GURU DARSHAN MAHENDRU Vs VIJAY KUMAR AGGARWAL & ANRJudgment by Delhi High Court
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 23.02.2024
Judgment pronounced on: 12.03.2024
+ RC.REV. 160/2018 & CM APPLS. 15875/2018, 50183/2019 and 1452/2024
GOPAL KRISHAN ….. Petitioner
Through: Mr Ram Bhakt Agrawal, Adv.
versus
VIJAY KUAMR AGGARWAL & ANR ….. Respondents
Through: Mr Rajesh Katyal, Adv.
+ RC.REV. 180/2018 & CM APPLS. 17564/2018, 50184/2019 and 1450/2024
TARA CHAND ….. Petitioner
Through: Mr Ram Bhakt Agrawal, Adv.
versus
VIJAY KUAMR AGGARWAL & ANR ….. Respondents
Through: Mr Rajesh Katyal, Adv.
+ RC.REV. 569/2018 & CM APPLS. 50112/2018, 50113/2018 and 1453/2024
GURU DARSHAN MAHENDRU ….. Petitioner
Through: Mr Ram Bhakt Agrawal, Adv.
versus
VIJAY KUMAR AGGARWAL & ANR ….. Respondents
Through: Mr Rajesh Katyal, Adv.
+ RC.REV. 570/2018 & CM APPLS. 50188/2018, 50190/2018 and 1455/2024
GURU DARSHAN MAHENDRU ….. Petitioner
Through: Mr Ram Bhakt Agrawal, Adv.
versus
VIJAY KUMAR AGGARWAL & ANR ….. Respondents
Through: Mr Rajesh Katyal, Adv.
+ RC.REV. 571/2018 & CM APPLS. 50194/2018, 50195/2018 and 1454/2024
GURU DARSHAN MAHENDRU ….. Petitioner
Through: Mr Ram Bhakt Agrawal, Adv.
versus
VIJAY KUMAR AGGARWAL & ANR ….. Respondents
Through: Mr Rajesh Katyal, Adv.
+ RC.REV. 572/2018 & CM APPLS. 50197/2018, 50198/2018 and 1451/2024
GURU DARSHAN MAHENDRU ….. Petitioner
Through: Mr Ram Bhakt Agrawal, Adv.
versus
VIJAY KUAMR AGGARWAL & ANR ….. Respondents
Through: Mr Rajesh Katyal, Adv.
CORAM:
JUSTICE GIRISH KATHPALIA
GIRISH KATHPALIA, J.:
CM APPL. 1452/2024 (subsequent events) & CM APPL. 50183/2019 (subsequent events) in RC.REV. 160/2018
CM APPL. 1450/2024 (subsequent events) & CM APPL. 50184/2019 (subsequent events) in RC.REV. 180/2018
CM APPL. 1453/2024 (subsequent events) & CM APPL. 50113/2018 (additional documents) in RC.REV. 569/2018
CM APPL. 1455/2024 (subsequent events) & CM APPL. 50190/2018 (additional documents) in RC.REV. 570/2018
CM APPL. 1454/2024 (subsequent events) & CM APPL. 50195/2018 (subsequent events) in RC.REV. 571/2018
CM APPL. 1451/2024 (subsequent events) & CM APPL.50198/2018 (subsequent events) in RC.REV. 572/2018
1. These applications filed on behalf of the petitioners (tenants) in these petitions under proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act are based on similar factual and legal matrix, so taken up together. I heard learned counsel for both sides.
2. Succinctly stated, circumstances relevant for adjudication of these applications are as follows.
2.1 The main revision petitions have been filed by the tenants to assail orders of the Additional Rent Controller, whereby leave to contest the eviction proceedings under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act was declined and consequently, eviction orders were passed. In all these cases, after preliminary hearing, operation of the impugned eviction orders was stayed by the predecessor bench.
2.2 During pendency of the revision petitions, the petitioners/tenants filed these 12 applications, seeking permission to place on record additional submissions/documents in order to disclose events that allegedly occurred subsequent to passing of the eviction orders impugned in these revision petitions. The subsequent events alleged by the applicants are that subsequent to passing of the impugned eviction orders, the respondents/landlords (non applicants herein) acquired vacant possession of few shops of the larger premises (of which the subject premises are part), and they inducted new tenants therein, which has extinguished their claim of bona fide requirement due to accrual of availability of reasonably suitable alternate accommodation.
2.3 The eviction petitions, from which the present revision proceedings have arisen, pertained to the ground floor shops no. 17, 18, 19, 40, 41 and 45 (hereinafter referred to as �the subject premises�) in the building bearing no.10240-10244 & 10248, Vijay Chambers, Library Road, Azad Market, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as �the larger premises�). In the said eviction petitions, the present non-applicants pleaded that they bona fide required the subject premises because on account of paucity of accommodation in their possession in the larger premises, their goods had to be kept outside their shops and in corridors, which goods are required to be stored by classifying/segregating them according to quality, rate, weight, material composition and dimension etc., and approximately 4000 bundles of water proof heavy canvass are required to be stored in shops near the road approachable by truck so that the same could be loaded/unloaded easily, and for that purpose the subject premises are most suitable.
2.4 As mentioned above, the applications filed by the tenants (applicants herein) seeking leave to contest the eviction proceedings were dismissed and in the present revision petitions challenging those eviction orders, the applications under consideration have been filed.
2.5 One set of these applications is with regard to acquisition of shops no. 44, 48 and 49 while the other set is with regard to acquisition of shops no.2, 23, 24A, 31, 54 and 58 of the larger premises. In all these applications, it is alleged by the applicants that after obtaining vacant possession of the said nine shops, the non-applicants inducted new tenants in those shops, which also shows that the requirement projected by them in the eviction petitions was not bona fide. These applications are strongly resisted by the non-applicants on the ground that having obtained stay on operation of the impugned eviction orders, the applicants are protracting the proceedings by way of such applications and that no such subsequent events as alleged by the applicants can be taken on record because that would prejudice the court, especially because in the larger premises containing more than 100 shops, some or the other shop would keep getting vacated, but need not necessarily be of use to the non-applicant as they need shops near the main road on ground floor of the larger premises.
3. During arguments on these applications, learned counsel for the applicants contended that out of 150 shops in the larger premises, almost 120 are now either in possession of the non-applicants or the same were re-let after being vacated, and this would be a relevant factor in order to ascertain continuation of the alleged bona fide requirement till disposal of the present revision petitions. On the other hand, learned counsel for non-applicants contended that such events of the alleged vacation of shops, followed by the alleged re-letting thereof during pendency of these revision proceedings cannot be allowed to be taken on record because having obtained stay on the operation of the impugned eviction orders, the applicants aim to protract these proceedings perpetually in the name of subsequent events.
4. Learned counsel for both sides referred to certain judicial precedents as discussed hereafter in support of their respective contentions. Basically, according to the tenants/applicants, the bona fide requirement has to continue till final disposal of the eviction dispute by the final adjudicatory forum, while according to the landlords/non-applicants, the bona fide requirement has to be tested only as on the date of institution of the eviction petitions.
5. The question to be examined is as to whether in the litigations of the present nature, rights and liabilities of the litigating parties get frozen on the date of institution of the lis or the same keep evolving and changing till final disposal by not just the court of first adjudication but by every superior court till the apex court. This question comes up before this Court in almost every proceeding under proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act, where the tenant is granted interim protection against the eviction order. And this question almost always comes in the form of application(s) of the tenant for permission to place on record additional submissions and/or documents contending that the same would show events which took place subsequent to passing of the eviction order. Many a time, the tenants enjoying interim protection against the eviction order come up with multiple successive applications to place on record subsequent events, claiming that the Supreme Court in the case titled Hasmat Rai & Anr. vs Raghunath Prasad, (1981) 3 SCC 103 laid down a mandate that till disposal of the revision proceedings in the High Court and even subsequent proceedings before the Supreme Court, the events sought to be brought on record by the tenant on the ground that those events, though occurred subsequent to disposal of the eviction petition by the Rent Controller must be taken on record, if the said events have bearing on the final outcome.
6. Broadly speaking, flowing from different High Courts and the apex court, there are two lines of judicial precedents � one strictly following Hasmat Rai dictum in favour of taking on record those subsequent events, and the other holding otherwise. Therefore, this aspect needs detailed deliberation, traversing through the relevant judicial precedents on this aspect in the distinctive backdrop of the provisions under the Delhi Rent Control Act.
7. To begin with, in view of the specific content of the Delhi Rent Control Act, distinct from other similar rent control legislations, it would be apposite to take a note of the scope of proceedings before this court brought under proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act.
7.1 By way of an amendment in the year 1976, Chapter IIIA was inserted into the Delhi Rent Control Act with retrospective effect from 01.12.1975, thereby stipulating summary trials pertaining to the eviction claims largely dealing with the situations where the landlord was in bona fide need of the tenanted accommodation. One such situation was already on the statute book in the form of Section 14(1)(e) of the Act and one more such situation was added by amendment of the year 1976 in the form of Section 14A. Subsequently, the amendment in the year 1988 added more such situations in the form of Section 14B to Section 14D of the Act. The broad scheme of Chapter IIIA precludes a tenant from contesting the eviction proceedings of those specific situations as a matter of right, unless the tenant obtains leave to contest from the Controller; and if the leave is declined, an order of eviction would necessarily follow. The whole idea is that a landlord who bona fide requires the tenanted premises should not suffer for long, awaiting eviction, though at the same time, the tenant also must not be subjected to eviction like any other civil consequence without being afforded an effective opportunity to defend himself in such civil proceedings. The court has to cautiously and judiciously strike a fine balance between the right of the landlord to eviction through summary proceedings and right of the tenant to continue tenancy under the social welfare umbrella.
7.2 At the stage of seeking leave to contest, it is sufficient if the tenant makes out a case by disclosing such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an eviction order. At the stage of seeking leave to contest, the tenant is not required to establish such a strong case that would non-suit the landlord. At the stage of seeking leave to contest, the test to be applied is as to whether the facts disclosed in the affidavit of the tenant prima facie show that the landlord would be disentitled from obtaining the eviction order and not that the defence may fail in the end. At the same time, the court also has to be conscious that a leave to contest cannot be granted for mere asking or in a routine manner, as that would defeat the object behind Chapter IIIA of the Act. It is only when the pleas and contentions raised by the tenant in the application seeking leave to contest make out a triable issue and the dispute on facts demands that the matter be properly adjudicated after ascertaining the truth through cross-examination of witnesses that leave to contest must be granted. Each case has to be decided on its merits and not on the basis of any generalized suppositions. The court also cannot ignore a situation where the case set up by the tenant has been so set up with the sole object of protracting the proceedings so as to lead to the landlord giving up in frustration, which would in turn frustrate the process of law. Where the tenant seeks leave to contest, pleading anything and everything, pulled out of thin air and claims to have raised a prima facie case, the court is under a duty to read between the lines so as to ensure justice to the parties as well as the process established by law.
7.3 Notably, the provision under sub-section (8) of Section 25B of the Act places complete embargo on any appellate scrutiny of an order passed by the Rent Controller in accordance with the summary procedure laid down under Section 25B for recovery of possession of the tenanted premises. The underlying principle was to ensure expeditious remedy to the landlord, who is in bona fide need of the tenanted premises. It is also significant to note that the proviso, enacted in Section 25B(8) of the Act to lift the blanket of scrutiny in a limited manner has to be understood and used in such a manner that it does not negate the legislative intendment of expeditious remedy in certain specific kinds of cases.
7.4 A careful examination of the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act would show that it does not specifically use the term �revision�. But the provision read in its entirety shows that the power conferred under the said proviso is a revisional power, completely distinct from appellate power in the sense that the appellate power is wide enough to afford the appellate court to scrutinize the entire case and arrive at fresh conclusion whereas the revisional power is quite restricted to superintendence and supervision aimed at ensuring that the subordinate courts and tribunals operate within the bounds of law. The proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act confines the satisfaction of the High Court to the extent that the order impugned before it was passed by the Rent Controller under Section 25B in accordance with law. It is trite that the power of revision conferred upon the High Court by the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act being in the nature of superintendence over the court of first adjudication on the decision making process, including compliance with the procedure laid down by law, the High Court cannot substitute and supplant its view over that of the court of the first adjudication by exercising parameters of appellate scrutiny. The High Court has a superintendence role only to the extent of satisfying itself on the process adopted. It is not permissible for the High Court in such proceedings to arrive at a finding of fact different from the one recorded by the Rent Controller, unless the findings of fact recorded by the Rent Controller were so unreasonable that no Rent Controller would have recorded the same on the material available. The High Court in such proceedings is obliged to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of the question as to whether it is according to law or is one that no reasonable person acting with objectivity could have reached on the material available.
7.5 The judicial precedents on the issue of taking on record the subsequent events cannot be read de hors the legal position elaborated above.
8. Now, it would be apposite to briefly traverse through the judicial pronouncements cited by learned counsel for applicants in support of their claim that the subsequent events, if pleaded during pendency of the proceedings under proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act have to be mandatorily taken on record and examined while ascertaining if the bona fide requirement projected by the landlord survives.
8.1 In the case of Hasmat Rai (supra), relied upon by learned counsel for applicants, the Supreme Court examined the issue of introduction of subsequent events and held thus:
�14…….Therefore, when an action is brought by the landlord under the Rent Restriction Act for eviction on the ground of personal requirement, his need must not only be shown to exist at the date of the suit, but must exist on the date of the appellate decree, or the date when a higher court deals with the matter. During the progress and passage of proceeding from court to court if subsequent events occur which if noticed would non-suit the plaintiff, the court has to examine and evaluate the same and mould the decree accordingly.�
And this Hasmat Rai dictum has been at fulcrum of all such actions brought before this High Court by the tenants during pendency of their revisional challenge to the eviction orders once operation of the impugned eviction order is stayed.
8.2 The judgment in the case of Mohd. Ismail vs Dinkar Vinayakrao Dorlikar, (2009) 10 SCC 193 was cited on behalf of the applicants, specifically relying upon the following extract:
�13. Unfortunately, in spite of repeated orders of remand passed by the High Court as well as admissions made by the respondent in his deposition about the fact stated in the application for taking into consideration of subsequent events, it would not be possible for us to accept the impugned Judgment of the High Court, which had failed to consider the requirement of the respondent after the subsequent events had occurred namely:
(1) death of one son of the respondent,
(2) absconding of the second son of the respondent for the last 8-9 years,
(3) two shops having been taken possession of, and
(4) possession was taken from another tenant Lal Mohd. in which, the third son has been running a Leatho machine business.
14. In our view, although such admitted facts had not been considered by the Courts below, we do not propose to allow the appeal in full but remand the case back to the High Court, who in turn, would frame issues to the extent whether in view of the subsequent events, as stated herein earlier, the bonafide requirement of the landlord/respondent has already been satisfied or not. For this purpose, it would be open to the respondent to amend his pleadings of the eviction petition against which, additional objection may also be filed by the appellant/tenant.�
8.3 In the case of M.M. Quasim vs Manohar Lal Sharma, (1981) 3 SCC 36, relied upon by the learned counsel for applicants, the Supreme Court observed thus:
�15.�The next step to be taken is whether where a person claiming to be such a landlord has sought to evict the tenant for his own occupation of the building but lost his interest in entirety in the building during the pendency of the appeal which is a continuation of the suit, would he still be entitled to maintain or continue the action after the cessation or extinguishment of his interest in the building? To examine this contention on merits one feature of the proceedings under the Rent Act may be taken into consideration. To what extent and in what circumstances the court can take notice of events subsequent to the institution of the action is the core problem. This is no more res integra and need not be examined in depth. In�Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu case�[(1975) 1 SCC 770 : AIR 1975 SC 1409 : : (1975) 3 SCR 958] this Court examined this question in relation to a proceeding under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. The landlord in that case sought to evict the tenant as he wanted to start his own business in the demised premises. In other words, action was for eviction for personal requirement. In the zigzag course of proceedings it transpired that subsequent to the commencement of the action the landlord had come into possession of another shop which would meet with his requirement and on this subsequent event the tenant requested the court to non-suit the plaintiff. At that stage the proceedings were pending before the High Court in a revision petition at the instance of the landlord questioning a remand to the trial court by the first appellate court for investigation of certain facts. In this revision at the instance of the landlord the High Court took notice of the subsequent event that the landlord’s requirement had been fully satisfied as he had come in possession of another shop. In appeal by the landlord to this Court, a serious exception was taken that the High Court could not have taken into consideration an event subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings and non-suit the landlord and that too at a stage when the proceedings were pending in revision at the instance of the landlord. Negativing this contention and dismissing the appeal this Court, after referring to the decision in�Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul�v.�Keshwar Lal Chaudhri�[AIR 1940 FC 26 : 1940 FCR 84], quoted with approval the following passage from�Patterson�v.�State of Alabama�[294 US 600, 607] :(SCC p. 773, para 5)
�We have frequently held that in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct error in the judgment under review but to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. And in determining what justice does require, the court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened since the judgment was entered.�
In the leading judgment in�Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul�case [294 US 600, 607] Varadachariar, J. observed that an appeal being in the nature of a rehearing the courts in India have in numerous cases recognised that in moulding the relief to be granted in a case on appeal, the Court of appeal is entitled to take into account even facts which have come into existence after the decree appealed against was made. Krishna Iyer, J., summed up the position in�Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu case�[AIR 1940 FC 26 : 1940 FCR 84] thus: (SCC pp. 772, 773, para 4)
�It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies binding the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fair play is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice – subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice …. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. …�
To sum up, there was a proper and regular application to meet with the requirements of Order 41 Rule 27, CPC for additional evidence inviting the court’s attention to a subsequent event of vital importance cutting at the root of the plaintiff’s right to continue the action. Coupled with it, there was evidence in the form of a certified copy of the decree showing that the plaintiffs, even if they had some shade of title to commence action, they having lost all interest in the property and the property having become one of exclusive ownership of a person not a party to the proceedings, were no more entitled to continue the proceedings for their own benefit.�
8.4 In the case of Jai Prakash Gupta (D) through LRs vs Riyaz Ahamad & Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 197, relied upon by learned counsel for applicants, the Supreme Court observed thus:
�20.�It is true that a suit or an original proceeding is to be tried in all its stages on the cause of action as it existed on the date of its commencement. The only exception to this rule is that a court may take notice of events, which have happened since the institution of the suit or the original proceeding and grant relief to the parties on the basis of the altered conditions, (sic�which) is applied in cases where it is shown that the original relief claimed has, by reason of subsequent change of circumstances, become inappropriate or that it is necessary to base the decision of the court on the altered circumstances in order to shorten litigation or to do complete justice between the parties. (See�Rai Charan Mandal�v.�Biswanath Mandal�[AIR 1915 Cal 103 : 20 CLJ 107] , AIR p. 104.) This was the view expressed by Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee, J. (as His Lordship then was) on this question when subsequent developments should be taken into consideration by the court during the pendency of a proceeding or of a suit or even at the appellate stage.�
8.5 The judgments in the cases titled Abdul Gaffer vs H.S. Srinivasa Setty (dead) by LRs (2009) 9 SCC 367; Mohan Lal vs Tirath Ram Chopra & Anr. (1982) DRJ 298; and Seshambal (dead) through LRs vs Chelur Corporation Chelur Building & Ors. (2010) 3 SCC 470 also were cited by learned counsel for applicants in support of his argument that the subsequent events that take place till final decision by the final adjudicatory authority are relevant and must be taken on record.
9. Then comes the other line of judicial pronouncements, referred to by the learned counsel for non-applicant to buttress his resistance to taking on record the alleged subsequent events.
9.1 After examining the Hasmat Rai dictum and other judicial precedents of that line, the Supreme Court in the case of Gaya Prasad vs Pradeep Srivastava, AIR 2001 SC 803 observed thus:
�10. We have no doubt that the crucial date for deciding as to the bona fides of the requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps have utility for him to reach the said crucial date of consideration.If every subsequent development during the post petition period is to be taken into account for judging the bona fides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate situation in our litigative slow process system subsists. During 23 years after the landlord moved for eviction on the ground that his son needed the building, neither the landlord nor his son is expected to remain idle without doing any work, lest, joining any new assignment or starting any new work would be at the peril of forfeiting his requirement to occupy the building. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and on that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a tenant from the building, the proposed enterprise would not get faded out by subsequent developments during the traditional lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. It is pernicious, and we may say, unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of his reaching the finale, after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation, merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period.
11. We cannot forget that while considering the bona fides of the need of the landlord the crucial date is the date of petition. In Ramesh Kumar vs. Kesho Ram [1992 Suppl. (2) SCC 623] a two-Judge Bench of this Court (M.N. Venkatachalia, J., as he then was, and N.M. Kasliwal, J.) pointed out that the normal rule is that rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined as they were when the lis commenced and the only exception is that the court is not precluded from moulding the reliefs appropriately in consideration of subsequent events provided such events had an impact on those rights and obligations. What the learned Chief Justice observed therein is this:
�6. The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded from taking a cautious cognizance of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief.�
12. This Court reiterated the same principle in Kamleshwar Prasad vs. Pradumanju Agarwal [1997 (4) SCC 413] that the crucial date normally is the date of filing the petition. In that case, a two-Judge Bench (K. Ramaswamy and G.B. Pattanaik, JJ) has held that even the subsequent event of death of the landlord who wanted to start a business in the tenanted premises is not sufficient to dislodge the bona fide need established by him earlier. ……
13. In our opinion, the subsequent events to overshadow the genuineness of the need must be of such nature and of such a dimension that the need propounded by the petitioning party should have been completely eclipsed by such subsequent events. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu vs. Motor and General Traders [1975 (1) SCC 770] which pointed to the need for re-moulding the reliefs on the strength of subsequent events affecting the cause of action in the field of rent control litigation, forewarned that cognizance of such subsequent events should be taken very cautiously. ……..
14. The next three-Judge Bench of this Court, which approved and followed the above decision, in Hasmat Rai vs. Raghunath Prasad [1981 (3) SCC 103] has taken care to emphasise that the subsequent events should have wholly satisfied the requirement of the party who petitioned for eviction on the ground of personal requirement. …..
15.The judicial tardiness, for which unfortunately our system has acquired notoriety, causes the lis to creep through the line for long long years from the start to the ultimate termini, is a malady afflicting the system. During this long interval many many events are bound to take place which might happen in relation to the parties as well as the subject matter of the lis. If the cause of action is to be submerged in such subsequent events on account of the malady of the system it shatters the confidence of the litigant, despite the impairment already caused.�
(highlighted emphasis is mine)
9.2 In the case Carona Ltd. vs Parvathy Swaminathan & Sons, (2007) 8 SCC 559, the Supreme Court held thus:
�42. In our judgment, the law is fairly settled. The basic rule is that the rights of the parties should be determined on the basis of the date of institution of the suit. Thus, if the plaintiff has no cause of action on the date of the filing of the suit, ordinarily, he will not be allowed to take advantage of the cause of action arising subsequent to the filing of the suit. Conversely, no relief will normally be denied to the plaintiff by reason of any subsequent event if at the date of the institution of the suit, he has a substantive right to claim such relief.�
9.3 In the case of Usha P. Kuvelkar & Ors. vs Ravindra Subrai Dalvi, 2008 (1) RLR 63, the Supreme Court rejected the argument of counsel for the tenant that since the landlord had died, the need had expired with him, so the question will have to examined again qua the bona fide requirement of the landlord. The Supreme Court referred to its earlier decision in the case of
Shakuntala Bai & Ors. vs Narayan Das & Ors., (2004) 5 SCC 772 in which it was held that the bona fide need of the landlord has to be examined as on the date of institution of the eviction proceedings in the sense that if the landlord passes away during pendency of the appeal, it would make no difference as his legal heirs are fully entitled to defend the estate.
9.4 In the case of Dharampal Gupta & Ors. vs Anand Prakash, (2008) 155 DLT 681, a coordinate bench of this court examined the issue at length and after taking note of the above cited precedents, including the Hasmat Rai dictum, observed thus:
�7.�There is no doubt that the view of the Supreme Court earlier had been that subsequent events should be taken into account however, the way the litigation in eviction matters has been taking decades, this view has now changed…..
….
9.�The proposition that subsequent events should be taken into account may look attractive however, it is totally unjust proposition because most of the time only subsequent events of the landlord are placed before the Courts and subsequent events of tenant/tenant’s family are never taken into account. As in this case, the original tenant had died, the rent of the premises has not been paid since 1992 and whether the premises is actually being used or not nobody knows. Normally, in such premises nobody resides and they are kept under lock and key. The deceased tenant’s family also grew with time as his 5 LRs have been mentioned in the LRs application itself. It is obvious that they all would not be living in one room; all of them would be having separate profession/business and would have acquired their own premises and living separately. The landlord, who had given one room on rent say on Rs. 50 or Rs. 60 per month years ago would have no means to know the developments in the family of the tenant, unless he is living in the same premises or in adjoining area and is close to the tenant’s family. He would not know what different business interests the tenant’s sons had acquired, what different properties the tenant’s other family members had acquired; these things can only be found by investigating agencies. A person receiving rent of Rs. 50 or Rs. 60 per month would not like to spend Rs. 30,000-40,000 on investigating agency just to find out the present status of tenant’s family. Most of the time tenants do not disclose their own growth, their own acquisitions of different premises either for residence or business and the premises are kept under lock and key only for the purpose of extracting money from the landlord at the time of vacating the premises, keeping in view of the fact that it takes 20-30 years in final culmination of a litigation in India. This is only one aspect. The other aspect of changing circumstances is that the person in dire necessity of premises for his�bona fide�requirement, files eviction petition under so-called summary procedure evolved by the legislature and this so-called summary procedure takes years and years and years in final culmination. The present Revision itself is pending in the Court since 2000 and has taken 8 years. During pendency of this Revision Petition, not only the father of the landlord/respondent had died but on the other hand the circumstances of tenant’s family also changed and original tenant died. The litigation in Courts progresses at snail’s pace. The judicial system, which is not alive to the urgent�bona fide�requirements of a landlord, cannot keep time standstill and cannot mandate that so long as the case is not decided, nothing shall happen in the world of landlord and tenant. Time does not wait for anybody, not even for Courts. The children of the landlord will grow. Finding that their own premises was under tenancy and was not being vacated despite litigation, they need not wait for 20 years to meet their requirement and are bound to make some alternate arrangements for themselves or for the other family members. It is highly unjust that the Court should not decide the matter within time bound limit and then take into account the change in circumstances of the landlord or tenant.
10.�The span of 10-20 years, which is normally spent in eviction petitions, is long enough to change the circumstances in the life of anyone and with every change in circumstances, like growth in family or reduction in the family or death or marriage in the family, a new cause of action would arise during pendency of the Revision or Appeal and a de novo trial shall again start and in this manner no petition can come to an end during the lifetime of any person. I, therefore consider that the Court has only to look into the cause of action which was available at the time when eviction petition was instituted. Once the trial is over and judgment is pronounced no new circumstance can be considered either during revision or appeal.
11.�Taking into consideration the subsequent events in fact has encouraged parties to prolong the case on one or the other pretext waiting for something to happen. If the landlord is old and ill enough the tenant keeps on dragging the petition waiting for landlord to die so that the entire cause of action evaporates. The dragging of petition is so easy in the Court that the whole purpose of filing the petition gets frustrated. I, therefore, consider that the subsequent events in the eviction petitions cannot form basis of decision in the revision and the Court has to stick to the cause of action which was there at the time of filing the petition. The subsequent events highly prejudice only one side because the subsequent events of the other side are always in dark. The argument of the petitioner is not tenable.�
(highlighted emphasis is mine)
The Petition for Special Leave to file appeal against the above decision of the coordinate bench of this court was dismissed by the apex court.
9.5 In the case of Ruparel & Company (Delhi) vs S. Avtar Singh Puri, 2009 (159) DLT 101, a coordinate bench of this court recapitulated the legal position and held thus:
�18. In any event, I find that the basic judgment relied upon by the petitioner in support of its submission that subsequent events can be looked into is Hasmat Rai (supra) as the same has only been followed in Variety Emporium (supra). However, Hasmat Rai (supra) has been considered in detail by my learned Predecessor, Mr. Justice S.N. Dhingra in Dharam Pal Gupta’s case (supra) wherein he has concluded that Court has only to look into the cause of action which was available at the time when eviction petition was instituted. Judicial discipline and proprietary requires that I follow the judgment of a Coordinate Bench, specially, when at the interim stage brother Mr. Justice S.N. Dhingra had dismissed petitioner’s application to take subsequent events into account. The said order has attained finality as even the Special Leave Petition against the said interim order has been dismissed. In my opinion, the dismissal of petitioner’s Special Leave Petition by the Apex Court for taking subsequent events into account clinches the issue and this Court cannot look into subsequent events.�
(highlighted emphasis is mine)
9.6 In the case of Speedline Agencies vs T.Stanes & Co. Ltd., 2010 (6) SCC 257, while dealing with proceedings under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, the Supreme Court took a note of the Hasmat Rai dictum as well as various other judicial precedents and observing that it would inflict great injustice in many cases if subsequent events are taken into account when long years have passed unless there are very compelling circumstances to take into account the subsequent events, held thus:
�22. Particularly in matters governed by the Rent Acts to take into account subsequent events would inflict hardship to landlords, in a case like the present one. In this context, it was held in para 9 of Joginder Pal vs. Naval Kishore Behal (2002) 5 SCC 397 that:- “9. The rent control legislations are heavily loaded in favour of the tenants treating them as weaker sections of the society requiring legislative protection against exploitation and unscrupulous devices of greedy landlords. The legislative intent has to be respected by the courts while interpreting the laws. But it is being uncharitable to legislatures if they are attributed with an intention that they lean only in favour of the tenants and while being fair to the tenants, go to the extent of being unfair to the landlords. The legislature is fair to the tenants and to the landlords — both……”
24. In the present case, subsequent event of amalgamation of a company took place during the pendency of the revision in the High Court. Though, subsequent events which have occurred during the pendency of a revision petition in the High Court or the matter was pending before this Court, have been taken into consideration by this Court in some cases, the question as to the difference between the exercise of jurisdiction in appeal and revision was not argued or decided in those cases.
25. In a revision under Section 25 of the Act, the Court is exercising a restricted jurisdiction and not wide powers of the appellate court. In M/s Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and Ors. vs. Rangaswamy Chettiar (1980) 4 SCC 259 at page 262 it was held:-
“……Therefore, despite the wide language employed in Section 25, the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with findings of fact merely because it does not agree with the finding of the subordinate authority. The power conferred on the High Court under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure but in the words of Untwalia, J., in Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagaval1; “it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second Court of first appeal”.
26. Mr. Parasaran reiterated that the High Court having only the power of limited jurisdiction and not powers of appellate court, the subsequent event which occurred during the pendency of the revision petition is not to be taken into account, the High Court will decide only as to the legality of the order under revision.
(highlighted emphasis is mine)
9.7 In the case of D. Sasi Kumar vs Soundararajan, Civil Appeal No. 7546-7547 of 2019, decided on 23.09.2019, the Supreme Court held thus:
�7. At the outset it is to be taken note that the Civil Revision Petition before the High Court is not to be considered as in the nature of an appeal. The scope of consideration is only to take note as to whether there is any perversity in the satisfaction recorded by the original Court, namely, the Rent Controller and in that light as to whether the Appellate Authority under the statute has considered the aspect in the background of the evidence to arrive at the conclusion to its satisfaction. The reappreciation of the evidence in the Civil Revision Petition to indicate that another view is possible would not arise. To that extent, a perusal of the impugned order indicates that the High Court in fact has proceeded as if the entire evidence required reappreciation by it. In that background what is necessary to be taken note at this juncture is as to whether the Rent Controller has considered the matter in its correct perspective by satisfying himself of the bonafide claim, as required under Section 10(3)(e) of the Act, 1960 and the hardship if any to the tenant as contemplated under the proviso thereto.
10. Further the High Court has also erroneously arrived at the conclusion that the bonafide occupation as sought should be not only on the date of the petition but it should continue to be there on the date of final adjudication of rights. Firstly, there is no material on record to indicate that the need as pleaded at the time of filing the petition does not subsist at this point. Even otherwise such conclusion cannot be reached, when it cannot be lost sight that the very judicial process consumes a long period and because of the delay in the process if the benefit is declined it would only encourage the tenants to protract the litigation so as to defeat the right. In the instant case it is noticed that the petition filed by the landlord is of the year 2004 which was disposed of by the Rent Controller only in the year 2011. The appeal was thereafter disposed of by the Appellate Authority in the year 2013. The High Court had itself taken time to dispose of the Revision Petition, only on 06.03.2017. The entire delay cannot be attributed to the landlord and deny the relief. If as on the date of filing the petition the requirement subsists and it is proved, the same would be sufficient irrespective of the time lapse in the judicial process coming to an end. This Court in the case of Gaya Prasad vs. Pradeep Srivastava, (2001) 2 SCC 604 has held that the landlord should not be penalised for the slowness of the legal system and the crucial date for deciding the bonafide requirement of landlord is the date of application for eviction, which we hereby reiterate.�
(highlighted emphasis is mine)
9.8 In the case of Shankarlal Nadani vs Sohanlal Jain, Civil Appeal No.2816 of 2022, decided on 12.04.2022, the Supreme Court observed thus:
�29.�Still further, one of the principles is that the rights of the parties have to be determined on the date when lis commences i.e., on the date of filing of the suit. The plaintiff is entitled to decree on that day when he initiated the proceedings, therefore, rights of the parties have to be examined as on the said day. Recently, this Bench in a judgment reported as�ECGC Limited�v.�Mokul Shriram EPC JV�was examining the question as to whether the condition of deposit while filing appeal under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 would be applicable or the provisions as it existed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 when the complaint was filed would be applicable. This Bench considering the Constitution Bench judgments in�Garikapati Veeraya�v.�N. Subbiah Choudhry,�Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel�v.�Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P., Nagpur�and�Hardeodas Jagannath�v.�The State of Assam�held that the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 would not be applicable to the complaints filed prior to the commencement of the 2019 Act. Therefore, the Judgment and Decree passed in the suit for possession does not suffer from any illegality.�
(highlighted emphasis is mine)
10. At the cost of repetition, I express my considered view that the Hasmat Rai dictum cannot be read de hors the peculiar texture of the Delhi Rent Control Act. It cannot be ignored that partially lifting the social welfare umbrella of the Act, Chapter IIIA was inserted in the Act to expedite the eviction proceedings in the designated category of cases; that vide Section 25B(8) of the Act the final orders passed by the Rent Controller on the eviction petitions falling under the designated categories are not amenable to appellate scrutiny of the Rent Control Tribunal; and that the scope of scrutiny by the High Court under proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act is limited to ascertain if the final orders passed by the Rent Controller are in accordance with law, and for that purpose, the High Court is precluded from substituting the view of the Rent Controller on facts with its own views.
11. Besides, the circumstances in which the Hasmat Rai dictum came into existence were completely distinguishable from the present case. In the case of Hasmat Rai (supra), a case under the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as �the MP Act�) the circumstances were as follows. The landlord filed a suit for recovery of possession on two grounds namely his requirement of the premises to open a medicine shop and his requirement of the premises for the purposes of reconstruction and repairs. The Trial Court delivered a finding that the premises were in dilapidated condition, so required reconstruction and the landlord had sufficient funds to undertake reconstruction; that the requirement set up by the landlord was a composite one where the front portion of the property would be used for business of chemist and the rear portion would be used for residence. An appeal preferred by the tenant was dismissed by the District Court. When the matter reached the High Court in second appeal, an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC was filed by the tenant seeking amendment of the written statement in order to plead a subsequent event that the other tenant firm namely M/s. Goraldas Parmanand had vacated the whole of the remaining portion of the building and if that was taken into consideration, the landlord would not be entitled to eviction order. That application was rejected by the High Court on the ground of delay as the said tenant firm had vacated more than three years ago. The High Court dismissed the second appeal and matter came to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed that since in the originally filed written statement, the tenant had already pleaded about eviction of the said tenant firm through execution of decree, the amendment sought by the tenant at the stage of second appeal was only to elaborate what was already stated and even from the pleadings of the landlord it was clear that the portion adjoining the subject premises already stood vacated by the said tenant firm, so the High Court had before it the uncontroverted facts (unlike in the present case) and the same ought to have been taken on record through amendment of the written statement.
12. Following is the important extract from the judgment in the case of Hasmat Rai (supra):
�14……….The M.P. Act enables a landlord to seek eviction of a tenant and obtain possession under various circumstances set out in Section 12. If a landlord bona fide requires possession of a premises let for residential purpose for his own use, he can sue and obtain possession. He is equally entitled to obtain possession of the premises let for non-residential purposes if he wants to continue or start his business. If he commences the proceedings for eviction on the ground of personal requirement he must be able to allege and show the requirement on the date of initiation of action in the court which would be his cause of action. But that is not sufficient. This requirement must continue throughout the progress of the litigation and must exist on the date of the decree and when we say decree we mean the decree of the final court. Any other view would defeat the beneficial provisions of a welfare legislation like the Rent Restriction Act. If the landlord is able to show his requirement when the action is commenced and the requirement continued till the date of the decree of the trial court and thereafter during the pendency of the appeal by the tenant if the landlord comes in possession of the premises sufficient to satisfy his requirement, on the view taken by the High Court, the tenant should be able to show that the subsequent events disentitled the plaintiff, on the only ground that here is tenant against whom a decree or order for eviction has been passed and no additional evidence was admissible to take note of subsequent events. When a statutory right of appeal is conferred against the decree or the order and once in exercise of the right an appeal is preferred the decree or order ceases to be final. What the definition of �tenant� excludes from its operation is the person against whom the decree or order for eviction is made and the decree or order has become final in the sense that it is not open to further adjudication by a court or hierarchy of courts. An appeal is a continuation of suit. Therefore a tenant against whom a decree for eviction is passed by trial court does not lose protection if he files the appeal because if appeal is allowed the umbrella of statutory protection shields him. Therefore it is indisputable that the decree or order for eviction referred to in the definition of tenant must mean final decree or final order of eviction. Once an appeal against decree or order of eviction is preferred, the appeal being a continuation of suit, the landlord’s need must be shown to continue to exist at appellate stage. If the tenant is in a position to show that the need or requirement no more exists because of subsequent events, it would be open to him to point out such events and the court including the appellate court has to examine, evaluate and adjudicate the same.�
(highlighted emphasis is mine)
13. Evidently, the Hasmat Rai dictum came up in the backdrop of the MP Act, which did not have any chapter analogous to Chapter IIIA of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The MP Act specifically provided for remedy through appellate and even second appellate scrutiny against eviction orders in cases of personal requirement of the landlord. In contrast, the provisions under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act specifically preclude the appellate scrutiny against such orders. As noted above, even the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act stipulates the scrutiny of such orders by the High Court only to the limited extent of ascertaining that the impugned eviction order was passed in accordance with law and while doing so, the High Court cannot venture into questions of facts.
14. If the ratio decidendi of the judicial precedents dealing with other rent control legislations is imported to the cases under the Delhi Rent Control Act, it would lead to anomalous situations. Following the Hasmat Rai dictum as thumb rule, if the subsequent events in cases arising out of disputes under the Delhi Rent Control Act are taken on record in the course of proceedings under proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act, followed by deliberation on impact of those subsequent factual developments on the final outcome, the High Court would be venturing into analysis of facts, which is an exclusive domain of the Rent Controller. In case, the decision of the Rent Controller is reversed by the High Court on the basis of the subsequent events, it would be setting aside of an order of the first adjudicatory authority, which is the exclusive and final authority dealing with facts under the Delhi Rent Control Act; that too, the setting aside of the impugned order would be on the basis of facts which were not even before the said authority. On the other hand, if the High Court after taking on record the subsequent events remands the case to the Rent Controller for fresh decision, there would be no end to successive repetition of such exercise, thereby gross abrogation of the lofty principles behind insertion of Chapter IIIA in the Delhi Rent Control Act. Most significantly, in proceedings under proviso to Sec.25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, allowing the tenant to place on record subsequent events would imply extending (that too, repeatedly) the statutorily fixed time limit of 15 days to file application for leave to contest, and that would clearly abrogate the legislative as well as judicial pronouncements holding the said period of 15 days to be non-extendable.
15. In the case of Hasmat Rai (supra), the eviction suit was filed under the provisions of Section 12(1)(f) of the MP Act, under which the landlord is required to establish through trial that he bona fide requires possession of the tenanted premises, let out for non residential purposes, for continuing or starting his own business and that he had no other reasonably suitable non residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. The burden to establish these requirements under Section 12(1)(f) of the MP Act is squarely on the landlord through full dress trial, in the backdrop of contest set up by way of written statement filed by the tenant. In contrast, under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B(4) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, the tenant is not allowed to contest the eviction petition as a matter of right, and has to first seek leave to contest. This difference between the two provisions is a vital indicator that approach of the court in dealing with eviction cases under these two enactments has to be different, lest apple are compared with oranges.
16. Similarly, in the other judicial precedents cited on behalf of the applicants herein, the issue of taking on record the subsequent events was dealt with pertaining to the rent control legislations other than the Delhi Rent Control Act and all those cases were decided on Hasmat Rai dictum dealing primarily with appellate scrutiny, which is barred under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. None of those cases dealt with the legislation which would stipulate a pretrial stage of deciding as to whether the tenant deserves to be granted leave to contest. All those cases dealt with legislations which stipulated the mandatory trial of the eviction petitions/suits.
17. I am of the considered view that the overall scheme of the Delhi Rent Control Act does not gel with the Hasmat Rai dictum. Of course, it is not and cannot be said that the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the above quoted judicial precedents that the bona fide need of landlord must continue to exist till the final adjudication has to be ignored. What is being said here is that the said principle would have no applicability to the proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act in view of its special scheme, otherwise the very purpose of the 1976 amendment to the Delhi Rent Control Act would get obliterated.
18. There is another aspect. The proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, strictly speaking is the power of the High Court to call for records and examine if the eviction order was passed in accordance with law. It is not a provision enabling the litigant to seek remedy stricto senso except to the extent that the petitioner approaching the High Court under proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act so approaches, alleging that the impugned order was not in accordance with law and once that is done, it is for the High Court to examine the issue. The evaluation as to whether the impugned order was in accordance with law or not cannot be on the basis of material which was not before the Rent Controller when the impugned order was passed. In other words, while exercising jurisdiction under proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act, in order to assess whether the impugned order is in accordance with law or not, the High Court would confine itself only to the material which was before the Rent Controller at the time of passing of the impugned order.
19. Then, a distinctive and very significant factor in the judicial precedent of Hasmat Rai (supra) was that the subsequent event in question there, which the Supreme Court allowed to be brought on record by way of amendment of the written statement was an already admitted fact that the other tenant firm namely M/s. Goraldas Parmanand had already vacated the other portion of the building in which the tenanted premises were situated. As mentioned above, the Supreme Court allowed the amendment of the written statement observing the same to be only an elaboratory amendment. In the present case, in reply to the application for leave to contest, the present respondents/landlords vehemently denied having re-let any shop and in the rejoinder, the petitioners/tenants did not come up with any reliable material to show even prima facie the alleged subsequent event of re-letting.
20. In the case of Jai Prakash Gupta (supra), relied upon by learned counsel for petitioner/tenant the circumstances before the Supreme Court were as follows. The application filed under Section 21(1)(a) of the UP Act 13 of 1972 before the Prescribed Authority at Meerut for release of the subject shop on the grounds of bona fide requirement for office space of landlord�s son was resisted by the tenant, which followed trial, culminating into rejection of the application for release, holding that the landlord was in occupation of a space available on first floor which could be used. The landlord filed an appeal under Section 22 of the UP Act, which was allowed by the Additional District Judge, holding that in view of the professional requirement of the landlord�s son it is the subject shop which was suitable. Against the appellate order, the tenant filed a writ petition in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. During pendency of the writ petition, the original applicant, for whose son�s office the subject shop was required passed away. Thereafter, wife of the deceased applicant as well as father of the tenant also passed away. Under these circumstances, a supplementary affidavit on behalf of tenant and a counter-affidavit on behalf of landlord were filed before the High Court, which were taken on record. The High Court set aside the judgment of the appellate court in view of those subsequent developments and remanded the case to the appellate court to consider the effect of the same on the bona fide need of the landlord. The judgment of the High Court was challenged before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court, holding that those subsequent events needed to be taken through a full dress trial. It is in such situation of rival claims that the Supreme Court upheld taking on record the subsequent events. Significantly, the Supreme Court while approving taking on record the subsequent events also added a rider that the court must take �cautious cognizance� of the subsequent events.
21. The judgment in the case of Abdul Gaffer (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for petitioner/tenant also was in a distinguishable factual and legal context. In the said case, pertaining to the Karnataka Rent Control Act, which also does not contain any special summary proceedings chapter, the court of first adjudication (Munsiff) allowed the eviction suit, which order was reversed by the District Judge in revision and before the High Court, certain subsequent events were pleaded and after reappreciating the evidence on facts in revision proceedings, the High Court restored the order of Munsiff. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court order, holding that it was not permissible for the High Court to interfere in the findings of facts. In the present case under the Delhi Rent Control Act also, this court while exercising powers similar to revisional powers would not be able to reappreciate the findings of facts by examining as to whether the subsequent events now sought to be pleaded are relevant, and if so to what extent while examining the question of grant of leave to contest.
22. The judgment of the Full Bench of this court in the case of Mohan Lal (supra) relied upon by learned counsel for petitioner/tenant elucidates the distinction between Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act and Section 35 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act pointing out that the power of revision under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act was available only after a party had exhausted appellate remedy, while the Delhi Rent Control Act in the designated category of cases expressly took away the right of appeal.
23. In the case of Kuldeep Singh vs Sanjay Aggarwal, (2018):DHC:2429, relied upon by learned counsel for petitioner/tenant also, the circumstances were quite distinct from the present case. The subsequent event sought to be brought on record in the said case was an admitted fact that subsequent to the eviction order the landlord had sold the suit property. Observing that the property of which the landlord sought eviction remained no longer under his control, so very foundation of the eviction petition had ceased to exist, the coordinate bench of this court took into consideration the said subsequent event. That, as discussed hereafter, is not the present situation. Significantly, the judgment of another coordinate bench of this court in the case of Dharam Pal Gupta (supra) passed prior in point of time taking a contrary view (which view was upheld by way of dismissal of the Special Leave Petition) was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge at the time of arguments in the case of Kuldeep Singh (supra).
24. In the case of M.M. Quasim (supra) as extracted above also, under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, the admitted factual position was that the landlord had lost his interest in entirety in the building during pendency of the appeal, so the question was as to whether he would still be entitled to maintain and continue the action after cessation of his interest. At that stage, the proceedings were pending before the High Court in revision petition at the instance of landlord questioning a remand to the trial court by the first appellate court for investigation of certain facts and it is during revision proceedings that the subsequent event was brought to the notice of the High Court.
25. In the cases of Bhavnagar University vs Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111; Union of India vs Dhanwanti Devi, (1996) 6 SCC 44; Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. vs Uttam Manohar Nakate, (2005) 2 SCC 489 and Punjab National Bank vs R.L. Vaid, (2004) 7 SCC 698, the Supreme Court elaborated on the doctrine of judicial precedent and held that a judgment is a precedent on what was for adjudication and not what can be logically deduced or inferred therefrom. Applying that principle, what was for adjudication in the case of Hasmat Rai (supra) was different from what is for adjudication in the present cases, the difference being as elaborated above the overall schemes of the applicable legislations.
26. It would also be necessary to take note of the ground realities on this issue. In almost all proceedings before the Delhi High Court under proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, after obtaining stay on operation of the impugned eviction orders (which stay is primarily granted keeping in mind the long time required to hear and decide such petitions on account of overflowing dockets), the tenants come up with such applications seeking to place on record subsequent events. Such subsequent events may be in the form of death of the landlord or his family members, coming into availability of additional accommodation, change of requirement of the landlord consequent upon change of his occupation, sale or re-letting of other vacated properties of the landlord etc. On the other hand, the landlords for the purposes of expeditious disposal of such revision petitions seldom come up with any such application, despite the fact that circumstances of tenant also undergo vital changes with time. The landlords, who have successfully obtained eviction orders, that too under designated categories of summary procedure inserted by way of Chapter IIIA in the Delhi Rent Control Act by the legislature cannot be expected to suffer endless rounds of scrutiny of their bona fide requirement because life does not remain standstill and the courts are unable to dispose of such petitions expeditiously after the same are filed.
27. Falling back to the specific factual matrix of the present case, as mentioned above, the premises which are subject matters of these six petitions are six shops situated on the ground floor of the building; the bona fide requirement pleaded elaborately in the eviction petitions is that there is paucity of accommodation in possession of the respondents/landlords due to which their goods are kept outside the shops in corridors and that the goods are to be stored by classifying/segregating the same according to quality, rate, weight, material composition and most importantly it is the 4000 bundles of water proof canvass that has to be stored in shop near the main road approachable by truck for safe loading/unloading. The petitioners/tenants through these 12 applications, filed on different dates seek to bring on record that 09 out of 150 shops of the larger premises were got vacated during pendency of these proceedings and new tenants were inducted therein. According to the petitioners/tenants, the facts of vacation and re-letting of the said 09 shops would show that the requirement of the respondents/landlords has come to an end.
28. One cannot be oblivious of practical realities while dealing with such situations. According to the petitioners/tenants, there are about 150 shops in the said larger premises and according to the respondents/landlords, the major requirement is on the basis of location of the subject premises so that the same are easily accessible for loading/unloading of canvass and also for the segregation of the material. In such situation, the landlord cannot be expected to keep waiting for the shops under litigation to be vacated, leaving the already vacated shops unused, thereby facing financial loss. In such situation, merely because the landlord, who has comprehensive plans for utilization of the complete larger premises, even if assumingly re-inducts tenants in 09 out of 150 shops to minimize the losses, it cannot be said that the very foundation of the eviction claim pending at the stage of proceedings under proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act would get knocked out. The present respondents/landlords cannot be non-suited merely because during pendency of these proceedings, 09 out of 150 shops, even if it is assumed, were got vacated and re-let. Even from that angle, the alleged subsequent events would not be of relevance at this stage.
29. To conclude, in my considered view, the Hasmat Rai dictum cannot be applied to the proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act and speaking specifically about the present case, the alleged subsequent events do not have any bearing on the eviction proceedings brought by the respondents/landlords under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
30. Therefore, all these 12 applications are dismissed with a total cost of Rs.10,000/-, to be paid by the applicants to the non-applicants by the next date of hearing.
RC.REV. 160/2018, RC.REV. 180/2018, RC.REV. 569/2018, RC.REV. 570/2018, RC.REV. 571/2018 & RC.REV. 572/2018
List these petitions for final arguments on 26.04.2024.
GIRISH KATHPALIA
(JUDGE)
MARCH 12, 2024/ry
RC.REV. 160/2018 & connected cases Page 1 of 36 pages Page 1 of 36 pages