NATIONAL INSURANCE CO LTD vs SHEELA DEVI (DECEASED) THR LRS

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on : 21 February 2024
Judgment pronounced on : 27 February 2024
+ MAC.APP. 360/2019 & CM APPL. 12254/2019, CM APPL.
7285/2020, CM APPL. 8954/2020
NATIONAL INSURANCE CO LTD ….. Appellant
Through: Mr. Zorawar Singh & Mr.
Hitesh Mankar, Advs.
versus
SHEELA DEVI (DECEASED) THR LRS ….. Respondents
Through: Mr. S.N. Parashar, Adv.
+ MAC.APP. 361/2019 & CM APPL. 12261/2019, CM APPL.
9061/2020
NATIONAL INSURANCE CO LTD ….. Appellant
Through: Mr. Zorawar Singh & Mr.
Hitesh Mankar, Advs.
versus
BABY CHANCHAL (DECEASED) THR LRS….. Respondents
Through: Mr. S.N. Parashar, Adv.
+ MAC.APP. 362/2019 & CM APPL. 12288/2019, CM APPL.
9062/2020
NATIONAL INSURANCE CO LTD ….. Appellant
Through: Mr. Zorawar Singh & Mr.
Hitesh Mankar, Advs.
versus
BABY LAVI (DECEASED) THR LRS ….. Respondents
Through: Mr. S.N. Parashar, Adv.
+ MAC.APP. 364/2019 & CM APPL. 12304/2019, CM APPL.
9067/2020

NATIONAL INSURANCE CO LTD ….. Appellant
Through: Mr. Zorawar Singh & Mr.
Hitesh Mankar, Advs.
versus
LRS OF MUKESH KUMAR (DECEASED) & ANR
….. Respondents
Through: Mr. S.N. Parashar, Adv.
+ MAC.APP. 369/2019 & CM APPL. 12324/2019, CM APPL.
8955/2020
NATIONAL INSURANCE CO LTD ….. Appellant
Through: Mr. Zorawar Singh & Mr.
Hitesh Mankar, Advs.
versus
GEETA DEVI (DECEASED) THR LRS ….. Respondents
Through: Mr. S.N. Parashar, Adv.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DHARMESH SHARMA
J U D G M E N T

1. This common judgment shall decide the above noted appeals,
which have been preferred by the appellant/insurance company
involving the same vehicle which was involved in an accident, which
occurred on 28.05.2015, resulting in death and injuries to its
passengers. These appeals arise out of five different claim petitions1
filed under Sections 166 and 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 19882 by

1 MACT 450048/16 (Old No. 261/14) challenged in MAC. APP. 360/19; MACT 450044/16 (Old
No. 257/14) challenged in MAC. APP. 361/19; MACT 450045/16 (Old No. 258/14) challenged in
MAC. APP. 362/19; MACT 450043/16 (Old No. 259/14) challenged in MAC. APP. 364/19; and
MACT 450050/16 (Old No. 260/14) challenged in MAC. APP. 369/19
2 MV Act

the respective claimants, which were allowed and compensation has
been awarded.
2. Needless to state that there arises a common issue of law and of
facts, and therefore, the instant appeals can be conveniently disposed
of together. For the sake of convenience, MAC. APP. 360/2019 shall
be the lead matter. However, this Court shall also briefly delve into
the facts of each of the individual cases so as to provide a complete
background of the claims.

BRIEF FACTS:

3. The facts which are common to the instant matters are that five
passengers including the driver got injured in the motor accident on
28.05.2015 that occurred sometime between 5.00 p.m. to 6.00 p.m.
near Chowki Chhijarsi, NH-24, PS Pilakhwa, District Hapur, Uttar
Pradesh, apparently due to rash and negligent driving of ECCO
Maruti Car bearing registration No. UP-14CF-1876, which was being
driven by its driver Harbeer Singh, who also sustained fatal injuries.
Sandhya Devi, her sister Kumari Chanchal and Kumari Lavi besides
their father Harbeer Singh also sustained injuries and died while other
relatives sustained injuries of various nature. Learned Additional
District Judge-01/MACT, North-West District, Rohini Courts, Delhi3,
based on the pleadings of the parties, framed the issues as follows:
Firstly, about whether or not death or injury occurred on account of
rash and negligent driving by its driver Harbeer Singh; Secondly,
about the entitlement of compensation, and if so, to what amount; and
Thirdly, the relief to be given.

3 Tribunal

4. Learned Tribunal decided issue No.1 in each of the aforesaid
claims petitions in favour of the claimants and vide issue No.2,
holding it in favour of entitlement of each claimants, compensation of
different amounts had been granted to the claimants depending upon
whether they are legal heirs of the deceased and/or victims.

LEGAL SUBMISSIONS ADVANCED:

5. Learned counsel for the appellant/insurance company urged that
the offending vehicle or ill-fated motor car was insured as per the
insurance policy valid for the period from 28.04.2014 to 27.04.2015,
wherein it was categorized as a „Saloon Car, 1196 CC, manufacturing
year 2014 and it had a sitting capacity of 7 persons”. It was urged
that evidently, 12 persons were travelling in the ill-fated car, which
was in clear violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance
policy, and it was urged that in such cases, it was the registered owner
of the vehicle, who should have been made liable to pay the
compensation to the victims. Further, it was vehemently urged that
the learned Tribunal has not awarded recovery rights to the
appellant/insurance company despite a clear violation of the terms and
conditions of the insurance policy.
6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents in the aforesaid
appeals alluded to the observations made by the learned Tribunal
while deciding issue No.1 holding that the deceased-driver was guilty
of rash and negligent driving which has resulted in the death of some
passengers as well as injuries to others. As regards the liability of the
appellant/insurance company to pay compensation, reference has been

invited to decision in National Insurance Company v. Anjana
Shayam4.
7. It is pertinent to mention here that the respondent No.3 i.e. the
registered owner of the offending vehicle has been proceeded ex parte
before the learned Tribunal and though a notice of the present appeals
was issued to the registered owner, none appeared and vide order
dated 16.11.2021 passed by the Joint Registrar of this Court, it has
been recorded that service upon the respondent No.3 had been duly
effected.

4 (2007) 7 SCC 445

ANALYSIS & DECISION:

8. Having heard the submissions advanced by the learned counsels
for the rival parties and on perusal of the record, at the outset, I find
that the present appeals are bereft of any merits.
9. First things first, it would be expedient to refer to the reasons
given by the learned Tribunal in deciding the issue No.1 in favour of
the claimants, which reads as under:-

“5. That, Ld. Counsel for the insurance company has argued that
after registration of the FIR, the cancellation report has been filed 2
by the police as the FIR was registered at the instance of Sh.
Narender Kumar, S/o Sh. Vijay Pal Singh, brother of Sh. Harbeer
Singh, who was driving the ECCO car bearing no. UP-14CF-1876
and who has stated in his statement made to the police that his
brother Sh. Harbeer, Singh was driving the vehicle in a rash and
negligent marnier, and hit the stationary vehicle and because of this
reason, the cancellation report has been filed by the police and
therefore, insurance company is not liable to make any payment of
the compensation.

This argument of Ld. Counsel for the insurance company is
unsustainable on the ground that if the insurance company believe
on the statement of Sh. Narender Kumar then, it has been stated
that his brother Sh. Harbeer Singh was driving the vehicle rash and

negligent manner and hit the stationary vehicle, even then the
negligence of driver of vehicle has been proved. It is pertinent to
mention that the insurance company has failed to examine any
witness to prove that the cancellation report filed by the police has
been accepted by the concerned Ld. Judicial Magistrate.
16. That, in view of the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view
the material proved on record, it stands duly proved by way of pre-
ponderence of probability that the deceased Smt Sheela met with
an ‘accident on 28.05.2014 because of rash and negligent driving of
Sh Harbeer Singh (who was also died in the said accident), who
was driving the vehicle bearing No. UP-14CF-1876. Therefore,
issue no. 1 is decided accordingly in favour of the petitioners and
against the respondents.

10. The aforesaid observations have to be appreciated in the
background that the claimants examined PW-1/Mr. Narender Kumar,
brother-in-law of deceased Smt. Sheela Devi as well as brother of
deceased-driver Harbeer Singh. He filed his detailed affidavit in
evidence Ex.PW-1/A and brought out that his relatives died due to
injuries sustained in the accident. Further, he stated to the police that
his brother i.e. the driver Harbeer Singh was driving the car in a rash
and negligent manner. Indeed, PW-1 was an interested witnesses
inasmuch as being a close relative of the legal heirs in question
besides the survivors, he would be interested in the outcome of the
matter in the sense that he would, in all probability, want to ensure
financial benefits to them.
11. Be that as it may, PW-2/Sandhaya, who was travelling in the ill-
fated car, brought out the manner in which the accident occurred
without any blemish. The aforesaid reasons by the learned Tribunal
cannot be interfered with, as evidently the death had occurred and it
was a case where the facts spoke for themselves. At the cost of
repetition, death and injuries had been sustained by the passengers,

who were travelling in same vehicle. Evidently, FIR No. 170/2014
under Sections 279/337/338/304-A/427 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 was registered with PS Pilakhwa, District Dhulana, District
Hapur, Uttar Pradesh. Merely because the investigation resulted in
filing of a „closure report”, it neither prejudices the claimants in any
manner nor it confers any defence to the appellant insurance company.
Learned Tribunal rightly relied on decision in National Insurance
Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Smt. Pushpa Rana5, wherein it was held as
under:

5 2007 SCC OnLine Del 1700
6 AIR 1980 SC 1354

“That last contention of the appellant insurance company is that the
respondents claimants should have proved negligence on the part
of the driver and in this regard the counsel has placed reliance on
the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Oriental
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Meena Variyal. On perusal of the award of
the Tribunal it becomes clear that the wife of the deceased had
produced (i) certified copy of the criminal record of criminal case
in FIR No. 955/2001 pertaining to involvement of the offending
vehicle, (ii) criminal record showing completion of investigation of
police and issue of charge sheet under Section 279/304-A, IPC
against the driver, (iii) certified copy of FIR, wherein criminal case
against the driver was lodged; and (iv) recovery memo and
mechanical inspection report of offending vehicle and vehicle of
the deceased. These documents are sufficient proofs to reach the
conclusion that the driver was negligent. Proceedings under Motor
Vehicles Act are not akin to proceedings in a civil suit and hence
strict rules of evidence are not required to be followed in this
regard. Hence, this contention of the counsel for the appellant also
falls face down. There is ample evidence on record to prove
negligence on the part of the driver” (Paragraph 12)

12. Learned Tribunal also relied on decision in the matter of
N.K.V. Brothers (P) Ltd. v M. Karumai Ammal6, wherein it was
observed as follows:

“Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country specially,
when truck and bus driver operate nocturnally. This proverbial
recklessness often persuades the Courts, as has been observed by
us earlier in other case, to draw an initial presumption in several
cases bases on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitar. Accidents tribunal
must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and
drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some
doubt here and some obscurity there. Save in plain cases,
culpability must be inferred form the circumstances where it is
fairly reasonable. The Court should not succumb to niceties,
technicalities and mystic maybes…” (Paragraph 3)

13. Therefore, this Court finds no merit in the plea that the
claimants had failed to prove that the accident resulted due to rash and
negligent driving of the deceased-driver.

INSURANCE POLICY VIOLATION:

14. On a careful perusal of the impugned judgment-cum-award
dated 06.08.2018, it appears that no issue was raised by the appellant/
insurance company before the learned Tribunal that it was not liable to
pay the compensation to the victims of the ill-fated insured vehicle
being plied in contravention of its registration certificate and/or
insurance policy. Indeed it was meant for seven persons, but only five
of the claimants have approached the Court seeking compensation.
15. Mr. Parashar, learned counsel for the respondents/claimants
rightly relied on the decision in Anjana Shayam (supra,) wherein the
bus had fallen into a naala (sewage line) leading to death of 25
passengers besides driver and 63 passengers sustaining injuries. The
bus had a sitting capacity of 42 passengers and in the said scenario,
the Supreme Court considered the scope and ambit of Section 149 of
the MV Act, which provides as follows:-

“149. Settlement by insurance company and procedure
therefor.- (1) The insurance company shall, upon receiving
information of the accident, either from claimant or through
accident information report or otherwise, designate an officer
to settle the claims relating to such accident.

(2) An officer designated by the insurance company for
processing the settlement of claim of compensation may make an
offer to the claimant for settlement before the Claims Tribunal
giving such details, within thirty days and after following such
procedure as may be prescribed by the Central Government.

(3) If, the claimant to whom the offer is made under sub-
section (2),

(a) accepts such offer, –

(i) the Claims Tribunal shall make a record of such
settlement, and such claim shall be deemed to be
settled by consent; and

(ii) the payment shall be made by the insurance
company within a maximum period of thirty days
from the date of receipt of such record of settlement;

(b) rejects such offer, a date of hearing shall be fixed by the
Claims Tribunal to adjudicate such claim on merits.”

16. In the case of Anjana Shayam, interpreting the aforesaid
observations, it was held as under:-

“Under Section 146 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, no vehicle
can be plied on the road without taking out an insurance against
third party risk. Section 147(1)(b)(ii) provides that in order to
comply with the requirements of Chapter XI of the Act, a policy of
insurance must be a policy which insures persons or classes of
persons, specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-
section (2) of that Section against the death of or bodily injury to
any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out
of the use of the vehicle in a public place. The limit in terms
of Section 147(2)(a) of the Act is the amount of liability incurred.
(Paragraph 12)

Under Section 149(1) of the Act, the insurance company has the
obligation, subject to the provisions of that Section, to satisfy the
decree or award made by the concerned court or Tribunal on claims
by third parties. Section 149(2) of the Act provides that no sum
shall be payable by an insurer unless notice of the proceedings had
been given to the insurance company before the commencement of
the proceedings through the court or the Claims Tribunal, and that
it shall not be liable if there has been a breach of a specified

condition of the policy as indicated in that sub-section. These cover
use of the vehicle for hire or reward where the vehicle is on the
date of the contract of insurance a vehicle not covered by a permit
to ply for hire or reward, or use for organized racing and speed
testing, or use for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which
the vehicle is used where the vehicle is a transport vehicle, or use
without side-car being attached where the vehicle is a motor cycle,
or there is a breach of a condition excluding driving by a named
person or persons or by any person who is not duly licensed, or by
any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a
driving licence during the period of disqualification, or a condition
excluding liability for injury caused or contributed to by conditions
of war, civil war, riot or civil commotion, or that the policy is void
on the ground that it was obtained by the non-disclosure of a
material fact or by a representation of fact which was false in some
material particular. Under sub-section (5), it is provided that if the
amount which an insurer becomes liable to pay under this Section
in respect of a liability incurred by a person insured by a policy
exceeds the amount for which the insurer would, apart from the
provisions of this Section be liable under the policy in respect of
that liability, the insurer shall be entitled to recover the excess from
that person. Therefore, on the scheme of the Act, the insurance
company, if it is not able to establish that there is a fundamental
breach of a condition which would enable it to disclaim liability, it
may have to pay the amount of compensation adjudged by a
Claims Tribunal subject of course to its rights to recover from the
insured, the owner of the vehicle such excess as it is obliged to pay.
(Paragraph 13)
Section 149 of the Act speaks of the judgment or award in respect
of the liability as is required to be covered by a policy under clause
(b) of sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the Act having to be
satisfied. Section 147(1)(b) compels insuring the person or classes
of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-
section (ii) of that Section. The case on hand will come under sub-
clause (ii) of clause (b) of Section 147 (1) of the Act which obliges
the owner to take out insurance compulsorily against the death of
or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused
by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place.
(Paragraph 14)

Section 58 of the Act makes special provisions in regard to
transport vehicles. Sub-Section (2) provides that a registering
authority, when registering a transport vehicle, shall enter in the
record of registration and in the certificate of registration various
particulars. Clause (d) provides that if the vehicle is used or
adapted to be used for carriage of passengers, the number of

passengers for whom accommodation is provided. Thus the
registration of the vehicle, which alone makes it usable on the road,
records the number of passengers to be carried and the certificate
of registration also contains that entry. So, an insurance company
insuring the passengers carried in a vehicle in terms of Section
147(1)(b)(ii) of the Act, can only insure such number of passengers
as are shown in the certificate of registration. (Paragraph 15)
The position is reinforced by Section 72 of the Act, which deals
with grant of stage carriage permits. Sub-Section (2) provides that
when a permit is decided to be granted for a stage carriage, the
Regional Transport Authority can attach to the permit one or more
of the conditions specified therein. Clause (vii) is the condition
regarding the maximum number of passengers that may be carried
in a stage carriage. Overloading also invites a consequence which
can be termed penal. Section 86 of the Act provides for
cancellation of a permit if any condition contained in the permit is
breached. Therefore, the apparent wide words of Section
147(1)(b)(ii) of the Act have to be construed harmoniously with the
other provisions of the Act, namely, Section 58 and 72 of the Act.
(Paragraph 16)
As early as in 1846, Dr. Lushington in Queen V. Eduljee Byramjee
[(1846) 3 MIA 468] posited that to ascertain the true meaning of a
clause in a statute the court must look at the whole statute, at what
precedes and at what succeeds and not merely at the clause itself.
This Court has accepted this approach in innumerable cases. Thus,
the expression ‘any passenger’ must be understood as passenger
authorized to be carried in the vehicle and ‘use of the vehicle’ as
permitted use of the vehicle. Affording of insurance for more
number of passengers than permitted, would be illegal since in that
case the manifest intention would be the overloading of the vehicle,
something not contemplated by law. Thus, it is not possible to
accept a contention that the insurance can be taken to cover more
passengers than permitted by the certificate of registration and the
permit as a stage carriage and that it will cover all the passengers
overloaded. Of course, in these cases, there is no dispute that the
insurance cover took in only the permitted number of passengers.
(Paragraph 17)

In this situation, the insurance taken out for the number of
permitted passengers can alone determine the liability of the
insurance company in respect of those passengers. In terms
of Section 149 of the Act, the duty of the insurer is only to satisfy
judgments and awards against persons insured in respect of the
third party risk. Obviously, this is to the extent the third party risk
is coverable and is covered. Section 149 of the Act speaks of

judgment or award being obtained against any person insured by
the policy and the liability of the insurer to pay to the person
entitled to the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum
assured payable thereunder subject to any claim the insurer may
have against the owner of the vehicle. Section 149 could not be
understood as compelling an insurance company to make payment
of amounts covered by decrees not only in respect of the number of
persons covered by the policy itself but even in respect of those
who are not covered by the policy and who have been loaded into
the vehicle against the terms of the permit and against the terms of
the condition of registration of the vehicle and in terms of violation
of a statute. (Paragraph 18)
It is true that the provisions in Chapter XI of the Act are intended
for the benefit of third parties with a view to ensure that they
receive the fruits of the awards obtained by them straightaway with
an element of certainty and not to make them wait for a prolonged
recovery proceeding as against the owner of the vehicle. But from
that, it would not be possible to take the next step and find that the
insurance company is bound to cover liabilities not covered by the
contract of insurance itself. The Act only imposes an obligation to
take out insurance to cover third party risks and in the case of stage
carriages, the passengers to be carried in the vehicle and the
passengers to be carried in the vehicle can be understood only as
passengers authorized or permitted to be carried in the vehicle.
(Paragraph 19)”

17. A meticulous perusal of the aforesaid observations would show
that the insurance company, which had contracted to indemnify the
insured, cannot avoid its liability under the terms of the insurance
policy subject to exceptions that are provided under Section 149(2) of
the MV Act. However, it does not mean that an insurer is bound to
pay amounts outside the contract of insurance and it shall be liable to
pay only to the extent the passengers permitted to be insured or
directed to be insured by the statute and actually covered by the
contract. When that is the case, in the instant matter, fortunately only
five claimants have come before this Court, i.e., in respect of death of

three persons and injuries to two. It is not open to the appellant/
insurance company to avoid its liability under the insurance policy.

CHALLENGE TO QUANTUM OF COMPENSATION:

18. At the outset, a half hearted attempt was made to challenge the
quantum of compensation. In MAC. APP 360/2019, the daughter and
the grandmother of the deceased Smt. Sheela Devi have claimed the
compensation. Learned Tribunal found that deceased Smt. Sheela
Devi was a house wife/homemaker and the minimum wages of an
unskilled workman on the date of accident i.e. @ Rs. 8554/- were
reckoned. 50% was deducted towards personal use and expenses for
the fact that the husband and two children of the deceased had also
died in the accident. Her age was rightly found to be 34 years as per
the date of birth being 10.10.1980 as reflected in the election identity
card and the multiplier of 16 was applied. The compensation was
assessed as under:

“8554+40% = 3421.6 Rs.8554+3421.6=11975 x 12 x 16 x 1/2
= 11,49,657.6 (Rupees Eleven Lakh Forty Nine Thousand Six
Hundred Fifty Seven and Six Paise Only)”

19. Thus, the total compensation was assessed as under:-

1.

Just Compensation

Rs. 11,49,657.6/-

2.

Funeral expenses and loss of Estate

Rs. 15,000/- +
Rs. 15,000/-
= Rs.30,000/-

Total

Rs.11,79,657.6

20. The aforesaid compensation was awarded to the claimants with
interest @ 9% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition
i.e., from 07.08.2014 till realization.

21. The claimant Sandhya was 11 years of age at the time of the
accident, thus a minor, and therefore, entire amount of compensation
was ordered to be awarded in her favour to the exclusion of claimant
No.2/grandmother. This Court finds that the amount of compensation,
by no means, can be said to be unfair, unjust or exorbitant.

MAC APP. 361/2019

22. This claim petition has also been filed by Ms. Sandhya and Smt.
Vimla Devi i.e., the sister and grandmother of deceased Chanchal.
Learned Tribunal found that deceased Chanchal was 8 years of age.
Thus, taking notional income to be Rs. 15,000/- and applying the
multiplier of 10, the calculation of assessment is as under:-

“Rs. 15,000 x A/Base Year
(„A” represents Cost Inflation Index)
Rs. 15,000 x 1024/331 = Rs. 46,404.83/-. Therefore the corrected
notional income is Rs. 46,404.83/-”

23. Accordingly, compensation of Rs. 6,18,731/- was allowed with
interest @ 9% per annum from the date of filing of the DAR/claim
petition i.e., 07.08.2014 till realization, which was awarded to
claimant No.1/Ms. Sandhya.
24. This Court finds no perversity, illegality or incorrect approach
in assessing the compensation.

MAC. APP. 362/2019

25. This claim petition has also been filed by Ms. Sandhya and Smt.
Vimla Devi i.e., the sister and grandmother of deceased Chanchal.
Learned Tribunal found that the deceased Lavi was 7 months old.
Thus, taking notional income to be Rs. 15,000/- and applying the
multiplier of 10, the calculation of assessment is as under:-

“Rs. 15,000 x A/Base Year
(„A” represents Cost Inflation Index)
Rs. 15,000 x 1024/331 = Rs. 46,404.83/-. Therefore the corrected
notional income is Rs. 46,404.83/-”

26. Accordingly, compensation of Rs. 6,18,731/- was allowed with
interest @ 9% per annum from the date of filing of the DAR/claim
petition i.e., 07.08.2014 till realization, which was awarded to
claimant No.1 Ms. Sandhya.
27. This Court finds no perversity, illegality or incorrect approach
in assessing the compensation.

MAC. APP. 364/2019

28. This claim petition has also been filed by Mr. Subhash Kumar,
Pinki and Sonia, i.e., son and two daughters of deceased Mukesh
Kumar. Learned Tribunal found that the deceased Mukesh Kumar was
46 years of age. Though it was claimed that he was working as a shoe
maker and earning about Rs. 15,000/- per month, however, for lack of
evidentiary proof of his income, learned Tribunal assessed the income
at minimum wages for an unskilled workman on the date of accident
@ 8554/- per month and future prospects were reckoned at 25%. 1/4th
was deducted towards personal use and expenses of the deceased and
the multiplier of 13 was adopted. The compensation has been worked
out as under:

“Rs. 8554+25%= 2138.5 8554+2138.5=10,692.5x12x13x3/4=
Rs. 12,51,922.5.

29. Thus, the total compensation was assessed as under:-

1.

Just Compensation

Rs. 12,51,022.5/-

2.

Funeral expenses and loss of Estate

Rs. 15,000/- +
Rs. 15,000/-

= Rs.30,000/-

Total

Rs.12,81,022.5

30. The aforesaid compensation including the interim award, if any,
was awarded to the claimants with interest @ 9% per annum from the
date of filing of the claim petition i.e. 07.08.2014 till realization.
31. This Court finds no perversity, illegality or incorrect approach
in assessing the compensation.

MAC. APP. 369/2019

32. This claim petition has also been filed by Mr. Subhash Kumar,
Pinki and Sonia, i.e. son and two daughters of deceased-mother Smt.
Geeta. Before the learned Tribunal, it was claimed that the deceased
Smt. Geeta was working as a tailor and earning Rs. 12,000/- to
Rs.15,000/- per month but for lack of evidentiary proof, her income
was assessed in terms of minimum wages provided for an unskilled
workman as on 28.05.2014 @ Rs. 8554/- per month and 50% was
deducted towards personal use and expenses of the deceased and the
multiplier of 14 was adopted for her age being 42 years at the time of
death. 25% was reckoned towards loss of future prospects. The
compensation has been itemized as under:

“Rs. 8554+25%= 2138.5 8554+2138.5=10,692.5x12x14x1/2=
Rs. 8,98,171/-”

33. Thus, the total compensation was assessed as under:-

1.

Just Compensation

Rs. 8,98,170/-

2.

Funeral expenses and loss of Estate

Rs. 15,000/- +
Rs. 15,000/-
= Rs.30,000/-

Total

Rs.9,28,170/-

34. The aforesaid compensation including interim award, if any,
was awarded to the claimants with interest @ 9% per annum from the
date of filing of the claim petition i.e., 07.08.2014 till realization.
35. This Court finds no perversity, illegality or incorrect approach
in assessing the compensation.
36. Before parting with this case, since no plea was taken before the
learned Tribunal with regard to there being any violation of the terms
and conditions of the policy of insurance, nor there is any evidence on
record so as to prove that there was any fundamental breach of the
terms and conditions of the insurance policy, and for the fact that no
relief is claimed in the present appeals seeking recovery rights either,
this Court does not find it to be a fit case where recovery rights be
awarded to the appellant/ insurance company.
37. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that there
are no merits in the present appeals. The decision by the learned
Tribunal does not suffer from any illegality, perversity or incorrect
approach adopted in law. Hence, the appeals are dismissed.
38. The pending applications also stand disposed of.

DHARMESH SHARMA, J.
FEBRUARY 27, 2024
Sadiq