ANJALI PANDEY vs GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR.
$~76
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(C) 5194/2023
ANJALI PANDEY ….. Petitioner
Through: Mr. Aayush Agarwala and Mr. Auritro Mukherjee, Advocates.
versus
GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR. ….. Respondents
Through: Ms. Prashansa Sharma Adv. with Ms. Nikita Vir, Adv. for Mr. Santosh Kr. Tripathi, Standing Counsel (Civil) GNCTD for R-1/DoE
Mr. Namit Suri, Mr. Rameezuddin Raja, Ms. Purnima Singh and Mr. Arjun Kaushal, Advocates for R-2
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
J U D G M E N T (O R A L)
% 08.02.2024
REVIEW PET. 44/2024
1. This review petition seeks review of the observations and findings contained in paras 46 to 50 of the judgment rendered by me on 29 January 2024 in WP(C) 5194/2023.
2. Mr. Agarwala, appearing for the review petitioner, first seeks review of my observation that the figure of 25% envisaged in Section 12(1)(c) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Act, 2009 (the RTE Act) refers to the number of students actually admitted.
3. It is sought to be submitted that no arguments were advanced by the petitioner on the aspect of interpretation of the expression strength as contained in Section 12(1)(c) of the RTE Act. It is further contended that a contrary view has been expressed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in its decision in Rameshwar Jha v. The Principal Richmond Global School1.
4. Mr. Namit Suri, learned counsel for the Respondent 2 school disputes this submission and asserts that, if the aspect of the strength of the class, within the meaning of Section 12(1)(c) of the RTE Act had not come up for arguments, there was no occasion for him to refer to the decision in The Sovereign School v. Directorate of Education2
5. In any event, Mr. Agarwalas submission does not constitute a legitimate ground to seek review of my judgment. There is no compulsion on a court to restrict its findings only to points which were argued by counsel. If during the course of deciding a matter, the Court is required to interpret a particular provision, the court is within its right to interpret the provision as it deems most appropriate, irrespective of whether learned counsel for the parties addressed arguments on that aspect or not.
6. It is for learned counsel to appreciate the issues which arise for consideration and cover all issues in their arguments. Else, no case would ever be decided.
7. Insofar as the submission that a Coordinate Bench of this Court has taken a different view with respect to the interpretation of Section 12(1)(c) is concerned, that, too, cannot constitute a ground for review. No such submission was made before this Court when the matter was argued. This, therefore, is not a ground which can constitute a justifiable basis to seek revisitation of the view expressed by this Court.
8. Besides, it is not the petitioners contention that the view expressed by this Court is contrary to the decision of any hierarchically superior judicial authority.
9. I have given cogent reasons as to why, in my view, the word strength must refer to the actual number of general category students admitted, and not to the numerical capacity of the class. If the strength of the class, to which Section 12(1)(c) of the RTE Act refers, is to be regarded as the declared strength of the class, a strange situation would arise. If, for example, the declared strength of general category students in a school is 100, and only 10 general category students are admitted, the school would perforce have at admit at least 25 EWS/DG students which, according to me, can never be the intent or purpose of Section 12(1)(c) of the RTE Act.
10. That said, if a school is unable to admit general category students equivalent to its declared strength, and desires, therefore, to have the number of EWS/DG vacancies available with it to be scaled down, it would be for the School to seek exemption from the DoE in accordance with the procedure prescribed in that regard. If it does not, and, at the time of furnishing information to the DoE about the strength of its class to be 100, then it would be bound to admit at least 25 EWS/DG students even if, when actual admissions take place, it is unable to admit 100 general category students.
11. Mr. Aggarwal also relied on the observation, by me, in the judgment under review, to support the above view that an unaided school survives on the fees which it earns. He submits that, even in the case of EWS students, the school is not required to provide education free of cost, and that the only difference is that the fees are paid by the DoE rather than the parents of the student concerned.
12. Mr. Agarwal candidly acknowledges, however, that the fees paid by the DoE is, in most costs, not equal to the fees which are charged by the school from the general category students.
13. As such, I do not see how my findings suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record.
14. Subject to the above observations, no ground for revisiting the judgment under review is made out.
15. The review petition is accordingly disposed of.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
FEBRUARY 8, 2024
dsn
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1 298 (2023) DLT 328
206 (2014) DLT 29
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