LIBERTY GENERAL INSURANCE LIMITED THROUGH ITS AUTHORISED LEGAL MANAGER MR. ASHISH SINGH TOMAR vs SATVEER & ORS.

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of order: 7th August, 2024
+ MAC.APP. 214/2020 & CM APPLs. 26796/2020&48521/2023

LIBERTY GENERAL INSURANCE LIMITED THROUGH ITS AUTHORISED LEGAL MANAGER MR. ASHISH SINGH TOMAR …..Appellant
Through: Ms. Prerna Mehta, Advocate

versus
SATVEER & ORS. …..Respondents
Through: Mr. Vipul Sharma and Mr. Mohit Tyagi, Advocates

CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE CHANDRA DHARI SINGH

ORDER

CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J (Oral)
1. The instant appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has been filed on behalf of the appellant insurance company seeking setting aside of the award dated 29th July, 2020 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, North – West District, Rohini Courts, Delhi in case bearing MACT no. 218/2017.
2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that vide the impugned award, the learned Tribunal allowed the claim petition by awarding the compensation of Rs. 6,80,000/- along with the interest @ 9% from the date of filing of DAR which is 13th February, 2017 till realization of the amount.
3. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal failed to appreciate that the accident took place on 17th December, 2016 and the statement of the father of the deceased child along with his maternal aunt was recorded on 17th December, 2016, i.e., after a considerable amount of delay, in which they had stated that the accident was caused by some vehicle and they could not note down the number of the offending vehicle, despite the best effort and also because of the maternal aunt being illiterate.
4. It is submitted that an FIR No. 566/2016, was registered under Section 279/337 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 at Police Station, Bharat Nagar against an unknown driver of an unknown vehicle, however, the alleged eye witness made a statement about the accident on 13th January, 2017, i.e., after about an unexplained delay of approximately one month in disclosing the number of the alleged offending vehicle in the present case.
5. It is submitted that as per the statement of the eyewitness recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the vehicle number was disclosed by the eye witness on 13th January, 2017. Further, in the chargesheet, the date of disclosure by the eye witness is alleged to be 10th January, 2017 whereas there is no document on record of this date, therefore, showing discrepancies and gross inconsistency on the face of the record.
6. It is submitted that there is no explanation as to why the number was not disclosed to the police station on the same day and it clearly reflects that the records are created in collusion with the police because as per the police, the number of the vehicle was disclosed on 10th January, 2017 whereas as per the statement of the alleged eye witness, his first statement was recorded on 13th January, 2017 and he had come to the police station along with the father of the deceased on his insistence on 15th January, 2017 and then disclosed the number. The discrepancies in the date and the statements made before the police clearly shows that it was a case of planted vehicle and the insurance company cannot be held liable.
7. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal failed to appreciate that the onus to prove that the vehicle bearing No. DL3CCC6295 (alleged offending vehicle) was involved in the present case was upon the claimants. In order to prove the same, the claimant has examined the father of the minor child PW1 who stated that the accident was caused due to the rash and negligent driving of the alleged vehicle owner, however the same was based on the information provided to him. From the bare perusal of the statement made by PW1, it is clear that his evidence is only of hearsay and he was not personally present at the time of the accident.
8. It is submitted that the alleged eye witness was examined as PW 2, who was not a witness summoned by the Court. Further, in the affidavit by way of evidence, the said witness stated that the driver/respondent no.3 of the vehicle fled from the site after the accident and he had made a mental note of the car number and informed the police personally about the manner of the accident. It is further submitted that the aforesaid witness also stated that his statement was also recorded by the police and after conducting investigation, however, from a bare perusal of the cross-examination of this witness, it is clear that that the statement is not reliable as the witness has contradicted himself with regard to the date when the statement was made to the police and his acquaintance with the father of the deceased minor child.
9. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal erred in not placing reliance on the evidence of the driver/respondent no.3 of alleged offending vehicle who stepped into the witness box and clearly stated that the accident had not taken place due to the offending vehicle and the driver/respondent no.3 has been falsely implicated in the accident.
10. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal erred in fastening the liability of the driver and the owner of the vehicle solely on the basis of the FIR registered against them and that no petition for quashing having been filed before the High Court.
11. It is further submitted that mere reliance on the registration of the criminal case against the driver of the offending vehicle and not filing of the quashing petition cannot be a ground for presuming that the vehicle was involved in the accident specially when the driver had stepped into the witness box and withstood the test of cross-examination. Therefore, the claim has been wrongly decided.
12. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal erred in granting Rs. 3,39,880/- as damages under the non-pecuniary heads without any bifurcation under the requisite heads.
13. In view of the foregoing submissions, it is prayed that the instant appeal may be allowed and the reliefs be granted.
14. Per Contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents vehemently opposed the instant appeal and submitted that the same is liable to be dismissed being devoid of any merits. It is submitted that the learned Trial Court has rightly held that the driver of the offending vehicle was liable for the death of the minor child and thus, there is no illegality or infirmity of any kind thereto. The instant appeal is merely a misuse of process of law.
15. It is pertinent to mention here that vide order dated 12th July, 2024, the respondents were directed to file their written arguments within two days, however, neither the respondents have filed their reply to the instant appeal, nor have they filed their written arguments. Therefore, this Court shall decide the instant appeal based on the material available on record including the Trial Court Record.
16. Heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and perused the material available on record.
17. The appeal is admitted.
18. It is the case of the appellant that it is highly unnatural for a person to remember the number of a vehicle for approximately one month without having any proximate reference or relation with the accident. It has also been submitted that if the claimants had the number of the alleged offending vehicle, then why the same was not disclosed to the police or why the same was not disclosed by the father when the eye witness informed him about the alleged offending vehicle number. Further, statement of both the witnesses in light of aforementioned discrepancies is not reliable and trustworthy. It has been further contended that the learned Tribunal erred in justifying the delay of 24 days by saying that it might be due to mental trauma and the great psychological impact which the family must have suffered from the death of the minor child, however, if PW 1 was in a fit state of mind to make a statement on 17th December, 2016 and the number of vehicle was known to him as disclosed by PW 2, the delay remains unexplained. It has been submitted that mere filing of the FIR will not establish the negligence against the alleged offending vehicle specially when there is a discrepancy with regard to the disclosure of the vehicle number involved in the accident after 24 days.
19. In rival submissions, the respondents have refuted the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant and submitted that the same are baseless and liable to be rejected as the instant appeal is a gross abuse of process of law.
20. Therefore, the limited issue before this Court is to ascertain whether the learned Tribunal erred in holding the driver/respondent no.3 of the offending vehicle liable for the accident that caused the death of the minor child.
21. At this stage, it is pertinent to peruse the impugned award, relevant paragraphs of which are as under:
“..1. The Detailed Accident Report (hereinafter referred to as DAR) was filed in this case on 13.02.2017 with reference to FIR No.566/16 U/s 279/337 IPC PS Bharat Nagar dated 17.12.2016 and subsequent charge sheet u/s 279/304A IPC which was filed in respect of death of Master Riyan. The ld. Predecessor of this court vide order dated 13.02.2017 treated the same as petition u/s 166(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988(hereinafter referred to as M.V. Act).
2. The facts mentioned in the DAR/file are that on 17.12.2016 at about 2:30 pm, Master Riyan (hereinafter referred to as ‘deceased’), aged about 03 years, was playing in front of his jhuggi i.e. SBI Colony, GTK Road, Delhi. At that time, suddenly a car bearing registration no. DL3CCC6295 (hereinafter referred to as “offending vehicle”) which was being driven by its driver/R1 at a very high speed, in rash and negligent manner hit the deceased. Due to said impact, deceased sustained grievous injuries. The deceased was admitted at LNJP hospital, Delhi and ultimately died on 17.12.2016 during the course of treatment.
2.1 The postmortem on the dead body of the deceased was conducted by doctors of Maulana Azad Medical College & Lok Nayak hospital, Delhi vide PMR No. 1283/16 wherein the cause of death was opined as hemorrhagic shock consequent upon blunt force trauma to abdomen, all injuries were antemortem in nature, fresh in duration and were possible in road traffic accident.
3. Paramjeet Singh who was the driver cum owner/R1 of the offending vehicle has filed his written statement wherein he has stated that he was neither driving the offending vehicle at the time of accident nor he was present at the place of incident. He has further stated that he has been falsely implicated in the present case. It was stated in the written statement that there was no eye witness to the incident, the offending vehicle was not impounded from the spot and the driver of the offending vehicle was also not arrested from the spot. It was further stated that the minor child was not crushed by the involvement and negligence of the offending vehicle but by some unknown vehicle and that perusal of the statement dated 13.01.2017 would show that the accused was already sitting in the police station and the eye witness was planted. He has stated that he was having valid driving licence and vehicle no. DL3CCC6295 was insured with Liberty Videocon General Insurance Co. and therefore, liability if any, was of the insurance co.
4. R2/ Liberty Videcon Gernal Insurance Co. Ltd has filed its written statement wherein it was admitted that offending vehicle was insured with it vide policy no. 201120010215100882500000 in the name of R1 from 19.02.2016 to 18.02.2017 i.e. covering the date of accident 17.12.2016. It was stated that there was an unexplained delay of approximately one month (24 days) in disclosing the number of the alleged offending vehicle. It was stated that the accident had taken place on 17.12.2016 and the vehicle number was disclosed by the eye witness on 10.01.2017. It was stated that there was no reasonable explanation in that regard. It was an admitted position that the driving licence of R1 was valid on the date of accident.
5. From the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by this court vide order dated 08.03.2018:
(1) Whether on 17.12.2016 at about 02:30 pm, at GTK road, near B81, Delhi, one white colour car bearing registration no. DL3CCC6295 which was being driven rashly and negligently by Paramjeet/R1 hit Riyan and caused his death?
(2). Whether petitioners are entitled to compensation, if so, to what amount and from whom? OPP
(3). Relief.
6. Petitioners have examined Sh. Satveer (father of deceased) as PW1 and Sh. Sanjay Kumar (eye witness) as PW2 in support of their case. R1 has examined himself as R1W1. The record would show that Insurance co/R2 has not examined any witness in support of its case.
7. I have heard the arguments addressed on behalf of ld counsel for petitioners, Ld counsel for R1 and ld counsel for insurance co/R3 through video conferencing due to Covid19 situation. I have also perused the written arguments filed online mode by the ld counsel for R2/insurance co and its copy forms part of the record. Now, I proceed to discuss the issues in the succeeding paragraphs.
8. Issue wise findings are as under:
ISSUES NO. 1
The onus to prove this issue beyond preponderance of probabilities is upon the petitioners.
9.1 Petitioners/claimants have examined Sh.Sanjay Kumar (eye witness) as PW2. He has tendered his evidence by way of affidavit as Ex. PW2/A. He deposed that on 17.12.2016 at about 02:30 pm, he was going to purchase Biri from Pan shop situated at the kucha portion of the road where some children were playing in front of their jhuggies i.e. in front of SBI colony, GTK road, Delhi. He deposed that suddenly a car bearing registration no. DL3CCC6295 ( “offending vehicle”) which was being driven by its driver/R1 at a very high speed, overtook another vehicle, he lost control over it and hit a minor child who was playing on kachaa portion of the road who sustained grievous injuries on his body. He deposed that R1 fled away from the spot. He further deposed that he had noted down the registration number of the offending vehicle/car and informed the police personally about the manner of accident. He deposed that his statement was also recorded by the police. He deposed that the said accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving on the part of R1. Copy of his aadhar card was proved as Ex. PW2/1.
9.2 PW2 was cross examined by ld counsel for respondents, wherein he deposed that he was a battery rickshaw puller, he had firstly visited PS Keshav Puram on 13.01.2017 and that the name of IO whom he met was Raj Kumar. He deposed that he did not know the petitioner prior to the accident. He deposed that he used to drive his rickshaw from Azadpur to Ghanta Ghar to Ashok Vihar. He deposed that he had no passenger at the time of accident in his rickshaw. He deposed that he did not shift the injured child to the hospital after the accident and did not make a call at 100 number after the accident. He deposed that he did not give any information to the police about the accident from the date of accident i.e. 17.12.2016 till before 13.01.2017. He deposed that no written notice to appear in PS was given to him by the police, however, he received a call from PS asking him to appear in the PS. He deposed that his statement was recorded on 13.01.2017 and subsequently he was also called in the PS on 23 occasions wherein again some queries were done from him, however, he was not sure if his statement was recorded on those dates or not. He deposed that he had met Mr. Satveer i.e. father of injured child on some day between 17.12.2016 and 13.01.2017, however, he did not remember the exact date. He deposed that Mr. Satveer had given his mobile number to the police. He admitted that he knew Mr. Satveer prior to the accident. He denied the suggestions that he was not present at the spot or that he was not an eye witness of the case accident or that due to it he neither shifted the injured child to the hospital nor he informed the police after the accident. He deposed that he used to ply a rickhaw on rent, other rickshaws were also parked on the road including that of Mr. Satveer and as such he knew him prior to the accident, however, he never had any talks with him prior to the accident. He further deposed that he did not ply any rickshaw of Mr. Satveer.
9.3 R1 has himself examined as R1W1. He has tendered his evidence by way of affidavit as Ex. R1W1/A. He has proved his aadhar card as Ex. R1W1/1. His affidavit Ex. R1W1/A is on the lines of his WS wherein he has stated that he has been falsely implicated in the present case and that the offending vehicle is not involved in the accident.
9.4 R1W1 was cross examined by ld counsel for petitioners wherein he admitted that he was facing trial in the corresponding criminal case FIR No. 566/16 PS Bharat Nagar. He deposed that he did not give any written complaint to any higher police authority regarding his alleged false implication in the matter. He further deposed that he had not filed any revision against the summoning order in FIR No. 566/16 PS Bharat Nagar. He deposed that he had no enmity with the family of the deceased or the IO of the case. He denied the suggestion that his affidavit is false or that the case accident occurred due to his fault and negligence.
9.5 The ld counsel for insurance co/R2 has primarily argued that the accident took place on 17.12.2016, the number of offending vehicle is not mentioned in the FIR dated 17.12.2016 and the alleged eye witness disclosed the registration number of the offending vehicle only on 10.01.2017 i.e. after an unexplained delay of about 24 days. She also argued that there are major contradictions in the testimony of alleged eye witness and his statements dated 10.01.2017 and 13.01.2017 as recorded by the police u/s 161 Cr.PC. She thus argued that the offending vehicle has been falsely implicated in the present case. The ld counsel for R1 also argued on the similar lines, however, further argued that the liability of paying compensation, if any, is with the insurance co..
9.6 Perusal of criminal case record would show that the accident is dated 17.12.2016 and the FIR of the case was also registered on 17.12.2016 at PS Bharat Nagar. The reading of FIR would show that the number of the offending vehicle has not been mentioned in it. The charge sheet which is part of DAR would show that it has been mentioned that the registration number of the offending vehicle came to be known to police only on 10.01.2017 upon which notice u/s 133 M.V. Act was given. The offending vehicle was produced by R1 before the police and was seized vide seizure memo dated 13.01.2017. To notice u/s 133 M.V. Act, R1 replied that the said offending vehicle i..e Toyota Corola Altis car was owned by him which was in his possession on 17.12.2016 (date of accident). The statement of Sh. Sanjay Kumar/PW2 u/s 161 Cr.PC was recorded by the police on 10.01.2017 and his supplementary statement as per record was also recorded on 13.01.2017. In his statement dated 10.01.2017 u/s 161 Cr.PC, Sh. Sanjay Kumar has inter alia stated to the effect that on 17.12.2016 at about 03:00 pm he was going after parking his battery rickshaw from Nank Piau towards GT Road and on the way while he was purchasing a biri from a pan shop in front of SBI colony then he saw that one car of white colour came from the side of GTK towards industrial area, hit a child playing there and thereafter fled from the spot. He further stated that he noted the registration number of the offending vehicle in his mind which was DL3CCC6295 which he also gave to the family members of the injured along with his mobile number. He further stated that on 10.01.2017 the father of the deceased came to him and thereafter he came to the police station upon which his statement was recorded. He also stated that he could identify the offending vehicle and its driver and that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle by its driver. The supplementary statement dated 13.01.2017 of Sh. Sanjay Kumar u/s 161 Cr.PC would show that he identified the offending vehicle and its driver R1 at the police station upon which R1/accused was arrested and the offending vehicle was seized. The arrest memo of the accused dated 13.01.2017 and the seizure memo of the offending car dated 13.01.2017 are on record.
9.7 PW1 i.e. father of deceased has inter alia deposed in his cross examination that Mr. Sanjay (PW2) had informed him personally regarding the accident at about 2:3003: 00 pm. PW2 has deposed in his cross examination that he had met Mr. Satveer i..e father of injured child on some day between 17.12.2016 and 13.01.2017, however, he did not remember the exact date. The FIR would show that it was recorded neither on the statement of PW1 nor that of PW2 but was recorded on the DD No. 18PP dated 17.12.2016 PP Sangam Park PS Bharat Nagar regarding admission of injured Riyan at Trauma Centre after an accident. The charge sheet also reflects that the registration number of the offending vehicle firstly came into knowledge of the police only on 10.01.2017. The statement dated 10.01.2017 of Sh. Sanjay Kumar u/s 161 Cr.PC would reflect that on that day the father of the deceased i.e. PW1 came to him upon which he came to the police station where his statement was recorded intimating the registration number of the offending vehicle. The case accident involves the death of a minor child of about 3 years. The family of the deceased including his father must have suffered a great shock and psychological trauma after the death of their minor child and the family must have required sufficient time to get over the loss and to look after other criminal aspects of the case. The said delay as argued by ld counsel for insurance co. can thus be attributed to the said great loss of the family. No doubt there are some variations in the statements of Sh. Sanjay Kumar u/s 161 Cr.PC and his testimony, however, these are not material in nature so as to entirely discard his testimony as given in the court. Sh. Sanjay Kumar as PW2 has specifically deposed regarding the registration number of the offending vehicle and that the case accident was caused due to rash, negligent and careless driving on the part of R1. The said portion of his (PW2) testimony seems trustworthy and can be relied upon. The copy of site plan as part of DAR would show that the accident occurred on the extreme left side of the road which would show that the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle. The copy of mechanical inspection report of the offending vehicle is also on record which would show that its right side mirror bracket was broken and its mirror cover was missing. The Ld counsel for respondents during final arguments wanted to highlight some contradictions in the testimony of PW2 and his above said statements dated 10.01.2017 and 13.01.2017 u/s 161 Cr.PC , however, the testimony of PW2 would show that the said statements u/s 161 Cr.PC were never put to PW2 in his cross examination by the respondents to contradict him. The testimony of R1W1 also does not inspire any confidence as he has admitted in his cross examination that he was facing trial in the corresponding criminal case FIR No. 566/16 PS Bharat Nagar and that he had not given any written complaint to any higher police authority regarding his alleged false implication in the matter nor filed any revision petition against the summoning order in FIR no. 566/16 PS Bharat Nagar.
9.8 The postmortem on the dead body of the deceased was conducted by doctors of Maulana Azad Medical College & Lok Nayak hospital, Delhi vide PMR No. 1283/16 wherein the cause of death was opined as hemorrhagic shock consequent upon blunt force trauma to abdomen, all injuries were antemortem in nature, fresh in duration and were possible in road traffic accident.
9.9 The copy of charge sheet in FIR No. 566/16 PS Bharat Nagar is on record u/s 279/304A IPC which has been filed against R1. The issue no. 1 is only to be proved by claimants beyond preponderance of probabilities as distinguished from beyond reasonable doubt. In a judgment in the case of Sunita vs Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Civil Appeal No. 166/2019, date of decision 14.02.2019 of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, the Hon’ble Apex Court has inter alia held as follows:……

In view of above said discussion, criminal record including charge sheet and testimony of PW2 it has been proved beyond preponderance of probabilities that the case accident was caused by R1 while driving the offending vehicle in a rash and negligent manner at the above said date, place and time and thereby caused the death of the deceased.
Issue no.1 is decided in favour of petitioners and against the respondents accordingly.

10. Issue No. (2)
In view of my findings on issue no.1, the petitioners are entitled to compensation.
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12. In view of above, the over all compensation amount thus comes to Rs.6,79,760/+-.
13.1 In facts and as per settled law, since the offending vehicle was duly insured with the insurance company/R2, hence R2 is liable to pay the entire compensation amount to the petitioners as per law…”

22. Upon perusal of the impugned award, it is made out that a claim petition was filed due to death of Master Riyan, and the DAR was filed on 13th February, 2017, following FIR No. 566/16, which was registered under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 at Police Station Bharat Nagar on 17th December, 2016. Subsequently, a charge sheet under Sections 279 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 was filed concerning the death of Master Riyan. The predecessor of the learned Tribunal treated the DAR as a petition under Section 166(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
23. The incident occurred on 17th December, 2016, at approximately 2:30 pm, when Master Riyan, aged about three years, was playing in front of his jhuggi at SBI Colony, GTK Road, Delhi. A car bearing registration number DL3CCC6295, driven by its owner, Sh. Paramjeet Singh (respondent no. 3 herein), at high speed and in a rash and negligent manner, hit Master Riyan, causing grievous injuries.
24. Master Riyan was admitted to LNJP Hospital, Delhi, where he succumbed to his injuries on the same day. The postmortem conducted by doctors at Maulana Azad Medical College and Lok Nayak Hospital indicated that the cause of death was hemorrhagic shock due to blunt force trauma to the abdomen, with all injuries being antemortem and fresh, consistent with a road traffic accident.
25. Sh. Paramjeet Singh, in his written statement, denied driving the offending vehicle at the time of the accident and claimed false implication. He asserted there were no eyewitnesses, the vehicle was not impounded at the spot, and he was not arrested from the scene. He argued that the child was hit by an unknown vehicle and mentioned that he had a valid driving license, and the vehicle was insured with Liberty Videocon General Insurance Co/appellant herein.
26. The insurance company, in its written statement, admitted the vehicle was insured under policy no. 201120010215100882500000, valid from 19th February, 2016, to 18th February, 2017. However, they highlighted a 24-day delay in disclosing the vehicle’s number, which was only revealed on 10th January, 2017, without a reasonable explanation. Despite this, they acknowledged that the driver’s license was valid on the accident date.
27. The court framed the following issues on March 8, 2018:
1. Whether on 17th December, 2016, at about 2:30 pm, at GTK Road, near B81, Delhi, a white car bearing registration number DL3CCC6295, driven rashly and negligently by Paramjeet Singh, hit Master Riyan and caused his death?
2. Whether the petitioners are entitled to compensation, and if so, what amount and from whom?
3. Relief.
28. The claimants presented Sh. Satveer (father of the deceased) as PW1 and Sh. Sanjay Kumar (eyewitness) as PW2. Sh. Paramjeet Singh testified as R1W1, while the insurance company did not examine any witnesses.
29. The learned Tribunal discussed the issues in detail, noting that the onus to prove the accident was caused by Sh. Paramjeet Singh’s rash and negligent driving lay with the claimants. Sh. Sanjay Kumar (PW2) provided an affidavit stating he witnessed the accident and identified the vehicle. Despite being cross-examined, his testimony was found credible, although he admitted knowing the deceased’s father prior to the accident.
30. Sh. Paramjeet Singh (R1W1) denied involvement but admitted facing trial in the criminal case related to the accident. The insurance company highlighted delays and inconsistencies in the eyewitness’s testimony but did not challenge the core facts.
31. The learned Tribunal found the evidence, including the postmortem report and mechanical inspection of the vehicle, supported the claimants’ claim. The site plan indicated the accident occurred on the extreme left side of the road, implying negligent driving. The learned Tribunal concluded that the claimants proved beyond a preponderance of probabilities that SH. Paramjeet Singh’s rash and negligent driving caused the accident and Master Riyan’s death.
32. In light of these findings, the learned Tribunal awarded the claimants a compensation of Rs. 6,79,760/-, with the insurance company liable to pay the entire amount, as the vehicle was duly insured.
33. Insofar as the law is concerned, it has already been reiterated time and again by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court that the standard of proof required in Motor Accident Claims is not strict as compared to the criminal proceedings. Unlike, the criminal matters, the standard of proof in claim matters follow the principle of preponderance of probabilities. It means that the party bearing the burden of proof must demonstrate that their version of events is more likely to be true than not. In other words, the evidence presented by one side must outweigh the evidence presented by the opposing side. This standard is less stringent than ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ which is used in criminal matters.
34. In the jurisprudence of motor vehicle accident claims, negligence refers to the failure of the offending vehicle’s driver to exercise the expected duty of care, leading to harm or injury to passengers or other road users. As per the law, the driver of the offending vehicle must abide by the speeding and other rules & regulations of the road which have been determined by the concerned authority. Failure to adherence to the said rules and regulations results in failure of duty to care resulting in breach of such duty.
35. In order to determine whether the driver of the offending vehicle has committed negligent act resulting in damage to others there must be shown a degree of proof. With regard to the same, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 5 SCC 656 has held that the proceedings under the Act are decided on the basis of the preponderance of probabilities and thus, the degree of proof required is much less than any other proceedings. Relevant extracts are as under:
“..11. The High Court, contends the learned counsel, erroneously decided the matter on the principle of “beyond reasonable doubt” whereas proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act were required to be decided on the basis of preponderance of probabilities and thus, the degree of proof required was much less. Additionally, the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act were not adversarial and in that regard, the evidence on record was sufficient to reach at the conclusion that Respondent 2’s negligence led to the accident and that the appellant was entitled to full compensation. Finally, the appellant suffered 40% permanent disability and 100% functional disability and on that basis, the Tribunal erred by not granting higher compensation to the appellant. He also contends that the courts below erred in absolving Respondent 1 Insurance Company from its liability. The following cases were cited by the learned counsel in support of the submissions : Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2001) 2 SCC 9 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 268] , Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz [Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz, (2013) 10 SCC 646 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 73 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 13] , Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC [Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009) 13 SCC 530 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1101] , Ravi Kapur v. State of Rajasthan [Ravi Kapur v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 9 SCC 284 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 660 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1107] , National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 205 : AIR 2017 SC 5157] , Kishan Gopal v. Lala [Kishan Gopal v. Lala, (2014) 1 SCC 244 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 184 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 241] , Harbans Lal v. Harvinder Pal [Harbans Lal v. Harvinder Pal, 2015 SCC OnLine P&H 9926] , New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Pazhaniammal [New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Pazhaniammal, 2011 SCC OnLine Ker 1881 : (2011) 107 AIC 382] , United India Insurance Co.Ltd. v. Deepak Goel [United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Deepak Goel, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 362] , Manisha v. Umakant Marotrao Kolhe [Manisha v. Umakant Marotrao Kolhe, 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 4613 : (2015) 6 Bom CR 640] and Mahawati Devi v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [Mahawati Devi v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Pat 1145].
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25. In Dulcina Fernandes [Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz, (2013) 10 SCC 646 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 73 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 13] , this Court examined similar situation where the evidence of claimant’s eyewitness was discarded by the Tribunal and that the respondent in that case was acquitted in the criminal case concerning the accident. This Court, however, opined that it cannot be oveR1ooked that upon investigation of the case registered against the respondent, prima facie, materials showing negligence were found to put him on trial. The Court restated the settled principle that the evidence of the claimants ought to be examined by the Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and certainly the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied as noted in Bimla Devi [Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009) 13 SCC 530 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1101] . In paras 8 & 9 of the reported decision, the dictum in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta [United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta, (2011) 10 SCC 509 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 798 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 328] , has been adverted to as under : (Dulcina Fernandes case [Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz, (2013) 10 SCC 646 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 73 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 13] , SCC p. 650)
“8. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta [United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta, (2011) 10 SCC 509 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 798 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 328] while considering the nature of a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 a three-Judge Bench of this Court has culled out certain propositions of which Propositions (ii), (v) and (vi) would be relevant to the facts of the present case and, therefore, may be extracted hereinbelow : (SCC p. 518, para 10)
‘10. (ii) The rules of the pleadings do not strictly apply as the claimant is required to make an application in a form prescribed under the Act. In fact, there is no pleading where the proceedings are suo motu initiated by the Tribunal.
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(v) Though the Tribunal adjudicates on a claim and determines the compensation, it does not do so as in an adversarial litigation. …
(vi) The Tribunal is required to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the enquiry.’
9. The following further observation available in para 10 of the Report would require specific note : (Shila Datta case [United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta, (2011) 10 SCC 509 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 798 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 328] , SCC p. 519)
‘10. … We have referred to the aforesaid provisions to show that an award by the Tribunal cannot be seen as an adversarial adjudication between the litigating parties to a dispute, but a statutory determination of compensation on the occurrence of an accident, after due enquiry, in accordance with the statute.’”

In para 10 of Dulcina Fernandes [Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz, (2013) 10 SCC 646 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 73 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 13] , the Court opined that non-examination of witness per se cannot be treated as fatal to the claim set up before the Tribunal. In other words, the approach of the Tribunal should be holistic analysis of the entire pleadings and evidence by applying the principles of preponderance of probability…”

36. The counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant further contends that there are gross discrepancies in the eyewitness’s statements, thereby, questioning the credibility and the learned Tribunal’s reliance on them. It has been asserted that the claimant’s evidence, including hearsay from the deceased’s father and the dubious testimony of the eyewitness, fails to prove the respondent no.3 vehicle’s involvement.
37. In view of the aforesaid point of law, i.e., preponderance of probabilities as the standard of proof, this Court is of the opinion that the learned Tribunal had sufficient material on its record to arrive at the finding that the driver/respondent no. 3 is guilty of the act of negligence that led to the death of Master Riyan.
38. The claimants in the case examined Sh. Sanjay Kumar (PW2), who testified via affidavit (Ex. PW2/A) that on 17th December, 2016 at about 02:30 pm, he witnessed a car with registration number DL3CCC6295 being driven at high speed by the respondent no. 3/driver, overtaking another vehicle, losing control, and hitting a minor child playing on the roadside, causing grievous injuries.
39. PW2 noted the vehicle’s registration number and informed the police. During cross-examination, PW2 admitted to meeting the father of the injured child, Sh. Satveer, between 17th December, 2016 and 13th January, 2017 and visiting the police station on 13th January, 2017. He denied knowing the claimant before the accident but acknowledged knowing Sh. Satveer, as their rickshaws were often parked nearby.
40. Respondent no. 3, the driver of the offending vehicle, testified via his affidavit (Ex. R1W1/A), asserting false implication in the case and denying the involvement of the offending vehicle in the accident. However, during cross-examination, respondent no. 3 admitted to facing trial in the corresponding criminal case (FIR No. 566/16 PS Bharat Nagar) and ‘not filing any complaint or revision petition regarding his alleged false implication’.
41. The learned counsel for the insurance company argued that the delay of 24 days in disclosing the registration number of the offending vehicle and the contradictions in PW2’s statements undermined the credibility of the testimony. However, the criminal case record showed that the accident and the FIR were dated 17th December, 2016, and the registration number of the offending vehicle was disclosed on 10th January, 2017. PW2’s statements to the police on 10th January, 2017 and 13th January, 2017 were consistent with his testimony. Despite some variations, the learned Tribunal found PW2’s testimony trustworthy, particularly regarding the registration number of the offending vehicle and the rash and negligent driving by respondent no. 3. The site plan corroborated the accident’s occurrence on the extreme left side of the road, indicating negligence. The mechanical inspection report of the offending vehicle further supported this finding.
42. The learned Tribunal emphasized that the issue must be proved beyond the preponderance of probabilities, a standard lower than beyond a reasonable doubt, citing one of the Supreme Court’s decision. The leaned Tribunal concluded that the accident was caused by the respondent no. 3 driving the offending vehicle in a rash and negligent manner, resulting in the death of the minor child. Thus, issue no. 1 was decided in favor of the claimants and against the respondents, and this Court is inclined to uphold the said findings as there does not seem to be any errors of law in the passing of the impugned award.
43. It is also pertinent to state here that the appellant has contended that mere reliance on the registration of the criminal case against the driver of the offending vehicle and not filing of the quashing petition cannot be a ground for presuming that the vehicle was involved in the accident especially when the driver had stepped into the witness box and withstood the test of cross-examination.
44. With regards to the above, it is held that in terms of the settled position of law, acquittal in a criminal case does not lead to an automatic inference that there was no negligence on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle.
45. This Court is also of the view that judgment of a Criminal Court determining the guilt or innocence of the driver of the motor vehicle concerned is neither conclusive nor binding on the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals, dealing with a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The findings as to the guilt or otherwise of the driver are wholly irrelevant for the purpose of the trial on merits of the claim petition before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal.
46. Furthermore, there is sufficient material such as the FIR, court notices, proceedings before the criminal case, statement of the drier/respondent no. 3 and also the fact that although the driver has contended that he was falsely implicated, he failed to approach the appropriate forum of law. Thus, the appellant’s contentions are rejected.
47. Moving further, the appellant has challenged that the learned Tribunal erred in determining the compensation amount as it failed to draw a table and give separate heads stating the amount awarded under the different heads. In this regard, it is stated by this Court that the said argument is baseless and without any force as well as evidence. Thus, the said argument gets rejected.
48. This Court is of the considered view that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a legislation enacted with the intent to impart social welfare and for the benefit of the victim/injured, and approaching an appellate Court challenging an award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal on surmises and conjectures defeats the purpose of the aforesaid enactment, ultimately causing prejudice to the victim.
49. Therefore, taking into consideration the observations made in the foregoing paragraphs, this Court does not find any merit in the instant appeal as the appellant herein has been unable to put forth any propositions to prove the findings of the learned Tribunal contrary and against the law. It is held that the instant appeal is baseless and there is nothing on record to show that the learned Tribunal erred in adjudicating any issue.
50. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the impugned award dated 29th July, 2020 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, North – West District, Rohini Courts, Delhi in case bearing MACT no. 218/2017 is upheld.
51. Accordingly, the instant appeal stands dismissed along with the pending applications, if any.
52. The order be uploaded on the website forthwith.

CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J
AUGUST 7, 2024
gs/ryp/av
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