INCOME TAX OFFICE vs ANIL TUTEJA & ORS.

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment Reserved on : 12.12.2023
Judgment Pronounced on : 08.01.2024

+ CRL.M.C.2757/2023

INCOME TAX OFFICE ….. Petitioner
versus

ANIL TUTEJA & ORS. ….. Respondents
Advocates who appeared in this case:

For the Petitioner : Mr. S.V. Raju, ASG with Mr. Zoheb Hossain, Senior Standing Counsel and Mr. Sanjeev Menon, Junior Standing Counsel for Revenue/IT Department.

For the Respondents : Dr. Abhishek Singhvi and Mr. N. Hariharan, Senior Advocate with Mr. Arshdeep Singh Khurana, Mr. Harsh Srivastava and Mr. Sidak Singh Anand, Advocates for R-1 and R-2.
Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Senior Advocate with Mr. Anshul Rai, Mr. Nimit and Mr. Harshwardhan, Advocates for R-3.
Mr. Mohit Mathur, Senior Advocate with Mr. Rahul Tyagi, Mr. Sangeet Sibou, Mr. Jatin, Mr. Aashish Chojer, Ms. Mizbah Dhebar and Mr. Shivam Batra, Advocates for R-4 & R-5.
Mr. P.Roychaudhuri, Advocate for R-8.
Mr. Sidhant Kumar, Mr. Shivankar Rao and Mr. Manyaa Chandok, Advocates for R-10.
Mr. Kapil Sibal and Mr. Dayan Krishnan, Senior Advocates with Mr. Ankur Chawla, Mr. Mahender Kumar and Mr. Amir Khan and Mr. Mahesh Kumar, Advocates for Impleading party-State of Chattisgarh.

CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE TUSHAR RAO GEDELA

J U D G M E N T
CRL.M.A. 10323/2023 & CRL.M.A. 19314/2023 (Both for stay)

1. These are applications under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”) for stay of operation of the impugned part of the order dated 06.04.2023 passed by the learned ACMM (Special Acts), Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in CT Case No. 1183/2022 titled as “Income Tax Office Vs. Anil Tuteja & Ors”.
2. The brief facts culled from the impugned order dated 06.04.2023 are as follows:
“A complaint u/s 200 Cr.P.C was made by Income Tax Office through Mr. Seuj Kumar Saikia, DDIT, Inv. Unit-1(4), New Delhi, alleging commission of offence punishable u/s 276C(1)/277/278 read with Section 278B/278E of The Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘The Act’) and section 120B/191/199/200/204 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short IPC). Since, the present complaint was filed by a public servant acting in discharge of his official duties and in course of his employment, so the formal examination of the AR of complainant was dispensed with, in terms of proviso (a) of Section 200 Cr.P.C.
The gravemen of accusation against accused persons is that Anil Tuteja (accused No. 1), a promotee IAS officer in the state of Chattisgarh is engaged in movement of unaccounted cash through different channels with regard to sectors such as agriculture, mining, liquor trade and licensing in the state of Chhattisgarh. His son Yash Tuteja (accused no. 2) and Saumya Chaurasia (accused no. 3) Deputy Secretary of Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh are his accomplices who are actively engaged and involved in aforementioned illegal operations. Numerous whatsapp chats betwixt accused no. 1 and accused no. 3 have been cited by  complainant to show that they discussed matters like payment of Rs. 4.5 Crores bribe by a bureaucrat to Ram Gopal Aggarwal (Treasurer, PCC), Rs. 75 Lakhs utilized for construction of house of one Vikas Tiwari (PCC spokesperson), Rs. 3 Lakhs given to accused no. 4 namely Anwar Dhebar (brother of Mayor of Raipur) and amount paid by Ashok Chaturvedi (GM of Text Book Corporation) for settlement of a corruption case etc. In one whatsapp conversation, the accused no. 1 and 3 were discussing about ‘payments’ with respect to one Mukesh, Mandeep (accused no. 8), Kishore, Sonwani, RG and Bhatia. As per this chat, RG (believed to be Ram Gopal Aggarwal) and Bhatia (short for Pawan Bhatia) allegedly made by Mukesh (Rs. 12.96 Crores), Mandeep (Rs. 14.86 Crores) and Kishore (Rs. 16 Crore), all these three persons were representatives of companies empanelled with agricultural department as approved rate contractors. Investigation revealed that the amounts paid by representatives were neither paid to government nor for any lawful purpose. An amount of Rs. 3 Crores changed hands through one Manish at behest of accused no. 1 and 3 as revealed from their whatsapp chats. Accused no. 8 Mandeep Chawla allegedly sought favours for various mining works and contracts from accused no. 1 and 3. Chats show that accused no. 8 also collects money for accused no. 1.
Analysis of whatsapp chats of accused no. 1 and an IFS officer Anil Rai (Secretary PWD, Chhattisgarh) disclosed about payment of money from IFS officer to accused no. 4. The accused no. 4 allegedly collected bribes from traders at behest of accused no. 1 and 3. Whatsapp chat of accused no. 4 revealed that Rs. 5 Crores were delivered by some person to him at instance of accused no. 1. Further investigation revealed whatsapp conversations between accused no. 1 and 4 regarding proposals of percentage shares of manufacture of country liquor, beer amongst various distillers of Raipur for FY 2019-20. They also discussed about the shares to be allotted to each group of distillers and their objections etc. From chats of accused no. 4 information about collection of bribes from liquor and other businesses by him and transfer of that money to accused no. 1 is unveiled. Photos of Rs. 10 and Rs. 20 currency notes were exchanged on whatsapp between accused no. 1 and 4 in order to communicate in code language about exchange of money. Issues of allotment of mines and payment of royalty etc. were also parts of chats of accused no. 1 and 4.
Accused no. 9 M/s Lingraj Suppliers Pvt. Ltd. is a company incorporated in Kolkata on 12.02.2009 and is allegedly indirectly controlled by accused no. 1 and 2. Accused no. 9 is purportedly managed by one CA Vikas Agarwal (accused no. 7). Bank account numbers were shared by accused no. 7 with accused no. 2 which was followed by transfer of money into the bank accounts of different companies from bank account of accused no. 9. It was also exposed during investigation that bogus companies like Chamunda Distributors Pvt. Ltd. and Mahadev Commodities Pvt. Ltd. made investments in accused no. 9 in the FY 2009-10 at very high valuation (Each share of Rs. 10/- face value was subscribed at a premium of Rs. 990/-) despite accused no. 9 not having any investments or worthwhile business at that time. Accused no. 10 Saurabh Jain and accused no. 11 Vaibhav Saluja were then shareholders of accused no. 9. Accused no. 10 and 11 failed to submit the bank account statement of accused no. 9 for FY 2009-10 which shows that the entire transaction of issue of shares at premium was a sham transaction designed to park unaccounted money. Accused no. 10 and 11 also owned one company namely M/s Safal Multi Trade Pvt. Ltd. M/s Safal Multi Trade Pvt. Ltd. acquired 93% shares of accused no. 9 in May 2010. M/s Safal Multi Trade had an asset base of few lakh rupees at the time of acquiring 93% shares of accused no. 9 which had securities premium its balance sheet of Rs. 13 crores. Accused no. 11 was an employee of M/s Meenakshi Beauty and Academy Pvt Ltd. (a business run by wife of accused no. 1). Accused no. 11 transferred his shareholding in Safal Multi Trade in 2017. Accused no. 7 disclosed that accused no. 9 is owned by M/s. Safal Multi Trade Pvt. Ltd. which itself is owned by Swati and Nishi Agarwal (accused no. 14 and 15 respectively) who purchased its shares in February 2019 but the sale consideration of Rs. 1.2 Crores had not been paid till date. Money was time and again transferred from bank account of accused no. 9 to M/s Meenakshi Beauty and Academy Pvt. Ltd. The directors of accused no. 9 are Ashok Kumar Agarwal and Garima Sharma (accused no. 12 and 13 respectively).
Text messages between accused no. 2 and Vishal Rahatgaonkar (accountant of Tuteja family) and bank account statements show that accused no. 9 was controlled by the Tutejas. Whastapp chats between accused no. 2 and 8 as well as between accused no. 4 and Nitesh Purohit (accused no. 5) show payments being made to Shamrock Hotel which is owned by accused no.8.
Search was conducted upon Minakshi Tuteja (w/o accused no. 10 on 27.02.2020. Search was also conducted at premises of accused no. 3. Accused no. 3 informed that her mobile phones were lost and when an attempt was made to take backup of her e-mails then a device made an access from Singapore and deleted entire data available in the mail. Whatsapp chats of accused no 1 and 3 also showed that accused no. 3 wrote that her personal secretary Jay will give money to Chaitanya Baghel (S/o Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh). A diary maintained by accused no. 3 was also recovered from her residence wherein various transactions done over the years were recorded about which no satisfactory replies were given by accused no. 3. Chats between accused no. 1 and 3 using code words and abbreviations were also discovered which showed movement of unaccounted cash of crores of rupees. Accused no. 6 Vikas Agarwal @ Subu Agarwal exchanged whatsapp messages with accused no. 4 regarding accounting of collection of bribes/commission from sale of liquor showing that he was also privy to and involved in illegal activity of raising and movement of unaccounted cash for accused no. 1. As per the complaint commission/bribes amounting to Rs. 14.41 crores went to accused no. 1 between 28.07.2019 to 20.12.2019.”
3. The petitioner/complainant being aggrieved of that part of the impugned order whereby the learned ACMM had directed the return of the complaint to the extent of those offences, which, according to the learned ACMM had arisen beyond the territorial jurisdiction of Delhi, is assailing the same through the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The impugned part of the order is as under:-
“Ordinarily, every offence shall be tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it is committed. The judgment passed by the High Court of Delhi in the case titled as Jolly Singh v. The State 2022 LiveLaw (Del) 1157: cited by the complainant is taken note of and the same is being adhered to. The entire case of prosecution is that for assessment year 2020-21, accused no. 1, 2 & 3 in collusion with each other took bribes, illegal commissions, unaccounted monies etc. (in state of Chhattisgarh), the collection work was clone by accused no. 4 to 6 & 13 on their behalf, thereafter with aid of accused no. 7, and 10 to 15, this unaccounted cash was deposited in bank account of accused no. 9 which in turn either kept it or transferred the same to the beauty saloon business run and owned by accused no. 2 and wife of accused no. 1. None of these acts had occurred within the territory of Delhi. The criminal conspiracy was not hatched at Delhi, the destruction of evidence was not done at Delhi, wilful evasion of tax or false verification of income tax returns did not occur at Delhi. No abetment of aforementioned offences was done at or from Delhi. No monetary transaction was executed at Delhi. The jurisdiction with regard to these offences is either at Kolkata or at Raipur or Bhilai or at other places of Chhattisgarh where the conspiracy was put into effect by accused persons. The complaint with regard to these offences qua all the accused persons is returned in original and the complainant may present the same before the court of competent jurisdiction.”

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
4. Mr. S.V. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General of India (hereinafter referred to as “ASG”) appears on behalf of the petitioner and submits that the learned ACMM vide the impugned order dated 06.04.2023 took cognizance of only half or part of the offences and returned the complaint qua the offences under Section 276C(1)/278 read with Section 278B/278E of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “I.T. Act”) and Sections 120B/199/200/204 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) committed by the accused persons on the ground that the Courts in Delhi lack the territorial jurisdiction over such offences, which is impermissible in law.
5. Learned ASG submits that the learned Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence must not necessarily have territorial jurisdiction to try the case as his power to take cognizance of the offence is not impaired by territorial jurisdiction. He further submits that even the provisions of Section 179 Cr.P.C. do not restrict the powers of any court to take cognizance of the offence. He relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal reported as 1999 8 SCC 686, especially to Para Nos. 11 and 13 to submit that the Court cannot be impaired by territorial jurisdiction during pre-cognizance stage.
6. Learned ASG further submits that this is a case of criminal conspiracy which is a continuing offence and continues to subsist and committed wherever one of the conspirators does an act or series of acts. In this regard, he relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of India & Ors. reported in (1993) 3 SCC 609, specifically to Para 25 wherein it was held that so long as the performance of the conspiracy continues, it is a continuing offence and it will continue so long as there are two or more parties to it, intending to carry into effect, the design.
7. He further submits that the conspiracy in the present case is not just restricted to evasion of taxes but extends to misleading the petitioner authority by giving false statements. On this basis, he submits that the statements given by the accused/ respondents under Section 131(1A) of the I.T. Act forms part of the conspiracy against which the proceedings under Income Tax Act were initiated against them.
8. Learned ASG submits that even though the criminal conspiracy may not have been hatched in Delhi and the willful evasion of tax or false verification of IT returns did not occur at Delhi but the statements given by the Accused No. 1, 2 & 3 under Section 131(1A) I.T. Act before the Income Tax Authorities in Delhi form an important part of and are an extension of the offence under Section 276C of the I.T. Act and Section 120B of IPC. Consequently, Delhi becomes the place where the offence of criminal conspiracy was continued to be committed by the accused respondents, thus giving Courts in Delhi the territorial jurisdiction to try the case.
9. Learned ASG refers to Sections 178 and 179 of the Cr.P.C., which are extracted hereunder:-
“178. Place of inquiry or trial.
(a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or
(b) where an offence is committed, partly in one local area and partly in another, or
(c) where an offence, is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or
(d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas,
it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.

179. Offence triable where act is done or consequence ensues.
When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued.”

On this, he submits that the present case is one of criminal conspiracy which has been committed in more local areas than one and thus, is covered by the provisions of Section 178 (c) of the Cr.P.C.
10. It is submitted that there is continuity in action and purpose which starts from the conspiracy to receipt of undisclosed income and extends to concealing such income from the returns of the respondents and concertedly evading and deflecting the authorities, including by way of the statements given under Section 131 (1A) of the I.T. Act within the territory of Delhi. Learned ASG contends that the respondents, in pursuance of the criminal conspiracy, gave misleading statements to the petitioner authority and as it is an admitted position of law that the overt acts committed in pursuance of the conspiracy would form part of the same transaction, the said giving of statements to the petitioner authority in the present case would form part of the same transaction, thus invoking the territorial jurisdiction of Courts of Delhi.
11. Learned ASG relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in Asit Bhattacharjee v. Hanuman Prasad Ojha & Ors. reported in (2007) 5 SCC 786 wherein it was held that where a part of cause of action has arisen, the police station concerned situated within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance under Section 190(1) Cr.P.C., will have the jurisdiction to make investigation. On this basis, Mr. Raju submits that the petitioner is conducting the investigation in Delhi where a part of the cause of action arose when the accused respondents gave misleading statements to the petitioner authority and for this reason, the learned ACMM had the territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance and even try the case.
12. Mr. Raju further relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Chandra Deo Singh vs. Prokash Chandra Bose alias Chabi Bose & Anr. reported as AIR 1963 SC 1430, specifically to para 7 which lays down that an accused person does not come into the picture at all, till the process is issued. He may remain present with a view to be informed but he has no right to take part in the proceedings. Taking strength from the same, learned ASG submits that an accused person does not have a right to interfere or even make submissions, rather just a right to be informed and be present.
13. He further submits that it is a clearly laid down law that the discretion must remain with the Police or the complainant to choose the place of trial and the accused should not have any say in the matter.
14. Reliance is further placed upon the judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Mahindra Kumar Narendra & Ors. Vs. State & Ors. reported as 2004 SCC OnLine Del 1025, specifically to Para 7 to submit that the proceedings can be initiated at any of the places where the offence has been partly committed and the Magistrate exercising jurisdiction over all those areas are empowered to take cognizance of the offence under Sections 170 and 173 of the Cr.P.C.
15. Learned ASG next refers to Para 10, 11 and 12 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Purushottamdas Dalmia vs. State of West Bengal reported as AIR 1961 SC 1589 wherein it was held that the provisions of the Code should be construed to give jurisdiction to the Court trying the offence of criminal conspiracy, to try all the overt acts committed in pursuance of their conspiracy. This is for the reason that if such overt acts committed could not be tried by the Court due to lack of territorial jurisdiction, then it would mean that either the prosecution is forced to give up its right of prosecuting the accused for commission of those overt acts or that both the parties are put through the trouble of trying those offences in a second Court who would be determining the same questions and appreciating the same evidence. That apart, there would also be a risk of the second Court coming to a different conclusion from that of the first Court.
16. On this basis, Mr. Raju submits that the acts of criminal conspiracy and willful evasion of tax committed by the accused respondents extended to the local area of the NCT of Delhi by way of statements given in concert by the Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in order to evade and deflect the Tax Authorities and thereby, giving the Courts in Delhi the territorial jurisdiction over the offences alleged in the complaint of the petitioner.
17. On the issue of maintainability, Mr. Raju draws support from the judgment in Prabhu Chawla Vs. State of Rajasthan & Another reported in (2016) 16 SCC 30 wherein the Supreme Court made it clear that since Section 397 Cr.P.C. is attracted against all orders other than interlocutory, a contrary view would limit the availability of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. only to petty interlocutory orders, which is wholly unwarranted. On this basis, learned ASG submits that the present petition filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is maintainable regardless of the availability of remedy under Section 397 Cr.P.C.
18. Thus, on the basis of the above contentions and the judgements relied upon, learned ASG seeks indulgence of this Court to pass interim order restraining the operation of the impugned order dated 06.04.2023 passed by the learned ACMM returning the complaint qua the offences in respect of Section 276C(1)/278 read with Section 278B/278E of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and Sections 120B/199/200/204 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 3
19. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior Counsel commenced his arguments challenging the very maintainability of the petition itself by discussing in detail provision under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to emphasize that although there is no legal bar to file a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. impugning such an order, but to maintain the same, the petitioner needs to demonstrate that there has been an “abuse of process of law” or to “secure the ends of justice” or there are some “exceptional or extraordinary circumstances” which actually lead the petitioner to file such urgent petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court.
20. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that as per the settled law, Section 482 Cr.P.C. must not be invoked when there is a clear cut statutory alternate remedy available to the petitioner and the same principle of law has been duly followed by the various High Courts while maintaining and observing such principle as a rule of prudence. Learned Senior Counsel contends that the petitioner, in the present case, has actually bypassed the statutory remedy, i.e., Criminal Revision, provided to the petitioner under Section 397 Cr.P.C., and had resorted to the jurisdiction of this Court without even displaying or pleading any signs of abuse of process of law or exceptional circumstance arising in the facts of the present case.
21. Learned Senior Counsel further emphasized upon the “Golden Thread” concept of the parameters which could entitle the petitioner to file the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., that is only when the aggrieved is able to show that the complaint in question has been filed with ulterior motives which amounts to abuse of the process of law or to prevent any untoward incident or happening that constitute an exceptional circumstance.
22. To buttress his above submissions and to further emphasize upon the scope and jurisdiction in respect of Section 397 Cr.P.C. and Section 482 Cr.P.C., learned senior counsel had relied and read out the relevant paras from the following judgments:-
a) Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chander (2012) 9 SCC 460 Para 20 and 21.
b) Madhu Limaye Vs. The State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551 Para 8 to 10.
c) Neeharika Infrastructure (O) Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315 Para 11, 34, 36 to 41, 58, 59, 63 and 77.
23. Learned Senior Counsel directly attacked the contention laid on behalf of the petitioner that learned ACMM should have taken the cognizance and then decided the aspect of territorial jurisdiction of the present complaint or rather an inquiry for the said purpose needs to be conducted, and submits that the same is absolutely erroneous and the inquiry for the said purpose was duly conducted by the learned ACMM while at the stage of taking cognizance of the present complaint. Learned Senior Counsel further invites attention of this Court to page 5 of the impugned order to submit that the learned ACMM had decided the issue of cognizance after conducting a proper inquiry from the concerned officials of the complainant.
24. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the learned ACMM was also cognizant of the law applicable with regard to jurisdiction inasmuch as the learned ACMM had duly noted in page 7 of the complaint that the jurisdiction at Delhi arises because of the fact that the assessment was centralized under the provisions of the Income Tax Act and also that there has been a violation of Section 131(1A) of the I.T. Act. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the learned ACMM had, therefore, rightly returned the complaint for the other alleged offences after conducting a due inquiry concluding that entire conspiracy and its constituents are alleged to have been committed in the State of Chattisgarh only and therefore, for those offences, the jurisdiction of the Courts at Delhi are not made out. Learned Senior Counsel further emphasizes that the transferring of the Income Tax Assessment does not confer jurisdiction upon any place and therefore the Learned ACMM was absolutely right in considering that mere transferring of assessment to Delhi does not render the jurisdiction of Criminal Courts at Delhi over the offences so alleged to have been committed in Chhattisgarh.
25. Learned Senior Counsel further argues that the gravamen of offences in the present complaint is actually the offences alleged under Section 276(C) of I.T. Act and had nowhere provided that the accused are being prosecuted for offences committed under Section 131(1A) of I.T. Act. He further submits that even at the end, the complaint so filed, also contends that the prosecution is only for two offences, relief whereof are further sought in the prayer and thus, submits that same has nothing to do with the recording of statement. Rather the offences are alleged to have been committed in Delhi and thus the complaint in respect of other offences was rightly returned by the learned ACMM. It is also submitted that even the prosecution under the Section 131(1A) of I.T. Act is also premature and cannot withstand judicial scrutiny since the same needs to follow up the process of assessment proceedings.
26. Learned Senior Counsel then sought to distinguish the applicability of judgement in Trisuns Chemical Industry (supra) relied upon by the learned ASG. According to Learned Senior Counsel, since the offences in the present complaint are alleged to have been committed in Chattisgarh and no consequence has ensued anywhere else outside Chhattisgarh, the learned ACMM is empowered to consider the question of jurisdiction at the stage of inquiry. He submits that Section 179 Cr.P.C enables and empowers the learned MM to conduct an inquiry on the question of jurisdiction to ascertain as to whether any offence or its consequence had ensued within the local limits of its territorial jurisdiction. He further brings the attention of this Court to Para 14 of the said judgement wherein it was held that the Magistrate is empowered to consider the question of jurisdiction at the stage of inquiry and trial.
27. Learned Senior Counsel also submits that the petitioner is actually pursuing the present complaint as a proxy litigation on behalf of the Enforcement Directorate despite there being no predicate offence on which ED can take action against the respondents. This is despite the fact that the ED itself was restrained by the Supreme Court against initiating any coercive action.
28. Learned Senior Counsel next argues that mere making of statements cannot be said to be part of the conspiracy by drawing analogy with the statements so made under Section 164 Cr.P.C. He submits that the learned ACMM had himself clearly understood that the statements so made by the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 in Delhi, in their individual capacities cannot relate back to the conspiracy which is alleged to have been committed in Chattisgarh. He also submitted that the learned ACMM, at the time of taking cognizance, had taken care to note that since the offences of cheating and tax evasion are distinct and different from making alleged false statements during the assessment proceedings, there is a clear demarcation of the places of jurisdiction for the same.
29. Learned Senior Counsel further goes on to submit that the learned ACMM was also of the correct opinion that the filing of the income tax returns were on individual basis, squarely different from each other and thus there cannot be any conspiracy necessitating filing of a composite complaint. According to Learned Senior counsel, since there are separate causes of action, the direction to file three separate complaints was in accordance with law.
30. Learned Senior Counsel further points out to the order dated 01.08.2023 passed by the Revisional Court, on the issue of false and incorrect submissions made by the learned counsel for the Complainant before it to submit that the complainant had deliberately tried to take advantage as only a part of the impugned order was stayed by Revisional Court and not the entire impugned order. He submits that such kind of act should not be condoned by the Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., particularly when the complainant/petitioner itself lacks bonafide in showing the abuse of the process of law or exceptional circumstances for this Court to entertain the present petition.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 1 & 2
31. Mr. N. Hariharan, learned Senior Counsel at the outset submits that Section 191 Cr.P.C. itself provides that the learned ACMM has an absolute discretion to take cognizance of any matter by emphasizing on the word “may”, used in the said section. Learned Senior Counsel argued that the learned ACMM had the power and discretion to consider the issue of jurisdiction which he had duly exercised and is manifest even from the plain reading of the impugned order and the same is not taken away by the judgment in Trisuns Chemical Industry (supra).
32. Learned Senior Counsel had provided a brief flavour of the entire alleged conspiracy to submit that just by making the assessment centralized does not confer the jurisdiction of Criminal Courts at Delhi of the offences alleged to have been committed in Chattisgarh. Learned Senior Counsel contends that the same was examined in detail by the learned ACMM while passing the impugned order and any action thereagainst would tantamount to taking away the discretion which was rightly exercised by proper application of mind and applying the Local Jurisdiction Rule, being the “thumb rule of jurisdiction”, which could not be the intent of the judgment in Trisuns Chemical Industry (supra). Further that, rightly or wrongly, the learned ACMM had himself bifurcated the offences on the basis of jurisdiction, for which power and discretion is statutorily conferred, as envisaged under the Code.
33. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the offences alleged against the respondents are under the Income Tax Act and therefore, the offences, if any, give rise to different causes of action and separate set of offences committed by different individuals could not be clubbed to become part of the assessment proceedings or the conspiracy. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that allegation of conspiracy is wrong in its inception as all the transactions are independent in their entirety.
34. In that, learned Senior Counsel submits that every individual has his own assessment and tax return and after filing of tax returns, the conspiracy if any, ends there and then. The statements made subsequent thereto cannot become a part of conspiracy. Learned Senior Counsel further argues that admittedly, the returns were duly filed 4 years back and thus, it cannot be presumed that the alleged false statements of certain individuals would now give rise to a cause of action against even those persons who had filed their Returns long back in time, which is the very question to be pondered upon. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that there is no continuum or continuity of conspiracy at Delhi as the alleged conspiracy ends with the filing of the tax returns. He further argues that the Court should be more cautious while dealing with the offences where Section 120B I.P.C. as is also alleged, since the statements so recorded can be read against the other accused persons under Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act.
35. For those questions so raised, learned Senior Counsel argues that the learned Revisional Court was itself seized of the matter examining the propriety and legality of the impugned order concerned and since only part of the order is challenged here, it would be in the interest of justice as also prudent that the present matter be remanded back to it, to take a call on the entire issue as also to prevent the diversity of findings or multiplicity of proceedings.
36. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that by virtue of filing the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., challenging the order of the learned trial court, the petitioner/complainant had actually caused great prejudice to the respondents in bypassing the procedure established under the Code. In that, by this contrivance, the right and opportunity to file an appeal against the order or to take the next step in line as per the Code are denied. Learned Senior Counsel further argues that revision so filed by the respondents is actually ante-dated to the present petition, coupled with the fact the complainant/petitioner also does not point out any concrete evidence or incidence of abuse of process of law or exceptional circumstance to justify the filing and maintainability of the present petition here under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
37. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that even as per Section 201 and the entire conspectus of the Chapter-XIV of the Cr.P.C., it is the discretion which is bestowed upon the learned MM to try and take cognizance of the offences which further also provides that the learned MM should mandatorily return it, to be presented before the proper court, if there is lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the learned MM had rightly done so by returning the complaint and not dismissing it. The petitioner has been unable to show that they are remediless in such a situation.
38. Learned Senior Counsel further points out that the present complaint was filed on 11.03.2021 under the alleged sections based upon which the ED has also registered an ECIR under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred as “PMLA”). Learned Senior Counsel specifically points out to this Court that there is no offence under the Income Tax Act which is Scheduled Offence under the PMLA and the entire edifice of the PMLA proceedings against Respondent Nos.1 and 2, is based only upon section 120B of IPC. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that without any scheduled offence being committed, offence under section 120B IPC cannot stand. He submits that the said move/action is draconian inasmuch as the subsequent implication under Section 120B IPC can make the accused liable for proceedings under the provisions of PMLA, which are required to be considered by the Court to curb the ED from taking a back door entry by prosecuting a proxy litigation under the guise of the complainant ITO.
39. Learned Senior Counsel next points out the intrusion and orchestration conducted by the ED to submit that the complainant is pursuing the present matter at the behest of ED since the ED is deliberately and intentionally taking advantage of the order of the learned Revisional Court of partial stay and had started arraying the persons as accused in the PMLA proceedings. Learned Senior Counsel further relies upon the contentions in the present application for stay to emphasize that the pleadings are drafted in such a manner so as to provide benefit to the ED only.

ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 4
40. Mr. Mohit Mathur, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 4 refers to the Complaint Case No. 1183/2022 filed by the petitioner appended at page 73 of this petition and specifically to para 81, to submit the involvement and allegation qua the respondent No. 4. The same is extracted hereunder:-
“81. …………Therefore, from the entire conspectus of the searches conducted, statements recorded and the factual matrix of the entire matter detailed herein above, it is apparent that accused – Anil Tuteja, Yash Tuteja, Saumya Chaurasia have committed offences u/s 276C(1)/ 277 of Income Tax Act for A.Y. 2020 – 2021 read with Section 120B/191, 199, 200 and 204 of Indian Penal Code, 1860; further, the said offences have been abetted and facilitated by Anwar Dhebar, Nitesh Purohit, Vikas Agarwal alias Subbu, Vikas Agarwal (CA at Kolkata), Mandeep Chawla (businessman/ owner of Shamrock Hotel Raipur), M/s Lingraj Suppliers Pvt Ltd, Saurabh Jain, Vaibhav Saluja (Shareholder till 2017), Ashok Kr. Agarwal and Garima Sharma (Current Directors) alongside current shareholders Swati and Nishi Agarwal u/s 278 of Income Tax Act read with Section 120B.”

41. Learned Senior Counsel upon reading the aggrieved part of the complaint submits that as regards the income aspect is concerned, the incorrect declaration of income or concealment of the unaccounted income is only qua the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and not against other respondents.
42. Mr. Mohit Mathur, learned Senior Counsel submits that there is a clear dichotomy drawn out in the complaint itself as the involvement of the respondent No. 4 does not figure in the complaint at all except the allegation against the respondent No. 4 for the offences under section 278 of I.T. Act read with section 120B IPC. The said provision is extracted hereunder:-
“278. Abetment of false return, etc.—If a person abets or induces in any manner another person to make and deliver an account or a statement or declaration relating to 6[any income or any fringe benefits chargeable to tax] which is false and which he either knows to be false or does not believe to be true or to commit an offence under sub-section (1) of section 276C, he shall be punishable,—
(i) in a case where the amount of tax, penalty or interest which would have been evaded, if the declaration, account or statement had been accepted as true, or which is wilfully attempted to be evaded, exceeds 7 [twenty-five hundred thousand rupees], with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to seven years and with fine;
(ii) in any other case, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three months but which may extend to 8 [two years] and with fine.”
43. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the complaint against the respondent No. 4 by the petitioner is only under Section 278 of I.T. Act read with section 120B IPC. He further contends that in a complaint where categorical offence is alleged, the prosecution cannot change their goal posts. On that, he submits that the petitioner’s allegation against the respondent No. 4 is that he abetted and facilitated the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in filing the false return and concealing the income.
44. Mr. Mathur, learned Senior Counsel submits that conspiracy has two parts and refers to section 120A & 120B IPC. The same is extracted hereunder:-
“120A. Definition of criminal conspiracy.– When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done,
(1) an illegal act, or
(2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy:
Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof.
Explanation It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object.
120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy.– (1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, [imprisonment for life] or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.
(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.”
Upon reading the abovementioned sections, he submits that abetment would tantamount to an offence when the act of the abettor is necessarily prequel to the act of the person who is committing the offence. An act to become an offence must succeed the abetment, therefore the abetment is done prior to the act having been completed.
45. Learned Senior Counsel also submits that the respondent No. 4 is accused of abetting the offence allegedly committed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 in not filing the returns. He further submits that to re-create the offence, the petitioners have enumerated all the other offences qua the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and the learned Trial Court has analysed and decided one part of the act as completed and as regards to the respondent No. 4, the learned Trial Court cannot take the cognizance of section 278 I.T. Act and should have tried separately. On this, he drew the attention of this Court to section 218 Cr.P.C. The same is extracted hereunder:-
“218. Separate charges for distinct offences.
(1) For every distinct offence of which any person is accused there shall be a separate charge, and every such charge shall be tried separately:
Provided that where the accused person, by an application in writing, so desires and the Magistrate is of opinion that such person is not likely to be prejudiced thereby, the Magistrate may try together all or any number of the charges framed against such person.

(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall affect the operation of the provisions of sections 219, 220, 221 and 223.”

46. Mr. Mathur, learned Senior Counsel submits that the learned Trial Court took cognizance of certain acts against the respondent Nos. 1 to 3. So far as the others are concerned, the learned ACMM has not discharged them but has merely returned the complaint to be filed in an appropriate forum. He further submits that the charge of Section 278 of I.T. Act is only limited to abetment alone, qua the respondent No. 4.
47. Learned Senior Counsel submits that in terms of section 2(n) of Cr.P.C., an offence is any act or the omission, whereupon cognizance is taken, stating that a particular act constitutes such offence. He further submits that section 482 Cr.P.C. is not a forum to test as to which offence ought to have been taken cognizance of.
48. Mr. Mohit Mathur, learned Senior Counsel submits that a revision petition is pending before the learned Sessions Court, wherein the other part of the impugned order is already challenged by the respondent Nos. 1 to 3. By relying upon section 397 Cr.P.C., learned Senior Counsel submits that both the Courts i.e. the Sessions Court and the High Court, exercise concurrent jurisdiction and when one of them is in seisin of such exercise, it would be inappropriate for the other Court to also simultaneously examine such matter. In this case, this Court under section 482 Cr.P.C. ought to restrain itself.
49. Mr. Mohit Mathur, learned Senior Counsel refers and relies upon the relevant paras of the judgement of the Supreme Court in Honnaiah Vs The State of Karnataka reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1001 to submit that the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. ought not to be allowed to be entertained by this Court as there is a remedy available with the petitioner under Section 397 Cr.P.C.
50. Learned Senior Counsel draws the attention of this Court to para 7 of the Stay application CRL.M.A. 19314/2023 filed by the petitioner. The same is extracted hereunder:-
“7. Further, it is submitted that as the impugned Order dated 06.04.2023 has not been stayed in the Petition filed by the Petitioner Department, the Petitioner Department as well as other law enforcement agencies are facing difficulties in discharging their functions. In this regard, reference is made to the Order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 18.07.2023 in Yash Tuteja & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors., WP(Crl.) No. 153 of 2023 filed by the Respondents No. 1 and 2 herein before the Hon’ble Supreme Court challenging proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 initiated on the basis of Scheduled offences that form a part of the Ct. Case No. 1183 of 2022. By way of the Order dated 18.07.2023, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:-

“On hearing learned counsel for the parties it transpires that the complaints have been returned, the income tax authorities having taken that to a further Court in appeal and there being any absence of stay, apart from the order already passed of no coercive action, the concerned respondent authorities must stay their hands in all manner. Ordered accordingly. On our query of learned ASG, we clarify that if the stay is obtained qua that order, it open to the respondents to move this Court for obtaining appropriate order.”

51. Mr. Mathur, learned Senior Counsel submits that when the Supreme Court in Honnaiah (Supra) has granted “any third party” to exercise the option of revision, in the present case, the petitioner despite being the complainant, instead of invoking the revisional powers has approached this Court for stay of the order of the learned Trial Court, which is per se not maintainable.
52. Learned Senior Counsel submits that jurisdiction cannot be assumed to have been conferred in Delhi merely on the basis that statements under Section 131(1A) of I.T. Act were recorded in Delhi. He submits that initiation of the proceedings under the Income Tax Act is contingent upon the petitioner’s scrutiny of the accounts. According to learned Senior Counsel, the abetment to file false IT Returns, that too 4 years back, cannot be stretched to mean that the same continued till the alleged false statements tendered by respondent nos.1 to 3 at Delhi. He submits that the respondent No. 4 has no role in respect of the affidavits filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 in Delhi.
53. Mr. Mohit Mathur, learned Senior Counsel concludes by referring to paragraph No. 2 of the complaint to submit that on 27.02.2020, all the conspiracy came to an end when the object was achieved. The same paragraph No. 2 is extracted hereunder:-
“2. That Search action was conducted upon Smt. Minakshi Tuteja (wife of accused no. 1 i.e. Shri Anil Tuteja, Joint Secretary, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, Raipur), accused no. 2, Accused no. 4, 6 and M/s A Dhebar Buildcon etc. at Chhattisgarh on 27.02.2020.”

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO. 5
54. Mr. Rahul Tyagi, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 5 adopts the arguments of Mr. Mohit Mathur, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No. 4, however, puts forth the following contentions.
55. Mr. Tyagi, learned counsel relies upon the provisions of section 397 Cr.P.C., to submit that when the Revisional Court is already seized with testing the correctness of the impugned order passed by the learned Trial Court, this Court ought to avoid examining the very same order.
56. Learned counsel submits on the concurrent powers of the Sessions Court by referring to Section 399 Cr.P.C. The same is extracted hereunder:-
“399. Sessions Judge’s powers of revision.—(1) In the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by himself, the Sessions Judge may exercise all or any of the powers which may be exercised by the High Court under sub-section (1) of section 401.

(2) Where any proceeding by way of revision is commenced before a Sessions Judge under sub-section (1), the provisions of sub-sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of section 401 shall, so far as may be, apply to such proceeding and references in the said sub-sections to the High Court shall be construed as references to the Sessions Judge.

(3) Where any application for revision is made by or on behalf of any person before the Sessions Judge, the decision of the Sessions Judge thereon in relation to such person shall be final and no further proceeding by way of revision at the instance of such person shall be entertained by the High Court or any other Court.”

57. Mr. Tyagi, learned counsel submits that the allegations against the respondent No. 5 is that, the illegal money earned was collected and handed over by respondent No. 5 to the respondent Nos. 1 to 3. He further makes it clear by submitting that the respondent No. 5 was not earning any income from that.
58. Learned counsel submits the only allegation qua the respondent No. 5 is recorded in paragraph 5 of the impugned order dated 06.04.2022. The same is extracted hereunder:-
“5. That it was found that accused no. 4 to 8, were (being friends/aides to Tuteja Group/Family), managing the collection and distribution of unaccounted cash.”

59. Mr. Tyagi, learned counsel refers to para 81 of the Complaint containing the allegations and sections invoked against respondent No. 5. The same is extracted hereunder:-
“81…further, the said offences have been abetted and facilitated by Anwar Dhebar, Nitesh Purohit, Vikas Agarwal alias Subbu, Vikas Agarwal (CA at Kolkata), Mandeep Chawla (businessman/ owner of Shamrock Hotel Raipur), M/s Lingraj Suppliers Pvt Ltd, Saurabh Jain, Vaibhav Saluja (Shareholder till 2017), Ashok Kr. Agarwal and Garima Sharma (Current Directors) alongside current shareholders Swati and Nishi Agarwal u/s 278 of Income Tax Act read with Section 120B.”

60. Learned counsel draws attention of this Court to section 278 of I.T. Act to submit that there is no material to show that the respondent No. 5 had abetted the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 to file false returns.
61. Mr. Tyagi, learned counsel submits that the allegations presented before this Court by the petitioner qua the respondent No. 5 having abetted in signing false statements by the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 were never a part of the complaint and submits that the petitioner cannot go beyond what is alleged in the complaint.
62. Learned counsel submits that conspiracy comes to an end by one of the following three ways:-
i) When the object of the conspiracy is achieved, it will come to an end.
ii) When it is abandoned, it will come to an end.
iii) When the conspiracy is discovered, it will come to an end.
63. Mr. Tyagi learned counsel submits that allegations are predicated on the alleged recovery of WhatsApp chats of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 pertaining to the year 2020 for the alleged offences at Chattisgarh. On that, learned counsel submits that since the alleged conspiracy was discovered in Chhattisgarh, the same ends qua the respondent No. 5 with such discovery and cannot continue till Delhi.
64. Learned counsel further submits that respondent No. 5 is an ordinary resident of Chattisgarh and the alleged cause of action having arisen there, filing of the complaint at Delhi will impair the fundamental right to fair trial of the respondent No. 5 as he have to travel to Delhi every time.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO. 8
65. Mr. P. Roychaudhuri, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 8 though adopts the arguments of Mr. Mohit Mathur, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No. 4, put forth the following contentions.
66. Learned counsel submits that there is no Income Tax case pending against the respondent No. 8. The allegations against the respondent No.8 is of offences under Section 278 IT Act and Section 120B IPC. He further emphasizes on the principle that Section 278 IT Act and Section 120B IPC cannot co-exist for the reason that the ingredients of offence under Section 278 IT Act is one of inducement, whereas the ingredient of offence under Section 120-B IPC is of conspiracy, which are two distinct offences having no co-relation.
67. Mr. P. Roychaudhuri draws the attention of this Court to Memo of Parties and submits that the complaint was instituted by Income Tax Office through Deputy Director of Income Tax (hereinafter referred to as “DDIT”) obtaining prior permission of competent authority. The affidavit was filed by the Additional Director of Income Tax (Investigation) rather than DDIT, who is the competent authority. Learned counsel refers to the first Stay Application CRL.M.A. 10323/2023 and submits that the petitioner prayed for the stay of the impugned part of the order dated 06.04.2023. He further submits that the petitioner has moved another identical Stay Application CRL.M.A. 19314/2023, which is impermissible in law as already notice has been issued in CRL.M.A. 10323/2023 The three ingredients of stay application are prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable loss or injury caused to the petitioner. On this, he submits that nothing has been stated in the Stay Application in support of any of the three conditions precedent before seeking stay.
68. Mr. P. Roychaudhuri submits that there is nothing against the respondent No. 8 except some alleged WhatsApp Chats exchanged between the respondent No. 8 and the respondents Nos. 1 to 3. He further submits that the respondent No. 8 has not been served by the Income Tax Office and till date there are no assessment proceedings against the respondent No. 8. The respondent No. 8 was never summoned in Delhi or Chhattisgarh.
69. Learned Counsel submits that the only allegation in the complaint against the respondent No. 8 is contained in Para 41. The same is extracted hereunder:-
“41. That Shri. Mandeep Chawla alias Mandy (accused no. 8) is a businessman based in Raipur and he runs hotels in the name of Shamrock Hotel in Raipur. He is a close friend of Shri Anil Tuteja (accused No. 1). There are several chats between Shri Mandeep Chawla and Shri Yash Tuteja. It has been found that Shri Mandeep Chawla and Shri Yash Tuteja used to communicate lakh through the word Inova/inoa. Extracts of these chats in the chronological order along with Certificate u/s 65B of Indian Evidence Act, 1872, are annexed herewith as Annexure-AJ.”

70. Mr. P. Roychaudhari concludes his arguments by submitting that the respondent No. 8 has neither visited Delhi nor has been summoned by the Income Tax office and as such no case is made out qua respondent no.8.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO. 10
71. Mr. Sidhant Kumar, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 10 adopts the arguments of Mr. Mohit Mathur, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No. 4, however, puts forth the following contentions.
72. Learned counsel submits at the very outset that this court, while hearing the stay application against the impugned order, is concerned only with the prosecution of the present case and not with the prosecution being conducted by other investigation agencies.
73. He further submits that the question before this court is only limited to the jurisdiction of the Court trying the present case and if the present stay application is allowed, the consequence of it would be that the complaint would be restored to its original number. On this, Mr. Kumar vehemently argues that until this Court has a definitive view on the issue of territorial jurisdiction, which is the very root of the proceedings, the learned ACMM cannot, in abhorrent subordination, proceed further and take any decision till the present case has been finally decided by this court.
74. Learned counsel submits for the sake of argument that even if all the facts in the complaint are assumed against the respondents herein, there is no prejudice caused to the prosecution and there is no cause or requirement to pass any orders in the present application.
75. Mr. Kumar refers to the order dated 18.07.2023 passed by the Supreme Court wherein the petitioner authority was directed to stay their hands in all manner as no stay had been granted of the order returning the complaint, impugned herein and in fact, a protection order was passed in favor of the respondents herein. It was further noted that the Supreme Court itself had permitted the predicate agency i.e., the Income Tax Department to move an application for stay in the present case. He further submits that the aforesaid order of the Supreme Court relied upon by the applicant/petitioner in its stay application, is in regard to the challenge made by the Respondent no. 1 and 2 against the PMLA proceedings against them. Therefore, he submits that such liberty to seek stay of the proceedings granted by the Supreme Court is only in respect of the PMLA proceedings, which has no relation with the proceedings impugned in the present case.
76. Learned counsel submits that reliance placed on the order of the Supreme Court by the petitioner is an act of completely obliterating the separation observed by this Court. What the Supreme Court holds in terms of the PMLA proceedings is of no consequence herein and the present case has to be independently examined on its own legs and the piecemeal adjudication where the applicant seeks interference by this Court at the interlocutory stage, to revive a complaint that has been returned, cannot be allowed.
77. He further submits that the revision proceedings are also pending, where it is open to the learned Revisional Court to come to any conclusion, be it in favor of or to the prejudice of the respondents, and as such, at this stage, deciding the present application would be pre-adjudicating the proceedings, causing prejudice to the rights and interests of the respondents herein. It is further submitted that the learned Revisional Court which presently has the jurisdiction of the proceedings under section 397 Cr.P.C. has all the powers to adjudicate and pass any effective order, after proper consideration of the case in its entirety, and this Court would be pre-judging a cause which is not before it and which in fact is pending before a subordinate Court. Mr. Kumar submits that such situation, in all likelihood, would bring inconsistent or contradictory outcomes and as such, the present application/petition is an abuse of process of law and the same cannot be allowed by this Court, especially at an interlocutory stage.
78. Learned counsel next submits that respondent no. 10 is similarly placed as respondent no. 8, who are not being proceeded by the Income Tax authorities. They have not been called to give any statement and as such, cannot be tied to the offence of conspiracy, that too retrospectively, merely on the basis of alleged false statements given by respondent nos. 1 to 3 to the petitioner authorities. He further submits that foundational facts of the offence of conspiracy are of the same transaction, however, none of the essential elements of conspiracy such as the offences constituting a part of the same transaction or continuity of action, are satisfied by the allegations made in the complaint. Looking at it factually, the respondent no. 10 is not concerned with the statements given by the respondent nos. 1 to 3 or with the filing, preparation or verification of the income tax returns by them individually, to be even associated with the alleged offence of conspiracy, and on this basis, submits that the complaint is very cryptic on this aspect.
79. Learned counsel refers to the complaint to point out that the two other groups i.e. Bhatia Group and one Sh. Vivek Dhand (Retd. IAS, posted as RERA Chairman) along with their accomplices have been dealt with separately on the aspect of prosecution by sanctioning authority, in that, they have been centralized under section 127 of I.T. Act to Central Circle-08, New Delhi, except the cases of Sh. Amalok Bhatia, Sh. Bhupendra Pal Singh Bhatia, Sh. Prince Bhatia and Sh. Vikas Aggarwal alias Subbu (an accomplice) which have been centralized to Central Circles, Bilaspur and Raipur. On this basis, he questions the very basis of the bifurcation of the complaints and their jurisdiction against the accused persons, who are said to be allegedly working in deep cahoots with each other. He further submits that the sole jurisdictional basis as against the respondent is the centralization of his returns, and if the case of the prosecution is taken to be true and if there was infact a larger conspiracy hatched between the said groups, then where is the question of such bifurcation and what is the basis of such pick and choose policy, where parts of the offences are prosecuted not together at one place, rather prosecuted arbitrarily at different places holding separate jurisdictions.
80. Learned counsel painstakingly took this Court through the allegations made against the respondent no. 10 in the complaint and submits that the cause of action, as per their own complaint, has not arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of Delhi. He further explains that none of the companies have been incorporated in Delhi, none of the alleged transactions have taken place in Delhi, and as such, the allegation that respondent no. 10 have conspired to generate the share premiums in the said companies and the actual control vests with the Tuteja Group, has no concern with the section 131(1A) of I.T. Act proceedings under the Income Tax Act against the respondent no. 10, which in fact is the only basis of seeking trial of the case in Delhi, by the petitioner.
81. He further submits that there is no averment in the complaint of any subsequent action committed by the respondent no. 10 after 2010, nor can he be said to be involved with the filing of income tax returns by the respondent nos. 1 and 2. Mr. Kumar refers to Para 81 of the complaint wherein it is clearly mentioned by the petitioner authority itself that reporting of the correct incomes and paying taxes on the same as per the Income Tax Act, 1961 is an act mandated by the statute in their individual capacity.
82. It is further mentioned that the offences against the respondent nos. 1 to 3 are made on the entire conspectus of the searches conducted as well as the statements recorded. On this basis, it is submitted that no search was ever conducted upon the respondent no. 10, and no statements were taken of him.
83. Mr. Kumar submits that the complaint is misconceived for the reason that it does not even attempt to lay down the foundational facts, and merely a brazen attempt has been made to pull in a malafide prosecution against respondent no. 10.
84. He also submits that the allegations qua the respondent no. 10 of abetting and facilitating the said accused persons, is dated back to 2010 and there is no whisper as to how the allegations against respondent no. 10 forms part of the same transaction forming an offence of conspiracy, except a very cryptic mention of the allegation that all the accused persons worked in cahoots with each other, in the said complaint.
85. Mr. Kumar questions the validity and legality of the notification of the CBDT SO2914(E) relied upon by the petitioner wherein it is stated that the Principal Director/Director or Income Tax (Investigation), Delhi-1 or Principal Director/Director of Income Tax (Investigation), Delhi-2 can exercise Pan India jurisdiction with regard to Chapter XXI penalties imposable and Chapter XXII offences and prosecution, to submit that the entire basis of the concept of jurisdictions of the courts, as provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is sought to be amended by the said notification. He further submits that a notification cannot override the fundamental provision that the territoriality has to be established for the court to try the cases before it, as provided by the Cr.P.C.
86. He further draws attention of this Court to the impugned order wherein the learned Trial Court had very categorically laid down that the said notification only enhances or enlarges the powers of the investigating authority to exercise pan India jurisdiction but the same does not have any bearing on Jurisdiction of Criminal Courts as contained in section 177 to 189 Chapter XIII Cr.P.C., as the power of an authority to investigate an offence is not co-terminus with the jurisdiction of a Court to entertain a case and anyway, such power of altering the jurisdiction of a criminal court is not vested in CBDT.
87. Mr. Kumar submits that the entire case of the prosecution is that for the assessment year 2020-21, accused no. 1, 2 & 3 in collusion with each other took bribes, illegal commissions, unaccounted monies etc. (in the state of Chhattisgarh), the collection work was done by accused no. 4 to 6 & 8 on their behalf, thereafter with aid of accused no. 7, and 10 to 15, this unaccounted cash was deposited in bank account of accused no. 9 which in turn either kept it or transferred the same to the beauty salon business run and owned by accused no. 2 and wife of accused no. 1. Learned counsel explains that none of these acts had occurred within the territory of Delhi. The criminal conspiracy was not hatched at Delhi; the destruction of evidence was not done at Delhi; the willful evasion of tax or false verification of income tax returns did not occur at Delhi; no abetment of aforementioned offences was done at or from Delhi; no mo