GAUTAM CHOPRA & ANR. vs KAMRUDDIN SAIFI
$~19
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 26th April, 2024
+ CS(OS) 271/2021 & I.A. 20930/2023
GAUTAM CHOPRA & ANR. ….. Plaintiffs
Through: Mr. Rajesh Yadav, Senior Adv. with Ms. Ruchira V. Arora and Mr. Dhananjay Mehlawat, Advs. (M: 9911006159)
versus
KAMRUDDIN SAIFI ….. Defendant
Through: Mr. Rishabh Kapur and Mr. Tanmay Gupta, Adv. (M: 9399594096)
CORAM:
JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH
JUDGMENT
Prathiba M. Singh, J.
1. This hearing has been done through hybrid mode.
I.A. 20930/2023 (for impleadment)
2. This is an application filed by Mr. Naimuddin under Order I Rule 10 CPC seeking impleadment in the present suit on the ground that the Applicant is a necessary party to the suit as he is in occupation of an area measuring 120 sq. meters at A-1, Manraj Garden Ziauddinpur, Wazirabad Road, Opposite Yamuna Vihar, New Delhi-110094. The case of the said Applicant is that he had taken on rent a shop along with the open land at the rear portion of the shop for running a steel welding and fabrication unit. Reliance is placed upon certain photographs along with the site plan, in support of this contention by the Applicant. The site plan extracted by the applicant in his application at page 12 is as under:
3. Vide order dated 11th January, 2024, this Court had directed the Applicant to be present in Court on the next date of hearing.
4. The primary contention of the ld. Counsel for the Applicant is that the Applicant has tenancy rights on even the open land in the rear portion of the shops under his occupation. In support of the same, he relies on various rent receipts indicating payment of rent, including rent receipt of payment of Rs. 805 made on 26th August, 2023, being made to Ms. Karina Malhotra.
5. The Court has questioned the ld. Counsel for the Applicant, if there is any actual documentation of the claim of the Applicant of having tenancy rights over the open area, at the rear-side of the shops. In response to the same, ld. Counsel for the Applicant has submitted that an arrangement with the landlord to use the open area for fabrication was in place since the beginning as the space in the shop was not enough for the fabrication works of the Applicant.
6. The Court has heard the ld. Counsel for the Applicant and perused the record.
7. The rent receipts and electricity bill which are relied upon by the Applicant would clearly show that the area under the occupation of the Applicant is at best shop No. 12 which is an identifiable shop as per his own site plan. The alleged rent receipts filed are signed by one Ms. Karina Malhotra who herself does not have any right in respect of the open land behind the rear-side of the shops. Her rights only extend to the shop. Thus, the Applicant who claims to be the tenant of Ms. Karina Malhotra cannot have any rights over the land in question which is admittedly, as per the Defendant in his possession, in respect of which order dated 30th March, 2022 has already been passed.
8. Accordingly, in this view of the matter, the Applicant in the present application, cannot claim any rights beyond the shop no. 12 for which the alleged rent receipts have been filed. The land in the present case is not part of or related to shop no. 12 or any of the shops which are at front as per the site plan above.
9. In this view of the matter, the proposed Defendants application is devoid of any merit and is liable to be dismissed.
CS(OS) 271/2021
10. Vide order dated 4th June, 20201 the Court had granted an ex-parte ad-interim injunction in the present suit. The operative portion of the said injunction order is set out below:
4. The plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case. The defendant, his employees, etc. are restrained by an ex parte injunction from selling, alienating, parting with possession or creating any third party rights or raising any construction whatsoever whether temporary or permanent on the said vacant land as described in the suit till further orders.
11. Further, the order dated 30th March, 2022 is relevant in the present case. The said order was passed in an application, I.A. No.7297/2021 under Order XV-A CPC, wherein the Court had clearly recorded that the Defendant is in occupation of a portion of the vacant land in ground of Godown No.1, i.e., the land measuring approx. 430 sq. yards, situated at A-1, Manraj Garden, Ziauddinpur, Wazirabad Road, Opposite Yamuna Vihar, New Delhi- 110094, which belongs to the plaintiffs. As recorded in the said order, the Defendant did not dispute the ownership of the Plaintiffs in respect of the aforesaid land. However, the dispute was only in respect of the area in the occupation of the Defendants. After having heard the ld. Counsel for the parties the Court has passed the following order:
I.A. No.7294/2021 (for directions) in CS(OS) 270/2021 & I.A. No.7297/2021 (for directions) in CS(OS) 271/2021
1. These applications have been filed on behalf of the plaintiffs under provisions of Order XV-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) on the basis that the defendants are in occupation of a portion of the open, vacant land in front of Godown No. 1, measuring approx. 430 sq. yards i.e. 360 sq. mtrs, situate at A-1, Manraj Garden, Ziauddinpur, Wazirabad Road, Opposite Yamuna Vihar, New Delhi- 110094, which belongs to the plaintiffs. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the defendants have forcibly and illegally fenced the open area in front of Godown No. 1 and behind the shops of the defendants and in respect of which they are each liable to pay rent/charges in terms of Order XV-A of the CPC at the rate of Rs.50,000/- per month.
2. It is submitted by the counsel for the plaintiffs that the defendant in CS(OS) 270/2021 has encroached about 115 sq. mtrs. of the land of the plaintiffs and the defendant in CS(OS) 271/2021 has encroached about 120 sq. mtrs. of the land of the plaintiffs.
3. The counsel for the defendants does not dispute the ownership of the plaintiffs in respect of the aforesaid land. However, he disputes that the area in occupation of the defendants is much less than that claimed by the plaintiffs. He submits that the defendant in CS(OS) 270/2021 and the defendant in CS(OS) 271/2021 have respectively been in actual, physical, continuous and peaceful possession of 68.79 sq. mtrs. and 109.44 sq. mtrs. of the land of the plaintiffs for over thirty years.
4. I have heard the counsels for the parties.
5. The plaintiffs have not placed on record any lease deeds in respect of similarly located properties of the neighbourhood to support the premise of rent/charges being payable in terms of Order XV-A of the CPC at the rate of Rs.50,000/- per month.
6. Nevertheless, with the consent of the parties, the following directions are passed:
(i) Each of the defendants shall deposit arrears of rent/charges at the rate of Rs.10,000/- per month with effect from 1st June, 2021 till date, i.e. 31st March, 2022, before the Court.
(ii) In view of the financial constraints expressed by the defendants, the arrears of rent/charges for the aforesaid period of ten months, amounting to Rs.1,00,000/-, for each of the defendants be deposited before the Court in four equal three-monthly instalments.
(iii) The first instalment of Rs. 25,000/- each shall be deposited by the defendants on or before 1st July, 2022.
(iv) With effect from 1st April, 2022, each of the defendants shall deposit in each succeeding month, on or before 5th of every month, rent/charges at the rate of Rs.10,000/- before the Court.
(v) The amounts as deposited by the defendants be kept in a fixed deposit.
12. As can be seen from the above order, a conditional order is passed by the Court that the Defendant would deposit the arrears of rent/ charges as prescribed therein at Rs.10,000/- per month. The arrears were also permitted to be paid in four equal instalments. The said order was not complied with by the Defendant. Thereafter order dated 14th November, 2022 clearly records that the directions given on 30th March, 2022 was challenged by the Defendant by way of an appeal to the Division Bench in FAO(OS) 81/2022 titled Mr Kamruddin Saifi v. Mr. Gautam Chopra and Anr. which was dismissed as withdrawn on 18th July, 2022. In the said order, the ld. Division Bench gave liberty to approach the ld. Single Judge in the present case by way of an appropriate application. The operative portion of the order of the ld. Division Bench is as follows:
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant seeks leave to withdraw this appeal, with liberty to approach the learned Single Judge by way of an appropriate application, if any, in accordance with law.
Leave and liberty granted.
The appeal is dismissed as withdrawn, and disposed of accordingly.
13. A review petition, REVIEW PET. 205/2022 was filed by the Defendant before this Court. The said review petition was listed before the Court on 14th November, 2022 and the following order came to be passed:
REVIEW PET. 206/2022(order dated 30.03.2022) & I.A. 13517/2022(for condonation of delay of 75 days in filing Review Pet. 206/2022) in CS(OS) 270/2021
REVIEW PET. 205/2022(order dated 30.03.2022) & I.A. 13515/2022(for condonation of delay of 75 days in filing Review Pet. 205/2022) in CS(OS) 271/2021
3. The present review petitions have been filed seeking review of the order dated 30th March, 2022 passed by this Court, which specifically records that the said order was passed with the consent of the parties.
4. There is a delay of 75 days in filing the present review petitions, for which the review petitioners seek condonation of delay.
5. The only ground taken in the review petitions is that the previous counsel, who appeared for the review petitioners on 30th March, 2022, wrongfully gave his consent to the said order being passed and he had no authority from the review petitioners to give such a consent.
6. Mr. Rajesh Yadav, senior counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs vehemently opposes the review petitions and makes the following submissions:-
i.) No cogent grounds for seeking condonation of delay have been taken by the review petitioners. In both the suits, the reasons given for the
condonation of delay are identical, i.e., the illness of the review petitioners.
ii) The order dated 30th March, 2022 was challenged by the review petitioners by filing appeals, being FAO (OS) No.83/2022 and FAO (OS) No.81/2022. The said appeals were dismissed as withdrawn on 18th July, 2022 with liberty to approach the Single Bench.
iv) In the memo of appeal filed on behalf of the review petitioners, no ground has been taken with regard to the consent wrongly given by the previous counsel.
7. A copy of the said memo of appeal filed on behalf of the review petitioners has been handed over in Court today.
8. I have heard the counsels for the parties.
9. There is a delay of 75 days in filing of the present review petitions. Identical grounds have been taken in the applications for condonation of delay filed in both the suits. The paragraph 3 of the aforesaid applications is set out below:
3. That the said delay was caused due to ill health of the Appellant and his other family members due to which the Appellant could not take necessary steps against the impugned Order dt. 30.03.2022 within limitation period.
10. It appears that the aforesaid paragraph has been blindly copied in both the applications for condonation of delay. No details of the illness or the period of illness have been given in the said applications.
11. There is merit in the submission of the plaintiffs that if the case of the review petitioners was that the previous counsel had wrongfully given consent for the passing of the said order, the aforesaid ground should have been taken in the appeal filed by the review petitioners against the said order. I have perused the memo of appeal filed on behalf of the review petitioners and no such ground exists.
12. Further, if the consent was wrongfully given by the previous counsel, the review petitioners should have immediately approached this Court. They could not have waited for almost three months before filing the present review petitions and that too, after he had been unsuccessful in the appeal filed against the said order.
13. Clearly, the review petitions are in the nature of an afterthought. In any event, if the consent was wrongfully given by the previous counsel, the remedy of the review petitioners was not filing the present review petitions, but to take other remedies as per law in this regard. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of this Court in Archies Greetings & Gifts Limited v. Garg Plastic, AIR 2003 Del 468.
14. I find no merit in the review petitions and the applications for condonation of delay in filing the review petitions. The review petitions along with the aforesaid applications stand dismissed.
14. As can be seen from the above order, the review against the consent order dated 30th March, 2022 was also dismissed. The said order in the review petitions was then challenged before the ld. Division Bench in FAO(OS) 24/2023 titled Rahisuddin v. Gautam Chopra & Anr. and FAO(OS) 25/2023 titled Kamruddin Saifi v. Gautam Chopra & Anr. By way of a common judgment dated 16th March, 2023, the said appeal was dismissed. After considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, the ld. Division Bench observed as under:
3. It is an admitted position before us, that the appellants in the present appeals, failed to comply with the directions enshrined in the consent order dated 30.03.2022, within the time specified therein. The solitary submission made on behalf of the appellants, before the learned Single Judge was that the counsel representing them at the time of the rendering by the learned Single Judge, of the consent order dated 30.03.2022, did not consult the former before recording his consent for payment of arrears of rent/charges, as recorded in the said order.
4. The review petitions being Review Pet. 206/2022 in CS(OS) 270/2021 and Review Pet. 205/2022 in CS(OS) 271/2021, instituted on behalf of the appellants, in this behalf, seeking modification of the consent order dated 30.03.2022, came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 26.08.2022
5. It is further observed that the appeals being FAO(OS) 127/2022 and FAO(OS) 130/2022, filed against the above said common order dated 26.08.2022, came to be dismissed as withdrawn by this Court on 15.11.2022
6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, argued that the provisions of Order XV-A of the CPC, 1908 vest a discretion with the learned Single Judge, to permit deposit of the directed amounts even subsequent upon the date specified for the said purpose and that, in the present case, in the facts and circumstances antecedent and attendant, the learned Single Judge has failed to exercise the discretion vested in the Court appropriately.
7. At this stage, it would be appropriate to extract the relevant provision of Order XV-A of the CPC, which reads as follows:
ORDER XV-A STRIKING OFF DEFENCE IN A SUIT BY A LESSOR
(1) In any suit by a owner/lessor for eviction of an unauthorized occupant/lessee or for the recovery of rent and future mesne profits from him, the defendant shall deposit such amount as the court may direct on account of arrears upto the date of the order (within such time as the court may fix) and thereafter continue to deposit in each succeeding month the rent claimed in the suit as the court may direct. The defendant shall continue to deposit such amount till the decision of the suit unless otherwise directed. In the event of any default in making the deposit as aforesaid, the Court may subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) strike off the defence.
8. A plain reading of the above provision leaves no manner of doubt that the subject provision expresses a clear mandate and stipulation requiring a party to comply with an order of deposit, passed by the learned Single Judge, on pain of suffering an adverse order of striking off the defence upon failure so to do. Further, it is not the appellants case that, he deposited arrears of rent/charges, in terms of the said common order dated 30.03.2022, within the time stipulated therein.
9. In view of the foregoing discussion, having given our anxious consideration to the observations recorded by the learned Single Judge, specifically in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the impugned orders, we find ourselves unable to countenance the submission made on behalf of the appellants.
10. The guiding principles as laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in Wander Ltd v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd reported as 1990 (Supp) SCC 72 justifies interference only when the exercise of discretion is palpably perverse. Even otherwise, in the present case, the common order dated 30.03.2022, was passed, with the consent of the parties and is consequently not amenable, to an appeal.
11. In view of the aforesaid parameters, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the impugned order as the same is devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed; with costs of Rs.10,000/-, each, to be deposited within a period of two weeks from today, with the Juvenile Justice Board.
12. Both the appeals are disposed of accordingly. The pending applications also stand disposed of.
15. Subsequently, a Special Leave Petition (SLP) challenging the above order, being SLP (C) Diary No. 34542/2023 titled Kamruddin Saifi v. Gautam Chopra and Anr. was also dismissed by the Supreme Court on 18th September, 2023. The dismissal of the SLP by the Supreme Court has brought an end to the cycle of appeals preferred by the Defendant. The dismissal of the SLP also seals the position of the Plaintiffs.
16. In this scenario, the clear position that emerges is
* the Defendant has demonstrated wilful disregard for the orders passed by the Court by not complying with the directions of the Court requiring the Defendants to deposit arrears of rent and other charges;
* the Defendant is continuing in unauthorised occupation of the suit premises and does not dispute the same
* the only challenge to the present proceedings by the Defendant is in respect of the extent of unauthorised occupation;
* the Defendant has admitted that he is in unauthorised occupation of at least a portion of the suit premises for an extended period of more than thirty years;
* the defence of the Defendant has been struck off under Order XVA, CPC on account of failure to comply with the directions of the Court.
17. Accordingly, in view of the above, there is an imminent need to direct corrective measures for the unauthorised occupation and non-compliance of Court orders to uphold the rights of the Plaintiffs to enjoy their property. Further, considering that the Defendant has been in unauthorized occupation of the land for more than thirty years, there is urgency in remedying the continued impingement of the Plaintiffs rights to their property.
18. The defence of the Defendant has already been struck off. The ownership to the land is also admitted as recorded in order dated 30th March, 2022. In view thereof, the Court is of the opinion that this is a fit case for pronouncing of judgment under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC against the Defendant. The said provision reads as under:
ORDER VIII
Written statement, set-off and counter-claim
xxx xxx xxx
10. Procedure when party fails to present written statement called for by Court.Where any party from whom a written statement is required under rule 1 or rule 9 fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the Court, as the case may be, the Court shall pronounce judgment against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit and on the pronouncement of such judgment a decree shall be drawn up.
19. The scope of Order VIII Rule 10 has been considered by the Supreme Court in Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan, 1999 INSC 385. In the said decision the Supreme Court has held that under Order VIII Rule 10 of the CPC, Courts must not mechanically pass judgment against the Defendant merely on account of non-filing of written statement. The Supreme Court clarified that Courts need to exercise judicial discretion and make an independent assessment of the facts and determine whether the allegations made therein justify a decree, without requiring the Plaintiff to prove its case. Thus, the judgment emphasises that it is essential for the Court to ensure that passing of a decree is not merely a procedural formality. The relevant extracts of the said decision are set out below:
15. This Rule, namely Rule 10, was also amended by the CPC (Amendment) Act 1976 (Act No. 104 of 1976). Prior to its amendment, it was held in a number of decisions that the rule can be invoked only in those situations where the Court has required the defendant to file the Written Statement in terms of Rule 9 of Order 8. A few other High Courts had taken the view that this Rule would be applicable even to those cases where a Written Statement was required to be filed under Order 8 Rule 1 CPC. The conflict of decisions has been set at rest by providing specifically under this rule that where a party from whom a Written Statement is required either under Rule 1 or Rule 9 of Order 8 fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the Court, the Court shall pronounce judgment against him or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. Rule 10 thus governs both the situations where a Written Statement is required under Rule 1 of Order 8 as also where it has been demanded under Rule 9. In both the situations, if the Written Statement has not been filed by the defendant, it will be open to the Court to pronounce judgment against him or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. It is to be noticed that if the Written Statement is not filed, the Court is required to pronounce judgment against the defendant. The words “against him” are to be found in Rule 10 of Order 9 which obviously means that the judgment will be pronounced against the defendant. This rule also gives a discretion either to pronounce judgment against the defendant or “make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit.” These words are of immense significance, inasmuch as they give a discretion to the Court not to pronounce judgment against the defendant and instead pass such order as it may think fit in relation to the suit.
16. There are thus two separate and distinct provisions under which the Court can pronounce judgment on the failure of the defendant to file Written Statement. The failure may be either under Order 8 Rule 5(2) under which the Court may either pronounce judgment on the basis of the facts set out in the plaint or require the plaintiff to prove any such fact; or the failure may be under Order 8 Rule 10 CPC under which the Court is required to pronounce judgment against the defendant or to pass such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit.
xxx xxx xxx
30. As pointed out earlier, the Court has not to act blindly upon the admission of a fact made by the defendant in his Written Statement nor the Court should proceed to pass judgment blindly merely because a Written Statement has not been filed by the defendant traversing the facts set out by the plaintiff in the plaint filed in the Court. In a case, specially where a Written Statement has not been filed by the defendant, the Court should be a little cautious in proceeding under Order 8 Rule 10 CPC. Before passing the judgment against the defendant it must see to it that even if the facts set out in the plaint are treated to have been admitted, a judgment could possibly be passed in favour of the plaintiff without requiring him to prove any fact mentioned in the plaint. It is a matter of Court’s satisfaction and, therefore, only on being satisfied that there is no fact which need be proved on account of deemed admission, the Court can conveniently pass a judgment against the defendant who has not filed the Written Statement. But if the plaint itself indicates that there are disputed questions of fact involved in the case regarding which two different versions are set out in the plaint itself, it would not be safe for the Court to pass a judgment without requiring the plaintiff to prove the facts so as to settle the factual controversy. Such a case would be covered by the expression “the Court may, in its discretion, require any such fact to be proved” used in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order 8, or the expression “may make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit” used in Rule 10 of Order 8.
20. The said position has been reiterated in a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Asma Lateef & Anr. v. Shabbir Ahmad & Ors., 2024 INSC 36 wherein it has been highlighted that Rule 10 of Order VIII, CPC is not mandatory and that it is not to say that a Court has no alternative but to pass a judgment in favour of the Plaintiff, in the absence of a written statement. The Supreme Court cautioned that if the plaint itself suggests involvement of disputed questions of fact, it would not be safe for the Court to pass a judgment without requiring the plaintiff to prove the facts. The relevant extracts of the said judgments are set out below:
13. Prior to answering the above question, we consider it appropriate to examine the scope and extent of power exercisable under Rule 10 of Order VIII, CPC.
15. We have no hesitation to hold that Rule 10 is permissive in nature, enabling the trial court to exercise, in a given case, either of the two alternatives open to it. Notwithstanding the alternative of proceeding to pronounce a judgment, the court still has an option not to pronounce judgment and to make such order in relation to the suit it considers fit. The verb shall in Rule 10 [although substituted for the verb may by the Amendment Act of 1976] does not elevate the first alternative to the status of a mandatory provision, so much so that in every case where a party from whom a written statement is invited fails to file it, the court must pronounce the judgment against him. If that were the purport, the second alternative to which shall equally applies would be rendered otiose.
16. At this stage, we consider it apposite to take a quick look at Balraj Taneja (supra) to examine the scope of Rule 10 of Order VIII. Therein, this Court ruled that a court is not supposed to pass a mechanical judgment invoking Rule 10 of Order VIII, CPC merely on the basis of the plaint, upon the failure of a defendant to file a written statement
17. What emerges from a reading of Balraj Taneja (supra), with which we wholeheartedly concur, is that only on being satisfied that there is no fact which need to be proved on account of deemed admission, could the court pass a judgment against the defendant who has not filed the written statement; but if the plaint itself suggests involvement of disputed questions of fact, it would not be safe for the court to pass a judgment without requiring the plaintiff to prove the facts. Balraj Taneja (supra) also lays down the law that provision of Rule 10 of Order VIII, CPC is by no means mandatory in the sense that a court has no alternative but to pass a judgment in favour of the plaintiff, if the defendant fails or neglects to file his written statement.
18. If indeed, in a given case, the defendant defaults in filing written statement and the first alternative were the only course to be adopted, it would tantamount to a plaintiff being altogether relieved of its obligation to prove his case to the satisfaction of the court. Generally, in order to be entitled to a judgment in his favour, what is required of a plaintiff is to prove his pleaded case by adducing evidence. Rule 10, in fact, has to be read together with Rule 5 of Order VIII and the position seems to be clear that a trial court, at its discretion, may require any fact, treated as admitted, to be so proved otherwise than by such admission. Similar is the position with section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It must be remembered that a plaint in a suit is not akin to a writ petition where not only the facts are to be pleaded but also the evidence in support of the pleaded facts is to be annexed, whereafter, upon exchange of affidavits, such petition can be decided on affidavit evidence. Since facts are required to be pleaded in a plaint and not the evidence, which can be adduced in course of examination of witnesses, mere failure or neglect of a defendant to file a written statement controverting the pleaded facts in the plaint, in all cases, may not entitle him to a judgment in his favour unless by adducing evidence he proves his case/claim.
21. In the present suit, it has to be borne in mind that not only has the Defendants defence been struck off, but there is a clear admission before the Court of unauthorised use of the suit property, which belongs to the Plaintiffs. The orders of this Court have been repeatedly challenged in superior courts and the same have failed. A conditional order was passed by this Court to pay arrears for past occupation of the property as also a monthly amount for continued occupation of the property. The same was not complied with. The Defendant does not even dispute the Plaintiffs ownership of the land. Considering this, the clear position that emerges is that the Plaintiffs have the right to enjoy possession of the suit property.
22. Further, in the present case, as the Defendants defence has been struck off already, as per the Explanation to Section 5 of the Indian Evidence Act, the Defendant is disentitled to lead evidence in the present suit. Therefore, in view of the fact that no evidence can be led by the Defendant and considering that the Plaintiff is willing to give up all the other prayers apart from the prayer of recovery of possession of the suit property, all the requirements for passing a judgment on the basis of Order VIII Rule 10, CPC have been satisfied.
23. Accordingly, a decree for recovery of possession by ejectment is passed against the Defendant in respect of the red colour in the site plan and prayer (i) of the suit is granted. The said prayer is extracted as under:
(i) a decree of recovery of Possession by ejectment of the Defendant from the area measuring 120 sq. meters shown in red colour in the site plan, forming part of the property situate at A-1, Manraj Garden, Ziauddinpur, Wazirabad Road, Opposite Yamuna Vihar, New Delhi – 110094, in favour of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendant, after removal of iron gates, grill fencing and the welding material/raw material and other goods erected/stored/dumped by the Defendant in the suit property;
24. The site plan as attached to the Plaint, is also extracted below, for the sake of clarity.
25. The Plaintiffs counsel submits that any further damages or mesne profits except what is due on 30th March, 2022, are also not pressed. Thus, the remaining reliefs are rejected except as contained in paragraph 6 of the order dated 30th March, 2022 in respect of which, the Plaintiff is free to take steps to recover in accordance with law.
26. Let the decree sheet be drawn. All pending applications is disposed of.
PRATHIBA M. SINGH
JUDGE
APRIL 26, 2024
dj/am
[Corrected and Released on 2nd May, 2024]
CS(OS) 271/2021 Page 2 of 2