served if the employee continues to work within the organisation, then the Court would not substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the management.
12. Consequently, this Court is of the view that the organisational interest of Border Roads Organisation is of paramount importance and if the superior officers of the Border Roads Organisation are of the opinion that the Petitioner is a ‘Suitable Officer’ to be posted in a high altitude area, then the same calls for no interference in writ jurisdiction, especially when the impugned decision is not perverse.”
(emphasis supplied)

58. Suffice to state, the process of deputation involves the consent of lending organization, borrowing organization and the officer. Surely, if the borrowing organization seeks personnel from the lending organisation, it is not necessary on the part of lending organization to send personnel. [Ref. Kamlesh Kumar Jha (supra)].
59. Even in another judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Sunil Kumar and Ors. vs. Indo Tibetan Border Police, MANU/DE/1529/2021, in paragraphs 10 and 11, it has been held as under:-
“10. The petitioners as personnel of armed force like ITBP can be posted anywhere based on the requirement of the force. They have no vested right to be deployed in Afghanistan. Rather it amazes us that in view of the dangerous situation prevailing in Afghanistan currently, the petitioners are keen to be deployed there. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of this Court in Pandu Ranga supra. While dismissing the writ petition filed by the petitioners therein for including their names in the list of personnel to be posted at the Indian Mission in Baghdad, Iraq, the following observations were made by the Division Bench of this Court:-
“14. Service personnel have no right to be posted or deployed at any place. Reference in this regard may be made to Shilpi Bose (Mrs) Vs. State of Bihar MANU/SC/0147/1991 : (1991) Supp (2) SCC 659, National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. Vs. Shri Bhagwan MANU/SC/0549/2001 : (2001) 8 SCC 574, State of U.P. Vs. Gobardhan Lal MANU/SC/0281/2004 : (2004) 11 SCC 402, Rajendra Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh MANU/SC/1341/2009 : (2009) 15 SCC 178, Union of India Vs. Deepak Niranjan Nath Pandit MANU/SC/0149/2020 : (2020) 3 SCC 404 and Baikuntha Nath Das Vs. Central Reserve Police Force MANU/DE/1708/2020.
xxx xxx xxx
20. We are rather intrigued with the anxiety shown by the petitioners to be posted at Baghdad which still qualifies, as per advisories issued by most of the countries, as an ‘unsafe destination’. The petitioners perhaps are unaware of the same.”
11. There is no merit in the present petition. Dismissed.”
(emphasis supplied)

60. So, it is clear from the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court as well as this Court that personnel like petitioners herein do not have a right to seek deputation which as per pronouncements of Co-ordinate Benches of this Court is not a matter of right. Moreover, in light of the facts and circumstances of the present case, as noted above, it cannot be held that there is any violation of the ITBP Rules as contended by Mr. Sheel. Therefore, we are of the view that the prayers as sought by the petitioners cannot be granted. The writ petition is dismissed. No Costs.
CM APPL. 65445/2023
Dismissed as infructuous.

V. KAMESWAR RAO, J

SAURABH BANERJEE, J

FEBRUARY 05, 2024/aky

W.P.(C) 7476/2023 Page 42 of 42

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