GAJENDER SINGH DRALL AND ORS Vs GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI AND ORS -Judgment by Delhi High Court
*INTHE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgmentdeliveredon: 24.01.2024
+ W.P.(C) 11104/2018, CM APPL. 43169/2018-(stay) & CM APPL.
10231/2022-by R-5 (for vacation of stay)
YUDHVIR SINGH& ANR…… Petitionersversus
GOVT. OF NCT OFDELHI & ORS…… RespondentsAND
+ W.P.(C) 320/2018GAJENDER SINGHDRALL AND ORS…… PetitionersversusGOVT OF NCT OF DELHI AND ORS.
….. RespondentsPresent:Mr.DhruvMehta, Sr. Advocate withMs.Smita Maan, Mr.Vishal
Maan, Mr.KeeethVerghese, Mr.AakashSehrawat, Mr.Aditya
Singh and Mr.Jitin Chillar, Advocates for the petitioners.
Mr.SanjayKumar Pathak, StandingCounselwithMr.SunilKumar Jha, Mr.M.S.Akhtar, Ms.RiniV.Tigga andMs.NidhiThakur, Advocates for respondents No.1 to 4.
Mr.ManishVashisht,Sr. Advocate withMr.KaruneshTandon,
Mr.RahulandMr.AnuragYadav, Advocatesfor respondentNo.5/DJB.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE V. KAMESWAR RAOHON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR MENDIRATTA
J U D G M E N T
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ANOOP KUMARMENDIRATTA, J.
Table of Contents
Sr.No.ParticularsPage
No(s).
(I)Brief background3(II)Case set up by the petitioners7(III)Case set up by the respondents10(IV)Contentionson behalf of the petitioners21(V)Contentionson behalf of the respondents27(VI)Rebuttal submissions on behalf of the petitioners37(VII)Findings/Analysis39A.Whetherthe writpetitionspreferredby thepetitionersare barredonthe groundofdelay andlachesoracquiescence orwaiverofrightsby the
petitioners40B.WhethernotificationunderSection11ofRFCTLARRAct, 2013isineffective andinoperative
afterlapse ofRFCTLARR(Amendment) SecondOrdinance, 201556C.Challenge tothe acquisitionproceedingsonthegroundsofurgency, discriminationand malafides69D.Challenge toacquisitionproceedingsonthe
ground ofnon-consideration ofobjections81E.ChallengetonotificationunderSection11ofRFCTLARR Act, 201385F.Challenge toacquisitionproceedingsbeinginviolationofMPD2021, ZDPandDDA’sLandPooling Policy90G.Substantive compliance93(VIII)Conclusion95
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(I)BRIEF BACKGROUND
1.The directionsof NationalGreenTribunalvide order datedMay08,2015inManojKumarMishrav. UnionofIndiatothe concerneddepartmentfor settingupofWWTP (Waste Water TreatmentPlant)fortacklingof discharge of waste andtoxic effluentsinYamuna River,
necessitatedthe acquisitionof landindifferent villagesunderthe RighttoFair CompensationandTransparencyinLandAcquisition, RehabilitationandResettlementAct, 2013(hereinafter referredtoas�RFCTLARR Act,
2013″).
2.InWrit Petition (C) 11104/2018(Yudhvir Singh and Another v.
Govt. of NCT of Delhiand Others)landof the petitionersinKhasraNo.ll//ll(4-00), 12/2(2-10), 19(4-16), 20(4-16), 21(4-12), 22(4-16), 28(0-
04)and16//2(4-12),totalad-measuring30bighas6biswa,situatedinVillage Tajpur Khurd, Delhiwasnotifiedfor acquisition. Petitionersseekquashingof notificationbearingNo.F.8/2/16/2015/L&B/LA/10643datedAugust28, 2015issuedunder Section11(1) of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013andfurtherproceedingsincludingdeclarationunderSection19issuedvidenotificationNo.F.NO.ADM/LAC/SW/2015/921-927datedJuly27, 2017under the said Act.
3.InWrit Petition (C) 320/2018(Gajender Singh Dralland Othersv.
Govt. of NCT ofDelhiand Others),landof the petitionersinKhasra
No.74/21(4-16), 74/22(4-03), 85//2/1(2-08), 85//2/2(2-08) and85//3/1(1-
09)situatedinVillage TikriKalan, NewDelhiwasnotifiedfor acquisition.
Petitionersseekquashingof NotificationbearingNo.F.8/2/15/2015/L&B/LA/10621datedAugust28, 2015under Section
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11(1) of the RFCTLARR ActandfurtherproceedingsincludingdeclarationissuedunderSection19vide NotificationNo.F.NO.LAC(W)/MISC./2017/4160datedAugust24, 2017under the saidAct.
4.Atthisstage, itmaybe noticedthatRFCTLARR Act, 2013whichcame intoforce w.e.f.January01, 2014repealedthe LandAcquisitionAct,
1894andprovidedfor �rehabilitationandresettlementmechanism”for the
projectaffectedpersonsandtheir families,ondisplacementfromtheacquiredland. The same requiredanassessmentof economic disadvantagesand�socialimpact�arisingoutof displacementandaimedatholistic
improvement of allround living standardof the affected personsandfamiliesdue toacquisitionofland, intermsof Chapter II of the RFCTLARR Act,
2013. Asprovidedunder Section9ofthe RFCTLARR Act, 2013, theauthorizedgovernmentmayexemptundertakingof the SocialImpactAssessmentStudy,if the landisproposedtobe acquiredunderthe urgencyprovisionsunder Section40of the saidAct. Also,Section10of the Actdealingwithspecialprovisionstosafeguardfoodsecurity, exemptedtheapplicationof saidprovisionincase of projectsthatare linear innature, suchasthose relatingtoRailways, Highways, major DistrictRoads, IrrigationCanals,Power LinesandLight.ItmayalsobenoticedthatRFCTLARR(SocialImpactAssessmentandConsent)Rules, 2014were notifiedw.e.f.
August 08, 2014under Section109of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013.
5.On December 31, 2014, the RFCTLARR(Amendment)
Ordinance,2014waspromulgatedbythe Presidentof India inexercise of
the powersconferredbyArticle 123of the Constitutionof India toamendthe RFCTLARR Act, 2013whichinteraliainsertedChapter III-A
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empoweringthe Appropriate Governmentfor exemptingcertainprojectsfromprovisions of Chapter-II & IIIof the Act.
Section10Athereinprovidesthatprovisionsof Chapter-II (relatingtodeterminationof socialimpactandpublic purpose) andChapter-III (relatingtospecialprovisionstosafeguardfoodsecurity) maybe exemptedbytheAppropriate Governmentinpublicinterestwithreferencetofollowingprojects:
(a)such projects vital to national securityor defenceof India and everypartthereof, including preparation fordefence; or defenceproduction;
(b)rural infrastructure including electrification;
(c)affordable housing and housing for the poor people;
(d)industrial corridors; and
(e)infrastructureand social infrastructureprojects including projectsunder public private partnership wheretheownership oflandcontinues to vest with the Government.�
6.Thereafter,theRFCTLARR (Amendment)BillwasintroducedonFebruary24, 2015inthe House of thePeople toreplace the 2014OrdinanceandwaspassedwithamendmentsonMarch10, 2015inthe HouseofPeoplebut could notbe passed by Councilof States.
In view of above, RFCTLARR(Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 waspromulgated bythePresident of Indiaon April03, 2015wherebytheChapter-IIIAasreferred in the earlier Ordinancewasretained.
Further, aprovisowasintroduced which provided thatAppropriate
Government shallbefore the issue of notification exemptingthe projectsfromapplication of Chapter-IIand Chapter-IIIof the RFCTLARRActensure that extent of land for proposed acquisition isthe bare minimum
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land required for such projects. Also,sub-section 2of Section 10Aof
the Ordinance providedthat the Appropriate Government shallundertake asurveyof itswastelandincludingaridland and maintainarecord containingdetailsof such landsin amannerasmaybeprescribed by the Appropriate Government.
7.The RFCTLARR Act(Amendment) SecondBill, 2015wasintroducedinthe House of People onMay11, 2015andreferredtoJointCommittee oftheHouse. Inorder togivecontinued effect totheprovisionsof
RFCTLARR(Amendment) Ordinance, 2015, the President of Indiainexercise of powersunder Article 123of the Constitution of Indiapromulgated RFCTLARR(Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015onMay30, 2015. Byvirtue of repealandsavingclause, itwasprovidedthattheRFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015isherebyrepealedandfurther notwithstandingsuchrepealanythingdone oranyactiontakenundertheprincipalActasamendedbyRFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance,
2015shallbe deemedtohave beendone or takenunder the principalActasamendedbythisOrdinance. The RFCTLARR(Amendment) Second
Ordinance, 2015 finallylapsed on August 31, 2015.
8.Apartfromother groundsinteralia,challengingthe acquisitionproceedings,the mainplankof the petitionersisthatthe LandAcquisitionproceedingsinitiatedvide issue of notificationunder Section11ofRFCTLARR Act, 2013byinvokingSection10A(1)(e)ofRFCTLARR
(Amendment) SecondOrdinance, 2015withoutcomplyingwithprovisionsrelatingtoSocialImpactAssessmentunderChapter IIandIIIofRFCTLARR Act, 2013couldnotbe continuedinviewof lapsingof theRFCTLARR (Amendment) SecondOrdinance on August 31, 2015.
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9.Atthe requestof thecounselfor the petitionersandasagreedbythe
counsel for the respondents,Writ Petition (C) No.11104/2018-Yudhvir Singh&. Another v. GNCTD& Othersistreatedasa leadcase.The date ofnotificationunder Section11of RFCTLARR Act, 2013inboththecasesisAugust28, 2015butthedeclarationunder Section19of theRFCTLARR
Act, 2013wasissuedondifferentdates{(i.e.July27, 2017inWP(C)
11104/2018andAugust24, 2017inWP(C) 320/2018)}.Similar legalcontentionshavebeenraisedinboththe casesexceptthatDJB (DelhiJalBoard) isnota partyinW.P.(C) 320/2018-Gajender SinghDrallandOthers
v. Govt. of NCTof DelhiandOthersandthere isnoreductionof proposedlandof acquisition insaidproceedings.
(II)CASE SET UP BYTHE PETITIONERS
10.As per the case of thepetitioners,preliminary notification issued under
Section11of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, invokingSection10A(1)(e) of the
RFCTLARR (Amendment) SecondOrdinance, 2015isineffective andinoperativeonlapse of OrdinanceonAugust31, 2015andtheproceedingscouldnothave beencontinuedinfurtherance thereof. Reliance insupportofthe contentionsisplaceduponthe ConstitutionBenchjudgmentof theHon”ble Supreme Courtof IndiainKrishnaKumarSingh andAnotherv.
State of Bihar and Others,(2017) 3 SCC 1.
11.Itisfurther the case of the petitionersthatthe identification of the landbythe respondentswasbehindthe backof private landownersandtheprocessandprocedure foridentificationof proposedlandidentifiedforacquisitionisunknowntoall. The landisstatedtohave beenidentified
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contrarytoproposedlocationofSTPsasper Sewerage MasterPlan(SMP-
2031), MPD-2021 and Zonal Development Plan (ZDP).
12.Further, thelandidentifiedbyrespondentNo.5for proposedacquisitionwasinitially51bigha 07biswawhichincludedlandadmeasuring30bigha 06biswa ownedandpossessedbythe petitioners, and21bigha 01
biswa ownedandpossessedbya private companynamelyM/s. AlliedRealtyPvt.Ltd. However, the requirementwassubsequentlyreducedfrom51bigha
07biswa to30bigha 06biswaandonlythe landofthe petitionerswasincludedwhile the landownedbyPrivate Companywasexcludedforobliquereasons. Thisreductioninlandisstatedtobe withoutanyjustificationandwasdonetofavourthe saidPrivateCompanyandpetitionersstooddiscriminated.
13.Itisfurther statedthatpursuanttorepresentations/complaintsfiledbythe petitioners, DelhiJalBoard(respondentNo. 5) decidedtocarryoutaVigilance Inquiry. RespondentNo.5 alsocalleduponthe petitionerstoparticipate inthe Vigilance InquiryandpetitionersfiledtheirreplydatedJuly12, 2017tothe queriesraisedduringthe inquiry. Thecopyof therepresentationdatedJune 08, 2017, letterdatedJuly07, 2017, notice/replydatedJuly12, 2017andnoting-sheetdatedAugust24, 2017made byCEOare alsoreliedbythepetitioners. Itisfurther the case of the petitionersthatduringthe saidinquiry,itwasrevealedthatnoting-sheetdatedAugust24,2017made byCEO,DelhiJalBoardreflectsthatafter the reductionof thetotalarea demand, Member (DR), Departmentof Land(EE)didnotdiscussthe selectionof the landwiththe superiorsandonlyafter the complaintfiledbythe petitioners, Member (DR) reviewedtherequirementoflandfor theproposedprojectandonce againmade a preliminaryobservationthatinstead
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of 30bigha, 50bigha of landwouldbe required. Further, toascertainthe
exactrequirementfor the saidpurpose, DelhiJalBoard(respondentNo.5)
constitutedanExpertCommittee anditwasdecidedthatif the Committeeproposes50bighaoflandthenrespondentNo. 5Departmentwouldgoforacquisitionforadditional20bigha of remainingland. Also,noting-sheetdatedOctober 06, 2017bythe Minister of Revenue revealedthatthe
VigilanceDepartmentofDelhiJalBoardconcludeditsinquirywiththerecommendationstoinitiate major penaltyproceedingsagainstthefourofficialsof DelhiJalBoardfoundresponsible for the lapses. Indisregardtotherepresentationsof thepetitionersandignoringthe findingsof the
Vigilance Inquiry, the authoritiesobtainedapprovalfromthe CompetentAuthorityfor issuance of declarationunder Section19of the RFCTLARR
Act, 2013.
The same wasfollowedbya noting-sheetdatedOctober 30, 2017by
the Hon”ble Lt. Governor (respondentNo.2) statingthatthe entire processof
landacquisitionshouldbe conductedina transparentmanner asper lawandif anylapseshave beenfoundonthe partof the officialsof DelhiJalBoard,
disciplinaryactionshouldbe takenagainstthem. Further, asthe issue astohowmuchlandisrequiredfor the proposedprojectisstillpending before theExpertCommittee, therefore,before takinganyaction, itwouldbe advisableto wait for the report of the Committee.
14.Itisfurtherthe case of the petitionersthatthe landownedbythe saidPrivateCompanyfallsinthe facilitycorridor asper the provisionsof MasterPlanforDelhi2021andtheZonalDevelopmentPlanandthesameisthevacantlandeasilyavailable foracquisitionfor the allegedpublic purpose.
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Onthe other hand,the landinquestionownedandpossessedbythe
petitioners,fallsoutside the utilitycorridor andthe usage thereof hasbeenspecificallyprovidedas’Residential’ inthe ZonalDevelopmentPlanforZone �K.
15.Itisalsosubmittedthatthoughthe hearingnoticewasissuedtothepetitionersandhearinggrantedbutthe objectionsfiledonbehalfof thepetitionersinresponse tothe notificationunder Section15ofRFCTLARR
Act, 2013 were dismissedwithout any application of mind and reasoning.
16.Further, onone hand, the acquisitionissoughttobe made underemergency,deprivingthe landownersof statutorybenefitsof Chapter-II andIII of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 and on the other hand, the extensionof timewasconsideredfor issuance of declarationunder Section19bysixmonthsatthe requestof requisitioning department.
17.Itisalsostatedthatthoughthe compliance withthe provisionspostdeclarationunder Section19of the Actispendingbutnotificationunder
Section25of theActwasissuedextendingthe time for makingthe award.
The entireacquisitionproceedingsarestatedtobe vitiatedbymalafide,
arbitrariness and discrimination.
(III)CASE SET UP BYTHE RESPONDENTS
18.Onthe other hand, respondentshave putforthfactualpositionwithdetailedlistof datesinW.P.(C) 11104/2018, whichmaybenoticed,forappreciatingthe stand of the respondents:
(i)Inthe lightof Order datedMay08, 2015passedbythe NationalGreenTribunal, PrincipalBenchatNewDelhiinOANo.06/2012andOANo.300/2013titledasManojKumar
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Mishrav. Union of Indiafor settingupof waste water
treatmentplants(WWTP), for effectivelytacklingthe problem
of dischargeofwaste,DelhiJalBoard(RespondentNo.5)
requestedthe PrincipalSecretary, L&B Department,
GNCTD/RespondentNo.1 toacquire land in seven villagesincludingVillage Tajpur Khurd, Delhiand Village TikriKalan, Delhiunder emergencyclause. ItwasmentionedthereinthatDJB firsttriedtogetthe GaonSabha landallottedfromGNCTDbutthesame wasnotavailable/sufficientfor saidprojectsand, thus,privatelandwasidentifiedwiththehelpofDC (SW) office. Inthe annexure totherequisitionletter, the
area of landinVillage Tajpur Khurdwasreflectedas51bigha
07biswa. Inthe meantime, the RFCTLARR (Amendment)
SecondOrdinance, 2015waspromulgatedbythePresidentof
India onMay 30, 2015.
(ii)The matter remained under correspondence andconsiderationofGNCTDaswellasMHA, Governmentof India for issuingcorrigenduminthe notificationconferringpower ofAppropriateGovernmentonLieutenantGovernorsince theCentralGovernmentistheAppropriate Governmentinrelationtoacquisitionof landsituatedwithina �UnionTerritory”(exceptPudducherry) andinadvertentlyinthe notificationissuedbytheCentralGovernment, ithadbeenmentionedas�State
Government”. Also, there appearedtobe some reservationsofrespondentsthatrequisitionofDJB wasnotstrictlycoveredfor
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acquisitionof landunder provisionsof Section40of the
RFCTLARR Act, 2013, which deals withurgency clause.
(iii)OnJune 19, 2015DJB sentrequisitionfor acquiringlandforsettingSTPs/SPSsbyDJB invariousvillagesincompliance ofdirectionsof NGT. OnJune 23, 2015DeputySecretary,
LA/L&B Department, GNCTDinformedthe concernedLACsthe schedule for a jointsurveyof the landsoughttobe acquiredindifferentvillagesincludingTajpur Khurd, DelhiandfurtheronJune 30, 2015jointsurveyof landwasconductedinthreevillagesincludingvillage Tajpur Khurd.
(iv)Thereafter,on July17, 2015as perDJB, the requirement of landinvillage Tajpur Khurdwasreducedfrom51bigha and07biswa to 30 bigha 06 biswa asper the opinion of �M/sEngineersIndia Limited-the projectmanagementconsultant”,appointedbyDJB. The piece of landof petitionersisstatedtohave beenchosenbythe respondent-DJB keepinginviewthatthe landiscontinuousandof regular shape andintermsof the opinionof
theofficialsandrevenuestaff, itiseasier totackle withminimum number of persons whose landis tobe acquired.
(v)OnJuly20, 2015withreferencetoletter datedJune19, 2015byDJB, the DeputySecretary, L&B, GNCTDinformedDJB thatthe proposaldidnotqualifyunder �urgencyclause”asspecifiedunder Section40of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013,since the samewasapplicable onlytoproposalsspecifiedinSection40(2)ofthe Act. Thus, detailedinformationonlandrequiredvillage-
wise, khasra no. andarea-wise alongwithcoordinates, mapof
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thelandrequiredandnumber ofpersonstobeaffectedbythe
proposedacquisition,wassoughttobe clarified. DJB wasalsoaskedtoclarifywhether the projectisqualifiedasinfrastructure
projectasspecifiedunder Section10A(1)(e) of the Ordinance,
alongwithproper justificationandthatthe proposedlandrequiredfor acquisitionisbare minimumlandfor executingtheproject.
(vi)Inthe meantime, thenotificationNo.2740(E) dated21.10.2014regardingdelegationof power toAppropriate GovernmentwasamendedbynotificationNo.2004(E) dated21.07.2015,bysubstitutingthe words�AppropriateGovernment”for the words�State Government”.
(vii)OnAugust13, 2015,DJB issueda lettertoPrincipalSecretary,
L&B givinga detailedinformationonthe landtobe acquiredinterms of the clarification earlier soughtbythem.
(viii)Thereafter,vide note datedAugust22, 2015oftheL&BDepartment, the draftpreliminarynotificationunder Section11of theActwasputupfor approvalof thecompetentauthorityalongwithrelevantdetailsinthe note andstatingthatthe landproposedtobe acquiredinthe saidvillagesisbare minimum
andproposedtobe acquiredunder Section10A(1)(e) of theRFCTLARR (Amendment) SecondOrdinance datedMay30,
2015. Further, theproposedacquisitionwouldbe exemptedfromapplicationof the provisionsofChapter-II(determinationof socialimpactandpublic Purpose andChapter III (specialprovisionstosafeguardfoodsecurity) of the RFCTLARR Act,
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2013. ItwasalsomentionedthatADM (SW) willbe the
Administrator under Section43(1) of theActfor rehabilitationandresettlementof displacedpersonsdue toacquisitionof saidland. After vettingof the draftnotificationsandsuitableamendments,the same were putupforthe approvalofthe
competentauthorityonAugust26, 2015.Afterconsiderationanddue applicationof mind, the approvalisstatedtohave been
grantedbythe DeputyChief Minister andHon”ble Lt. Governor
of DelhionAugust28, 2015.
(ix)The preliminarynotificationunderSection11of the Actnotifyingthe landmeasuring30bigha06biswa invillageTajpur Khurdfor purpose of constructionof waste water
treatment plantwasissuedonAugust28, 2015.
(x)Similar separate notificationsarestatedtohave beenissuedsimultaneouslyfor other villages, namely, Kakrola (11bigha 15biswa), Kair (9bigha 12biswa), Kazipur (4bigha 16biswa),
TikriKalan(15bigha 04biswa) andBijwasan(2bigha 11biswa) (2150sqm).
(xi)The notificationinrespectof Village Tajpur Khurdundersection11isstatedtohave beengotpublishedintwolocalDelhinewspapersone inEnglish(HindustanTimes) andone inHindi (Navbharat Times).
(xii)The RFCTLARR (Amendment) SecondOrdinance lapsedonAugust31, 2015.
(xiii)OnOctober 05, 2015, thepetitionersarestatedtohave filedobjectionsunder Section15of the Actfollowedbya reminder
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datedOctober 19, 2015. Vide hearingnotice datedDecember
11, 2015, the petitionerswere directedtoappear before the
District Magistrate (DM) for hearing onDecember 21, 2015.
(xiv)Further, inthe meantime, on18.12.2015, RFCTLARR
(Compensation, RehabilitationandResettlementandDevelopmentPlan)Rules, 2015werenotifiedbythe CentralGovernmentinexerciseof powersunder Section109of the Actand published in the Gazette of India.
(xv)OnDecember 22, 2015, DM recordedthe pointsfor
determinationandonthe requestof the petitioners, thematterwasfixedfor hearingfor January05, 2016whichwasfinally
closed onJanuary28, 2016.
(xvi)Further, after consideringthe objections,the DM(SW)/LAC
submittedhisreportunder Section15(2) ofthe Actontheobjection received against the acquisitionproceedings in Village
Tajpur Khurdfor infrastructure projecti.e. constructionof
Waste water treatmentplanttherebyrejectingthe objectionsfiledbythe petitionersfindingnomeritandthus,
recommendingacquisitionof the notifiedlandmeasuring30bigha 06 biswa.
(xvii)Thereafter, the reportof the DM(SW)/LAC wasputupforconveyingthe recommendationsonthe objections,tothe
�AppropriateGovernment”together withrecordof proceedingsfor approval and the file was senttothe Deputy Chief Minister.
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(xviii)OnApril26, 2016, the �Administrator”under the Actconducteda jointfieldsurvey/inspectionof proposedacquiredlandwithfieldstaff in village Tajpur Khurd, Delhi.
(xix)OnMay25, 2016, the �Administrator”under the Act,issuedPublic Notice withcopyof the same tothe petitioners/affectedpartiesfor the purposesof rehabilitationandresettlementandrequireda reportregardingthe landownersunder Section16(1)
of the ActandJune 17, 2016wasfixedfor public hearingandfieldsurvey.
(xx)OnAugust22, 2016, uponreceiptandconsiderationof proposalreceivedfromconcerneddistrictfor extensionof time forissuance of declarationunder section19of the Act, the
CompetentAuthorityextendedthe time for issuance of
declarationunderSection19ofthe Actbya periodofsix(06)
monthsintermsof Section19(7) of theActvide notificationdatedAugust22, 2016. The same wasdulynotifiedandpublished as per the statutory requirements by allmodes.
(xxi)The ADM/Administrator (RR) under the RFCTLARR Act,
2013prepareda detailedreportforRehabilitationandResettlementScheme underSection16of the Act. The reportwaspreparedunder variousheads, namely, preface, particularsof landsandimmovablepropertiesbeingacquiredof eachaffectedfamilies, Listof Trees, building,other immovable
propertyor assetsattachedtothe landor buildingtobe
acquired, listof affectedfamilies(includingtenantsontheland)
withAadhar No. (ifavailable), name ofmembersofaffected
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families, livelihoodlostinrespectof landlosersandlandlesswhose livelihoodsare primarilydependentonthe landbeingacquired, listof public utilities and Government buildings whichare affectedor likelytobe affected, where resettlementofaffectedfamiliesisinvolved, detailsof the amenitiesandinfrastructuralfacilitieswhichare affectedor likelytobe
affected, where resettlementof affectedfamiliesisinvolved,
details of anycommonpropertyresources beingacquired, listof
displacedfamilieswithAadhar Noof itsmembersif available,
consultationwithGramPanchayat/GramSabha andRehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme.
(xxii)OnDecember 13, 2016, Dy. Secretary(LA), L&B/GNCTDrequestedthe LAC (SW) toexpeditethe matter sothatnotificationunder Section19of the Actmaybe issuedwithinthe time.
(xxiii)OnJanuary11, 2017&January14, 2017,the proposalfor
approvalof the ReportoftheDM(SW)/LAC wasresubmittedbyD.C.(HQ) for approvalof the Appropriate Governmenti.e.
Hon”ble Lt.Governor of Delhi. The Chief Secretary/GNCTDreturnedthe file onJanuary14, 2017seekingcertainclarifications.
(xxiv)OnJanuary19, 2017, withreference toThe RFCTLARR
(Compensation, RehabilitationandResettlementandDevelopmentPlan)Rules, 2015, theDy. Secretary(LA),
L&B/GNCTDrequestedthe DM(SW) toprocessfurther for theacquisition proceedings as per the Rulesof2015.
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(xxv)OnFebruary07, 2017, the DM/LAC requestedthe DJB toimmediatelydepositthe totalamountof Rs.13,02,91,667/-
(includingRs.6,69,12,500/-for village Tajpur Khurd) for thecostof landacquisitioninfivevillagessothatthe processisnotdelayed.
(xxvi)OnFebruary15, 2017, the petitionerssubmittedrepresentationstothe Hon’ble LG, DeputyChief Minister, Revenue Minister ofDelhi andDivisionalCommissioner allegingthe following:
(a) Initiallya totallandmeasuring51bigha 07 biswaswasidentifiedfor acquisitionwhichincludedlandmeasuring30bigha 06 biswasof the petitioners.However, landmeasuring21bigha 01 biswa of AlliedRealtyPvt.Ltd.
was left out from the Notification.
(b) Acquisitioniscontrarytothe provisionsof MPD-2021
and Zonal Development Plan.
(c) The landinquestiondoesnotfallinplace where theWWTP canbe setupandthere ismore thansufficientvacantland in two places.
(d) The proposedacquisitiondefeatsthepurpose of landpoolingpolicy.
(xxvii)OnFebruary22, 2017, uponreceiptandconsiderationof the
proposalfromconcerneddistrictfor extensionof time for
issuance of declarationunder Section19of the Act, the
CompetentAuthorityextendedthe time for issuance of
declarationunderSection19ofthe Actbya periodofsix(06)
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monthsintermsof Section19(7) of theActvide notificationdatedFebruary22, 2017. The same wasdulynotifiedandpublished as per the statutory requirements by allmodes.
(xxviii)Vide detailednote datedMay25, 2017, the DM/LAC(SW),
Delhiprovidedthenecessarydetailsregardingtheobjectionsofthe petitioner asalsothe clarificationassoughtfor bythe ChiefSecretaryvidenote datedJanuary14, 2017andsubmittedthefile for approvalof the recommendationofthe recommendationof theCollectorfor the acquisitionof thenotifiedlandfor theprojectandforpublicationofdeclarationunder Section19ofthe Actalongwithsummaryof theRehabilitationandResettlement Scheme.
The saidnote wasthereafter putuponJune 02, 2017forapprovalof the Appropriate Government/CompetentAuthority
i.e.Hon”ble Lt.Governor Delhi. After due considerationandapplicationof mind,theapprovalwasgrantedbythe Hon”bleLt. Governor of Delhi onJune 09, 2017 asper the proposal.
(xxix)OnJuly20, 2017, DJB submitteda cheque bearingNo.560403datedJuly20, 2017foraSumof Rs.6,69,12,500/-drawnonCorporationBank,JhandewalanBranch, NewDelhitotheCollector DistrictSouthWesttowardsthe costof landfor
constructionof WWTP in Village Tajpur Khurd.
(xxx)OnJuly27, 2017, a Declarationwasmade under Section19(1)
of the Acttherebyacquiringthe landinquestionfor the purposeof settingupof Waste Water TreatmentPlant(WWTP). Itwas
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recordedthatthere wasnofamilywhichwastobe resettledandalsothatthePetitionersweretheland-ownersbutnotthefarmers.
(xxxi)OnAugust08, 2017, the petitionersinsteadof assailingor
challengingthe acquisition, againmade representationstotheHon’ble LG, CEO/DJB andDivisionalCommissionerfor
leaving the adjoiningland.
(xxxii)After issuance ofdeclarationandRehabilitationandResettlementnotificationunder Section19oftheAct, theCollector proceeded, inter alia, towardsascertainingthemarketvalue of the acquiredlandbycallingrequisite informationrelatingtosalefromthe concernedSubRegistrarfor the
purpose of makingthe requisite awards.
(xxxiii)OnNovember09, 2017, vide UOletter/note datedNovember
08, 2017(receivedonNovember 09, 2017inthe office of theDM(SW)/Collector), theSecretarytoMinister conveyedtotheSecretaryRevenueandDM(SW)/Collector Delhithe
instructionsof Hon”ble Lt. Governor ofDelhifor DelhiJalBoardandRevenue Departmentalongwithnotingpartof CDNo.000440853containingthe saidinstructionsinthe subjectmatter onthe complaints made by the petitioners.
(xxxiv)Since the requisitioningdepartmenti.e.DelhiJalBoardhadrequestedfor some more time for decidingthe elementsofrehabilitationandresettlemententitlementfortheprojecttoaffectedfamiliesasprovidedunder secondschedule of the Act,
proposalwas sent byDistrict(SouthWest)for extension of time
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for makingAwardunder Section25oftheAct.Uponconsiderationof thesaidproposalthe CompetentAuthorityextendedthe time for makingthe awardunder Section25ofthe
Actbya periodof six(06) monthsvide notificationdatedJuly25, 2018andthesame wasdulynotifiedandpublishedasper
the statutory requirementsby all modes.
(xxxv)OnOctober 10, 2018, petitionersfiledthe writpetitionchallengingthe acquisitionof landinVillage Tajpur Khurd.
Vide order datedOctober 15, 2018, thisCourtgrantedaninterim injunctioninfavour of the petitioners.
(IV)CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
19.Learnedcounselfor thepetitionerssubmitsthatvalidityof impugnedacquisition proceedingsistobe tested on followingprinciples:
A.Anycompulsory acquisition must standbythe rigours of Article300A of the Constitution and has tocompulsorily beinaccordance with law.
B.Impugned acquisition initiated under RFCTLARR Act, 2013,
which stipulates a schemeof both pre and postacquisitionsafeguards to ensure the process to befair, transparent,
participative& justice oriented.
C.Theacquisition basedon principleofeminent domain iscompulsory/unavoidableand only protection available is thatofprocedure.
D.Being an expropriatory legislation, everyprovision/procedure to
be construed &applied strictly & very stringently.
Itisurgedthatthe acquisitionproceedingsinitiatedbyrespondentsfailedtoqualifythe aforesaidtestsastheproceedingsare neither fair nortransparentandpetitioner waskeptoutofexercise of identificationof land
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for acquisition. The proceduralrigoursare statedtohave beenignoredbyrespondentsandacquisitionhasbeenundertakenignoringthe availabilityof
other land.
20.Itisurgedthatpreliminarynotificationissuedunder Section11of theRFCTLARR Act, 2013aswellasSection10Aof the Ordinance isineffective andinoperative postthe expiryof the Ordinance andproceedingscannotbecontinuedinfurtherance thereofandisnotsaved. Further, actionsandtransactionspendinginpipeline or evenconcludedactionstakenundertheRFCTLARR (Amendment) SecondOrdinance, 2015doesnotsurvive,
post ceasingof Ordinance onAugust31, 2015.
RelyinguponobservationsinKrishnaKumarSingh andAnotherv.
State of BiharandOthers(supra). Itisurgedthatthe concurringviewoftheBenchwasthatthe natureof power invokedfor issuingof Ordinancesdoesnotadmitof creationof anyenduringrightsinfavour of those affectedbysuchOrdinances.Further, asper observationsof Hon”ble Mr. JusticeMadanB. Lokur, whenanOrdinanceceasestooperate, allactionsinthepipeline onthe date itceasestooperate willterminate andpipeline actionscannotcontinue. Itisalsosubmittedthatneither anypendingactionortransactionnor anyconcludedactionor transactioncansurvive beyondthedate of expiryof anOrdinance andactions/transactionsunder anOrdinance
donot continue beyondthe life of the Ordinance.
Itisfurther submittedthatfor actionstakenor concludedunder anOrdinance, tocontinue after ithaslapsed,a savingclauseisrequiredandnoexpressprovisionhasbeenmade inArticle 123andArticle213of theConstitutionof Indiafor savingof rights, privileges, obligations, liabilities
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whichhave arisenunder anOrdinancewhichhasceasedtooperate. Itisemphasizedbyhimthatinthe absence of a savingclause,the ConstitutionofIndia doesnotattachanydegree of permanence toactionsortransactionspendingor concluded duringthe currencyof Ordinance.
Further, relyinguponobservationsofHon”ble Mr. Justice D.Y.
Chandrachudinaforesaidjudgmentinparas133.2-135, itisurgedthatenduringrightstheorywhichhadbeenappliedinEnglishdecisionstotemporarystatuteswaswronglybroughtinwhile construingthe effectof anOrdinance whichhasceasedtooperate.Itispointedoutthatthere isafundamentalfallacyinequatinganOrdinancewitha temporaryenactmentandthenatureof power invokedforissuanceof Ordinancesdoesnotadmitof creationof anyenduringrightsinfavourofthose affectedbysuchOrdinances. Attentionisalsodrawnto para 4, 56, 63 to73, 133to 135, 136,
137, 145 & 146 of the judgment.
Referringto para 132of the judgment, itiscontendedthatSection 6 ofGeneralClausesActprotectsandcontinuesrightsandliabilitiesonlyincase
of repealof anenactmentandSection6of GeneralClausesActdoesnotcome tothe rescueof the respondentincase of anOrdinance, asanOrdinance lapses/ceasestooperate whenithasfailedtoobtainthe legislativeapproval,whereas�repeal”takesplace throughlegislation. Reliance is
further placeduponPunjabNationalBankv. Union of India&Ors.,2022SCC OnLine SC 227.
Referringtopara 71-73and148of the saidjudgment, itiscontended
thatasper viewsof Hon”ble Mr. Justice MadanB. Lokur, noteven
irreversible effectorpublic interestor constitutionalnecessitytheoryisapplicable. Further inholdingtherelief,the Courtwoulddetermine whether
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undoingwhathasbeendone under theOrdinancewouldmanifestlybe
contrary to public interest or constitutional necessity.
21.Learnedcounselfor the petitionersreferringtoAlokAgrawalv. StateofChattisgarh, W.P.(C)No.1401/2015decidedon 03.11.2017contendsthatthetheoryof irreversibilitycannotbe appliedinthe presentcase asawardisyettobe passed. Itispointedoutthatthe HighCourtof Chattisgarhthereinquashedthenotificationissuedunder Section11of 2013ActreadwithSection10Aof Ordinance followingthe judgmentinKrishnaKumarSingh
v. State of BiharandOthers(supra)andheldthatsucha notificationwouldstandlapsedonthe date uponwhichthe Ordinance ceasedtooperate, asthesituationhasnotbecome irreversibleandonlynotificationunder Section11(1)oftheActof2013hadbeenissued. Further, since neither awardhadbeenpassednor possessionhadbeentakenfromthe petitioners, theprovisionsof Chapter-II andChapter-III oughttohave beencompliedwithbythe Appropriate Governmentandwithoutfollowingthe saidprovision,
the acquisitionof the petitioners’ landisunsustainable and badin law.
22.Itisfurthercontendedthatthe preliminarynotificationunder Section11 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013issine qua nonof acquisition andconditionprecedentto exerciseof further powersunder the Act. Itisurgedthatonce
the notificationunder Section11readwithSection10A(1)(e) of theRFCTLARR (Amendment) SecondOrdinance, 2015doesnotsurvive due tothe lapse of the Ordinance, the proceedingstakenthereunder cannotbedeemedtohave beensaved. Assuch,the acquisitionproceedingsinfurtherance of preliminary notification are bad in law and without any basis.
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Itisalsosubmittedthatthe contentionof respondentspertainingtosurvivalof landacquisitionproceedingsinthe guise of makingcompliance
withorderspassedbythe Hon”ble Supreme CourtandNGTisuntenable asgovernmentcannotbe allowedtotransgressthe expresslegalprovisionsandprocedure,inthe garbof implementingCourt”sdirections. Insupportof saidcontention,reliance isplaceduponDevenderKumarTyagi&Othersv.Stateof Uttar Pradesh & Others, (2011) 9SCC 164.
23.The acquisitionproceedingsare furtherstatedtobe unsustainable inlawfor complete nonapplicationof mindatallstages. Itiscontendedthattheentireproceedingsrelatingtoidentificationoflandforthe purposeof
constructionof STP waswithoutanymeaningfulsurveyor inquiryandthesame wasdonecompletelyatthediscretionof theofficials. The onlysurveythatisstatedtohave beenconductedwasonJune 30, 2015whiletheselection/identificationwasmade onMay13, 2015. ItispointedoutthatSection4mandatesconsultationandparticipationof public andaffectedpersonsevenatthe stage whenthe governmentonlyintendstoacquire land.
Further, the DJB Sewerage Master Plan-2031isstatedtobe notavailable atthe time ofmakingselection.
24.Itisalsosubmittedthatthere wasnoapplicationof mindastowhatsoever astotheneed, urgency, basisandfoundationforinvocationofpowersconferredunder Section10Aof the SecondOrdinance todeprive thelandownersof the mandatoryprovisionsof the RFCTLARR Act, 2013. Thereasonsextendedbytherespondentsinthisregardarestatedtobe withoutanyrelevance. It is urgedthateven provisotoSection10A of the Ordinance,
requiresauthoritiestoensure thatthe area of landrequiredisminimum,
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whereasthe requisitioningdepartment/R5/DJB wasnotcertainaboutthesame even postissuance of declarationunder Section 19of the Act.
25.Itisfurther contendedthatthe declarationunder Section19of theActwasobtainedkeepingthe Hon”ble Lt. Governor indarkandthere wasnoapplicationof mindonthe objectionsfiledbythe landownersor ontherecommendationof reportof LAC.Also, the objectionsunder Section15of
the Actare statedtohave beenrejectedwithoutdealingthe same effectivelyandobjectivelyandmakingita mere formality. Insupportofcontentions,
reliance isfurther placeduponGojerBrothersPrivate LimitedandAnother
v. State of WestBengalandOthers,(2013) 16SCC660andUshaStudandAgriculturalFarmsPrivate LimitedandOthersv. State of HaryanaandOthers,(2013) 4 SCC 210.
26.Itisfurther submittedbylearnedcounselfor the petitionersthatthe
proceedingsforacquisitionreflectcolourableexercise of powerwhich standsvitiated bymalafides,discrimination, arbitrarinessand favouritism. The landof the private companymeasuring21bigha 01biswaisstatedtohave beenexcludedfromacquisitionfor oblique reasonsandonlythe landof thepetitionerswaswronglyincludedfor acquisition. Nofreshsurveyregardingcomparable suitabilityfor exclusion/inclusionof particular landisstatedtohave beencarriedoutandalsonojustifiablereasonswere givenastowhydeviationwasmade fromthe locationofSTP inSMP-2031, whenthe vacantlandwasalreadyavailable there. The landof the petitionersisstatedtohavebeenpickedupamidstlarge tracksof continuouslandownedbyprivate
limitedcompaniestogive them the benefit.
27.The proposedacquisitionisstatedtobe inviolationof SMP-2031,
MPD-2021, ZDP andDDA”sLandPoolingPolicy.ItisurgedthatVillage
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Tajpur Khurdfallsinarea eligible for DDA”slandpoolingpolicyand
petitionershadalreadyoptedandappliedforsurrenderingtheir landinthesaidscheme. Itispointedoutthatunder the saidScheme, 40%of thepooledlandisavailable tothe DDA/governmentfor developmentpurposes. Itis
further submittedthatthe petitioner”slandwhichisnowsoughttobe
acquirediftakenthroughthelandpoolingpolicyfromthe DDAshallbeavailable free of costtothe public exchequer andthattooinpublic interest.
Reliance isfurther placeduponR.K.MittalandOthersv. Stateof UttarPradesh andOthers, (2012) 2 SCC 232.
28.Itissubmittedbylearnedcounselfor thepetitionersthatlandacquisitionproceedingshave tobestayedwheresoever the same have beeninitiatedwithoutfollowingthe provisionsof Chapter II & Chapter III of theAct. Reliance isfurther placeduponValluriJayaramandAnotherv. Stateof AndhraPradesh,2020SCCOnLineAP3396, KarriPrathapRayalaReddy v.State of AndhraPradesh, 2020SCCOnLine AP4034andKanuparthiVenkataSimhadriv. State of Telangana, 2020SCCOnLineTS 2312.
(V)CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THERESPONDENTS
29.The contentionsraisedonbehalf of the respondentsinboththe writpetitionsare common.LearnedCounselappearingfor Respondent1to3andRespondent1to4inW.P(C) 320/2018andW.P (C) 11104/2018alsorelyuponsubmissionsmade onbehalf ofRespondentNo.5DJBinWP(C) No.11104/2018-Yudhvir Singh &. Another v. GNCTD & Others.
Learnedcounselsfor respondentssubmitthatthewritpetitionspreferredbypetitionersare notmaintainable due todelay,laches,waiver,
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acquiescence andestoppel. The writpetitionshave beenpreferredwithoutshowinganysufficientcauseafterabouttwotothreeyearsfromthe dateof
publishingof impugnednotificationunder Section11of theRFCTLARR
Act, 2013onAugust28, 2015andonlyafter issue ofdeclarationunderSection19of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013onAugust24, 2017in{WP(C)
320/2018)}andJuly27, 2017in{WP(C) 11104/2018} respectively.The
petitionersare furtherstatedtohaveparticipatedintheprocessof acquisitionproceedingsbyfilingobjections, makingrepresentationsandcomplaintsbefore variousauthorities. Therefore, the petitionersbytheir expressconductacquiesced in the proceedings for proposed acquisition and waived their righttoquestionthe legalityandvalidityof acquisitionproceedings. Itisalsourgedthatthe acquisitionproceedingshadsubstantiallyprogressedfromthedate of issuance of the preliminarynotificationunder Section11of the Actandevendeclarationunder Section19wasissuedonAugust24, 2017and
July27, 2017. Insupportof the contentions, reliance isplaceduponState ofMadhyaPradeshandAnotherv. BhailalBhaiandOthers, 1964SCCOnLine SC10,Aflatoon andOthers. v. Lt. Governorof DelhiandOthers,
(1975) 4SCC285, State ofMaharashtrav. Digambar, (1995) 4SCC683andBandaDevelopmentAuthority v. MotiLalAgarwal&Others, (2011) 5SCC394andChairman, StateBankof IndiaandAnotherv. M.J. James,
(2022) 2 SCC 301.
The petitionersare statedtohave notapproachedthisCourtwithcleanhands, asthe complete materialfactshadnotbeendisclosedor hadbeendistorted. Reliance isfurther placeduponV. ChandrasekaranandAnother
v. Administrative OfficerandOthers, (2012) 12SCC133andRamjasFoundation and Anotherv. Union of Indiaand Others,(2010) 14 SCC 38.
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30.The primarycontentionraisedonbehalf of the petitionerschallengingthevalidityof the acquisitionproceedingsonlapse ofthe Ordinance, placingreliance uponKrishnaKumarSingh v. State of BiharandOthers(supra),
hasbeenvehementlydisputed. Also, the malafidesattributedquatheacquisitionproceedingsaredenied. The acquisitionproceedingsare statedtohave beenundertakenbonafideinviewof the directionsissuedbythe NGTinManojKumarMishrav.Union of IndiaandOthers(supra). Itisurgedthatthe publicpurposeandpublic interestisparamountthantheprivate
interestof thepetitionersandtheactionwasinitiatedfor settingupof STP intermsof the directionsof the NGT. The matter isstatedtohave beenproceededwithinaccordance withmandate undertheRFCTLARR
(Amendment) SecondOrdinance, 2015andrelevantprovisionsunder theRFCTLARR Act, 2013. Referenceisalsomade todetailedlistof dateswhichhasalreadybeennoticedtocontendthatdueprocessintermsof theActwasfollowedandthe objectionsfiledonbehalf of the petitionersweredulyconsideredinaccordance withlaw. The acquisitionproceedingsisstatedtohave beencarried outinrespectof the landidentifiedinothervillagesfor settingupof STP withoutchallenge butobjectionshadbeenraisedonly in respect of the land involvedinpresent Writ Petitions.
31.Learnedcounselfor the respondentscontendsthatthe factualpositionin KrishnaKumarSingh andAnotherv. State of BiharandOthers(supra)
isdistinguishable since inthe saidcase, none of the Ordinanceswhichwere
issuedinexerciseofthe power oftheGovernorunder Article 213of theConstitutionwereplacedbefore the State Legislature asmandated. Further,
the State Legislature didnotenacta lawintermsof the Ordinancesandthe
last of them was allowed to lapse.
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Itisurgedthatinthe presentcase, after thepromulgationoftheOrdinanceinitiallyonDecember 31, 2014, theRFCTLARR (Amendment)
Bill, 2015wasintroducedonFebruary24, 2015, whichwaspassedinthe
House of People but could not be passed by the Council of States. In view ofabove, RFCTLARR(Amendment) Ordinance, 2015waspromulgatedonApril03,2015.Thereafter, the RFCTLARR (Amendment) SecondBill,
2015wasintroducedin the House of People onMay11, 2015whichreferredtheBilltotheJointCommitteesof the Houses. Inviewof above, togive
continuedeffecttothe RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015, theRFCTLARR (Amendment) SecondOrdinance, 2015waspromulgatedonMay 31, 2015.
32.Itisvehementlycontendedthatinpara93inKrishnaKumarSingh v.
State of BiharandOthers(supra), the threefold test was noticedi.e.firsttestof irreversibilityof effect, secondimpracticalityof reversingaconsequence
whichhasensuedunder the Ordinance andthe thirdbeingtestof public
interest. Themajorityviewof the Constitutionbenchisstatedtohave beenrecordedinconclusioninpara 105.12of the saidjudgmentregardingthequestionastowhether rights, privileges,obligationsandliabilitieswouldsurvive inOrdinancewhichhasceasedtooperate, holdingthatthe questionmustbedeterminedasamatter of construction. Inthe lightof theaforesaidtest,the petitionersare statedtobe disentitledfor the relief asclaimedsincetheacquisitionproceedingshavebeenundertakeninpublic interestfor thepurpose of settingof Waste Water TreatmentPlant. Nochallenge is stated tohave beenmade bythe petitionerstothelegalityor validityof the threeOrdinancesinthisregard. Itisurgedthatthe case of the petitionersfails
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even on thetest of�constitutional necessity”asthereis neither anydispute onthepublicpurpose(settingupofWWTP) nor thereisanychallenge tothe
saidpublic purpose.
33.Reliance isalsoplaceduponDatlaVenkataAppalaPrasadraju v.
State of AndhraPradesh, 2022SCCOnline AP2526whereinthe DivisionBenchplacingreliance uponKrishnaKumarSingh v. State of BiharandOthers(supra)dismissedthewritpetitionsandappealschallengingthe
acquisitionproceedingsinitiatedfor establishingGreenFieldAirportexemptingtheprojectsfromthe provisionsof ChapterII andChapter III ofthe Actunder Section10AinsertedbyOrdinance. It issubmittedthateveninthesaidwritpetition, theprojectswereexemptedfromtheprovisionsofChapter II andChapter III of the Actunder Section10AinsertedbyOrdinance 9 of 2014.
34.Placingreliance uponChameliSinghandOthersv. State of U.P. andAnother, (1996) 2SCC549andFirstLandAcquisition CollectorandOthersv. NirodhiPrakash GangoliandAnother, (2002)4SCC160, itiscontendedbylearnedcounselfor the respondentsthatpre-notificationandpostnotificationdelaybygovernmentofficialswouldnotrender the exerciseof power toinvoke urgency clause invalid.
35.ReferringtoDeepakResortsandHotelsPvt.Ltd. v. Union of IndiaandOrs., 149(2008)DLT 582(DB),itisfurther urgedthatchoice of site atwhichSTP shouldbe constructedisamatter lefttothe Executive fordeterminationandthe interferencewiththe selectionisuncalledfor, unlessdecisionissooutrageouslyperverse thatnoreasonable personcouldcountenance thesame. PlacingrelianceuponRamniklalN. Bhutta andAnotherv. State ofMaharashtraandOthers, 1997(1) SCC134, itis
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contendedthatpowerunder Article 226ofthe Constitutionof India mustbe
exercisedonlyinfurtherance of interestofjustice andnotmerelyonmakingof a legalpoint.Malice couldnotbe inferredinthe presentcase asthe
acquisitionproceedingswere for a publicpurpose of settingupof WWTPpursuanttothe directions of the NGT.
36.Itisfurther pointedoutbylearnedcounselfor therespondentsthatClause15oftheOrdinance providesfor a savingclausefor allactionstakenunderthePrincipalActtobedeemedtohave beendone or takenunderthePrincipalActasamendedbythe Ordinance. The rightsacquiredpursuanttotheacquisitionare statedtoendureandlastevenafter the expiryof the
Ordinance as the acquisition was for a public purpose.
37.Itisalsopointedoutthatthe notificationsissuedunder Section11and19of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013andproceedingsthereunder are justandvalidandhave beenundertakenbythe CompetentAuthorityafter takingthenecessary approvalsof the Appropriate Government, which was granted afterconsiderationof allthe facts, material and due application of mind.
38.Learnedcounselfor RespondentNo.5 DJB inWP(C) 11104/2018alsopointedoutthatthe compensationamounttothe tune of Rs.6,69,00,500/-
(RupeesSixCrore SixtyNine LakhFive HundredOnly) wasalsodepositedby respondent No. 5with the land acquiring agencyandonly when the awardwastobe passed,the petitionerspreferredthe writpetitionsinJanuaryandOctober,2018aftera periodof more thantwoyearsfromthe date ofissuance of the preliminarynotificationunder Section11datedAugust28,2015. The petitionersalsofiledcomplaintsagainstofficialsof DJB on
unfoundedallegationsbutwhenthe resultsdidnotgoasper theirexpectations,theychallengedthe notificationsanddeclarationsafter a
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considerable delay. The writpetitionisstatedtohave beenfiledonlyafter
the closure of vigilance case bythe CVC,while the challenge couldhave
beenmade immediatelyafter issuance ofnotificationunder Section11onAugust 28, 2015.
39.Reliance isalsoplaceduponUrban ImprovementTrust, Udaipurv.
Bheru LalandOthers,(2002) 7SCC712, ReliancePetroleumLimitedv.
ZaverChandPopatlalSumariaandOthers,(1996) 4SCC579andHariSingh andOthersv.State of UPandOthers, (1984) 2SCC624tocontendthatwhere the landisneededfor a publicpurpose,theCourtoughttohave
takencare andnotentertainthe writpetitiononthe groundsof delay,asitislikelytocause seriousprejudice tothe personsfor whose benefitthe landisbeingacquired.Itisfurther urgedthatithasbeenobservedinvariousjudgmentsbyHon”ble ApexCourtthatthe jurisdictionof Courtshouldnotbe exercisedinfavour of the personswhoare guiltyof lachesandinordinate
delay. Reference isalsomade toMahantNarayanaDessjivaru v.State ofAndhraPradesh,AIR1959AP471andArce PolymersPrivate Limitedv.
Alphine Pharmaceuticals Private Limitedand Others, (2022)2SCC 221.
LearnedcounselforrespondentNo.5DJB alsodrawsattentionto
AdministrativeLaw(Page 300to307),OxfordUniversity Press,
9thEditiontoemphasize thattheCourtmayholdthattheactor order isinvalidbutmayrefuse relief tothe petitioneronthe groundsasreferredinthe relevant paragraph reproduced below:
�Such an absolute resultdepends, however, upon the willingness of
the courtto grantthenecessarylegal remedies.Thecourtmayhold
thatthe act or order is invalid, but mayrefuse relief to the applicantbecause of his lackof standing.”because hedoes not deservea
discretionaryremedy,”because hehas waived his rights,or forsomeother legal reason.In anysuchcasethe ‘void’order remains effective
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and, must beacceptedas ifitwas valid. It seems also thatan ordermaybevoid for onepurpose and valid for another;”and thatitmaybe void against one person but valid against another.” A common casewherean order, howevervoid, becomes valid for practical purposes iswherea statutory timelimit expires after which its validitycannot bequestioned.”Thestatutedoes not say that the void order shall bevalid;but bycutting offlegal remedies itproduces thatresult.”AsLord Diplocksaid of acompulsory purchaseorder allegedto bemadein bad faith but challenged after the expiryof thelimitation period,
the order ‘had legal effect notwithstanding its potential invalidity”
40.Reliance isplaced uponPara 16toPara 19inKrishnaDeviMalchandKamathiaandOthersv.Bombay EnvironmentalAction GroupandOthers,
(2011) 3SCC363tosubmitthatthe petitionershave notchallengedorassailedthe�Ordinance�termingittobe voidbutwithinthe teethhaveallegedthe actionsof Governmenttobe a nullity. Itiscontendedthatanorder, evenif notmade ingoodfaithisstillanactcapable of legalconsequencesandbearsnobrandof invalidityuponitsforeheadunlessthenecessaryproceedingsare takenatlawtoestablishthe cause of invalidityandtogetitquashedor otherwise upset, itwillremainaseffective for itsostensible purpose.
41.Itisfurther urgedbylearnedcounselfor RespondentNo.5DJB thatthere isnothinginthe Ordinance relatingtoSection11of the RFCTLARR
Act, 2013whichrequiredthe same tobeplaced before the Parliament. Therewasnoquestionof anysuchprovisionunder the Ordinanceeitherinthenatureof repealor afreshenactmentofSection11of the Act, whichwasrequiredtobe tabledfor considerationofthe Parliament.The Ordinance
maskedthe applicabilityof Chapter II andChapter III of the Actfor thepurposesof infrastructure projectsandthattoofor public purpose bysuggestinginclusionof Chapter IIIA. Thisinclusioncouldnotbe brought
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intothe statute bookwiththe resultthatthe enactmentwhichwasintroducedonJanuary1, 2014remainedunaffected. The preliminarynotificationthatwasissuedunder Section11of theRFCTLARR Acttherefore remainedunaffectedasthe same wasissuedunder the ActandnotundertheOrdinance. Itissubmittedthatsofarasnon-adherence tochapterII andchapter III were concerned, atthe relevanttime the applicationof the samewasexemptedor maskedasper the Ordinance whichwas�law”duringthe
relevantperiodandthe provisionsofthesame were tobestrictlyconstruedandapplied. Thus,there wasnoerrorinexercise of power while issuingthepreliminary notificationunder section 11 of the Act.
42.Itisfurther urgedthatsubstantialcompliance wasundertakentofulfilltheobjective of the Act,asprior to issuance of preliminarynotificationinthe
Section11of theact, the purpose foracquisitionandthe bare minimumrequirementof landwasstrictlycompliedwith. The effectof acquisitionontheenvironmentwasconsideredbytheacquiringagencyanditwasensuredthatnobodywasdisplacedandpermissionof Hon”ble LGof Delhiwasdulyobtained.
43.Section15of the Ordinance isstatedtoprovide for a savingclause for
alltheactionstakenunderthePrincipalActtobe deemedtohave beendoneor taken under the Principal Act as amended by the Ordinance.
44.Placingreliance uponDr.AbrahamPataniof Mumbaiandanother
v. State of MaharashtraandOthers, 2022SCC Online SC 1143,itissubmittedthatpublicinterestwillalwaysprevailuponthe private interestandthe private interestmustgive waytothe interestof the generalpublic.
Reference isalsomade to63MoonsTechnologiesLimitedv.Union of
India,(2019) 18SCC401, whereinthe Supreme Courtafterreferringto
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variousdecisionswherethe phrase�public interest”hasbeeninterpreted,
observedthatthe expressionpublic interestwouldmeanthe welfareofthepublicorthe interestof societyasawhole, ascontrastedwiththeselfishinterestof a groupof private individuals.Thus, �public interest”mayhave
regardtotheinterestof productionof goodsor servicesessentialtothe
nation,sothattheymaycontribute tothenation”swelfare andprogress, andinsodoing, may also provide muchneeded employment.
45.The pleaof malafideassetoutbythe petitionerisalsocontendedtobe pointlessasthe landinquestionisstatedtohave beenfoundtobe moresuitable,andthe requirementwasreducedfrom50bighasto30bighasafterthe same wasexaminedasper the reportof EngineersIndia LtddatedJuly17,2015. Reliance isplaceduponBharatSingh andOthersv.State of
HaryanaandOthers, (1988) 4SCC534,whereinithasbeenobservedthatthegovernmentwouldacquire onlythatamountof landwhichisnecessaryandsuitable for the publicpurpose inquestion. The landbelongingtothepetitionersisstatedtohave beenacquiredconsideringthe same assuitable
for the public purpose. Itisurgedthatthe petitionerscannotcomplainof anydiscriminationmerelybecause landofother personshadnotbeenacquiredby the Government.
46.Fromthe date of issuanceofthepreliminarynotification, tillthe filing
of the writpetition, itisstatedtobe evidentthatthe �AppropriateGovernment”wanted toconstructthe WWTP and took determinative stepstoensure thatwaste andpollutedwater doesnotenter the river Yamuna inline
of the directionsof Hon”ble Supreme CourtandNGT. The entire projectwas
givena finalshape andstepswere takentoconclude the same andnoactionisstatedtoremaininpipeline. Itisfurther submittedthatthe power of
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eminentdomainhasenshrinedinarticle inArticle 300Aof the Constitutionhasbeenexercisedbythe Appropriate Governmentinaccordance withthestatute. The objectionof the petitionersthatthe landinquestionfallsinresidentialzone or the use of landwascontrarytolandpoolingpolicyisdisputed.
(VI)REBUTTAL SUBMISSIONS ONBEHALFOFTHE
PETITIONERS47.Inthe rejoinder submissions, learnedcounselfor the petitioners
reiteratesthatthe onlyactiontakenunder the Ordinance isissuance of
notificationunder Section 11 dated August 28,2015 and the same in the lightof judgmentinKrishnaKumarSingh v. State of BiharandOthers(supra)
canbe termedasanactioninpipeline inthe processof acquisitionand not asaconcludedactunder the Ordinance. Itisonlythe irreversibleactionsthatendure evenafter the lapse of Ordinance andinthe presentsetofcircumstances, nosuchactdone isofirreversiblenatureandundoingwhereof would be prejudicing the public purpose.
The contentionof therespondentsthatthe actsare savedbythe savingclause inOrdinance isstatedtobe untenable. Ordinance byitsverynature
cannotprovide for anysavingclause. Secondly, the wordingof the savingclause initself clearlyintendstosave actsdone under the Ordinance onlywhenthe Ordinance isapprovedandthe PrincipalActisamendedbytheOrdinance.
48.Itisvehementlycontendedthatthe plea of sufficientcompliance asraisedonbehalfofrespondentsduringthe courseof argumentswasnotatallraisedinthe pleadings. Further, the SocialImpactAssessmentsurveyunderChapter II andIII ofthe actisentirelydifferentanditisa settledposition
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thatwhatisrequiredtobe done mandatorilyunder the statute mustbe doneinthe manner, process and procedure prescribedthereunder.
49.Reliance placedbyrespondentonDatlaVenkataAppalaPrasadraju
v. State of AndhraPradesh(supra)isstatedtobe distinguishable onfacts, asthereina lotof progresshadtakenplace inthe acquisitionproceedings, like
consentawardswerepassed, 1937affectedlandownershadagreedtothe
consentawards, possessionof 2064acresof landwasalreadytaken,
compensationamountof Rs678croreswasalreadypaidtothe landownersandsince landadmeasuringonly37acresremained, the courtobservedthattestof irreversibility, impracticalityandpublic interestaslaiddowninKrishnaKumarSingh v. State of BiharandOthers(supra)stoodsatisfied.
However, itissubmittedthatinthe presentcase respondentshave totallyfailedtoshowif anyother actwasdone under the Ordinance apartfrommere issuance of notification under Section 11 of the Act.
50.Itisfurther urgedthatAcquisitionproceedingscanbe challengedatdifferentstagestillthe time vestingof landtakesplaceswhichisonlybytakingoverphysicalpossessionunder Section16ofLA Act,1894orSection38of2013Actafter passingof Awardanda separatecauseofactionarisesateachstage.Reliance isfurtherplaceduponAnilKumarGuptav. StateofBihar& Ors. (supra). Itispointedoutthatinpresentcase, neither Awardhasbeenmade nor possessionhasbeentakenof the acquired, nor anyvestingof landcanbe presumedandthereisnodelayinpreferringthe writpetitions. The judgmentsreliedbyrespondentsare statedtobedistinguishable onfactsasthereinthe challenge toacquisitionproceedingswas made after vesting of landinquestion.
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51.Itisfurther submittedthatnoplearegardinginterconnectionof allSTP projectsindifferentvillageswastakennor anyplea wasraisedinpleadingsthatquashingof acquisitioninpresentcase wouldaffectallotherprojects. Itisurgedthatpre andpostnotificationdelayonpartof the
Authoritiesandrepeatedextensionsfor makingof declarationunder Section19,andAwardunder Section26of the Actdemolishthe plea ofurgencyraisedbytherespondents. Reliance isfurtherplaceduponDarshanLalNagpal v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors.,(2012) 2 SCC 327.
52.Learnedcounselforthe petitionersfurtherreiteratesthatfilingofstatutoryobjectionsundersection15ofthe Actandrepresentationsbefore
competentauthoritiesobjectingtoacquisitioncannotbe construedandinterpretedasa consentor participationinacquisitionor awaiver/estoppel/
acquiescence on partof petitioners.
(VII)FINDINGS/ANALYSIS
53.At the outset, relyinguponA.V.G.P. Chettiar & Sonsand Others v. T.
Palanisamy Gounder, (2002) 5SCC337, a contentionhasbeenraisedonbehalfof the petitionersthatthe groundstakenbythe respondentsintheir
arguments have notbeen elucidated in their pleadings.
The same isrefutedbyrespondentsanditissubmittedthattheproceedingsconducted bythe LAC are self-speakingandthe same have beenreliedandplaceduponbythe respondentsonrecord. Itisfurther submittedthatthe petitionershave suppressedandnotcompletelybroughtoutthecompletefactualdetailsinthepleadingsor toprove the allegationsofmalice. Reliance isalsoplaceduponBharatSingh andOthersv. State ofHaryanaand Others(supra).
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We are of the consideredviewthatsince the proceedingsundertakenbythe LAC have beenplacedonrecordalongwithrelevantdocuments, the
petitionscanbe disposedof after consideringthesubmissionsinthe lightofthe pleadingsanddocumentsonrecord.Defective or vague pleadingswouldnotbe fatal, if the partieshave understoodwhatthe case pleadedisandaccordinglyplacedmaterialbefore theCourt,andif neither partyisprejudiced. Reference isthisregardmaybe made toRamNarainArorav.
Asha Rani, (1999) 1 SCC 141.
Itmayalsobe observedthatthe powerunder Article 226oftheConstitutionof India isdiscretionaryandmaybe exercisedonlyinfurtherance of interests of justice and not merelyonthe makingout of a legalpoint,asinthe matter of landacquisitionthe interestsof justice andthepublic purpose coalesce.
A.Whetherthe writpetitionspreferredby the petitionersare barredon
the groundofdelayandlachesoracquiescence orwaiverofrightsby the petitioners
54.Respondentshave vehementlyopposedthe WritPetitionsbeingbarredbydelayandlaches. Itisalsosubmittedthatthepetitionershavingacquiescedinthe acquisitionproceedings,cannotchallenge the validityoftheproceedings.Itispointedoutthatthoughanultraviresstatutecannotbevalidatedbyacquiescence butanacquiescingpartycanbe estoppedfromquestioningit.Further, the actionneednotnecessarilybe setatnaughtinalleventsthoughthe order maybe void, ifthe partydoesnotapproachtheCourtwithinreasonabletime whichisalwaysa questionof fact.Reliance isfurther placeduponMahantNarayanaDessjivaru v. State ofAndhraPradesh(supra), KrishnaDeviMalchandKamathiaandOthersv. Bombay
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EnvironmentalAction GroupandOthers(supra), State of Rajasthan andOthersv.D.R.LaxmiandOthers, (1996) 6SCC445andLarsen & ToubroLtd. v. State of Gujarat &Ors.,(1998) 4 SCC 387.
55.Onthe other hand, learnedcounselfor thepetitionerssubmitsthatthe
initiationof acquisitionproceedingsrightfromthe inceptionhasbeenopposedandchallengedbywayof objectionsunder Section15of theRFCTLARR Act, 2013onOctober05, 2015. Areminderinthisregardwasissuedandthe objectionswere reiteratedatthe stage of hearingnotice onDecember 11, 2015. Also, thematter wastakenupbythe petitionerswithvariousauthoritiesbywayof representations/reminders, challengingthe
acquisitionproceedingsandthe same beingvitiatedbymalafide,
arbitrarinessanddiscrimination, till2017. The vigilance inquiryisalsostated to havebeen directed tobe conducted bythe authorities onthebasis of
aforesaidrepresentations. The declarationunder Section19isstatedtohaveonlybeenissuedonJuly27,2017.Representationsare statedtohave beenfurther filedbythe petitionersagainstthe acquisitionproceedingsonAugust08, 2017andthe presentproceedingswere initiatedin2018after thepetitionerswere leftwithnootheroption.ItissubmittedthattheAwardisyettobepassedbythe LAC. Relianceisfurther placeduponRoyalOrchidHotelsv. G. JayaramaReddy, (2011) 10SCC608, AnilKumarGuptav.
State of Bihar& Ors., (2012) 12SCC443,LajjaRamandOthersv. UT,
Chandigarh andOthers, (2013) 11 SCC 235, V.K.M.Kattha Industries Pvt.
Ltd. v. State of Haryana& Ors., (2013) 9 SCC 338.
56.Noticing the distinctionbetween�acquiescence” and �delay andlaches”
itwasobservedinChairman, State Bankof IndiaandAnotherv. M.J.
James(supra), that�doctrine of acquiescence”isanequitable doctrine which
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applieswhena partyhavinga right, standsbyandseesanother dealingina
mannerinconsistentwiththatright, while theactisinprogressandafter
violationiscompleted, whichconductreflectshisassentoraccord.Further,
�laches”unlike�limitation”isflexible. However, bothlimitationandlachesdestroythe remedybutnotthe right. �Laches”like �acquiescence”isbaseduponequitable considerations, but�laches”unlike �acquiescence”importsevensimple passivity. Onthe other hand, acquiescence impliesactive assentand is basedupontheruleofestoppelinpais. It bars a partyafterwardsfromcomplainingof the violationofthe right. �Waiver”isapplicable whena
partyknowinglygivesupanexistinglegalclaim, advantage, benefit, orprivilegefor aspecific reasonwhile beingaware of the relevantfactsandtheir legal rightsinthe case.
57.We are of the consideredopinionthattheRule againstlachesisone ofthe practice andnotlaw. There cannotbea hardandfastrule or straitjacketformula for decidingquestionof �delayandlaches”andeachcaseneedstobe consideredonitsownfacts. The questionsof prejudice, change of
position, creationof third-partyrightsor interestsare alsorelevantandtheState beinga virtuouslitigantisexpectedtolookintogenuineclaims,andabandonmentof rightor acquiescence cannotbe inferredunlessanduntilthe
same isexpressor implied.There isnodispute astothe principlesoflawlaiddowninthe judgmentsreliedupon,bothbythe learnedcounselfor thepetitionersaswellastherespondents,andthe factorofdelayhastobeconsideredin the light of the facts andcircumstances inrespective cases.
58.Inthe instantcase,itdoesnotappear thatthe petitionershave beenfencesitters,or theyfailedtotake stepstofile theobjections,or pursue thematter withthe concernedauthorities.Thepetitionerscontinuouslyopposed
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the notificationissuedunder Section11of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013andalsoconsistentlyfollowedwiththe concernedauthorities. The petitionerscannotbe deemedtohave adoptedanydilatorytacticsor waivedtheir rightsascontendedbythe respondentsbutraisedtheir bonafideconcernsatappropriate stages. The petitioners, onthe issuance of notificationunder
Section11of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013dulyfiledthe objectionsandalsotookupthe matter bywayof representations/reminderswiththe concernedauthoritiesandleftwithnoother option, petitionersfinallysetthe lawinmotionbywayof filingofpresentwritpetitions. The petitionerscannotbesaidtohave acquiescedinanymanner intheacquisitionproceedings. The
contention raised onbehalf of the respondents is without merit.
59.The conclusionsdrawnbyusare alsosupportedbythe authoritiesreliedupon by the petitioners and may be briefly noticed:
(i)In RoyalOrchidHotelsv. G. JayaramaReddy (supra),the issuefor considerationbefore the Hon”ble ApexCourtwaswhetherthelandacquiredbythe State Governmentatthe instance of Karnataka
State TourismDevelopmentCorporationfor thespecifiedpurpose
i.e.golf-cum-hotelresortnear Bangalore Airportcouldbetransferredbythe Corporationtoa private individualandcorporateentities. The HighCourtallowedthe petitionsquashingthe landacquisitionproceedings. One of the contentionsbefore the ApexCourtwasthatthe HighCourtcouldnothave entertainedthewritpetitionssince therewasanunexplainable delayof 12yearsinpreferringthe writpetitions.The ApexCourtobservedthatdiscretionexercisedbyHighCourttoentertainanddecidewritpetitiononmeritsisnotvitiatedbyanypatentlegalinfirmiyasthe
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respondentwasnotsleepingover hisrightsandwasnotguiltyoflaches. Itwasfurther heldthatRule againstlachesisoneofpractice andnotoflaw. There isnohardandfastrule andnostraitjacketformula for decidingquestionof delay/laches. Eachcase istobe decidedonits own facts.
(ii)InAnil Kumar Gupta v. State of Bihar & Ors. (supra), the Hon”bleApexCourtheldthatawritpetitionchallengingSection6declarationafter twoyears”gapcannotbe heldtobebarredbydelay/laches. The Courtobservedthatappellanthadchallengedtheacquisitionproceedingsimmediatelyafter passingof the awardandpleadedthatthedeclarationissuedunderSection6(1) wasliable tobe declaredanullitybecause of violationof the time-limitprescribedinthefirstproviso(ii) toSection6(1) and,thus,thewritpetitioncannotbe statedtohave beenbarredbytime. Itwasalsoheldthatevenif the petitionisfiledbeyondthe periodof limitationprescribedforfilinga suit, the Courtmayentertainthe petitionprovidedthe petitioner givesa satisfactoryexplanationor maydeclinereliefina case wherethe petitionisfiledwithinlimitationbut the explanation for the delay is notsatisfactory.
(iii)InLajjaRamandOthersv. UT, Chandigarh andOthers(supra),
thedispute pertainedtoacquisitionoflandsituatedinVillagesLahora andSarangpur, Chandigarh, byrespondentno. 1forthepurpose of developmentof complexfor importantprojectsandalliedpurposes, i.e., ChandigarhScience Parkandinstitutionalarea
andalsofor regulatedandplanneddevelopmentunder the Capitalof Punjab(DevelopmentandRegulation) Act, 1952. TheHigh
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Courtdismissedthe writpetitionspreferredbythe petitionersonthe groundthatthere wasdelayof nearlythree andtwoyearsrespectivelyinapproachingthe writcourtfromthe dateofnotificationsissuedunder Section4& 6of the Actandisfataltothe proceedings. Secondly,thatafter the awardpassedbytheLAO, the appellantscouldnothaveapproachedthe WritCourtquestioningthe notificationsissuedbyrespondentNo.1under
Section4 & 6of theAct. However, the Hon”ble ApexCourtsetaside the judgmentof HighCourtandheldthatacquisitionchallengedafter makingof anawardbutbefore the possessionistaken,isnotbarred by delay andlaches.
(iv)InV.K.M.KatthaIndustriesPvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana&
Ors.(supra), the appellantcompanywasanindustrialunitandthe
landownedbyitfor runningthe businesswasnotifiedfor
acquisitionfor public purpose, namely, for the developmentofIndustrialestate. The appellantchallengedthe acquisitionwhichwasdismissedbythe HighCourtonthe groundof delayandlaches.
The contentionof the appellantwasthatthenotificationunder
Section4(1) of the Actwasnotpublishedinthe localitywhereinthelandissituated, whichpreventedthe appellantcompanyfromfilingobjectionsunder Section5-Aof theActandthe HighCourterred indismissingthe writpetitiononthe groundthatthe same isnot maintainableafter the announcement of award.
Hon”ble ApexCourtheldthatthe writpetitionpreferredbefore
the HighCourtcouldnothave beensimplydismissedonthe
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groundof delayor lachesor onthe groundthatthe same wasfiledafter passingof the award.
60.The judgmentsrelieduponbylearnedcounselfortherespondentsare
distinguishable andmay be briefly noticed:
(i)InReliance PetroleumLimitedv. ZaverChandPopatlalSumariaandOthers(supra), Hon”ble ApexCourtobservedthatthe HighCourtwasnotjustifiedinentertainingthe writpetitionandexercisingthe discretionaryjurisdictiontoquashthe notificationsandawardmade thereinsincethepetitionersdidnotchallengethevalidityof notificationunder Section4(1) anddeclarationunder
Section6immediatelyafter publication and waited tillthe
award waspassedfindingthatthe compensationasclaimedwasnot given.
Onthe face of record, the writpetitionthereinwasnotpreferredafter notificationunder Section4(1) anddeclarationunder Section6of the LAAct, 1894,butafter passingoftheaward, which is notthe factualpositioninthe present case.
(ii)InHariSinghandOthersv. State of UPandOthers(supra), writpetitionunder Article 226challengingnotificationunder Sections4, 6& 17of LandAcquisitionAct, filedaftertwoanda half yearsafter notification,onthe groundof notbeingaware aboutthenotificationtillnoticesunder Section9(1) were issued,wasdismissedbythe HighCourt. Hon”ble ApexCourtnoticedthatabsence of notificationofnoticeinthe localityunderSection4(1)
wasnotpleadedandco-tenureshadnotimpeachedthe notification
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andheldthatnointerference wascalledfor onpreliminarygroundsof laches as well as on merits.
Apparently, the aforesaidcase isdistinguishable asthe
Hon”ble ApexCourtnoticedthatabsence of notificationof notice
inthe localityunderSection4(1) wasnotpleadedandthe co-
tenureshadnotimpeached the notification.
(iii)InUrbanImprovementTrust, Udaipurv. Bheru LalandOthers(supra), Hon”ble ApexCourtheldthatthe writpetitionsshouldhave beendismissedbythe HighCourtonthe groundof delayandlachessince the notificationunder Section6of LAActwaspublishedinthe officialgazette on24.05.1994butthe writpetitionswere virtuallyfiledafter twoyears. Itwasfurther heldthatina case where landisneededfor a public purposethattoofor
a scheme framedunder UrbanDevelopmentAct, the Courtoughttohave takencare innotentertainingthe same onthe groundof
delayasitislikelytocause seriousprejudice tothe personsfor
whose benefitthe HousingScheme isframedunder saidActandalso inhavingplanned development of the area.
The authorityonthe face of recordisdistinguishablesince there
wasdelayof abouttwoyearsinchallengingthe proceedings. The
writpetitionthereinwaschallengedaftera periodofalmosttwoyearsafter notificationunder Section6of the LAAct, 1894whileinthe presentcase,the objectionschallengingthe acquisitionproceedingswere raisedbythe petitionersbefore various
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authoritiesandhave filedthe writpetitionsalmostafter a year of
declaration under Section19 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013.
(iv)Larsen & ToubroLtd. v. State of Gujarat& Ors. (supra), relatestoSection48& 41of LandAcquisitionAct, 1894andHon”bleApexCourtheldthatwithdrawalfromacquisitionmustbeprecededbya notificationtothe beneficiary(inthe saidcase aCompany) for whomthe acquisitionproceedingswere initiatedandalsoanopportunitytosuchbeneficiarytoshow-cause againsttheproposedwithdrawalshouldbe given. Itwasfurther observedinpara21thatwritpetitionchallengingthe notificationsissuedunderSection4& 6of the Actisliable tobe dismissedonthe groundof
delayandlachesif challenge isnotmade withina reasonable timeandthepetitioner cannotsitonthe fence andallowtheState tocompletetheacquisitionproceedingsonthe basisthatnotificationunderSection4anddeclarationunder Section6were valid,andthentoattackthe notifications onthe groundswhichwere availabletohim at the time when they were published.
Itmaybe observedthatthere isnodispute onthe propositionoflawlaidthereinbutthefactualpositioninthe presentcaseiscompletely distinguishable.
(v)InStateofRajasthan andOthersv. D.R.LaxmiandOthers(supra), Hon”bleApexCourtheldthatwhenthere isinordinate
delayinfilingthe writpetitionsandwhenallthe stepshavebecome finalinacquisitionproceedings, the courtshouldbe loathetoquashthenotification. Itwasfurtherobservedthatif the partydoesnotapproachthe Courtwithinreasonable time, whichis
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alwaysa questionof factandhave the order invalidatedoracquiescesor waivesthe rights, the discretionof the Courthastobe exercisedinareasonable manner.Itwasheldthatsincethe
acquisitionthereinhadbecome finalandpossessiontakenaswellasreference was soughtfor enhancing the compensationwhich wasaccepted, the HighCourtwasunjustifiedininterferingandquashingthe notificationunder Section4(1) anddeclarationunder
Section6 of LA Act, 1894.
The factualpositioninaforesaidcase isapparently
distinguishable sincethe delayandlachesare manifestinviewof
the awardproceedings becoming final.
(vi)InMahantNarayanaDessjivaru v. State of AndhraPradesh(supra), the writpetitionwaspreferredfor a declarationthattheMadrasHinduReligiousEndowmentsActof 1923, MadrasActIof 1925, MadrasActII of1927, MadrasActXIXof 1933, MadrasActXIXof 1951andAndhraActVII of1954, insofarastheyare
inconsistentwiththeconstitutionare ultraviresandinoperative.
The HighCourtdismissedthe writpetitiononthegroundthatpetitionhasbeenpreferredafter a periodof five yearsandninemonthsafter the constitutioncame intovogue onJanuary26,1950.
Itwasfurther heldthatthe jurisdictionof writ, Courtwillnotbeexercisedinfavourofpersons, whoare guiltyof lachesandinordinate delay. Itwasalsoheldthatwhere a personreceivesabenefitunder the Actandacquiescesinit,itisnotopentohimtochallenge the validity of that Act.
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Itmaybe observedthatthe factualpositionisapparently
distinguishable since the petitionhadbeenpreferredafter a period
of five years andninemonthsinthe saidcase.
(vii)InIndrapuriGrihaNirman SahakariSamitiLtd. v. StateofRajasthan, (1975) 4SCC296, the appellantspreferredwritpetitionchallengingthe validityof notificationsissuedunderSection4& 6of the Actafter a periodof 9years. The HighCourtdismissedthe writpetitiononthe groundof delayandthe same
wasupheldbythe Hon”ble ApexCourt. The Hon”ble ApexCourtobservedthatanychallenge toanotificationunder Section4andadeclarationunder Section6of the Actshouldbe made withina
reasonable time thereafterandthe lengthof delayisanimportantcircumstance becauseof the nature of actsdone duringthe intervalonthe basisof the notification anddeclaration.
The aforesaidcase isapparentlydistinguishable since
notification under Section 4 was publishedon June 09, 1960, awardwasmade onJanuary09, 1964andthewritpetitionswerepreferred only onJanuary 23, 1970 after a period of nine years.
(viii)InArcePolymersPrivate Limitedv.Alphine PharmaceuticalsPrivate LimitedandOthers(supra), the challenge wasmade toa
judgmentof the HighCourt, whereby, the proceedingsinitiatedbyAndhra Bankwere setaside asbeinginviolationof the provisionsof the SecuritisationandReconstructionof FinancialAssetsand
Enforcementof SecurityInterestAct, 2002(inshort�SARFAESI
Act�) andTheSecurityInterestEnforcementRules, 2002. The
factualgroundinthe instantcasewasthatthebankhadissued
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notice under Section13(2) of SARFAESI Actfor dischargingitsliabilitywithin60days. The borrower neither made anypaymentnor respondedwithareplyinsteadwrote letters, acceptingdefaultandnon-paymentandfurther enlistingreasonsfor notadheringtothepaymentschedule. Subsequently, noticeswere issuedbytheBankfor auctionof property. The borrower challengedthe validityof proceedingsinitiatedunder Section13(2) of SARFAESI Act.
Hon”bleApexCourtapplyingthe principle of waiver andestoppel,
allowedthe appealsagainstthe impugnedjudgment. ItwasobservedthatWaiverisanintentionalrelinquishmentof aknownright. Waiverapplieswhena partyknowsthe materialfactsandiscognizantof the legalrightsinthatmatter, andyetfor someconsiderationconsciouslyabandonstheexistinglegalright,
advantage, benefit, claimor privilege. Waiver canbe contractualorbyexpressconductinconsiderationof some compromise.
However, a statutoryrightmayalsobe waivedbyimpliedconduct,
like, by wanting to take a chance of a favourable decision.
The factthatthe other side hasactedonit, issufficientconsideration. Sinceborrowerbyexpressconduct, hadaskedthebanktocompromise itspositionandalter the contractualterms,
hence, the principle of equitable estoppelasa rule of evidence,barsthe borrower from complainingofviolation.
Itmaybe observedthatthe principle ofwaiver andestoppelhighlightedinthe aforesaidcase relatingtoSARFAESI Actisnotdisputed. Further, the �waiver of rights”wasexpressbyconductofborrower therein.
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(ix)InStateofMadhyaPradesh v. BhailalBhai& Ors.(supra), itwasobservedthatitwasnecessaryfor the HighCourttoconsiderthequestionof delaybefore anyorderfor refundoftaxwasmadeandthe directionsissuedfor refundwere setaside bythe Hon”ble ApexCourt.ItwasalsoobservedthatLimitationActdoesnotassuchapplyto the granting of relief under Art226. Further, the maximumperiodfixedbythe legislature asthe time withinwhichthe reliefbya suitina CivilCourtmustbebroughtmayordinarilybe takentobe a reasonable standardbywhichdelayinseekingremedyunderArticle 226canbemeasured.Thecourtmayconsiderthedelayunreasonable evenif itislessthanthe periodof limitationprescribedfor a civilactionfor the remedybutwhere the delayismore thanthisperiod, itwillalmostalwaysbe properfor thecourttohold that it is unreasonable.
(x)InAflatoonandOthers. v. Lt. Governorof DelhiandOthers(supra), Hon”bleApexCourtdismissedthe writpetitionsonthegroundof delayandlachesasthere wasnoreasonwhythe
petitionerswaitedtill1972tocome tothisCourtfor challengingthevalidityof thenotificationissuedin1959onthe groundthattheparticularsof thepublic purpose werenotspecified. Itwasalsoobservedthata validnotificationunder Section4isa sine quanonfor initiationofproceedingsfor acquisitionofproperty.Further,to
have satonthe fenceandallowedthe Governmenttocomplete theacquisitionproceedingsonthe basisthatthenotificationunder
Section4andthe declarationunder Section6were valid,andthentoattackthenotificationongroundswhichwere available tothem
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atthe time whenthe notificationwaspublishedwouldbe puttingapremium on dilatory tactics.
Itmaybe observedthatthe saidcase isdistinguishable asthe
challenge intheaforesaidcase wasmade after completionofthe
acquisition proceedings.
(xi)InState ofMaharashtrav. Digambar(supra), respondentbeinganagriculturisthadpreferreda writpetitionfor grantof compensationfor hislandwhichhe allegedwasutilizedbythe governmentwithouthisconsentinthe course of executionof scarcityrelief
worksin1971-1972. The HighCourtthereinhadallowedthe writpetitioncondoningthe delayof 20years. However, the Supreme
Courtsetaside theorder of HighCourtinappealandheldthatpersonsseekingrelief againsttheStateunder Article 226of theConstitution, be theycitizensor otherwise,cannotgetdiscretionaryrelief obtainable thereunder unlesstheyfullysatisfythe HighCourtthatthe factsandcircumstancesofthe case clearlyjustifiedthelachesor undue delayontheir partinapproachingthe Courtfor
grantof suchdiscretionaryrelief. Therefore, where a HighCourtgrantsrelief toa citizenor anyother personunder Article 226ofthe Constitutionagainstanypersonincludingthe State withoutconsideringhisblameworthyconduct, suchaslachesor unduedelay, acquiescenceor waiver, the relief sograntedbecomesunsustainable evenifthe reliefwasgrantedinrespectof allegeddeprivation of his legal rightby the State.
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There isnodisputetothe propositionof lawlaiddownin
aforesaidcase butitispertinenttonote thatthe delayin
approachingthe Court in the said case wasfor about 20 years.
(xii)InBandaDevelopmentAuthority v. MotiLalAgarwal& Others(supra), the Courtheldthatitistrue thatnolimitationhasbeenprescribedfor filinga petition under Article 226of the Constitutionbutone of the severalrulesof self-imposedrestraintevolvedbythesuperior courtsisthatthe HighCourtwillnotentertainpetitionsfiledafter longlapse of time because thatmayadverselyaffectthesettled/crystallisedrightsof theparties. Ifthe writpetitionisfiledbeyondthe periodoflimitationprescribedfor filinga civilsuitforsimilar cause,the HighCourtwilltreatthe delayunreasonableanddecline to entertain the grievance of the petitioner on merits.
Inthe saidcase, itwasfurther observedthatdelayof evena fewyearswouldbe fatal, if acquiredlandhasbeenpartlyor whollyutilizedfor the public purpose. The delayof nine yearsfromthedate of publicationof declarationissuedunder Section6(1) of LAAct, andalmostsixyearsfromthe date of passingof awardwasheldsufficientfor denyingequitable relief torespondentno.1.Itwasfurther heldthatwhere objectionof delay/lacheswasnotraisedbyDDAor State Government, HighCourtwasdutyboundtotake cognizance thereof anddecline relief since acquiredlandhadbeenutilizedfor implementingthe residentialscheme andthird-party rightshadbeen created.
Itmaybe observedthatthe aforesaidcase isclearlydistinguishable sincethe delaywasalmostofnine yearsafterthe
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declarationunder Section6(1)ofthe Actandaboutsixyearsfromthe date of passingof award.
(xiii)InChairman, State Bankof IndiaandAnotherv. M.J. James(supra), itwasobservedthatabsence ofperiodof limitationinclause22(x)oftheService Codetofile Appeal,doesnotmeananytime,andassumptionisthatappealshouldbe filedatearliestpossible opportunitythoughthe reasonable time cannotbe putinstraitjacketformula or judiciallycodifiedinformof days. Itdependsuponfactsandcircumstancesofeachcase andrightnotexercisedfor longtime isnon-existent. The doctrine of delayandlachesaswellasacquiescence isappliedtonon-suitlitigantswhoapproachthe Court/Appellate Authoritiesbelatedlywithoutanyjustifiable reason.
Itmaybe observedthatinthe saidcase, thestudiedsilenceofthe respondentwhodidnotcorrespondor make anyrepresentationfor nine yearswasobservedtobe withanulterior motive ashe
wantedtotake benefitof the slipupthoughhe hadsuffereddismissal.
(xiv)There isnotdisputetothe propositionof lawasreferredinV.
ChandrasekaranandAnotherv. Administrative OfficerandOthers(supra), relieduponbythe respondents,whereinitisreiteratedthatwhenever a personapproachesa Courtof equity, inthe exercise of itsextraordinaryjurisdiction, itisexpectedthathewillapproachthe saidCourtnotonlywithcleanhandsbutalsowitha cleanmind, a cleanheartandcleanobjectives. Thus, he whoseeks equitymust do equity.
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Also, the principle thata personwho does not come to the Courtwithcleanhandsisnotentitledtobe heardonmeritsof hisgrievance,andinanycase suchpersonisnotentitledtoanyreliefasemphasizedinRamjasFoundation andAnotherv. UnionofIndiaand Others(supra) isnot disputed.
B.WhethernotificationunderSection 11of RFCTLARR Act, 2013isineffective andinoperative afterlapse of RFCTLARR (Amendment)
Second Ordinance, 2015
61.The challenge of the petitionerstotheacquisitionproceedingisprimarilyonthe groundthatthe preliminarynotificationissuedbytherespondentsonAugust28, 2015under Section11of the RFCTLARR Act,
2013invokingSection10A(1)(e) of the RFCTLARR (Amendment) SecondOrdinance, 2015,isineffective andinoperative inviewof lapsingofOrdinance onAugust31, 2015. Assuch, itiscontendedthatthe respondentswere boundtocomplywiththe provisionsof Chapter-II andChapter-III oftheRFCTLARR Act,2013since noenduringrightssurvive onlapsingoftheOrdinance. Insupportof the contentions, reliance isplaceduponKrishnaKumarSingh v.State of Bihar andOthers(supra)alongwithAlokAgrawal
v. State ofChattisgarh(supra).
62.Ontheother hand,thestandof therespondentsisthatsince the
preliminarynotificationunderSection11of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013invokingSection10A(1)(e) of the Ordinance satisfiesthe three-foldtestofirreversibility, impracticalityandpublic interest, aspropoundedinKrishnaKumarSingh v. State ofBiharandOthers(supra), the dispensationwithrequirementsof Chapter-II andChapter-III of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013isvalid. Consequently, the further stepstakenthereuponfor acquisition
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includingdeclarationunder Section19of the RFCTLARR Act,2013are inaccordancewithlaw. Relianceisfurtherplaced uponDatlaVenkataAppalaPrasadraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra).
63.The issuefor considerationiswhetheronlapse of RFCTLARR(Amendment) SecondOrdinance,2015onAugust31, 2015, the notificationunder Section11invokingSection10A(1)(e) of the Ordinance issuedbythecompetentauthoritydidnotcreate anyenduringrightsinfavour of the
respondents. Consequently, if the respondentsafter lapse of the Ordinancewere boundtoissue a freshnotificationunder Section11of the RFCTLARR
Act, 2013after complyingwiththe provisionsof Chapter-II& III ofthe
2013 Act in respect of Social Impact Assessment.
64.RelyinguponPunjabNationalBankv. Union of India& Ors.
(supra), a contentionhasbeenfurtherraisedbylearnedcounselfor thepetitionersthatwhereina provisionisomittedwithouta savingclause infavour of pendingproceedings, thenfreshproceedingsmaybe initiatedforthe same purpose andthe pendingproceedingsshallnotcontinue. Reference
isalsomade toConstitutionBenchjudgmentof Hon”ble ApexCourtin
KohlapurCanesugarWorksLtd. v. Union of India, (2000)2SCC536
which was referred in aforesaid case.
Itmaybe noticedthatinPunjabNationalBankv. UnionofIndia&
Ors.(supra), itwasheldthattheproceedingsinitiatedunderthe erstwhileRule 173-Q(2) of CentralExcise Rules, 1944wouldcome toanendontherepealof saidRule. The respondent”ssubmissionthatproceedingswouldbe
savedonaccountof 38A(c) and38A(e) of the CentralExcise Act, 1944andSection6ofGeneralClausesAct,1897wasnotaccepted.Inthe aforesaidcontext, itwasfurther noticedthatConstitutionBenchinKohlapur
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CanesugarWorksLtd. v. Union of India(supra) heldthatSection6ofGeneral Clauses Act, 1897 is applicable where any Central Actor Regulationmade after commencementof GeneralClausesAct�repeals”anyenactmentbut is not applicable in case of omission of Rule.
65.There isnodispute tothe propositionthatSection6of the GeneralClausesAct, 1897protectsrights, privilegesandobligationsandcontinuesliabilitiesincase ofrepealof anenactmentwhichtakesplacethroughlegislation. However, the consequencesincase of lapsingof Ordinance maynot be protectedunder Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
Ontheface of record, the presentcaserelatestoconsequencesarisingfromlapsingof Ordinance orwhere it�ceasestooperate”. The reliance
placeduponPunjabNationalBankv. Union of India& Others(supra) isnot ofmuch assistance tothepetitioners,since it relatesto omission of Rule.
66.InKrishnaKumarSingh &Othersv.State of Bihar& Others(supra), the questionfor considerationbefore the SevenJudgeConstitutionBenchwas, whether thesevensuccessive repromulgationsof the Bihar NonGovernmentSanskritSchools(TakingOver ManagementandControl)
Ordinance, 1989, suffer fromillegalityor Constitutionalimpropriety. The
judgmentauthoredbyHon”ble D.Y. ChandrachudJ.,whichisthemajority
viewconcludedthatthe successive repromulgationsof the firstOrdinance
issuedin1989wasafraudonthe Constitution, especiallywhennone of theOrdinanceswere ever tabledbefore theBihar Legislative Assemblyasrequiredunder Article 213(2) of the Constitution. The viewsexpressedby
bothHon”ble D.Y. ChandrachudJ.,aswellasHon”ble MadanB. Lokur J.
thattheOrdinancesissuedbythe Governmentinexercise of power underArticle 213or Article 123of the Constitutionof India doesnotadmitof
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creationofenduringor irreversible rightsinfavourofthose affectedbysuchOrdinances, wherethe Ordinancesthemselveswere fraudonthe
Constitution, were alsoconcurredbyHon”ble JusticeT.S.Thakur,CJI. The
ConstitutionBenchdecisionsinState of Orissav. BhupendraKumarBose,
1962Supp.2SCR380,T. VenkataReddy v. State of AndhraPradesh,
(1985)3SCC198tothe extentthe same extendedthe theoryof�creationofenduring rights” were overruled.
Itmayalsobe noticedthatwhile Hon”ble D.Y. ChandrachudJ.wasofthe viewthatnon-placingof Ordinancesbefore the ParliamentandStateLegislature, asthecase maybe, wouldstillcreate afraudonthe
Constitution. However, Hon”ble MadanB. Lokur J.,tooka differentview
thatthe same isnotmandatoryunder Article 213(2) of the ConstitutionofIndia andnor wouldthefailure todosoresultintheOrdinance nothavingthe force andeffectasanenactedlawor beingof noconsequencewhatsoever.
67.Onthe issue of effectof consequence or survivalof actionsand
transactionsconcludedunderanOrdinance, the observationsof Hon”ble
D.Y. Chandrachud, J. inpara 147 and148may be noticed:
�147.When an Ordinanceceases to operate,thereis no doubt thatallactions in the pipeline on the date itceases to operate will terminate.
This is simplybecause when the Ordinanceceases to operate, italsoceases to havethesameforceand effect as an Act assented to bythe
Governor of the Stateand therefore, pipeline actions cannot continuewithout anybasisinlaw. Quite naturally,allactions intended tobecommenced onthe basis of the Ordinancecannot commenceafter theOrdinance has ceased to operate.
148.Do actions or transactions concluded before the Ordinance
ceases to operate, survive after the terminal date?�
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68.Inthe conclusionsdrawninKrishnaKumarSinghv. Stateof Bihar
andOthers(supra), ithasbeenheldthatthe expression�cease tooperate”in
Article 123and213doesnotmeanthatonthe expiryof a periodof six
weeksof the reassemblingof the Legislature or onresolutionofdisapproval
beingpassedunder Article 213,the Ordinance isrenderedvoidabinitio.
The question astowhether rights, privileges, obligationsand liabilities
would survivean Ordinancewhichhasceased tooperate must be
determined asamatter of construction. The appropriate test tobe
applied isthe test of public interest and constitutionalnecessity.This
wouldincludetheissueastowhetherthe consequenceswhichhave taken
place under the Ordinance have assumedanirreversible character. Further,
insuitablecasesitwouldbe opentoCourttomouldtherelief. The
conclusionsinpara105.9to105.12maybe beneficiallyquotedfor
reference:
�105.9.
Article 213(2)(a)provides thatanOrdinancepromulgated under that
Article shall �cease to operate�six weeks afterthe reassembling of
the legislature or even earlier, ifaresolution disapproving itispassed
in the legislature. The Constitution has used different expressions such
as �repeal�(Articles 252, 254, 357, 372and 395); �void�(Articles
13, 245, 255 and276);�ceaseto haveeffect�(Articles 358 and 372);
and �cease to operate�(Articles 123, 213 and352).Each of these
expressions has a distinct connotation. The expression�cease to
operate� inArticles 123 and 213 does not meanthat upontheexpiry
ofa period of six weeks ofthereassembling ofthelegislatureor
uponaresolutionofdisapproval being passed, theOrdinanceisrendered void ab initio.Both Articles 123 and 213 contain a distinctprovision setting outthecircumstances in which an Ordinanceshallbevoid. AnOrdinanceis void in a situation whereitmakes aprovision which Parliament would not becompetent to enact [Article123(3)]or which makes a provision which would not bevalid ifenacted in an Act of thelegislature of the Stateassented to bytheGovernor [Article213(3)]. TheFramers having used the expressions
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�cease to operate�and �void�separately in the sameprovision, theycannot convey the samemeaning.
105.10
Thetheoryof enduringrights which has been laid downin the
judgment in Bhupendra Kumar Boseand followed in TVenkata Reddybythe Constitution Bench is basedon the analogyof a temporaryenactment. Thereis a basic differencebetween an ordinanceand atemporary enactment. Thesedecisions of the Constitution Bench
which haveaccepted thenotion of enduring rights which will survivean ordinancewhich has ceased to operate do not lay downthe correctposition. Thejudgments are also no longergoodlawin view of thedecision in S R Bommai.
105.11
No express provision has been madeinArticle 123andArticle213for saving of rights,privileges, obligations and liabilities whichhavearisen underan ordinancewhich hasceased to operate. Such
provisionsare however specifically contained inother articles of theConstitutionsuch asArticles 249(3), 250(2), 357(2), 358 and 359(1A).
This is, however, not conclusiveand theissueis essentially oneof
construction; ofgiving contentto the�forceand effect” clausewhile
prescribing legislative supremacy and the rule oflaw
105.12The questionas to whether rights, privileges, obligations andliabilities would surviveanOrdinancewhich has ceasedto operatemust bedetermined as a matter ofconstruction. The appropriate test
to beapplied is thetest ofpublicinterest and constitutionalnecessity. This wouldincludetheissueas to whether theconsequences which havetaken placeunder theOrdinancehaveassumed anirreversible character. Ina suitablecase, itwould be
open to the court to mould the relief.�
69.Itmaybe observedthatthe validityof the Ordinanceshasnotbeen
challengedbythe petitioners. Apparently, stepswere takenfor introducing
RFCTLARR (Amendment) BillonFebruary24, 2015afterpromulgationof
RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2014. Since the saidBillcouldnot
be passedbythe Councilof States, RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance,
2015waspromulgated. The RFCTLARR (Amendment) SecondBill, 2015
wasfurther introducedinthe House of People onMay11, 2015, which
referredittotheJointCommittee ofthe House. Inorder togivecontinued
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effecttothe provisionsofRFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015, thePresidentof IndiapromulgatedRFCTLARR (Amendment) SecondOrdinance, 2015whichlapsedonAugust31, 2015. The exercise undertakenbytheExecutivetoobtainthe legislative approvalisapparentonthe face ofrecord though the Ordinance wasultimatelypermittedtolapse.
70.Inorder todetermine whether the obligations, rightsandliabilitiessurvive after issueof preliminarynotificationunderSection11readwith
Section10A(1)(e) of the Ordinance, the testof �public interest”and�constitutionalnecessity”maybe applied. The term�public interest”cannotbe putina straitjacketformula andbroadlyincludes the purpose inwhich thegeneralinterestof the societyisservedasopposedtothe particular interestof theindividualwithwhichhe maybe vitallyconcerned. The necessityfor
acquisitioncaninnomanner bedisputedsince the landisproposedtobe
acquiredinthe presentcase for settingupof WWTPsasdirectedbyNGT.Itiswellsettledthatpublicinterestmusthave paramountcyover private
interestandthe rightsof the individualsmustonlybe watereddownwhenthe necessarycircumstancesdemandingsucha drastic measure exist.
Reliance inthisregardmayalsobe placedupon63MoonsTechnologiesLtd. &Ors. v. Union of India& Ors. (supra), AbrahamPataniv. State of
Maharashtra, 2022SCCOnLine SC1143, AircraftEmployees’HousingCoop. Society Ltd. v. Secy.,RuralDevelopmentandPanchayatRaj, Govt.
of Karnataka, (1996) 11 SCC 475asreferredby respondent No.5.
71.Itmayalsobenoticedthatsimilar notificationswere issuedunderSection11of RFCTLARR Act. 2013for the STP projectsindifferentvillagespursuanttodirectionsof NGTandthesame are under
implementation. Theprocessof acquisitionwasinstitutedfar backinMay,
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2015andsome time wasconsumedbytheconcerneddepartmentsinorder toironouttheissuesandunderstandthe nuancesoftheOrdinances.Section10A(1)(e) of the RFCTLARR (Amendment) SecondOrdinance, 2015wasfinallyinvoked since the project for installation of WWTP wasrequiredtobeurgentlycommissionedanddulyfellwithinthe categoryof socialinfrastructure projectswhichmaybe exemptedbytheAppropriate
Government. The exemptionunder Section10AoftheRFCTLARR
(Amendment) SecondOrdinance, 2015wasinvokedinpublic interestto
curbthedelayinexecutionofinfrastructuralprojectwhichwouldhave beenoccasionedbyadherence toprovisionsofSocialImpactAssessmentunder
Chapter IIofthe RFCTLARR Act, 2013.Thenotificationunder Section11wasfollowedwiththe normalprocedure of considerationof objectionsunderSection15of the Actanddeclarationunder Section19of the RFCTLARR
Act, 2013.
The petitionersdulyparticipatedinthe acquisitionproceedingsbyfilingof objectionswhichwere consideredinaccordance withlawandoverruled.
72.Inthe factsandcircumstances, weare of the consideredviewthatthenotificationunder Section11of RFCTLARR Act, 2013notifiedonAugust28, 2015resultedinvestingof rightsof irreversible character for purpose of
acquisitionandnoother actionremainedinpipeline specificallywithreferencetothe procedure tobe followedfor issuanceof preliminarynotificationunder Section11of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013. The enduringrightscreatedbyissue of notificationunder Section11of the Actcannotbedeemedtobe reversible merelyonaccountof ceasingof operationofOrdinance onAugust31, 2015. The respondentswere notrequiredtofollow
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the procedure under Section3to10of theRFCTLARR Act, 2013after issue
of notificationunderSection11andinvokingofSection10A(1)(e) oftheOrdinance asnothingremainedinpipeline andagainresortingtotheprovisionsof ChapterII andChapter III wouldbe impracticableandcontraryto public interest,as itwould have delayedthe executionandimplementationof the project. We have nohesitationtoholdthatthe notificationunderSection11of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013attainedfinalityandthe rightscreated thereunderwouldnotlapse onthe expiryof the Ordinance onAugust31, 2015.
73.The aforesaidpropositioninlawalsostandssquarelycoveredbyDatlaVenkataAppalaPrasadraju v. Stateof AndhraPradesh(supra)reliedonbehalf ofthe respondents. Anidenticalissue wasraisedthereinchallengingthe acquisitionproceedingsundertakenunder the Ordinance
No.5 of2015.The landinquestionwasacquiredfor establishmentof anAirportatBhogapuram,VizianagaramDistrictnear Visakhapatnamcity,
since the existingAirportinVisakhapatnamisa defence airportunder thecontrolof the Ministryof Defence, Governmentof India andthere were
operationalconstraintsandlackof scope for itsexpansiontomeettherequirementsof anInternationalAirportstandards. The initialproposalwasfor acquisitionof about5311.88acresof land, whichwassubsequentlyreducedto2004.54acresonlyfor phase 1of the developmentof AirportandAirportrelatedactivities,besides119acresfor approachroads.Mostof the
landownershadgivenconsentandacceptedcompensationfor the saidacquisition. Further litigation remained pending only in respect of 37 acresofland.The District Collector issued Rc.No.30/20212G3dated 31.08.2015exemptingChapterIIand IIIof the RFCTLARRAct, 2013and
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published the same in theDistrict Gazette on 31.08.2015andthereafter
issuedlandacquisitionnotification, whichwaschallengedinthe petitionsbefore the High Court.
Acontentionwasraisedbythepetitionersthereinthatsince the
Ordinance stoodlapsed, the entireactionundertakenunder the saidOrdinance stoodlapsed.The submissiononbehalf of the State thatconsentawardshadbeenpassedqua2064acresbelongingto1937ownerspayingcompensationamountof Rs.678croreswasalsostatedbythe petitionerstobe illfounded,onthegroundthatthere isunequalbargainingpower betweenthe landholdersandtheState.Also, issueswere raisedonthepointof
identificationandsegregationof landfor purpose of landacquisition.
Challenge wasalsomade toconstitutionalvalidityof AP StateActNo.22of2018.
Ontheother hand, the challengewascontestedonbehalfoftherespondentsonthegroundthatthenotificationforlandacquisitiondidnotlapsewiththe lapsingofOrdinanceinviewofoverridingtestof publicinterestandconstitutionalnecessitylaiddowninKrishnaKumarSingh v.
State of BiharandOthers(supra)whichsubsumedthe requirementofirreversibilityandimpracticality. ItwasalsopointedoutthatRs.678croreshadbeenpaidtothe landownersandthe Governmentwasinpossessionof
2064acresagainst2200acres. Further, 1937landownersoutof affected1959landownershadagreedfor consentawardswhichhave since beenpassed. Itwasalsoarguedthatthere wasnoviolationof Section10Aof the
Ordinance since theState hadensuredminimumacquisitionof landasthe
proposed acquisitionof 5311 acres wasprunedto2700 acres.
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The issue for considerationbefore the HighCourtwaswhether the
impugnednotificationsunder Section11(1) of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013wouldlapse, asthesame are notsavedafter Ordinance No.9 of 2014,
Ordinance No.4 of 2015andOrdinance No.5 of 2015were allowedtolapse
withoutthere being any saving clause.
The HighCourt applied the three-fold testofirreversibility,
impracticalityand public interest asreferred in KrishnaKumarSingh v.
State of BiharandOthers(supra) and held that requiringthe State tofollowthe procedure contemplated under Section 3to10ofthe LAAct,
2013would be contrarytopublic interest asthe same willdelayimplementation of the project when almost entire land except 37acresisavailable for development of the Airport.Thus, the Court wasof theviewthat despite lapse of the last Ordinance No.5of 2015, the actsdoneor action taken by issuingnotificationunder Section11(1) of theLAAct,
2013would not lapse and the same holdsgood for the impugnedacquisition.
Itmayfurther be observedthatthe judgmentof the HighCourthasbeenfurther upheld bythe Hon�ble ApexCourt since the SpecialLeavePetition No.21164/2022preferredbythe petitionershasbeendismissed,
observingthatconstructionanddevelopmentof anAirportisfor public
interestandonlybecause of smallpatchof land, the entire projectcannotbeheldup.Itwasfurther observed�Evenotherwise,alsothe questionsbeingraisedinthisspecialleavepetitionhavebeenansweredby the HighCourtwhichinourconsideredopinionare wellconsideredandinaccordance with
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lawandthe impugnedjudgmentandorderdoesnotrequire anyinterference�.
74.Insofar asAlokAgrawalv. State of Chattisgarh (supra)reliedbythe
learnedcounselfor the petitionersisconcerned,apreliminarynotificationunderSection11(1)of RFCTLARR Act, 2013wasissuedonApril01, 2015alongwithnotificationdatedMarch02, 2015inexercise of power underSection10Aof RFCTLARROrdinance, 2014exemptingallprojectsasstatedinOrdinance fromapplicationof Chapter II & III of theActof 2013.
Itwasthereinheldthatsince neither theawardhadbeenpassed, norpossessionof landwastakenunder Section38of the Actof 2013, thepositioncannotbesaidtobe irreversible andthenotificationissuedbytheState GovernmentdatedMarch02,2015wouldalsocome toanend. Theeffectof the same beingthatprovisionsof Chapter II & III of the Actof
2013 are requiredtobe complied with mandatorily for landacquisition.
75.Inouropinion,theaforesaidjudgmentgivenbythe learnedSingle
Judge of ChhatisgarhHighCourtona closer lookisclearlydistinguishable,
since thereinitwasheldthatthe exercise of the power byAppropriateGovernmentunder Section10Aof the Ordinance of 2014videnotificationdatedMarch02, 2015exemptingalltheprojects(enumeratedinSection10Awithoutreflectingindividualprojects)fromprovisionsof Chapter II &
III of the Actfulfillingthe conditionsfor exercise of power inpublic interestisbadinlaw. Itwasalsoobservedthatthe notificationdatedMarch02,
2015issuedunder section10Aof the Ordinance exemptingallprojectsfromprovisionsof ChapterII & III of the Actof 2013isnothingbuta colourable
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exercise of power bythe State Government,tomake acquisitionforsupplying water to private companies.
However, the factsandcircumstancesinthe presentcase,clearlyspelloutthe needof public interestfor settingupof WWTP inviewof directionsof NGT. The declarationof the Appropriate Governmentthatacquisitionisproposedfor public purpose, isconclusive andisnotopentochallenge sincethe petitionershave not beenable toestablishthatthe proposedacquisitionissoughttobe made for some collateralpurpose.Anydelayinexecutionof
projectwouldhave beendetrimentaltointerestof public andalsodelayedthe interconnectivityof WWTPs,for whichpurpose the landwasnotifiedtobe acquiredindifferentvillagesandsimilar notificationswere issued. Itmayfurther be noticedthatthe notificationunder Section11inthepresentcasehasbeenfollowedbysubsequentconsequentialproceedingsincludingissuance of declarationunderSection19of the Actof 2013after dulyconsideringthe objectionsraisedbythe petitioners. The entire projectwasgivena finalshapeincludingsubmissionof cheque of Rs.6,69,12,500/-
towardscostoflandbyDJB for constructionofWWTP. Nothingremainedinpipeline once the notificationunderSection11of theActof 2013invokingSection10A(1)(e) of the Ordinance wasissued. Inthe factsandcircumstances, we are unable toagree withthe submissionsof learnedcounselfor the petitionersthatthe rights, privileges, obligationsandliabilities do not survive or endure,once the Ordinance has ceased to operate.
76.Itmayfurther be observedValluriJayaramandAnotherv. StateofAndhraPradesh (supra), KarriPrathapRayalaReddy v. State of AndhraPradesh (supra) andKanuparthiVenkataSimhadriv. State of Telangana
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(supra)reliedbythelearnedcounselforthe petitionersarenotof muchrelevance since the proceedingsinsaidcasesare yettobe finallydisposedofandthe stayappearstohave beengrantedduringthe pendencyof theproceedings.
C.Challengetotheacquisition proceedingson the groundsof urgency,
discrimination andmalafides
77.Acontentionhasalsobeenraisedbylearnedcounselfor the
petitionersthatthepreliminarynotificationunderSection11of the
RFCTLARR Act, 2013hasbeenissuedwithoutanyapplicationof mindastothe need, urgencyandwithoutanybasisor foundationfor invocationofpowersconferredunder Section10Aof theOrdinance,whichhasdone awaywithcomplyingwiththe mandatoryprovisionsenshrinedinChapter II(Determinationof SocialImpactandPublic Purpose) andChapter III(SpecialProvisionto Safeguard) of RFCTLAAR Act, 2013. Further, placingreliance uponDevenderKumarTyagi&Othersv. State of UttarPradesh &
Others(supra), itissubmittedthattheAppropriate Governmentisnotpermittedtotransgress, expresslegalprovisionsandprocedure inthegarbof
implementingCourtdirections/orders. The directions/ordersissuedbythe
Hon”ble Supreme Courtmustbe abidedbywithinfour cornersof legalframeworkandstatutoryprovisions. Referringtoparas25to29, 35to38and 48 ofDarshanLalNagpalv. Govt. of NCTof Delhi& Ors.(supra), itisalsourgedthatlongtime gaponthe partofauthoritiesintheirownactionsmilitatesagainsttheplea of urgencyinacquisition.Reliance isfurther
placeduponDev Sharan & Ors. v. Stateof UttarPradesh,(2011) 4SCC
769.
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78.The authoritiesreliedbylearnedcounselfor the petitionersmaybe
briefly noticed:
(i)InDev Sharan & Ors. v. State of UttarPradesh (supra),the
considerationemphasizedbythe Hon”ble ApexCourtisthatif
public purpose canbe satisfiedbyexploringother avenuesof
acquisition, the Courtbefore sanctioninganacquisitionfocusitsattentiononthe conceptof socialandeconomic justice. Thoughthe constructionof jailinthe saidcase washeldtobe inpublicinterestbutitwas observed that theacquisitioncould not have beenmade byinvokingthe urgencyclause under Section17of LAAct,
1894since there wasa slowpace atwhichthe governmentmachinery had functionedinprocessingthe acquisition.
(ii)InDevenderKumarTyagi&Othersv. Stateof UttarPradesh&
Others(supra), itwasheldbyHon”ble ApexCourtthatthere wasnojustificationforinvokingurgencyprovisionsinanarbitrarymanner byreferringtoCourt”searlier directionsasadefence forillegalandarbitraryactof acquiringlandwithoutanopportunityofraisingobjectionsandhearingtopetitionersunder Section5Aof
LAAct, 1894. ItwasfurtherobservedthatnotificationsunderSection4of LAAct, 1894were issuedafter abouttwoyearsof
directionstoState Governmentforrelocationofpollutingbonemillsandalliedindustriesanddeclarationunder Section6wasissuedsixmonthsthereafter whichexhibitedlethargicalandlackadaisicalattitudeof State Governmentandassuchthere wasnojustificationininvokingurgencyprovisions. Itwasalsoheldthatthere wasnoapprovalfor constitutionof Leather CityProject
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asa sub-regionalplaninconsonance withregionalplanbyNCRPB(NationalCapitalRegionPlanningBoard) and, therefore,
acquisitioninabsence ofexpressapprovalintermsofSection19andoperationof Section27of NCRPBAct, 1985rendersentireacquisition proceedingsillegal and hence vitiated.
(iii)In Darshan LalNagpalv.Govt. of NCTof Delhi& Ors. (supra),
the issue for considerationbefore the apexcourtwasthatwhethertheGovernment of NCTof Delhi could have invokedSection 17(1)
and(4) of the LandAcquisitionAct, 1894anddispense withtherule of hearingembodiedinSection5A(2) thereof for the purposeof acquiringor establishmentof electric substationatvillageMandoli. ItwasobservedthatThe DivisionBenchof the HighCourtacceptedtheexplanationgivenbythe respondentsbyobservingthatsub-stationinEastDelhiisneededtoevacuate andutilizethepowergeneratedfrom1500MWgasbasedplantatBawana andwhile doingsothe Benchcompletelyoverlookedthatthere waslongtime gapofmore thanfive yearsbetweeninitiationof the proposalfor establishmentof the sub-stationandthe issue ofnotificationunder Section4(1) readwithSection17(1) and(4) ofthe Act. Further notangible evidencewasproducedbytherespondentsbefore the Courttoshowthatthetaskof establishingthesub-stationatMandoliwasrequiredtobe accomplishedwithina fixedschedule andthe urgencywassuchthatevenfewmonthstime, whichmayhave beenconsumedinthe filingof objectionsbythelandownersandotherinterestedpersonsunder Section5A(1)
andholding of inquirybythe Collector under Section 5A(2), would
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have frustratedthe project. The urgencyprovisionscanbe invokedonlyif evensmalldelayof fewweeksormonthsmayfrustratethe
public purpose for whichthe landissoughttobe acquired. Nobodycancontestthatthe purpose for whichthe appellants’ landandlandbelongingtootherswassoughttobeacquiredwasa publicpurposebutitisonethingtosaythattheStateanditsinstrumentalitywantstoexecutea projectof public importance withoutlossoftime anditisanaltogether differentthingtosaythatfor executionof suchproject, privateindividualsshouldbe deprivedoftheir propertywithoutevenbeing heard.
The authoritiesrelieduponbypetitionersare distinguishablesince inthe aforesaidcasesthe considerationwasslowpaceatwhichthe governmentfunctionedwhichexhibitedlackadaisicalattitude of the officialsandthere wasnogroundfor invokingurgencyprovisions. However, itmaybe noticedthatinthe presentacquisitionproceedings, onlyapplicationof Chapter II andIIIofRFCTLARR Act, 2013hasbeendone awaywithbutthe objectionsonbehalfofthepetitionerscouldstillbe filedinaccordancewithSection15of the 2013Act. Also, the urgencyfor establishmentofWWTPscouldnotbedoubtedin view of directions of NGTas wellasthe factthatWWTPsindifferentvillageswere tobe connectedfor effective implementationof the project. After issueof
directionsbyNGTinMay, 2015, the notificationunder Section11of 2013ActhadbeenissuedonAugust28,2015, ina shortspanof
time. The project, however, remainsinlimbobecause of the stayof proceedings in the writpetitions filedby thepetitioners.
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79.Onthe other hand, learnedcounselfor the respondentshave submittedthatthe urgencyfor implementationof the projectfor settingupof Waste
Water TreatmentPlantismanifestinviewof the directionsissuedbyNGTandtheactionof the AppropriateGovernmentisfullyjustified. Relianceisfurther placeduponUnion of IndiaandAnotherv. Mohiuddin MasoodandOthers, (2020) 14SCC760, ChameliSingh andOthersv.Stateof U.P. andAnother(supra) andFirstLandAcquisition CollectorandOthersv. NirodhiPrakash Gangoli and Another(supra)
80.The decisionregardingurgencyisanadministrative decisionandaquestionof subjectivesatisfactiontobe takenbytheAppropriateGovernmentonthe basisof materialonrecord.IthasbeenobservedinFirstLandAcquisitionCollectorandOthersv. NirodhiPrakash GangoliandAnother(supra)thatif notificationhasbeenissuedinvokingpowersunder
Section17(1)and17(4)(of the LAAct, 1894), the same shouldnotbeinterferedwithbythe Courtunlessitcomestoa conclusionthatappropriateauthorityhadnotapplieditsmindtothe factorsanddecisionhasbeentakenmalafidely. Mere allegationthatpowerwasexercisedmalafidewhileinvokingprovisionsunder Section10A(1)(e) ofthe Ordinance inthe presentcase wouldnotbe enoughandinsupportof suchallegations,specific
material shouldbe placedbefore the Court.
The observationsofthe Hon”ble ApexCourtinChameliSingh v.
StateofU.P. (supra),are alsoapttobe noticedwhereinitwasheldthatthe
State exercisesitspower of eminentdomainfor public purposeandacquirestheland. Solongastheexercise of thepower isfor publicpurpose, the
individual’srightof anowner mustyieldplace tothe larger public purpose.
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Itwasalsoobservedthatthe opinionof urgencyformedbythe AppropriateGovernmenttotake immediate possession, isa subjective conclusionbasedonthe materialbefore itanditisentitledtogreatweightunlessitisvitiatedbymalafidesor colourableexercise of power. The delaybyitself acceleratesthe urgency:Larger the delay, greaterbe the urgency.Itwasfurtherobservedthatsolongasthe unhygienic conditionsanddeplorable housingneedsof Dalits, Tribesandthe poor are notsolvedor fulfilled,the urgencycontinuestosubsist. Whenthe governmentonthe basisof materialformeditsopinionof urgency, the Court, notbeinganappellate forum, wouldnotdisturbthe findingunlessthe courtconclusivelyfindsthe exercise of thepower malafide.
Also, itmaybe observedthatinUnionof IndiaandAnotherv.
Mohiuddin MasoodandOthers(supra), Hon”ble ApexCourtheldthatthe
HighCourthaderredinholdingthatinvocationof the urgencyclause wasbad,asitfailedtoappreciatethattherewasonlya time gapof3monthsbetweenthe notificationunder section4andnotificationunderSection6ofthe Act. Merely, thatsome time hadbeentakeninidentifyingthe landandinissuingactualSection4notification, the HighCourtisnotjustifiedinobservingthatthere wasnourgencyatalland/or there were nogroundstoinvoke the urgency clause.
In the present case, there can be no secondopinionthat imminent stepswererequiredtobetakenfor settingupof WasteWaterTreatmentPlants(WWTPs) in differentlocationsinviewofdirectionsofNGTinMay, 2015.
The stepsfor settingupWWTPswere accordinglytakenafter identificationof landfollowedwithnotificationunder Section11of2013ActonAugust
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28, 2015invokingSection10A(1)(e) of the Ordinanceindifferentvillages.
The urgencyiswritlarge inthe factsandcircumstancesanditcannotbe saidthatthe actioninthisregardisactuatedwithdelay,collateralmotivesor
there wasnojustificationfor undertakingthe processinvokingSection10Aof the Ordinance.
81.The conclusiondrawnbyusisalsosupportedbyDeepakResortsandHotelsPvt. Ltd. v. Union of IndiaandOrs. (supra) relieduponbytherespondents, whereinlandwasacquiredfor settingupofSewage TreatmentPlants(STP) inDelhiinVillage Kapashera. The landacquisitionproceedingswere challengedonthe groundthatthe notificationunderSection17(1) and17(4) oftheActwasvitiatedinasmuchasthe sameused
theexpression�likelytobe acquired� whichimpliesthatthere wasno
existingneedfor the landinquestionandthatthelandmaybe requiredsometime infuture. The High Court observed that the urgencyregardingtheneed for settingup of the sewage treatment plants, hasbeen judiciallyrecognised bythe Supreme Court and the workof settingup of such
plantshasbeen directed tobe undertaken forthwith and completed at
war footingand, assuch, it isfutile for the petitionerstocontend that
there wasnorealjustification for invokingthe emergencyprovisionsofSection 17(4). It wasfurther observed thatanumberofSewage
Treatment Plantshave alreadybeenset up bythe respondentsbut thefact that there isneed for settingup one at Kapasheraisnot in dispute.
Thatbeingso, nofaultcan befound withthe Government takingadequate stepsfor settingup of such aplant on an urgent basisbyinvokingthe provisionsof Section 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act. Placingreliance uponUnionof IndiaandOthersv. Praveen GuptaandOthers,
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(1997) 9SCC78itwasobservedthatthe decisionregardingurgencyisanadministrative decisionanda matter of subjective satisfactionof theAppropriate Governmenttobe takenat,onthe basisof the materialonrecord.Itwasfurther heldthatthe invocationof the powersunder Section17(1) and17(4) of the Actwasperfectlyjustifiedandthere wasneither anyillegality nor any irregularity inthe decision to invoke said powers.
82.The petitionersalsochallenge the acquisitionproceedingsonthegroundof discriminationandmalafidesanditisallegedthatthe landof the
private companywasleftoutfor oblique reasons. Itisfurther submittedthatthesurveywasnotcarriedinaccordance withthe provisionsof the
RFCTLARR Act, 2013andneither anyeffortwasmade tofindouttheavailabilityof aridor waste land. Itisalsourgedthatthe landwhichwasalready earmarked for the purpose wasnot taken intoconsideration.
83.The same hasbeendisputedonbehalf of the respondentsandithasbeencontendedthatthe identificationof landwascarriedafter the surveyandtherequirementoflandincase ofVillage TajpurKhurdhadbeenreducedafter reassessingthe requirementandacquisitionwasproposedonlyfor the bare minimumlandrequiredfor the public purpose ofsettingupof
Waste Water TreatmentPlant(WWTP) intermsof the directionsof the
NGT. Itisemphasizedthatthe matter wasconsideredandsince the
identifiedlandwassuitable andownedonlybya singleperson,itwouldhave beenmore convenienttodeal, consideringthe objectivesunder theRFCTLARR Act, 2013. Reliance isfurther placeduponBharatSingh andOthersv. State ofHaryanaandOthers(supra),StateofA.P. v.
GoverdhanlalPitti, (2003) 4SCC739, Union of Indiav. TarsemSingh,
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(2019) 9SCC304, GiriasInvestment(P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2008)
7 SCC 53.
84.The authoritiesreliedonbehalf of the respondentsmaybe brieflynoticed:
(i)InState of A.P. v. GoverdhanlalPitti(supra)reliedbyrespondentNo.5, the DivisionBenchcame toa conclusionthattheproceedingsfor acquisitioninitiatedbythe State were notfair
andbonafidesince the schoolbuildingwasa hundredyearsoldandwasdeclaredunfitfor humanhabitationasfar backasinthe year
1990andnoactionwastakentoacquire the building.Theproceedingsfor acquisitionwere commencedonlywhenitsufferedanorder of evictionunder the RentControlActandobtainedextendedperiodfromthe HighCourttovacate the premisesof theschool. Aggrievedbythe order of DivisionBench, Stateapproachedthe Hon”bleApexCourtwhereinitwasobservedthatevenif thatbe the situationthatthe Stateastenantof the schoolbuildingtooknostepstoacquire the landbefore order of evictionanddirectionof theHighCourt, itcannotbe heldthatwhenitdecidedtoacquire the building, there existednogenuine publicpurpose. If onlythe possessionof the propertycouldbe retainedasa tenant, itwasunnecessarytoacquire the property. The order of
evictionaswellasthe directiontovacate issuedbythe HighCourtonlyprovide just,reasonable andproximate causefor resortingtoacquisition under the Land Acquisition Act.
(ii)InBharatSingh andOthersv. State of HaryanaandOthers(supra), thepetitionerschallengedthe validityof the acquisitionof
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their landbythe State of Haryana under the LandAcquisitionAct,
1894 for a public purpose i.e. for the development and utilization oflandforindustrialpurpose atGurgaonbytheHaryana UrbanDevelopmentAuthority. One of the groundsonwhichthe appellantchallengedthe acquisitionproceedingswasthatsince the landisagricultural, itshouldnothave beenacquiredinviewof the policydecisionof the government. The Hon”bleApexCourtoverrulingthiscontentionobservedthatinawelfare State, itisthe dutyofthegovernmenttoproceedwiththe workofdevelopmentandtake
stepsfor the growthof industrieswhichare necessaryfor thecountry’sprogressandprosperityandforsolvingthe questionofunemployment. Itistrue thatagriculturallandisnecessaryandshouldnotordinarilybe convertedtonon-agriculturaluse,butkeepinginviewtheprogressandprosperityof the country, theState hastostrike a balance betweenthe needfor developmentofindustrializationandthe needfor agriculture. Itwasalsocontendedthat the petitioners have been discriminated against inasmuch as the
landof other persons inthe villagehas not beenacquired. The apexcourtdismissingtheappealsobservedthatthe governmentwillacquire onlythatamountof landwhichisnecessaryandsuitablefor the public purpose inquestion. The landbelongingtotheappellantshave beenacquiredobviouslyconsideringthe sameassuitable for the public purpose andassuchtheappellantscannotcomplainof anydiscriminationbecause the landof other personshasnotbeen acquired by the government.
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(iii)InUnion of Indiav. TarsemSingh (supra), itwasheldthatSection3-JasamendedbyNationalHighwaysLaws(Amendment)
Act, 1977excludingapplicabilityof LAAct, 1894, resultinginnon-grantof solatiumandinterestinrespectoflandsacquiredunderNationalHighwaysAct, isviolative of Article 14oftheConstitutionof India andthe judgmentof the HighCourtwasaffirmed.
(iv)InGiriasInvestment(P) Ltd. v. State ofKarnataka(supra), theappellantwasaggrievedbythe landacquisitionproceedingsinitiatedfor apublicpurpose namelyfor constructionof trumpetinterchange andaccessroadfromNationalHighway-7toBangalore airport. The appellantsraiseda plea of mala-fidesinlandacquisitionproceedingsonthe groundthatoriginallocationofproposedconstructionwasdeliberatelychangedtohelpimportantpersonswhose landwouldhave beenotherwise acquiredunder theoriginalproposal.TheHon”bleApexCourtobservedthatthere canbe twowaysbywhicha case of malafidescanbe made out;onethatthe actionwhichisimpugnedhasbeentakenwiththespecific
objectof damagingthe interestof the partyand, secondly, suchactionisaimedathelpingsome partywhichresultsindamage tothepartyallegingmala fides.Itwasfurther heldthatmere
allegationofmala-fide isnotenoughtosucceed andthelandwhichhadbeende-notifiedbelongedtothose whohadnopositionorpower.
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85.InStateof A.P. v. GovardhanlalPitti(supra),Hon”bleApexCourtinterpretedthe term�malice� andthe relevantexcerptsof the judgmentmay
be beneficially referred:
�12.Thelegal meaning of maliceis �ill-will or spitetowards a partyand anyindirect or improper motivein taking an action�. Thisissometimes described as �malicein fact�.�Legalmalice�or �malicein law�means �something donewithout lawfulexcuse�. In otherwords, �itis an act donewrongfullyand wilfullywithout reasonable
or probablecause,and not necessarily anact donefrom ill feelingand spite. It is a deliberate act in disregard of therights of others�.
(SeeWords and Phrases LegallyDefined, 3rd Edn., LondonButterworths, 1989.)
13.Wheremaliceis attributed to the State, itcannever bea case of
personalill-will or spite on the partof the State. If at allit is malicein
legal sense, itcan bedescribed as an act which is taken withanobliqueor indirect object. Prof. Wadein hisauthoritativeworkonAdministrativeLaw(8th Edn., at p. 414) basedon English
decisions and in thecontext of alleged illegal acquisition proceedings,
explains thatan action bythe Statecan bedescribed mala fideifit
seeks to �acquireland��for a purpose not authorised bythe Act�.
TheState, ifit wishes toacquire land, should exercise its power bonafide for the statutorypurpose and for none other.
14.Legal malice, therefore, on the partof the State as attributed toitshould beunderstood to mean thatthe actionof the State is nottakenbona fidefor the purpose of the Land Acquisition Act and ithasbeen takenonly to frustratethe favourabledecisions obtained bytheowner of the property against the Statein the eviction and writ
proceedings.�
86.We have alreadyobservedthatinthe instantcasethe landinquestion
wasacquiredfor �public purpose”of settingupof WWTP andthere cannot
be anychallenge toaforesaidextent. Itcannotbe ignoredthatina welfare
State, theAppropriate Governmentisboundtoundertake the workof
developmentkeepinginconsiderationthe issuesof environmentandthe
same couldnothave beenignoredinviewof directionsofNGT.Since
Section10A(1)(e) of the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015as
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wellasRFCTLARR(Amendment) SecondOrdinance, 2015empowerstheAppropriate Governmentinpublic interesttoexemptinfrastructuralprojectsincludingprojectsunder public private partnership, fromthe applicationofprovisionsof Chapter-II andChapter-III of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, thestepsfor acquisitioninthisregardwere initiatedbythe departmentinaccordancewiththe provisionstoavoidanydelayinexecutionof project.
Attheaforesaidstage ofinitiationof acquisitionproceedingsaswellastillfinalapprovalofthecompetentauthorityforissuanceofnotificationunderSection11of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013onAugust28, 2015, the authoritieswouldnothave visualizedthattheRFCTLARR (Amendment) SecondOrdinance, 2015whichwaspromulgatedtogive continuedeffectof theprovisionsofRFCTLARR (Amendment)Ordinance, 2015wouldlapseonAugust31, 2015. The pleadingsaswellasthe documentsfiledonrecordbythe respondentsinrespectof the acquisitionproceedingsclearlyreflectthatarea of landwhichwasnecessaryandsuitable for the public purpose ofsettingupof WWTPwasapproved.Merelybecause the landbelongingtothe petitionershappenedtobe acquired, leavingthelandofanother PrivateCompany, cannotbe assumedtobe the sole groundof discrimination,sincethematter wasconsideredbythe competentauthorityfromthe perspective ofsuitabilityaswellasconsideringthe number of persons,whomaybeaffectedbythe proposedacquisition. Inviewof above, the contentionofmalafidesanddiscriminationraisedonbehalf of the petitioners,iswithoutmerits.
D.Challenge toacquisition proceedingson the groundofnon-
consideration of objections
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87.The acquisitionproceedingshave nextbeenchallengedbythepetitionersonthe groundthatthe objectionsof the petitionerswere notconsideredinaccordance withlaw.Referringtoparas1,4,8,31& 32ofChatroDeviv.Union ofIndia& Ors.,2007(93) DRJ738,itiscontendedthatrighttoraise objectiontoacquisitionunder Section5Aof the LAAct,
1894washeldtobe a substantiverightandprovisionthereof mustbe
compliedwithstrictly. Further, itwasheldthathearinggrantedbyoneCollector,while reportmade byanother Collector doesnotsatisfytherequirementof saidprovision. Reliance wasalsoplaceduponGojerBrothersPrivate LimitedandAnotherv. State of WestBengalandOthers
(supra), whereinthe Hon”ble ApexCourtallowingthe appealsobservedthatthe LAC summarilyrejectedthe objections, withoutdealingwiththe same
effectivelyandobjectivelyandhence thenon-considerationof objectionsfiledbyappellantshadresultedindenialof effective opportunityof hearingtothem. The manner inwhichtheJointsecretarytothegovernmentapprovedtherecommendationmade byLAC favouringacquisitionof thepropertyisreflective oftotalnon-applicationofmindbythe competentauthoritytothe recommendationmade byLAC andthe reportpreparedbyhim.
Referencewasalsomade toUshaStudandAgriculturalFarmsPrivate LimitedandOthersv. State of HaryanaandOthers(supra),
whereintheCourtobservedthatIssuance ofSection6declarationwithoutconsideringthe objectionsof the appellantsandother relevantfactorsmustbe heldasvitiateddue tonon-applicationof mind. The courtobservedthatitissurprisingthatnotonlythe Chief Minister buttheHighCourtalsooverlookedthe factthatChief Minister hadorderedacquisitionofvacant
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landbelongingtoM/sRaniShaver PoultryFarmLtd. Further,whennotificationwasissued, state governmentreleasedthe acquiredlandleavingappellant”slandand, inthismanner, theywere subjectedtohostilediscrimination.
88.The contentionshave been opposed on behalf of the respondentsas theobjectionsare statedtohave beendulyconsideredinaccordance withlaw
andalsoanopportunityof hearingwasgrantedtothe petitionersaftertheyfiledtheir objectionsinwriting. The matter isstatedtohave beendulyconsideredbythe competentauthorityatrelevantappropriatestagestillissueof declarationunder Section19of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013.
RelyinguponCCE v. HariChandShriGopal, (2011) 1SCC236, itissubmittedonbehalf of the respondentsthatsubstantialcompliance of therelevantprovisionsof the RFCTLARR Act, 2013hadbeenmadekeepinginperspective the object andpurpose of the relevant provisions.
RelyinguponAnandSingh v. StateofU.P.,(2010) 11SCC242,itiscontendedthatthe power of eminentdomainisinherentinthe governmentandinthe presentcase the objectionswere dulyconsideredandopportunitywasgranted tothe petitioners. Further, since the acquisition proceedingshadculminatedinissuingof declaration, the clockcouldnotbe turnbackwardsby holding that objections were not consideredby the competentauthority.
89.Itmaybe appropriate tonotice thatinAnandSingh v. State of U.P.
(supra), the Hon”bleApexCourtheldthatthe power of eminentdomainbeinginherentinthe governmentisexercisable inthe public interest, generalwelfare andfor public purpose. ItwasalsoobservedthatSection5Aof theLAAct, 1894confersanimportantrighttosubmitobjectionsandpersuade
theauthoritiestodropthe acquisitionforthereasonsofunsuitabilityofthe
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land for the statedpublic purpose, grave hardship that may be causedby suchexpropriation, availabilityof alternative landfor achievingpublic purposeetc. The exceptionalandextraordinarypower of doingawaywithinquiryunder Section5Aina case where possessionof landisrequiredurgentlyor
inanunforeseenurgencyisprovidedinSection17of the LAAct, 1894andsuchpower shouldnotbe lightlyinvokedina routinemanner, save
circumstanceswarrantingimmediate possession. Inviewof above, theprinciple highlightedbythe learnedcounselfor the petitionersthatthesummaryrejectionof objectionswithoutdealingwiththesame effectivelyandobjectivelyresultsinnon-considerationof objections, cannotbe
disputed.
90.Keepingthe aforesaidprinciple inconsideration, itmaybe seenthatasper case of respondents, onJune 23, 2015DeputySecretary,LA/L&BDepartment, GNCTDinformedthe concernedLACsfor a jointsurveyof the
landsoughttobe acquiredindifferentvillagesandfurther onJune 30thejointsurveyof the landwascarried. The reductionof landfrom51bighaand00biswa to30bigha 06biswa wastakeninviewof the opinionof M/sEngineersIndia Ltd.The urgencyclause under Section40of RFCRLARRAct, 2013wasnotinvokedconsideringthatthe same isonlyfor proposalsspecifiedinSection40(2)of 2013Act. After due consideration, the draftnotificationswere putupfor approvalof the competentauthorityonAugust26, 2015andnotificationunderSection11of the ActwasaccordinglyissuedonAugust28, 2015. The same wasfollowedwitha hearingnotice datedDecember 11, 2015tothe objectionsfiledbythe petitionersonOctober 05,2015andthe matter wasfinallyfixedfor hearingonJanuary05, 2016. Theobjectionswere dulyconsideredandthereportwasplacedunder Section
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15(2)of the Acttherebyrejectingthe objectionsfiledbythe petitioners. The
reportofDM (SW/LAC)wasaccordinglyplacedconveyingtherecommendationsofthe objectionstothe Appropriate Governmentwithrecordof proceedings, whichafter followingof procedure, culminatedinpassingof declarationunder Section19datedJuly27, 2017after extensionof time for issuance of declarationinaccordancewithlaw.Theobjections/representationsfiledonbehalfof the petitionersappear tohave
beendulyreflectedduringthe processof seekingapprovalbythe competentauthorities. Inthe factsandcircumstances, due processappearstobefollowedbythe respondentsandthefindingsof the competentauthoritycannotbesubstitutedmerelybecause a favourable viewwasnottakeninrespect of the petitioners.
E.Challenge to notification under Section 11of RFCTLARR Act, 2013
91.Itisnextcontendedbylearnedcounselforthe petitionersthatpreliminarynotificationunder Section11of the 2013Actwaspublishedinthe localNewspapersbythe Appropriate GovernmentonlyonSeptember 01,
2015, whereastheOrdinance hadalreadylapsedonAugust31,
2015.Learnedcounselfor the petitionersfurther contendsthatnotificationunder Section11of 2013Act(correspondingtoSection4of LAAct, 1894)
isa sine quanonof anyacquisitionandconditionprecedentfor exercise ofanyother powersunder the Actandpublicationof thesame after August31,2015vitiatesthe proceedings. Reference ismade topara 7, 9to11in
NarendrajitSingh & Anr. v. The Stateof U.P. andAnr.,(1970) 1SCC
125.
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Placingreliance onpara 8and17inMadhyaPradesh HousingBoardv. Mohd. Shafi& Others, (1992) 2SCC168, itisemphasizedbythepetitionersthatacquisitionhastostartwitha notificationissuedunderSection4ofLAAct, 1894whichismandatoryevenincase of urgencyandaconditionprecedentfor exerciseofanyfurtherpowersunderthe LAAct,
1894. Further, the preliminarynotificationhastobe construedstrictlyandany lapse in the same vitiates the entire proceedings.
Further, referringtopara 14& 15inD. B. Basnett(Dead) throughLRs. v. Collector, EastDistrictGangtok, Sikkim&Anr.,(2020) 4SCC572,
itisurgedthatwhere notificationunder Section4isinvalid, entire
proceedings wouldbe vitiated.
Referringtoparas19 & 20of P. Parthasarathy v.State of Karnataka,
2011 (12) SCC 183it is contended that definitive intent and conclusive prooffor acquisitionisonlybyissuance of declarationunder Section6oftheLAAct, whereas Section4 notification is a mere proposal.
92.Ontheother hand,the contentionshave beenopposedonbehalfoftherespondents. Gazettenotificationunder Section11isstatedtohave beenissuedonAugust28, 2015after obtainingthe approvalof the competentauthorityanditissubmittedthatpublicationof the same inthe newspaperafter August31, 2015doesnotvitiate theproceedings.Reliance isfurther
placeduponKrishnaDeviMalchandKamathiaandOthersv. BombayEnvironmentalAction GroupandOthers(supra)tocontendthattheauthoritiesrightlycontinuedwiththeacquisitionproceedingsasthenotificationunder Section11couldnotbe deemedtobe voidbyvirtue oflapse of Ordinance. The notificationunder Section11continuedtohave the
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legalforce untilandunlessitwassodeclaredtobe voidbya competentforum.
Reliance isalsoplaceduponSandeepS. Metange v. State of
Maharashtra, 2021SCCOnLine Bom5726andState of M.P. v. Vishnu
Prasad Sharma, (1966) 3 SCR 557.
93.Itiswellsettledthatthe rightinlandisa constitutionalrightunder
Article300Aof theConstitutionofIndiaandincase anypersonisdivestedof the rightsinpropertybywayof acquisition, the provisionsof theenactmenthave tobe strictlyfollowed. Undoubtedly, the acquisitioncommenceswithnotificationunder Section11of 2013Act,whichismandatoryandconditionprecedenttoexercise of further powersbyAppropriate Government.The public announcementbytheAppropriateGovernmentfollowedbypublicationofnoticeenablesthe affectedlandownerstocanvasstheir objections, if any, toacquisition. Accordingly, ifnotice under Section11of 2013Actisdefective anddoesnotcomplywithrequirementsof theAct, the same notonlyvitiatesthe notificationbutalsorenders subsequent proceedingsconnectedwith the acquisition as bad.
94.Inthe presentcase, the gazette notificationunder Section11of theRFCTLARR Act, 2013hasbeenpublishedafterthe approvalof competentauthorityonAugust28, 2015prior tolapsingthe Ordinance onAugusts31,
2015. The publicationin the Newspaper thereafterisonlyforthe purpose ofnotificationto the public oftheintention toacquire the proposed landandthesame doesnotnullifythe gazette notificationissuedonAugust28, 2015.
The notificationunder Section11of theRFCTLARR Act, 2013invokingSection10A(1)(e) does not suffer from any infirmityon aforesaidground.
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95.The authoritiesreferredtobythepetitionersare distinguishableonfacts and may bebriefly noticed:
(i)In NarendrajitSingh & Anr. v. The State of U.P. andAnr.
(supra),the Hon”ble ApexCourtheldthatnotificationunderSection4ofLAAct, 1894sufferedfromseriousdefectsincethe
localitywhere the landswere neededwasnotspecifiedanddefectinnotificationunderSection4(1) cannotbe curedbygivingfullparticularsinthe notificationunder Section6(1). Further, evenbefore issue of notificationunder Section4, the Governmenthadmade upitsmindtoacquire the landofpetitionersinasmuchasthere wasenquirybetweenthe twonotificationsandnovalidreasonhadbeengiventoexplainwhythe detailsspecifiedinnotificationunder Section6(1) couldnotbe giveninthe one under
Section4(1).
(ii)InMadhyaPradeshHousingBoardv. Mohd. Shafi& Others(supra), itwasnoticedthatnotificationunderSection4(1) and17(1)wasverycryptic asthe khasranumbershadnotbeengivennorprecise localityhadbeenindicatedandassuchthe descriptionwasfoundtobe insufficient. Also, the �public purpose”for whichthelandwasacquiredwasmentionedas�residential”, whichwasheldtobe vague andassuchthe State waspreventedfromtakingfurther stepsinthematter. Thenon-disclosure of the localitywithprecision was held toinvalidate the publication.
(iii)InD. B. Basnett(Dead) through LRs. v. Collector, EastDistrictGangtok, Sikkim&Anr.(supra),since the respondentsfailedtoshowanynotificationshowingintenttoacquire landor anyother
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declarationthereafter,exceptcoveringletter for compensation, itwas held thatland was not acquired in accordance with law.
(iv)InP. Parthasarathyv. Stateof Karnataka(supra), the challenge
wastoanorder passedbythe HighCourtholdingthe validityandlegalityof notificationissuedbyrespondentState under sub-
section4of Section28of the Karnataka IndustrialAreasDevelopmentAct, 1966. Anappealwaspreferredagainstthe saidorder andthe DivisionBenchof the HighCourtdismissedtheappealholdingthatanydefect in the preliminarynotificationwouldnotprove fataltotheacquisitionproceedings. Inthe SLP preferredagainstthesame,theHon”bleApexCourtupheldthe orderpassedbythe DivisionBenchobservingthatthoughthere wassomediscrepancyinthe descriptionof propertyproposedtobe acquiredbutitdidnotmisleadthe petitioner regardingthe identityof land.
Also, the decisioninNarendrajitSingh & Anr. v. The Stateof
U.P. andAnr.(supra)washeldtobe distinguishable onfacts,sinceinthe saidcase therewere noparticularsgiveninthe notification.
Reference wasalsomade toBabu BarkyaThakurv. StateofBombay, AIR1960SC1203, whereinitwasobservedthatitisonlyunder Section6thata firmdeclarationhastobe made bythe
Governmentthatlandwithproperdescriptionandarea soastobeidentifiable is neededfor a public purpose or for a Company.
There isnodisputetothe principle referredinBabu BarkyaThakurv. State ofBombay(supra) asemphasizedbylearnedcounsel for the petitioners.
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F.Challengetoacquisition proceedingsbeingin violation ofMPD
2021, ZDP and DDA”s Land Pooling Policy
96.RelyinguponR.K.MittalandOthersv. State of UttarPradesh andOthers(supra), learnedcounselfor the petitionershave alsocontendedthattherespondentsfailedtoconsider thatacquisitionisinviolationoftheMaster Planof DelhiandZonalPlans.ItisalsopointedoutthatVillageTajpur Khurdiscoveredunder DDA”slandpoolingpolicyandthepetitionershadoptedfor surrenderingtheir landtoDDAunder the saidscheme whereunder anarea of 37.2 acresisavailable tothe authorities. Itisurgedthatsame landcanbe acquiredfromthe landpoolingpolicyfrom
DDA and would be available free of cost to the exchequer.
The contentions have beenopposedon behalf of the respondents.
97.Atthe outset, itmaybe observedthattheoptionof developmentbywayof landpoolingpolicyisstillunder considerationandnofinalrightscanbe saidtohave beenculminatedunder the saidscheme. Merelyanoptionexercisedbythe petitionersinthisregardcannotforeclose therightsof theAppropriateGovernmenttoacquire the landif the ownershipof thesamevests with the concerned petitioners.
Itmaybe noticedthatinAflatoon andOthersv. Lt. Governorof
DelhiandOthers(supra), the issue before the Hon”ble ApexCourtwaswhether the acquisitionproceedingscouldhave beeninitiatedfor planneddevelopmentofDelhiinthe absence of Masteror ZonalPlan. Itwasobservedbythe Hon”ble ApexCourtafter takingintoconsiderationtheDelhiDevelopmentAct, 1957, thatthe proceedings did notgetvitiatedinthe
absence of suchplan. Itwasalsoobservedthatacquisitiongenerally
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precedesdevelopmentandif for proper development, landissoughttobeacquired, the actiontakenbythe Appropriate Governmentcannotbe saidtobe unlawful or in colourable exercise of power.
Inthe presentcase, thereisnothingonrecordif anyof the competentauthorities/DDAhasobjectedtothe constructionof WWTPsontheidentifiedlandintheconcernedvillagesbeingcontrarytothe provisionsof
Master Planor ZonalPlan.Thelandofthe petitionersconstitutesonlyasmallchunk of land whichis proposed to be acquired in larger public interestandincaseanysuchconsequentialamendmentinZonalPlanisrequired, the
stepsinthisregardcanbe takenbythe authoritieskeepinginviewthe ratiolaiddowninAflatoon andOthersv. Lt. Governorof DelhiandOthers(supra).Thepetitioners”maingrievanceleadingtofilingof complaintswiththe relevantauthoritieswasinitiallywithrespecttomethodologyadoptedfor
identificationof landandmaliciouslyleavingthe adjacentlandownedbythecompany by reducing the area of land required for acquisition.
Inthe aforesaidcontext, the authoritieshave dulyexplainedthatthe
bare minimumlandwasconsideredfor acquisitionandsince the landof thepetitionersinchunkwasownedbya single party, the same wasconsideredsuitable foracquisition. The discretionvestedwiththeauthoritiesinthisregardcannotbe deemedtohave beenexercisedwithmalice the departmentconcernedwasonlyina positiontoascertainthe suitabilityof the land. The
petitionerscannotcomplainof discriminationbecause the landof otherpersonshadnotbeenacquiredbythe governmentandwasinthe bestposition to ascertainthe suitability of the land.
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98.InsofarasR.K.MittalandOthersv. State of UttarPradesh andOthers(supra)relieduponbythepetitionersisconcerned, the same isdistinguishable. Inthe saidcase, the mainissue for considerationbefore the
Hon”ble ApexCourtwastoconsider theambitandscope of powerof the
NOIDAAuthoritytopermitusers, other thanresidential, inthe sectorsspeciallyearmarkedfor residentialuse inthe Master-Planofthe NewOkhlaIndustrialDevelopmentArea andwhether the residentialpremisescanbe,
whollyor partlyusedbythe originalallottee or evenitstransferee, for anyother purpose other thanresidentialasbankswere beingrunonthe landinquestion. Itwascontendedbyappellantsthattherewasinadequacyof spacefor banks, clinicsandother commercialofficesinthe developmentarea andthenumbersof plotsfor the bankswasnotsufficienttomeetthe needsof thepublicinthe residentialsectorsandnoalternativespacesareavailableforrelocationof thebanks. NOIDADevelopmentAuthority, onthe otherhandcontendedthatbankingactivityisimpermissible inthe residentialsectorsas
itcausesinconvenience topublic anddisturbance toresidents. The Hon”ble
ApexCourtobservedthatthe master planandzonalplanhave bindingeffectinlawandif a scheme/master planisbeingnullifiedbythearbitraryactsoftheauthorities, the courtneedstointervene andwhenever itisnecessaryevenquashthe ordersof the authorities. Further, itwasheldthatBanking,
NursingHomesoranyothercommercialactivityinanysectorin
developmentarea earmarkedfor �residentialuse� notpermittedandif done
isinpatent violationof Master Plan.
Inthe presentcase, the landunder acquisitionisanagriculturallandwhichisnottobeusedfor commercialpurpose butfor establishmentof
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WWTP/STP. Nospecific objectionbythe concernedcompetentauthorityhasbeenplacedtoassume thatthe acquisitioncouldnotbe made for saidpurpose orZonalPlancouldnotbe modified, if required. Developmentforpublicpurpose cannotbecurtailedonaforesaidgrounds.Inthefactsandcircumstances, we donotfindmerits in thecontentionraised on behalf of thepetitioners.
99.Itmayalsobe noticedthatinreplyonbehalf of the petitionersinWP(C) 320/2018, a standhasalsobeentakenthatpreviouslyacquiredlandof appropriate sizehasbeenacquiredfor same purpose ofestablishingWWTPs/STPsvide awardNo.17/DCW/1997-98inVillageTikriKalanwhichislyingvacant. The perusalof copyof awardno.17/DCW/1997-98
Village TikriKalanrevealsthatthe landwasacquiredfor the publicpurposeof resettlementof PVC dealersasreflectedinthe introductorypara itself.
Nothingfurther hasbeenbroughttothe notice of thisCourtinsupportof the
contentionthatanyother plotfor establishmentof WWTPsasproposedforpresentproject is available with the Appropriate Government.
G.Substantive Compliance
100.We agree withthesubmissionmade bylearnedcounselfor therespondentsthatthe statute hasbeensufficientlyfollowedsoastocarryoutthe intentof the statute andaccomplishthe reasonable objectfor whichitwaspassed.InCCEv. HariChandShriGopal(supra), theHon”ble ApexCourthighlightedthe doctrine of substantialcompliance, whichmeans�actualcompliance inrespecttothe substance essentialtoeveryreasonable
objective of the statute� andthe Courtshoulddetermine whether the statute
hasbeenfollowedsufficientlysoastocarryoutthe intentof the statute and
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accomplishthe reasonable objectivesfor whichitwaspassed.Itwasalso
observedthathowever, sucha defence cannotbe pleadedif a clear statutory
prerequisitewhicheffectuatestheobjectandthepurposeofthe statute has
notbeenmet. The observationsinpara 32to34maybe beneficially
reproduced:
�32.Thedoctrineof substantial complianceis a judicialinvention,
equitable in nature, designed to avoid hardship in cases wherea partydoes allthatcan reasonably beexpected of it, but failed or faulted insomeminor orinconsequent aspects whichcannotbedescribedas the
�essence�or the �substance�of the requirements. Likethe concept of�reasonableness�, the acceptanceor otherwiseof a plea of�substantialcompliance�depends upon the facts and circumstances
of eachcaseand the purpose and object to beachieved and thecontext of the prerequisites which are essential to achievethe object
and purpose of the rule or the regulation. Such a defencecannot bepleaded ifa clear statutory prerequisite which effectuates theobject
and the purpose of thestatute has not been met.Certainly, itmeans
thatthe Courtshould determinewhetherthe statute has been followed
sufficientlyso asto carryout the intent forwhich the statute wasenacted and not a mirrorimagetypeofstrict compliance. Substantial
compliancemeans �actual compliancein respect to the substanceessentialto everyreasonable objectiveof the statute� and the Court
should determine whether the statute hasbeen followed sufficientlysoas to carry out theintent of the statute and accomplish the reasonableobjectives for which it was passed.
33.A fiscal statute generallyseeks to preservethe need to complystrictly withregulatory requirements thatare important, especially
when a partyseeks thebenefits of an exemption clause thatareimportant. Substantialcompliancewith an enactment is insisted,
wheremandatoryanddirectory requirements arelumped together,for
in such a case, ifmandatory requirements are complied with, it will beproper to say thatthe enactment has been substantiallycomplied withnotwithstanding the non-complianceof directoryrequirements. Incases wheresubstantial compliancehas been found, therehas beenactualcompliancewith the statute, albeit procedurally faulty. Thedoctrine of substantial complianceseeks to preservethe need to
complystrictly with the conditions orrequirements thatare importantto invokea tax or duty exemption and to forgivenon-complianceforeither unimportant and tangentialrequirements or requirements that
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are so confusinglyor incorrectlywritten thatan earnest effort atcompliance should be accepted.
34.Thetest for determining the applicabilityof the substantialcompliancedoctrinehasbeen the subject of a myriad of cases andquiteoften, the critical question to beexamined is whether the
requirements relateto the�substance�or �essence�of the statute, if
so, strict adherenceto those requirements is a precondition to giveeffect to thatdoctrine. On the other hand, iftherequirements are
proceduralor directory in thattheyare not of the �essence�of the
thing to bedonebut aregiven with a view to the orderlyconduct of
business, theymaybefulfilled bysubstantial, ifnot strict compliance.
In other words, amereattempted compliancemaynot besufficient,
but actualcompliancewith those factors which are considered as
essential.�
(VIII).CONCLUSION
101.Inviewof the directionsof NGT, the Appropriate Governmenttookthe stepsfor acquisitionfor realizingthe lawfulpublic purposeof settingupof WWTPswhichfallswithinclause (e) ofSection10A(1) of the Ordinance.
The public purposemusthave paramountcyover the private interestasalreadyheldabove. The decisionof the competentauthorityinthisregarddoesnotappear tohave beenexercisedmalafidelyor forcollateralpurpose.
The objectionsfiledonbehalf of the petitionerswere dulyconsideredinaccordancewiththerelevantprovisions.Substantialcompliance totheprovisionsof 2013Acthasbeenmade bythe respondents.The objectionsraisedonbehalf ofthe petitioners on the ground of discrimination,malafides,
absence of urgency to dispense with Chapter II & Chapter III of the 2013 Actare withoutanymerit, asdiscussedabove.Inthe factsandcircumstances,itisnota fitcasewhereinthisCourtmayexercise powersunder Article 226oftheConstitutionof Indiafor setting aside the acquisition proceedings.
102.For the foregoingreasons, boththe writpetitionsare dismissed.Stayordersinboththe writpetitionsalsostandvacated.Noorderastocosts.
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Pendingapplications, if any, alsostanddisposedof.Acopyof thisjudgment be placedin other writ petition.
(ANOOP KUMARMENDIRATTA)
JUDGE
(V. KAMESWARRAO)
JUDGEJANUARY24, 2024/sd
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