RITU SETHI vs VIVEK SETHI

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on:13th September, 2023
Pronounced on:20th December, 2023

+ CRL.M.A. 35626/2018 in MAT.APP.(F.C.) 107/2017

RITU SETHI ….. Appellant
Through: Appellant in person.

Versus

VIVEK SETHI ….. Respondent
Through: Mr. Amarjit Singh Bedi & Mr. Varun Chandiok, Advocates.

CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KUMAR KAIT
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA

J U D G M E N T
NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA, J.
CRL. M.A. 35626/2018 (under Section 340 CrPC filed by appellant)
1. An application has been filed by the appellant/wife under section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “CR.P.C, 1973”) seeking a direction for inquiry against the respondent for the act of perjury committed by him.
2. It is submitted that the respondent has filed a false Affidavit along with his Reply to the present Appeal, giving his address No. A-29, Gulmohar Park, New Delhi i.e. the alleged property taken on rent by him, which is incorrect. In fact, he never shifted out of the property in Greater Kailash, belonging to is grandmother, but only to defeat the bonafide claim of the appellant of right of residence in matrimonial home, he falsely alleged to have shifted out to rented accommodation. To substantiate the false claim, the appellant has produced a registered Lease Deed dated 14.06.2016 vide which certain portions of the property bearing No. S-83, Greater Kailash, Part-I, New Delhi was leased out to certain Kesar Kaur, wherein the respondent had signed as a witness mentioning his address as S-83, Greater Kailash, Part-I, New Delhi.
3. It is thus asserted that the respondent has committed the offence of perjury as the address specified in his Reply Affidavit to the present Appeal is No. A-29, Gulmohar Park, New Delhi which is an absolute falsehood.
4. Submissions heard.
5. At the outset, it is pertinent to refer to Section 340 CR.P.C, 1973 which reads as under:
Section 340: Procedure in cases mentioned in section 195.
(1) When, upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of Justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary,—
(a) record a finding to that effect;
(b) make a complaint thereof in writing;
(c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction;
(d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and
(e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate.
(2) The power conferred on a Court by sub-section (1) in respect of an offence may, in any case where that Court has neither made a complaint under sub-section (1) in respect of that offence nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint, be exercised by the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of sub-section (4) of section 195.
(3) A complaint made under this section shall be signed,–
(a) where the Court making the complaint is a High Court, by such officer of the Court as the Court may appoint;
1[(b) in any other case, by the presiding officer of the Court or by such officer of the Court as the Court may authorise in writing in this behalf.]
(4) In this section, “Court” has the same meaning as in section 195

6. In Chajoo Ram vs RadheyShyam, (1971) 1 SCC 774, it was held as under:
“12. It is trite law that so as to enable the court to refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction suppression must be of material fact. What would be a material fact, suppression whereof would disentitle the appellant to obtain a discretionary relief, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Material fact would mean material for the purpose of determination of the lis, the logical corollary whereof would be that whether the same was material for grant or denial of the relief. If the fact suppressed is not material for determination of the lis between the parties, the court may not refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. It is also trite that a person invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be allowed to approach it with a pair of dirty hands. But even if the said dirt is removed and the hands become clean, whether the relief would still be denied is the question.”

7. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Pankaj Chaudhary, (2019) 11 SCC 575 it was held by this Court that prosecution for perjury be sanctioned by the courts only in those cases where perjury appears to be deliberate and that prosecution ought to be ordered where it would be expedient in the interest of justice to punish the delinquent and not merely because there is some inaccuracy in the statement.
8. Yashovardhan Birla v. Kamdhenu Enterprises Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 7311 it was observed that for initiating proceedings under Section 340 of the CrPC, the statements should have been made deliberately and consciously.
9. Based on the settled law as discussed above, this court finds that the mentioning of different addresses in two documents cannot be considered as suppression of a fact that was material to the relief of the present Appeal. No person can be punished for such inaccuracies especially when they have not caused any injustice to the parties.
10. Moreover, the address mentioned by the respondent in the Lease Deed of 2016 cannot be made a basis to assert that the address specified in his Affidavit filed before this Court in 2018 proves that the respondent has given a false information. A person may have taken a premises on rent, but on documents may give his other permanent address. The proceeding for prosecution for false evidence is warranted only when there is a deliberate false statement made for causing harm or to gain undue advantage.
11. In the present case, we are compelled to conclude that faced with a divorce, this application is another attempt by the appellant to somehow arm twist the respondent somehow and not let him be at peace. This application emanates only from the sense of wrecking vengeance and involving the respondent in further litigation, which is neither the object of Section 340 Cr.P.C. nor can this court perpetuate such ill directed designs of the appellant.
12. In view of the above, we find no merit in the present Application which is hereby dismissed.

(NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA)
JUDGE

(SURESH KUMAR KAIT)
JUDGE

DECEMBER 20, 2023
S.Sharma/Ek

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 107/2017 Page 5 of 5