delhihighcourt

M/S RAHUL ASSOCIATES & ANR vs M/S BMS ENTERPRISES & ANR

$-
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV

+ RFA 99/2014 & CM APPL. 5195/2014

Between: –

M/S RAHUL ASSOCIATES,
THROUGH ITS PARTNER, MR. RAHUL MATHUR
G-81, (FF), MIDDLE CIRCLE,
CONNAUGHT PLACE ……APPELLANT NO.1

MR. RAHUL MATHUR
S/O SHRI A.C. MATHUR
K-60B, IIND FLOOR,
KALKAJI,
NEW DELHI ……APPELLANT NO.2

(Through: Mr. Lalit Bhardwaj, Mr. Rajesh Saxena and Mr. Jatin Anand, Advs.)

AND

M/S BMS ENTERPRISES
H-9/11, MALVIYA NAGAR,
NEW DELHI …..RESPONDENT NO.1

SHRI BALBIR SINGH
(SINCE DECEASED) …..RESPONDENT NO.2

A) SMT. HARMINDER KAUR,
W/O LATE SHRI BALBIR SINGH,
R/O H-9/11, MALVIYA NAGAR,
NEW DELHI-110014

B) SHRI INDERMEET KAUR,
W/O RAHUL KAPOOR,
R/O H-9/11, MALVIYA NAGAR,
NEW DELHI-110014

C) SHRI MANINDER SINGH SAMBHY
S/O LATE SHRI BALBIR SINGH,
R/O H-9/11, MALVIYA NAGAR,
NEW DELHI-110014

(Through: Mr. Sidharth Mullick and Mr. Arun Kumar, Advs.)

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% Reserved on: 12.12.2024
Pronounced on: 24.12.2024
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JUDGMENT

The present appeal arises from the impugned judgment and decree dated 22.11.2013, rendered by the Court of the Additional District Judge, Central-01, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, in Civil Suit No. 231 of 2008. The learned Trial Court decreed the suit filed by the respondent-plaintiffs, awarding a sum of ?10,73,948 [Rupees Ten Lakh Seventy-Three Thousand Nine Hundred Forty-Eight] with interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum from the date of filing of the suit until realization.
2. The facts of the case, as gleaned from the record, reveal that the respondents-plaintiffs filed a suit seeking recovery of ?16,53,768/- [Rupees Sixteen Lakh Fifty-Three Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty-Eight], along with pendente lite interest at the rate of 18 percent per annum.
3. The appellants-defendants, namely, M/s Rahul Associates and Rahul Mathur, are engaged in the business of property development, construction, and reconstruction. Rahul Mathur, appellant No. 2-defendant No. 2, was conducting his business as a partner of M/s Rahul Associates.
4. It was averred that respondent No. 2-plaintiff No. 2, i.e. one Mr. Balbir Singh, was the sole proprietor of respondent No. 1-plaintiff No. 1, i.e. M/s BMS Enterprises, a sole proprietorship firm. According to the respondents-plaintiffs, respondent No. 2-plaintiff No. 2 was a building contractor engaged in the development, construction, and reconstruction of properties, conducting his business under the name and style of M/s BMS Enterprises.
5. As per the plaint, on 09.06.1999, an agreement was executed between appellant No. 2-defendant No. 2, and respondent No. 2-plaintiff No. 2, outlining the terms for the execution of construction work to be undertaken by M/s BMS Enterprises for M/s Rahul Associates. The construction work was to be carried out at the site located at E-6, Greater Kailash, Part-I.
6. The respondents-plaintiffs commenced the work, and by 09.09.1999, the roof of the ground floor had been laid. However, on 12.09.1999, the respondents-plaintiffs submitted a bill amounting to ?10,73,948 for payment, which, according to the respondents-plaintiffs, was not made by the appellants-defendants. Instead of making payment, the appellants-defendants allegedly unilaterally revoked the agreement dated 09.06.1999, attempted to remove the shuttering, and obstructed the respondents-plaintiffs from carrying out further work.
7. Subsequently, the respondents-plaintiffs filed a suit for permanent injunction as Civil Suit No. 263/1999, seeking to restrain the appellants-defendants from engaging another contractor for the said work. However, the said suit was rejected on 04.11.1999 under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [CPC].
8. The respondents-plaintiffs further stated that despite repeated requests, the appellants-defendants failed to make payment of the final bill for the work already completed, compelling them to institute the present civil suit. In their written statement, the appellants-defendants controverted the contentions raised in the plaint and opposed the claims made therein. The appellants-defendants, inter alia, contended that the suit is not maintainable as it is barred by the provisions of Section 69 of the Partnership Act, 1932 [Act]. They argued that the agreement dated 09.06.1999 was executed with respondent No. 2-plaintiff No. 2 in his capacity as a partner of an unregistered partnership firm, and as such, the suit is not maintainable under the provisions of the Act.
9. It was further asserted that an earlier civil suit filed by the respondents-plaintiffs had already been dismissed, wherein, the respondents-plaintiffs were considered to be a partnership firm, and since that order was not challenged, the present suit is barred by the principle of res judicata. Additionally, the appellants-defendants contended that the suit is hopelessly time-barred, as the respondents-plaintiffs submitted the bill for ?10,73,948/- under the agreement dated 09.06.1999, but filed the suit only on 11.09.2002.
10. The Trial Court, after framing of the issues and allowing the parties to lead their respective evidence, proceeded to evaluate the material placed on record. Upon appreciation of the evidence, the Trial Court decreed the civil suit in favor of the respondents-plaintiffs and against the appellants-defendants. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the appellants-defendants have, therefore, preferred the present appeal.
11. Mr. Lalit Bhardwaj, learned counsel appearing for the appellants-defendants, contends that the impugned judgment and decree suffer from material illegality and are liable to be set aside. He submits that the Trial Court failed to consider the judgment and decree passed by the Court of Civil Judge in Civil Suit No. 263/1999, whereby, the suit for specific performance filed by the respondents-plaintiffs was dismissed under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC.
12. Learned counsel further argues that the matter deserves to be remitted to the Trial Court for fresh adjudication in light of additional evidence brought on record through an application under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 of the CPC. He submits that respondent No. 2-plaintiff No. 2 failed to show interest in the execution of the work and that the work performed was of substandard quality. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on a letter dated 20.08.1999 issued by the Architect, M/s Design Associates, to the appellants-defendants, which allegedly indicates that respondent No. 2-plaintiff No. 2 was not entitled to any payment. Learned counsel further submits that along with the application under Order 41 Rule 27, the appellants-defendants have brought on record the said letter dated 20.08.1999, as well as complaints and a telegram dated 19.09.1999. It is contended that the said documents established that, due to the hostile behavior of respondent No. 2-plaintiff No. 2, the appellants-defendants were compelled to terminate the contract via telegram dated 19.09.1999.
13. It is also argued that these documents could not be placed on record earlier as the case was initially defended by Mr. S.K. Tiwari, Advocate. Subsequently, when the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Trial Court was enhanced, the case was transferred to Mr. Rajiv Tiwari, Advocate, who was the younger brother of Mr. S.K. Tiwari. According to him, in this process, one of the files containing the relevant documents was misplaced. Learned counsel submits that if the said documents are considered in the proper perspective, they would unequivocally demonstrate that the impugned judgment and decree are unsustainable in law. In support of his contentions, learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin1 and Sanjay Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand2.
14. Mr. Sidharth Mullick, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiffs, vehemently opposes the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants-defendants. Learned counsel submits that the civil suit remained pending before the Trial Court for approximately 14 years, during which no efforts were made by the appellants-defendants to produce the documents that are now being sought to be introduced in the instant appeal. He contends that the appellants-defendants were fully aware of the judgment passed by the Court of Civil Judge in Civil Suit No. 263/1999, and the additional documents now relied upon, even if considered, would not help the appellants-defendants in any manner, whatsoever. Learned counsel further argues that the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC has been filed with malafide intent to delay the proceedings and is not maintainable, particularly in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. K.C. Subramanya3. He submits that the plea raised by the appellants-defendants lacks substance and is merely an afterthought. Learned counsel concludes his submission by stating that the Trial Court has correctly appreciated the evidence and material on record and that the impugned judgment and decree do not warrant interference in the instant appeal.
15. I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel appearing for the parties and have also perused the record.
16. The Trial Court on completion of the pleadings, framed the following issues for its consideration:-
“4. From the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed vide order dated 23.03.2004 :-
1)Whether the suit filed by the plaintiff no-1 is not
maintainable under order 30 CPC? OPD
2)Whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file
the present suit? OPD
3)Whether there is no privity of contract between the
plaintiffs and defendants? OPD
4)Whether suit is barred under section 69 of the
Partnership Act? OPD
5)Whether the present suit is barred by the
provisions of resjudicata and under order 2 rule 2
CPC? OPD
6)Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder of parties? OPD
7)Whether the suit is barred by time? OPD
8)Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover an
amount of Rs.16,53,768/- alongwith interest as
claimed in the plaint? OPP
9)Relief.”

17. Before the Trail Court, it is seen that respondent No. 2-plaintiff No. 2, appeared as a proprietor of respondent No. 1-plaintiff No. 1 entity as PW1. He tendered his affidavit, which has been marked as Ex.A-1, and proved various documents on record, including the certificate from the bank regarding the proprietorship concern [Ex.P-1], the agreement dated 09.06.1999 [Ex.P-2], the running bill dated 12.09.1999 [Ex.P-3], and the final bill dated 21.09.1999 [Ex.P-4]. PW1 was extensively cross-examined by the appellants-defendants over multiple dates. PW2, Mr. Rajat Aggarwal, a friend and associate of the respondent-plaintiffs, also supported the case of the respondents-plaintiffs through his affidavit marked as Ex.PW-2/A. He, too, was subjected to cross-examination. Appellant No. 2-defendant No. 2, appeared as DW1 and tendered his affidavit marked as Ex.DW1/A. He was cross-examined on behalf of the respondent-plaintiffs.
18. All the issues were decided in favor of the respondents-plaintiffs and against the appellants-defendants. However, in the present appeal, considerable emphasis has been placed by learned counsel for the appellants-defendants on the issue of the maintainability of the civil suit in light of the provisions of Section 69 of the Partnership Act, 1932. Accordingly, it becomes imperative to examine the findings rendered by the Trial Court with respect to this said issue.
19. Notably, Ex.P-1, the certificate issued by Allahabad Bank, unequivocally affirms that respondent No. 1-plaintiff No. 1 maintained a current account with the bank in the capacity of a proprietorship firm, with respondent No. 2-plaintiff No. 2 as its sole proprietor. The said certificate reads as under:-
“LPN/VL/22/3/04 Lajpat Nagar
dt. 22/3/04
Mr. Balbir Singh
Prop.
BMS Enterprises

It is certified that BMS Enterprises in maintaining a current account with us in the capacity of a proprietorship firm.
The proprietor of the said firm is Mr. Balbir Singh Sambhi.”

20. The Trial Court observed that the consistent stand of the respondents-plaintiffs was that respondent No. 1-plaintiff No. 1 is a proprietorship concern. This assertion was substantiated by the certificate marked as Ex.P-1. Furthermore, during his examination, DW1 admitted that he was unaware of any other partners of the firm and that he had exclusively dealt with respondent No. 2-plaintiff No. 2. The Court, therefore, concluded that the mere presence of the word “partner” typed before the name of respondent No. 2-plaintiff No. 2, Balbir Singh, in the agreement marked as Ex.P-2, cannot be considered conclusive evidence to establish that respondent No. 1-plaintiff No. 1 is a partnership concern. The findings rendered in paragraph No.12 of the Trial Court reads as under:-
“12. The defendants in the pleadings as well as in evidence have raised the contention that plaintiff no-1 is a partnership concern and without producing registration of the partnership firm, the suit is barred. It has been consistently maintained by the plaintiffs that the plaintiff no-1 is a proprietorship concern. The certificate EX P-1 is produced in support of the same. DW-1 in his cross-exainination has admitted that he is not in knowledge of other partners of the firm and he has been dealing only with plaintiff no-2. Merely because in the agreement EX P-2 the word ‘partner’ is typed before the name of Sh. Balbir Singh (plaintiff no-2), this cannot be the conclusive that plaintiff no-1 is the partnership concern. The plaintiff have been able to bring sufficient evidence on record to show that plaintiff no-1 is the proprietorship concern. On “Jie other hand, defendants have failed to bring any material on record to suggest that plaintiff no-1 is a partnership concern despite the fact that onus of proving of this issue has been upon the defendants. The issue is accordingly decided against the defendants.
21. During the course of arguments, the appellants-defendants were unable to point out any infirmity or error in the conclusions arrived at by the Trial Court. However, it is argued that if the matter is re-examined by the Trial Court in view of the additional evidence, the position would change.
22. Under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC, the Appellate Court is empowered to admit additional evidence only in exceptional circumstances. The provision does not confer an absolute right upon the parties to introduce such evidence. Additional evidence may not be permitted if, on the basis of the evidence already on record, the Appellate Court is in a position to deliver a satisfactory judgment. It is a well-settled principle that the Appellate Court should ordinarily refrain from allowing new evidence to be adduced solely to enable a party to raise a new point in appeal. Factors such as inadvertence, inability to comprehend legal issues, reliance on erroneous legal advice, or negligence on the part of a pleader do not constitute sufficient grounds to invoke the provisions of this rule. Furthermore, the mere importance of certain evidence does not, by itself, justify its admission in appeal.
23. In the instant case, the reasons assigned by the appellants-defendants do not constitute sufficient cause under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC. The suit remained pending for about 14 years. The decision earlier was passed in the presence of the appellants-defendants. No efforts were made to obtain the certified copy of the said decision.
24. In the written statement, the appellants-defendants did mention about the said earlier suit filed at the behest of the respondent-plaintiffs. According to the appellants-defendants, if the findings rendered in that case would have any bearing on the facts of the present case, the same ought to have been relied upon. The other documents which have been produced along with the application under Order 41 Rule 27 also be of no significance and admittedly, these documents were in existence during the pendency of the civil suit. As to when the appellants-defendants came in possession of those documents have not sufficiently been disclosed. Even otherwise, the findings rendered by the Courts below regarding entitlement to recover the amount in question is concerned, the same is rested on the basis of the pleadings and evidence of the parties. In the absence of any evidence being adduced by the appellants-defendants to prove any deficiency in work carried out with the respondents-plaintiffs at the site, the plea, raised is that, the respondents-plaintiffs are not entitled to the money as per the agreed terms, cannot be accepted. Bill dated 21.09.1999 has admittedly been received by one Rameshwar Prasad, who was the official of the appellants-defendants. The respondents-plaintiffs deposed that the work was done and the bill was raised. That evidence remained unassailable.
25. Findings rendered by the Courts below from paragraph Nos.16 to 18, read as under:-
“16. The plaintiff has claimed an amount of Rs. 10,73,948/- on account of bill dated 21.09.1999 and further interest amount on the same. I have given due consideration to the pleadings and evidence of the parties. The bill is EX P-4 and received by Rameshwar Prasad. It is the contention of the plaintiff that Rameshwar Prasad was the official of the defendant. The plaintiff entered into the witness box and deposed about the work done and the bill raised on that account. Despite cross-examination, the defendants have not been able to impeach the testimony of plaintiff to their benefit. It is admitted that work was done by the plaintiff at the site at the instance of the defendants in accordance with the agreement. It has been contended by the defendants in their written statement as well as during the evidence that plaintiff has raised false bill by mentioning the extra amount. However, no questions with respect to the extra amount were either put forth to the plaintiff during his cross-examination or specified by the defendants in his affidavit EX DW-l/A. The evidence of the plaintiff/PW-2 has remained consistent and cogent on the aspect of work done as well as bill raised against the defendants.
17. On the other hand, the defendants have taken the plea that work was not done to their satisfaction and the same was defective and was not completed in time. However, no such notice was ever given by the defendants to the plaintiff stating that work has not been done properly or in time. The defendants have also failed to examine any witness particularly the architect, v/ho could prove any defects in the work done by the plaintiff at the site. The defendants have also stated about termination of agreement vide telegram dated 09.06.1999 but no evidence is brought on record to show sending of any such telegram. DW-1 has failed to categorically controvert the claim of the plaintiff and even it has not been stated in the affidavit that bill was not received through Rameshwar Prasad.
18. On examination of the evidence of both the sides, I am of the opinion that plaintiff has been able to prove its case, whereas defendants have not been able to rebut the claim of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount of Rs. 10,73,948/- as per bill dated 21.09.1999. The plaintiff is, however, not entitled to any interest since no provision for grant of interest is made either in the agreement or in the bills. I, therefore, order that plaintiff is entitled to the amount of the bill i.e. Rs.10,73,948/-. However, the plaintiff is entitled to pendente lite and future interest since the payment is wrongly withheld by the defendant. I, therefore, grant interest @10% per annum in accordance with economic standards of the country w.e.f. filing of the suit till the realization of the amount. The issue is accordingly decided in favour of the plaintiff.”
26. The Supreme Court in N. Kamalam v. Ayyasamy4 has unequivocally held that the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC are not intended to permit an appellant to rectify weaknesses in their case or fill omissions committed at the Trial Court stage. The provision does not authorize the rectification of lacunae or gaps in evidence or facts at the appellate stage. The Court also emphasized on the element of delay, noting that in the said case, additional evidence was sought to be introduced nearly a decade after the filing of the appeal, which weighed significantly against the appellant. Similarly, in the present case, the appellants-defendants are seeking to adduce additional evidence after a substantial lapse of time, offering an unsatisfactory explanation that the relevant file went missing during office relocation. Upon a closer examination of the principles underlying Order 41 Rule 27, it is evident that additional evidence at the appellate stage is permissible only under specific and limited circumstances. The appellants-defendants in this case have failed to satisfy the permissible grounds, which are inter alia:-
a. That the Trial Court wrongfully refused to admit evidence that ought to have been admitted;
b. That the appellants-defendants were unaware of the case or its specific issues during the proceedings; or
c. That this Court cannot render a judgment without the additional evidence.
27. The relevant portion from the decision in N. Kamalam is extracted hereunder for reference:-
“19. Incidentally, the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 have not been engrafted in the Code so as to patch up the weak points in the case and to fill up the omission in the Court of appeal — it does not authorise any lacunae or gaps in evidence to be filled up. The authority and jurisdiction as conferred on to the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence is restricted to the purpose of pronouncement of judgment in a particular way. This Court in Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham [AIR 1965 SC 1008 : 67 Bom LR 782] has been candid enough to record that the requirement of the High Court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. In para 9 of the judgment, this Court observed: (AIR p. 1012)
“This provision does not entitle the High Court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in a case. It does not entitle the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence only for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in a particular way. In other words, it is only for removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate Court is empowered to admit additional evidence. The High Court does not say that there is any such lacuna in this case. On the other hand what it says is that certain documentary evidence on record supports ‘in a large measure’ the plaintiffs’ contention about fraud and mala fides. We shall deal with these documents presently but before that we must point out that the power under clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 cannot be exercised for adding to the evidence already on record except upon one of the grounds specified in the provision.”
Further in Pramod Kumari Bhatia v. Om Prakash Bhatia [(1980) 1 SCC 412 : AIR 1980 SC 446] this Court also in more or less an identical situation laid down that since an application to the High Court has been made very many years after the filing of the suit and also quite some years after the appeal had been filed before the High Court, question of interfering with the discretion exercised by the High Court in refusing to receive an additional evidence at that stage would not arise. The time-lag in the matter under consideration is also enormous and the additional evidence sought to be produced was as a matter of fact after a period of 10 years after the filing of the appeal. Presently, the suit was instituted in the year 1981 and the decree therein was passed in 1983. The first appeal was filed before the High Court in April 1983 but the application for permission to adduce additional evidence came to be made only in August 1993. Needless to record that the Courts shall have to be cautious and must always act with great circumspection in dealing with the claims for letting in additional evidence particularly, in the form of oral evidence at the appellate stage and that too, after a long lapse of time. In our view, a plain reading of Order 41 Rule 27 would depict that the rejection of the claim for production of additional evidence after a period of 10 years from the date of filing of the appeal, as noticed above, cannot be termed to be erroneous or an illegal exercise of discretion. The three limbs of Rule 27 do not stand attracted. The learned trial Judge while dealing with the matter has, as a matter of fact, very strongly commented upon the lapse and failure on the part of the plaintiffs even to summon the attestors to the will and in our view contextually, the justice of the situation does not warrant any interference. The attempt, the High Court ascribed it to be a stage-managed affair in order to somehow defeat the claim of the respondents — and having had the privilege of perusal of record we lend our concurrence thereto and the finding of the High Court cannot be found fault with for rejecting the prayer of the appellants for additional evidence made in the belated application. In that view of the matter, the first issue is answered in the negative and thus against the plaintiffs, being the appellants herein.”

28. With respect to the decisions relied upon by the appellant, particularly Ibrahim Uddin, it is pertinent to note the observations of the Supreme Court, in the said decision, while referring to U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava5 and S. Rajagopal v. C.M. Armugam6, held that it is not the function of the appellate Court to supplement the evidence already adduced by either party in the lower Court and further observed that in the absence of satisfactory reasons for the non-production of evidence before the Trial Court, additional evidence should not be admitted at the appellate stage. A party that has been remiss or negligent in producing evidence in the Trial Court is not entitled to the indulgence of introducing such evidence in appeal. Furthermore, where a party had sufficient opportunity to present certain evidence before the lower Court but failed or consciously elected not to do so, such evidence cannot be allowed to be introduced at the appellate stage under this rule. The Court further noted that the inadvertence of the pleader, as has been canvassed by the appellant in the case that certain documents were misplaced, does not constitute a “substantial cause” within the meaning of this Rule. The relevant extract of Ibrahim Uddin is reproduced hereunder:-
“38. Under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, the appellate Court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined. But the requirement of the said Court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. This provision does not entitle the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in a case. It does not entitle the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence only for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in a particular way. In other words, it is only for removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate Court is empowered to admit additional evidence. (Vide Lala Pancham [AIR 1965 SC 1008] .)
39. It is not the business of the appellate Court to supplement the evidence adduced by one party or the other in the lower Court. Hence, in the absence of satisfactory reasons for the non-production of the evidence in the Trial Court, additional evidence should not be admitted in appeal as a party guilty of remissness in the lower Court is not entitled to the indulgence of being allowed to give further evidence under this Rule. So a party who had ample opportunity to produce certain evidence in the lower Court but failed to do so or elected not to do so, cannot have it admitted in appeal. (Vide State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava [AIR 1957 SC 912] and S. Rajagopal v. C.M. Armugam [AIR 1969 SC 101] .)
40. The inadvertence of the party or his inability to understand the legal issues involved or the wrong advice of a pleader or the negligence of a pleader or that the party did not realise the importance of a document does not constitute a “substantial cause” within the meaning of this Rule. The mere fact that certain evidence is important, is not in itself a sufficient ground for admitting that evidence in appeal.”

29. Upon consideration of the judgment rendered by the Trial Court and the submissions advanced by the parties, it is evident that the findings of the Trial Court are based on a proper appreciation of the facts and law. Upon careful consideration of the material on record, the submissions of the parties, and a thorough re-examination of the evidence presented before the learned Trial Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the findings and conclusions of the Trial Court are based on a proper appreciation of the facts and the relevant law. The judgment is both sound and unassailable, thus not warranting for any interference by this Court.
30. The Court, therefore, does not find any substance in the instant appeal. Therefore, the same stands dismissed, along with the pending application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC.
31. Let the Registry to release the amount deposited by the appellants-defendants in favour of the respondents-plaintiffs, upon due verification.

(PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV)
JUDGE
DECEMBER 24, 2024
p/sp

1 (2012) 8 SCC 148
2 (2022) 7 SCC 247
3 (2014) 13 SCC 468
4 (2001) 7 SCC 503
5 AIR 1957 SC 912
6 AIR 1969 SC 101
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