AZAD SINGH NEGI vs GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR.
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of order: 6th May, 2024
+ W.P.(C) 2944/2023 & CM APPLs. 22711-12/2024
AZAD SINGH NEGI ….. Petitioner
Through: Ms.__, Advocate (Appearance not given)
versus
GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR. ….. Respondents
Through: Mr.Divyam Nandrajog, Panel
Counsel for GNCTD with Mr.Jatin Dua, Advocate for R-1
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE CHANDRA DHARI SINGH
ORDER
CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J (Oral)
1. The captioned writ petition has been filed on behalf of the petitioner under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India seeking setting aside of the impugned interim order dated 29th September, 2018 and final award dated 16th October, 2018 passed by the learned POLC-XIX, Dwarka Courts, Delhi in case bearing LIR No. 741/2016.
2. Vide the impugned final award, the petitioners claim seeking his reinstatement in service was rejected by the learned Labour Court after it found that despite repeated opportunities, the petitioner had failed to lead the evidence.
3. During the course of arguments on 20th April, 2023, the Predecessor Bench of this Court had observed that the captioned writ petition is barred by delay and laches, and in view of the same, the petitioner had sought time to file an additional affidavit explaining the delay.
4. In compliance of order dated 20th April, 2023 passed by the Predecessor Bench of this Court, the additional affidavit explaining the delay in filing the present petition was filed by the petitioner on 11th April, 2024.
5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents vehemently opposed the instant petition and prayed that the present petition may be dismissed at the threshold on the grounds of delay and laches itself.
6. It is submitted that the impugned award was passed in the year 2018 and the instant petition has been filed in the year 2023, i.e., after a lapse of more than five years.
7. It is submitted that the petitioner has failed to explain the reason behind the said inordinate delay and therefore, the instant petition, being barred by delay and laches may be dismissed.
8. Per Contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner vehemently opposed the contentions advanced by the respondents submitting to the effect that the averments made by the respondents are baseless.
9. It is submitted that since his illegal termination on 9th June, 2011, the petitioner did not have any sustainable source of income and was pursuing the litigation before the learned Labour Court by working as a daily wager with caterers in marriage parties, and by borrowing funds from his relatives.
10. It is submitted that after the dismissal of his claim, the petitioner was not able to arrange funds to approach this Court and when he arranged some funds, lockdown was imposed due to the then prevailing COVID-19 pandemic due to which the petitioner was not able work as a daily wager, and he had to use the said funds to keep up his family, and it is only in the latter half of the year 2022 that the petitioner again started earning.
11. It is submitted that the above stated reasons led to the delay in filing the instant petition and the same are bona fide grounds.
12. Therefore, it is submitted that the delay and laches may be condoned and the instant petition may be heard on merits.
13. Heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and perused the record.
14. Before delving into the facts of the matter at hand, this Court finds it appropriate to discuss the principle of delay and laches in a writ petition.
15. In a recent judgment of Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 551, the Honble Supreme Court reiterated its view qua the doctrine of delay and laches in filing a writ petition holding that delay and laches is one of the factors to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The relevant portion of the said judgment is as under:
..13. Reiterating the aspect of delay and latches would disentitle the discretionary relief being granted, this Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 has held:
16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, procrastination is the greatest thief of time and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.
14. Having regard to the afore-stated principles of law enunciated herein above, when we turn our attention to facts on hand, it would not detain us for too long for accepting the plea of the appellant in affirming the order of the Learned Single Judge and dismissing the writ petition on the ground of delay and latches. We say so for reasons more than one, firstly, it requires to be noticed that the writ petitioner was a rival applicant along with the appellant herein for grant of LPG distributorship and she along with the appellant herein, were found to be eligible and the appellant herein was held to be successful by virtue of draw of lots. This factual aspect would reflect that the writ petitioner was aware of all the developments including that of the allotment of distributorship having been made in favour of the appellant herein way back in 2014, yet did not challenge and only on acceptance of the alternate land offered by the appellant in March, 2017 and permitting him to construct the godown and the showroom. Same was challenged in the year 2017 and thereby the writ petitioner had allowed his right if at all if any to be drifted away or in other words acquiesced in the acts of the Corporation and as such on this short ground itself the appellant has to succeed. Secondly, another fact which has swayed in our mind to accept the plea of the appellant herein is that, undisputedly the appropriate government had felt the need of permitting the Oil Marketing Companies to be more flexible and as such modification to the guidelines had been brought about on 15.04.2015 whereby the applicants were permitted to offer alternate land where the land initially offered by them was found deficient or not suitable or change of the land, subject to specifications as laid down in the advertisement being met. There being no stiff opposition or strong resistance to the alternate land offered by the appellant herein not being as per the specifications indicated in the advertisement, we see no reason to substitute the court’s view to that of the experts namely, the Corporation which has in its wisdom has exercised its discretion as is evident from the report filed in the form of affidavit by the territory manager (LPG)/BPCL whereunder it has been stated:
16. This Court is of the view that as per the settled law, fence-sitters cannot be allowed to raise the dispute or challenge the validity of the order after its conclusion. No party can claim the relief as a matter of right as one of the grounds for refusing relief is that the person approaching the Court is guilty of delay and laches. The Court exercising public law jurisdiction does not encourage agitation of stale claims where the right of third parties crystallizes in the interregnum.
17. Insofar as the instant matter is concerned, the impugned award which has been assailed by the petitioner before this Court was passed on 16th October, 2018 and the present petition has been filed on 27th February, 2023. Thereafter, the Predecessor Bench of this Court had directed the petitioner to file an additional affidavit explaining the reason behind the delay and laches in filing the captioned writ.
18. It is pertinent to note that the direction to file the additional affidavit was passed vide order dated 20th April, 2023 and the petitioner did not comply with the said order until 11th April, 2024.
19. The petitioner was granted additional opportunity to file the said affidavit which is apparent from the reading of the order dated 4th August, 2023. Therefore, apart from the delay of more than five years in challenging the impugned award, there is also a delay of almost 225 days in complying with the directions passed by this Court, i.e., to file the additional affidavit.
20. This Court is of the view that while exercising extraordinary powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, this Court can take into account various factors and one of such factors is delay and laches. The said factor is one of the grounds, at the discretion of the writ Courts, to refuse the reliefs sought by the writ petitioner.
21. It is observed by this Court that there is tremendous delay and laches on the part of the petitioner in approaching this Court and as per the settled position of law, delay defeats equity. If the petitioner wanted to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court, he should have come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity.
22. Upon perusal of the contents of the said additional affidavit, this Court does not find any cogent reason to condone the inordinate delay of more than five years as the present petition is grossly barred by delay and laches.
23. It is held that the learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to satisfy this Court as the grounds raised by the petitioner qua the explanation of delay and laches do not seem to be bona fide rather an afterthought to assert his rights which do not seem to be reasonable and legally tenable.
24. In view of the above, the instant petition alongwith pending applications stands dismissed.
25. The order be uploaded on the website forthwith.
CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J
MAY 6, 2024
dy/ryp/av
Click here to check corrigendum, if any
W.P.(C) 2944/2023 Page 7 of 7