AABI BINJU vs UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

2025-02-28 Information

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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 25 November 2024
Pronounced on: 28 February 2025

+ W.P.(C) 1164/2020
AABI BINJU …..Petitioner
Through: Mr. K.L. Manhas, Advocate

versus

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. …..Respondents
Through: Mr. Shoumendu Mukherji, Sr. Panel Counsel with Ms. Megha Sharma, Mr. Arya Jha and Mr. Aniruddha Ghosh, Advs.

CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR MENDIRATTA
JUDGMENT
% 28.02.2025

C. HARI SHANKAR, J.

1. This writ petition assails judgment dated 12 September 2019, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal1 in seven Original Applications2, instituted by the petitioner. The Tribunal, by judgment dated 12 September 2019, has dismissed all the OAs. Aggrieved thereby, the applicant in the OAs, Aabi Binju, has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

2. The petitioner was an employee of the Central Soil & Mineral Research Station3, an office under the Ministry of Water Resources, River Development and Ganga Rejuvenation4. The case relates to the Annual Confidential Reports5 of the petitioner for the years, 2001-02, 2003-04, 2004-05, 2005-06, 2006-07, 2007-08 and 2008-09. The copies of the aforesaid ACRs were provided to the petitioner on 27 May 2009. The petitioner represented against the said ACRs on 9 June 2009, 20 July 2009 and 8 August 2011. The representations were rejected on 5 August 2011 and 29 December 2011.

3. The petitioner instituted the aforenoted seven OAs challenging his ACRs for the years mentioned, as well as the rejection of his representations thereagainst by communications dated 5 August 2011, 29 December 2011 as well as two subsequent communications dated 28 December 2012 and 25 February 2014. He sought, in the OAs, quashing of the adverse remarks entered in his aforenoted ACRs.

4. The OAs were first dismissed by the Tribunal by judgment dated 28 March 2019. The petitioner challenged the said decision before Court by way of WP (C) 4896/2019. By judgment dated 8 May 2019, this Court set aside the order dated 28 March 2019 of the Tribunal and remanded the OAs to the Tribunal for consideration afresh. The impugned judgment dated 12 September 2019 is the outcome of the said de novo consideration. The Tribunal has once again dismissed all the OAs.

5. Aabi Binju is, therefore, once again before us.

The ACRs, tabulated

6. We deem it appropriate to reproduce the content of ACRs for the years 2001-02, 2002-03, 2003-04, 2004-05, 2005-06, 2006-07, 2007-08 and 2008-09 in their entirety6, tabulated, as Annexure A to this judgment. The petitioner addressed representations, against the aforesaid OAs, on 9 June 2009, 20 July 2009, 8 August 2011, 3 December 2012 and 16 October 2013.

The present lis

7. The orders on the petitioners representations, which form subject matter of challenge in the OAs filed by him, were passed on 5 August 2011, 29 December 2011, 28 December 2012 and 25 February 2014.

8. Vide his representation dated 9 June 2009, the petitioner assailed the remarks contained in his ACRs for the year 1 April 2001 to 31 March 2002.

9. For the said year, as is apparent from the table annexed as Annexure A to this judgment, the reporting officer had graded the petitioner Very Good, but the grading had been downgraded to Good, by the reviewing officer. The petitioner pointed out that the petitioner had never been communicated any corrective measures, to be taken by him, to improve his performance. It was also pointed out that the reviewing officer had not adduced any reason for downgrading the petitioner, vis-à-vis the grading granted by the reporting officer. The grading of Good, it was pointed out, was below the prescribed benchmark of Very Good, for further promotion. The petitioner submitted that the reviewing officer belonged to the Specialization of Civil Engineering, whereas the petitioner was an Electronics Engineer. Even for this reason, he submitted that the downgrading, by the reviewing officer, of his Very Good grading granted by the reporting officer, was not legally sustainable. He pointed out that he had never received any warning, memo or any other communication complaining about the manner of discharge, by him, of his duties.

10. The representation dated 20 July 2009, also addressed by the petitioner to the respondent, was on similar lines.

11. The representations dated 9 June 2009 and 20 July 2009 were rejected by the Additional Secretary (Water Resources) by order dated 5 August 2011, which read thus:

ORDER

WHEREAS, Shri Aabi Binju, Scientist C (erstwhile Senior Research Officer) had submitted six representations dated 9.6.2009 and one representation dated 20.7.2009 addressed to the Secretary (WR) for expunction of adverse remarks of Reporting/reviewing officers and review of his overall ACR/APAR grading for the period from 1.4.2001-31.3.2002(one ACR) and 1.4.2003-31.3.2004; 1.4.2004-31.3.2005; 1.4.2005-31.3.2006; 1.4.2006-31.3.2007; 1.4.2007-31.3.2008; 1.4.2008-31.3.2009 (six ACRs).

2. WHEREAS the following officers were Reporting and Reviewing Authorities relating to the ACRs/APARs of the under mentioned period:-

Period
Name of reporting officer
Name of reviewing officer
1.4.2001-31.3.2002
Dr. R.B. Gangadhar, erstwhile Joint Director, CSMRS

Dr. K. Venkatachalam, erstwhile Director, CSMRS
1.4.2003-31.3.2004
Shri Murari Ratnam, erstwhile Joint Director, CSMRS
Dr. A.K. Dhawan, erstwhile Director, CSMRS
1.4.2004-31.3.2005
Shri Murari Ratnam, erstwhile Joint Director, CSMRS
Dr. A.K. Dhawan, erstwhile Director, CSMRS
1.4.2005-31.3.2006
Shri Murari Ratnam, erstwhile Joint Director, CSMRS
Dr. A.K. Dhawan, erstwhile Director, CSMRS
1.4.2006-31.3.2007
Shri Murari Ratnam, erstwhile Joint Director, CSMRS
Dr. A.K. Dhawan, erstwhile Director, CSMRS
1.4.2007-31.3.2008
Shri N. Chandrasekaran, erstwhile Joint Director, CSMRS
Shri Murari Ratnam, Director, CSMRS
1.4.2008-31.3.2009
Shri N. Chandrasekaran, erstwhile Joint Director, CSMRS
Shri Murari Ratnam, Director, CSMRS

In order to examine the representations of the officer, in terms of existing guidelines of DOPT the comments of in-service Reporting and reviewing officers were called for on the points raised in the representations vis-à-vis the remarks/gradings given by them in the ACR/APAR. The reporting officers relating to the period 2001-2002, 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 have since retired on superannuation. Further, reviewing officers relating to the period 2001-2002, 2003-2004, 2004-2005, 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 have also retired on superannuation. The comments of Shri Murari Ratnam in his capacity as reporting officer/ reviewing officer have been obtained and considered.

3. WHEREAS on going through all the representations of the officer reported upon i.e. Shri Aabi Binju it is observed that he has raised the following contentions uniformly:-

(i) that he had not received any warning/memo before his ACR was down-graded; and

(ii) that the reviewing officer was from a different area/field of specialization.

4. WHEREAS his contention that Shri Aabi Binju, Scientist C, CSMRS had not received any warning/memo before his ACR was downgraded has no substance as no such instructions were prevalent during that period. His contention that the reviewing officer was from a different area/field of specialization is also not tenable since the reviewing officer was fully competent to comment upon the type of work that he was doing and it did not necessarily require someone belonging to the same discipline. Above all, Shri Aabi Binju, Scientist C has not given any concrete evidence to substantiate his claim for upgradation of his ACR. For example, in matters relating to the number of software problems solved or AMCs handled, he has not maintained any record.

5. WHEREAS after careful consideration of the matter, I do not find any merit in the representations and none of the seven representations has provided any relevant material to substantiate his plea for upgradation, all the seven representations of Shri Aabi Binju, Scientist C, CSMRS in respect of ACRs/APARs for the period from 1.4.2001-31.3.2002 (one ACR) and 1.4.2003-31.3.2004; 1.4.2004-31.3.2005; 1.4.2005-31.3.2006; 1.4.2006-31.3.2007, 1.4.2007-31.3.2008; 1.4.2008-31.3.2009 (six ACRs) are hereby rejected.

(G. Mohan Kumar)
Additional Secretary (Water Resources)
Tel. No.23710619

12. This decision was reiterated on 29 December 2011.

13. The petitioner again represented to the respondent on 3 December 2012. The representation was rejected by the CSMRS and MOWR on 28 December 2012, stating that, as the petitioners request for review of his ACRs already stood rejected, the queries addressed in the letter was no longer relevant.

14. Essentially challenging the communications dated 5 August 2011, 19 August 2011, 29 December 2011, 28 December 2012 and 25 February 2014, as well as his ACRs for the years 2001-02 to 2008-09, except for 2002-03, to the extent they were adverse to him, the petitioner instituted the aforementioned seven OAs before the Tribunal. The prayer clauses, in these OAs, may be reproduced thus:

Prayer Clause in OA 4518/2014

8. RELIEF SOUGHT:

In view of the above Facts given in para 4 and the Grounds given in para 5 above, the Hon’ble Tribunal may graciously be pleased to:

(i) quash the adverse entries and the overall grading ‘good’ given in the impugned ACR (A1) of the applicant for the period from 1.4.2003 to 31.3.2004 as well as the impugned order dated 5.8.2011 (A2) together with the communications dated 19.8.2011, 29.12.2011, 28.12.2012 and 25.02.2014 (A3 colly).

(ii) direct the respondents to upgrade the abovesaid ACR, conforming with the performance of the applicant during the report period (2003-04).

(iii) direct the respondents to grant all consequential benefits to the applicant as deemed fit upon quashing and setting aside the adverse remarks and low grading given by the reporting/reviewing officers in the impugned ACR;

(iv) may also pass any further order(s)/direction(s) as be deemed just and proper to meet the ends of justice:

*****

Prayer Clause in OA 4519/2014

8. RELIEF SOUGHT:

In view of the above Facts given in para 4 and the Grounds given in para 5 above, the Hon’ble Tribunal may graciously be pleased to:

(i) quash the adverse entries and the overall grading ‘good given in the impugned ACR (A1) of the applicant for the period from 1.4.2004 to 31.3.2005 as well as the impugned order dated 5.8.2011 (A2) together with the communications dated 19.8.2011. 29.12.2011, 28.12.2012 and 25.02.2014 (A3 colly).

(ii) direct the respondents to upgrade the abovesaid ACR, conforming with the performance of the applicant during the report period (2004-05).

(iv) may also pass any further order(s)/direction(s) as be deemed just and proper to meet the ends of justice:

*****

Prayer Clause in OA 4532/2014

8. RELIEF SOUGHT:

In view of the above Facts given in para 4 and the Grounds given in para 5 above, the Hon’ble Tribunal may graciously be pleased to:

(i) quash the adverse entries and the overall grading ‘good given in the impugned ACR (A1) of the applicant for the period from 1.4.2005 to 31.3.2006 as well as the impugned order dated 5.8.2011 (A2) together with the communications dated 19.8.2011, 29.12.2011, 28.12.2012 and 25.02.2014 (A3 colly).

(ii) direct the respondents to upgrade the abovesaid ACR, conforming with the performance of the applicant during the report period (2005-06).

(iv) may also pass any further order(s)/direction(s) as be deemed just and proper to meet the ends of justice:

*****

Prayer Clause in OA 4533/2014

8. RELIEF SOUGHT:

In view of the above Facts given in para 4 and the Grounds given in para 5 above, the Hon’ble Tribunal may graciously be pleased to:

(i) quash the adverse entries and the overall grading ‘good given in the impugned ACR (A1) of the applicant for the period from 1.4.2006 to 31.3.2007 as well as the impugned order dated 5.8.2011 (A2) together with the communications dated 19.8.2011, 29.12.2011, 28.12.2012 and 25.02.2014 (A3 colly).

(ii) direct the respondents to upgrade the abovesaid ACR, conforming with the performance of the applicant during the report period (2006-07).

(iv) may also pass any further order(s)/direction(s) as be deemed just and proper to meet the ends of justice:

*****

Prayer Clause in OA 4623/2014

8. RELIEF SOUGHT:

In view of the above Facts given in para 4 and the Grounds given in para 5 above, the Hon’ble Tribunal may graciously be pleased to:

(i) quash the adverse entries and the overall grading ‘good given in the impugned ACR (A1) of the applicant for the period from 1.4.2007 to 31.3.2008 as well as the impugned order dated 5.8.2011 (A2) together with the communications dated 19.8.2011, 29.12.2011, 28.12.2012 and 25.02.2014 (A3 colly).

(ii) direct the respondents to upgrade the abovesaid ACR, conforming with the performance of the applicant during the report period (2007-08).

(iv) may also pass any further order(s)/direction(s) as be deemed just and proper to meet the ends of justice:

*****

Prayer Clause in OA 4625/2014

8. RELIEF SOUGHT:

In view of the above Facts given in para 4 and the Grounds given in para 5 above, the Hon’ble Tribunal may graciously be pleased to:

(i) quash the adverse entries and the overall grading ‘good given in the impugned ACR (A1) of the applicant for the period from 1.4.2008 to 31.3.2009 as well as the impugned order dated 5.8.2011 (A2) together with the communications dated 19.8.2011, 29.12.2011, 28.12.2012 and 25.02.2014 (A3 colly).

(ii) direct the respondents to upgrade the abovesaid ACR, conforming with the performance of the applicant during the report period (2008-09).

(iv) may also pass any further order(s)/direction(s) as be deemed just and proper to meet the ends of justice:

*****

Prayer Clause in OA 4061/2014

8. RELIEF SOUGHT:

In view of the facts and submissions as made herein above, it is most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Tribunal may graciously be pleased to:

(i) quash and set aside the remarks of the reviewing officer dated 31.05.2002 in the ACR of the applicant for the period 01.04.2001 to 31.03.2002 (Annexure A-1), quash and set aside the order dated 05/08.08.2011 (Annexure A-1-a), order dated 29.12.2011 (Annexure A-1-b), order dated 28.12.2012 (Annexure A-1-c) and order dated 25.02.2014 (Annexure A-1-d).

(ii) To pass order/order(s) as deemed fit to the respondents to grant all consequential benefits to the applicant upon quashing and setting aside the remarks of the reviewing officer;

(iii) May also pass any further order(s), direction(s) as be deemed just and proper to meet the end of the justice:

Thus, it would be seen that, in each OA, the petitioner challenged the ACRs for one particular year, and the same orders issued by the respondents by way of response to the petitioners representations.

Earlier proceedings

15. The petitioner earlier filed OAs 4533/2014, 4518/2014, 4532/2014 and 4623/2014, which were decided by the Tribunal by a common judgment dated 28 March 2019. (In the judgment dated 12 September 2019, under challenge before us, it appears to have been erroneously recorded, in para 8 that all the seven OAs, which were decided by the impugned judgment, had earlier been decided by the judgment dated 28 march 2019.)

16. The said judgment records the petitioner as having advanced, before the Tribunal, only one contention, which was that, without issuing any warning or censure to him, the petitioner could not have been graded Average by the reporting officer or reviewing officer. The judgment records the petitioner as having placed reliance on the decision in State of UP v Yamuna Shankar Mishra7 as well as on an earlier order passed by the Tribunal itself.

17. The findings of the Tribunal, in its judgement dated 28 March 2019, were as under:

7. One of the important contentions advanced by the applicant was that he could not be rated as average, in the absence of any warning or other similar admonitions, referable to the relevant point of time, issued by the competent authority.

8. We have perused the extract of the OM dated 05.06.1981. The gist thereof is that whenever an officer being reported has been issued written warning, admonition or reprimand, it shall be open to the reporting officer either to refer the same in his evaluation for the relevant period or to omit the same, depending upon the circumstances. There is nothing to suggest that in the absence of any warning, admonition or reprimand, grading of ACRs as ‘Average’ cannot be made. Similarly, in the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in the State of UP v Yamuna Shanker Misra and Another (supra), we do not find any observation, much less a direction to the effect that the rating of average can be only on the strength of any warning or admonition. The same is the case in the OA No. 1189/2012.

9. Though an observation was made in the judgment in OA No. 1189/2012 to the effect that the ACR was graded as average in the absence of any warning, we do not find any enunciation of principles of law, or reference to any provisions of law. We do not find any basis to interfere with the impugned order and the OA is, accordingly, dismissed.

18. OA 4061/2014 came up for hearing before the Tribunal on 24 April 2019. The Tribunal held that the said OA was covered, on all force, by its earlier order dated 28 March 2019 and, therefore, dismissed OA 4061/2019 as well.

19. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the petitioner approached this Court by means of WP (C) 4896/2019. This Court observed that the Tribunal had considered only one issue, which was whether the petitioner was required to be issued any warning or censure before having been graded Average in his ACRs. The petitioner sought to contend, before this Court, that the facts relating to each year in question were different and that he had, therefore, raised separate grounds in his OAs. The Average grading, it was submitted, related only to the years 2005-06 and 2006-07. A grievance was ventilated that the Tribunal had not examined the individual facts of each assessment year independently or considered any submission of the petitioner other than the contention that a grading of Average had to be preceded by a prior censure or warning.

20. Criticising the Tribunal for having restricted its examination to one single issue, this Court, vide judgment dated 8 May 2019, deemed it appropriate to remand the aforenoted OAs, namely OAs 4533/2014, 4518/2014, 4532/2014 and 4623/2014 to the Tribunal for reconsideration on merits. This Court, however, made it clear that, on the issue of whether a grading of Average could be entered in the ACRs without any prior censure or warning to the officer concerned, the views of the Tribunal, as expressed in the judgment dated 28 March 2019, had attained finality.

21. Consequent to the aforesaid remand by the High Court, the four OAs which had been decided by the Tribunal by judgment dated 28 March 2019, along with OA 4061/2014, 4519/2014 and 4625/2014, were taken up and decided by the Tribunal by the impugned judgment dated 12 September 2019.

The impugned judgment

22. We may observe that the impugned judgment of the Tribunal makes for somewhat disturbing reading. The Tribunal appears to have taken offence at the views expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in its order dated 8 May 2019. While paras 9 to 11 of the impugned judgment clearly voice the unhappiness of the Tribunal, the following words, from para 11, are particularly emphatic:

11. The Honble High Court wants this Tribunal to undertake course correction with regard to the manner in which it has sometimes been dealing with the OAs to ensure that the cases are properly dealt with. We only leave it to their Lordships to ponder as to how far these comments uphold the dignity of the judiciary in general. Firstly, the Tribunal is not subordinate to the High Court and secondly, an observation of that nature would not accord with the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court. We leave the matter at that.

The Tribunal was and is headed by a retired Chief Justice of a High Court. That being so, we prefer not to say anything further regarding the above comments of the Tribunal, or the displeasure voiced by it, with the order dated 8 May 2019 of this Court.

23. The Tribunal has, to be fair, proceeded to address certain other issues which were argued before it. Interestingly, the Tribunal has, in para 25 of the impugned order, observed thus:

25. We verified form the learned counsel for the applicant whether he has any other point to argue and we proceeded to dictate the order only when he said that he has no other point to argue.

24. It appears that the Tribunal was insulating itself against any further critical comments by this Court. Nonetheless, as learned Counsel for the petitioner specifically stated that he was arguing only the points noted in the impugned judgment, we need also address ourselves only to the said points.

25. The grounds urged by the petitioner, before the Tribunal, and the findings of the Tribunal thereon, are to be found in paras 16 to 25 of the impugned judgment which may be reproduced thus:

16. Coming to the merits of the case, the representations made by the applicant were general in nature, covering ACRs of as many as seven years. The principal contention of the applicant is that he has not been issued any warning or memo and that the reviewing officer was from a different area. The competent authority observed that the applicant has not placed sufficient evidence to substantiate his claim for upgradation of ACRs. Specific reference was made to the fact that he had not maintained any record of the number of software problems solved or AMCs handled. The order dated 5.08.2011 reads as under:

*****

From a perusal of the same it becomes clear that the Competent Authority examined his representation in accordance with the prescribed procedure and expressed his views. The Tribunal does not function as an appellate authority in matters of this nature.

17. In M.V. Thimmaiah v UPSC8, the Honble Supreme Court held as under:

“. courts normally do not sit in the court of appeal, to assess the ARCs and much less the Tribunal can be given this power to constitute an independent Selection Committee over the statutory Selection Committee. The guidelines have already been given by the Commission as to how the ACRs to be assessed and how the marking has to be made. These guidelines take care of the proper scrutiny and not only by the Selection Committee but also the views of the State Government are obtained and ultimately the Commission after scrutiny prepares the final list which is sent to the Central Government for appointment. There also it is not binding on the Central Government to appoint all the persons as recommended and the Central Government can withhold the appointment of some persons so mentioned in the select list for reasons recorded. Therefore, if the assessment of ACRs in respect of Shri S. Daya Shankar and Shri R. Ramapriya should have been made as “outstanding” or “very good” it is within the domain of the Selection Committee and we cannot sit as a court of appeal to assess whether Shri R.Ramapriya has been rightly assessed or Shri Daya Shankar has been wrongly assessed. The overall assessment of ACRs of both the officers were taken; one was found to be “outstanding” and the second one was found to be “very good”. This assessment cannot be made subject of court’s or Tribunal’s scrutiny unless actuated by mala fide.”
(Emphasis Supplied)

This was followed by the Honble Delhi High Court in its judgment dated 6.01.2015 in W.P. (C) 43/2014.

18. If that is the prerogative conceded to the Selection Committee, the liberty of the Reporting and Reviewing Authorities to assess the performance of the concerned officer can easily be imagined. The system provides for inbuilt checks and balances. The applicant did not even plead malafides against any of the officers. The very purpose of maintaining ACRs, that too by providing for three tier authorities i.e. Reporting, Reviewing and Accepting Authorities is to ensure that an objective and transparent
assessment of the performance of an employee is made.

19. It may be true that the evaluation of the ACRs of the applicant was “Very Good” upto the year 2001-02. The occasion to interfere with the gradation in the ACR would arise if only any malafides are attributed against the Reporting and Reviewing Authorities or if it is demonstrated that the finding recorded in the ACR, with reference to any factual aspect is incorrect. None of these aspects are either pleaded or proved in this OA.

20. We also reject the plea that the assessment as “average” could not have been made unless any admonition or warning was given. A perusal of the relevant memos discloses that when even any warning or admonition is administered, it must be reflected in the ACRs. It is different from saying that assessment as ‘average’ cannot be made, in the absence of warning or admonition. If an officer is rated as “outstanding’ in a year, it is not necessary that same rating must be continued throughout. That would negate the very concept of annual evaluation.

21. Another contention advanced by the applicant is that the adverse entries were not communicated. Reliance is placed upon OM dated 8.02.2002. It reads as under:

2.2 In the case of promotions from lower Groups to Group A, while the mode of promotion happens to be %election by merit, the bench-mark prescribed is ‘good’ and only those officers who obtain the said bench-mark are promoted in the order of merit as per grading obtained. Thus, officers getting a superior grading supersede those getting lower grading. In other words, an officer graded as ‘outstanding’ supersedes those graded as ‘very good’ and an officer graded as ‘very good’ supersedes officers graded as ‘good’. Officers obtaining the same grading are arranged in the select panel in the order of their seniority in the lower grade. Those who get a grading lower than the prescribed bench-mark (‘good’) are not empanelled for promotion.

2.3 In promotions to the level in the pay-scale of Rs.12,000-16,500/- and above, while the mode of promotion is ‘selection by merit, the bench-mark prescribed is ‘very good’ and only those officers who obtain the said benchmark are promoted in the order of merit as per the grading obtained, officers getting superior grading supersede those getting lower grading as explained in paragraph 2.2 above. Officers obtaining the same grading are arranged in the select panel in the order of their seniority in the lower grade. Those who get a grading lower than the prescribed bench-mark (‘very good’) are not empanelled for promotion.”

From this, it becomes evident that the necessity to communicate the entries in ACRs would arise if only they are adverse to an employee. Nothing adverse was observed in the relevant ACRs. At the most it is below benchmark in the context of promotion. Necessity to communicate such remarks arose in the light of the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Dev Dutt v Union of India9.

22. At any rate, the subject matter of the OAs is not denial of promotion on the ground that the ACR is below benchmark. The prayer is to upgrade the ACRs. The application was filed in the year 2009. At that length of time, he cannot pray for expunction of adverse remarks.

23. Further plea raised by the applicant is that though the competent authority is under obligation as per CM dated 14.05.2009 to dispose of the representation made for upgradation of the ACRs within a period of three months, his representation was kept pending for quite a long time. This plea would have held water in case the complaint of the applicant was that his representation was not being attended to. He approached the Tribunal nearly three years after the representation was disposed of. The plea which can be raised before the disposal of the representation, does not hold any weight when it is raised three years after the disposal thereof.

24. It is true that in OM dated 20.05.1972, the competent authority is placed under obligation to pass a reasoned order and to deal with various contentions urged by an employee in the context of upgradation of the ACRs. It is also true that the order passed by the competent authority in the instant case is brief in its purport. The fact, however, remains that the applicant raised the issue long after the ACRs were made. The competent authority suffers from two impediments. The first is about the non-availability of the officers for their comments on account of their retirement and the second is the failure on the part of the applicant to place any material with reference to the relevant issues.

25. We verified form the learned counsel for the applicant whether he has any other point to argue and we proceeded to dictate the order only when he said that he has no other point to argue.

26. Thus, the findings of the Tribunal, and the contentions advanced before it by the petitioner, were as under:

(i) The order dated 5 August 2011, whereby the petitioners representations dated 9 June 2009 and 20 July 2009 were rejected, specifically noted that the petitioner had not placed sufficient evidence on record to substantiate his claim for upgradation of his ACRs. Specifically, the order noted that the petitioner had not maintained any record of the number of software problems solved or AMCs handled.

(ii) The Supreme Court had, in M.V. Thimmaiah, observed that Courts and Tribunals could not sit an appeal over gradings in ACRs, unless they were actuated by mala fides. Provision for in-built checks and balances were contained in the system itself. The petitioner had not pleaded mala fides against any officer. The very provision for a three-tier assessment, by the Reporting, Reviewing and Accepting Officers, of an employees ACRs, was to ensure objectivity and transparency.

(iii) The petitioner had also failed to demonstrate that there was any incorrect factual aspect relating to the findings recorded in his ACRs. In the absence of any allegation of mala fides, the mere fact that the petitioner may have been graded Very Good till 2001-02, could not constitute a basis to interfere with the impugned ACR gradings.

(iv) The petitioner further sought to contend that the adverse entries recorded in his ACRs had not been communicated to him. For this purpose, the petitioner had placed reliance on DOPT OM dated 8 February 2002. However, a reading of the said OM disclosed that communication was required to be made only of entries which were adverse. There were no adverse entries in the petitioners ACRs. At the highest, the ACRs were below the prescribed benchmark for promotion. It was only after Dev Dutt, that the law required communication of ACRs which were not adverse.

27. No other substantial ground was urged before the Tribunal or decided by it.

28. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the petitioner has approached this Court by means of the present writ petition.

Issues that arise

29. In view of the statement made by learned Counsel for the petitioner as recorded in para 25 of the impugned judgment, we restrict our consideration to the issues which were argued before the Tribunal. As has already been noted, by this Court, in its judgment dated 8 May 2019, the contention that no Average grading could be entered in the petitioners ACRs in the absence of any prior warning or censure, already stood rejected by the Tribunal in its order dated 28 March 2019, and that decision has attained finality. We, therefore, do not propose to examine that aspect of the matter.

30. Substantially, therefore, two issues arise for consideration before us. The first is with respect to the petitioners ACRs themselves, and whether the gradings and the observations contained in the ACRs, as entered by the Reporting and reviewing officers, were sustainable in law. The second is whether communication of the ACRs was necessary, before they were taken into consideration by any Committee while assessing the petitioners case for promotion.

ACRs and the scope of judicial review

Vijay Kumar v State of Maharashtra10

31. In Vijay Kumar, the ACRs of the appellant before the Supreme Court contained the following entry:

He is serious, intelligent and a quiet type of officer and that he took interest in group discussions.

32. The report, however, also stated that the officer would not freely mix with his fellow probationers and had a marked inferiority complex which, on occasion, had laid to problems. The Supreme Court observed that the reports contained nothing adverse against the officer. Para 5 of the judgment of the Supreme Court reads thus:

5. Even on the merits, the appellant appears to have a good case. The report said to have been communicated under the first letter obviously does not indicate anything against the appellant. It reads as follows:

He is serious, intelligent and a quiet type of officer and that he took interest in group discussions.

It however states that the appellant would not freely mix with his fellow probationers and he had a marked inferiority complex which had on occasion led to some problems. We do not find anything adverse in these remarks. He has been assessed as a serious, intelligent and quiet type of officer. He took interest in group discussions. These are indeed the best qualities of any officer. The inferiority complex attributed to the appellant in that report cannot outweigh those good qualities. It is more often the superiority complex that causes harm to the public and not the inferiority complex.

S Ramachandra Raju v State of Orissa11

33. In S Ramachandra Raju, the Supreme Court noted the manner in which the ACRs of the appellant before it had been recorded, thus:

3. It was contended and stated in the grounds of appeal that despite his request, the Tribunal did not call for his service record nor considered the totality of his service. It relied upon the only report of the Review Committee which in turn was founded upon the adverse remarks based on the report of the Principal. We directed the State to produce the entire record of the appellant and his confidential reports in his service record of his character roll. Accordingly they have been placed before us. We have perused the entire record. The record disclosed that from the year 1973-74 onwards, the year in which the College was taken over, his work was commended as good, sincere and satisfactory. He is a sincere teacher, helpful in maintaining discipline, a strong-minded person and willing worker. In the year 1980, the Government communicated that his work was unsatisfactory for the years 1976-77, while the Principal recorded for the same year that his integrity was good, his zeal was fair, his work was fair but relationship with the students was average. Same was the report for the year 1979-80. For the year 1980-81, the Principal also reported that his integrity was good. He was a good teacher, his conduct was good and work was satisfactory. Same was the report for the year 1981-82. The Government communicated to the appellant that he had not conducted any research work. The report for the year 1982-83 equally was satisfactory and he was advised to publish papers. For the year 1983-84, the report was that his conduct was good, his integrity was good, he was a good teacher, his work was fair and his relationship with the students was good. The Government reiterated that he did not conduct any research work. For the year 1984-85 his knowledge on the subject was good, his work as a teacher was very good. He takes pains in imparting lectures. He is a sincere worker, his zeal is good, integrity is good, official conduct is good, work as a proctor is good, his relationship with the students is good. For the year 1985-86, the remarks of the Principal was that his work as a teacher and knowledge on the subject is satisfactory, his work as a proctor is satisfactory, his integrity up to the mark, his relationship with the students is satisfactory. We do not have the report for the year 1986-87. For the year 1987-88 the report of the Principal is that his knowledge on the subject is average, work as a teacher is below average. He is inclined to drop classes when not watched. His relationship with the students average, work as a proctor average, official conduct average, zeal below average, integrity below average, in general remarks, it was stated that he is a disintegrated officer, constantly grumbling over his lost opportunity and neglects his duties, he prefers to stay away from the college as long as possible. It was communicated by the Government on 5-12-1988, the record also shows that his representation was considered to expunge the remarks for 1987-88 and was rejected. For the year 1988-89 another Principal in his report dated 13-5-1989 stated that appellant’s knowledge on the subject is good, his work as a teacher is good, other works in the department is good, in his extracurricular activities as Vice-President of humanitarian society his work is commendable, his power of taking responsibility is good, his relationship with the students is good, his work as a proctor is fair, official conduct good, zeal good, integrity fair and in general remarks a very responsible and disciplined teacher. In the year 1989-90 it was reported that his knowledge on the subject is good, his work as a teacher is good, his work in the department is good as a Vice-President of the humanitarian society and as a Judge of several debate competitions he exhibited good work, his relationship with the students is good, his work as a proctor fair, official conduct good, zeal fair, integrity is good and in the general remarks he is a polite and reliable officer which received on 20-6-1990 and the same were the remarks for the year 1990-91.

On the sole basis of the adverse remarks contained in the appellants ACRs for the year 1987-88, the appellant was compulsorily retired under FR 56(j)12. The Supreme Court held that, on an overall conspectus of the facts and given the position that the gradings of the appellant before and after 1987-88 were universally commendable, the adverse entries contained in the sole ACR of the appellant for the year 1987-88 could not constitute a legitimate ground to compulsorily retire him.

34. That aspect of the matter is not of particular significance for us.

35. However, paras 10 and 11 of the report merit reproduction, thus:
10. Keeping these principles in mind and on considering the facts extracted hereinbefore we find that the exercise of power by the Government falls in the category of arbitrary exercise of power or failure to take the total record of service into consideration objectively. It has taken only the solitary adverse report for the year 1987-88 as a foundation to compulsorily retire the appellant from service. The Review Committee as well considered only that report, neither earlier reports nor subsequent reports were considered. It is seen that admittedly the appellant was promoted as a Reader after the adverse report and the adverse comments were communicated to him and in a mechanical way they rejected the report (sic representation) to expunge the adverse remarks, even without going into the contention of the appellant that the then Principal was actuated with mala fides by submitting wrongly or falsely in confidential reports which appear to have some foundation or suspicion for such a contention. Consistent record earlier and later periods would establish that the appellant has meritorious record of service as a teacher and that his devotion to the service is good and fair and that he maintains discipline, good relations with the students and imparts teaching to the students fairly with good knowledge as a teacher. Therefore, in that background the exercise of the power is illegal.

11. The facts are eloquent. From 1973-74 the appellant started with a commendation of his performance to be satisfactory to fair in the year 1990-91. Would it be comprehensible that in the year 1987-88 whether he would suddenly drop down and become an average or below average teacher? When he was a responsible teacher and he had cordial relations with the student community, and was taking pains to impart lessons to the students, would it be believable that he avoids to take classes and drops down if not watched? When anterior to or subsequent to 1987-88 he was a man of ability and of integrity, the same would become below average only for the academic year 1987-88 without discernible reasons. It would speak volumes on the objectivity of assessment by the reporting officer i.e. the Principal. This conduct is much to be desired. This case would establish as a stark reality that writing confidential reports bears onerous responsibility on the reporting officer to eschew his subjectivity and personal prejudices or proclivity or predilections and to make objective assessment. It is needless to emphasise that the career prospects of a subordinate officer/employee largely depends upon the work and character assessment by the reporting officer. The latter should adopt fair, objective, dispassionate and constructive commends/comments in estimating or assessing the character, ability, integrity and responsibility displayed by the officer/employee concerned during the relevant period for the above objectives if not strictly adhered to in making an honest assessment, the prospect and career of the subordinate officer being put to great jeopardy. The reporting officer is bound to lose his credibility in the eyes of his subordinates and fail to command respect and work from them. The constitutional and statutory safeguards given to the government employees largely became responsible to display callousness and disregard of the discharge of their duties and make it impossible to the superior or controlling officers to extract legitimate work from them. The writing of the confidentials is contributing to make the subordinates work at least to some extent. Therefore, writing the confidential reports objectively and constructively and communication thereof at the earliest would pave way for amends by erring subordinate officer or to improve the efficiency in service. At the same time, the subordinate-employee/officer should dedicate to do hard work and duty; assiduity in the discharge of the duty, honesty with integrity in performance thereof which alone would earn his usefulness in retention of his service. Both would contribute to improve excellence in service.
(Emphasis supplied)

M.A. Rajasekhar v State of Karnataka13

36. This case dealt with remarks entered in the ACRs of a Tehsildar in the State of Karnataka. The judgment of the Supreme Court is short and paras 3 to 6 thereof may be reproduced thus:

3. This appeal by special leave arises from the order of the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore dated 11-2-1992 made in Application No. 1961 of 1990. Admittedly when the appellant was working as a Tehsildar an adverse remark had been made for the year 1988-89 as under:

Competent, good at getting work done, but does not act dispassionately when faced with dilemma.

4. Calling that in question, the appellant filed an OA. It is now settled law that the object of making adverse remarks is to assess the competence of an officer on merits and performance of an officer concerned so as to grade him in various categories as outstanding, very good, good, satisfactory and average, etc. The competent authority and the reviewing authority have to act fairly or objectively in assessing the character, integrity and performance of the incumbent. It is seen that in the review order, various grounds on which the various criteria are to be complied with were specifically noted thus:

3. A perusal of Annexure A-1 goes to show that in most of the aspects the work of the applicant is satisfactory. According to the form in which the confidential remarks of the officers are to be written, the reporting officer is required to indicate his assessment of the officer on the following aspects of his work:

1. Knowledge of work;
2. Power of expression;
3. Power of acquiring general information;
4. Attention to detail;
5. Industry;
6. Judgment;
7. Speed of disposal;
8. Willingness to accept responsibility and to take decision;
9. Relationship with subordinates and colleagues;
10. Public relations;
11. Integrity.

The report about all the above aspects is satisfactory. There is no adverse report about integrity. However, the underlined remarks in Annexure A-1 are made. The last sentence in those remarks indicates that the intention of the officer who wrote those remarks was to treat the remarks as advisory. He has stated that the officer should evince more interest. When all the ten aspects of the work which are required to be assessed by the rules are satisfactory the alleged adverse remarks get considerably diluted and we are of the considered opinion that the ends of justice would be served if the remarks are treated as advisory with a direction that they should not be made use of against the applicant for any purpose.

5. It was found that his integrity was not doubted and his work also in all those respects was found to be satisfactory. Under those circumstances, the remark that he does not act dispassionately when faced with dilemma must be pointed out with reference to specific instances in which he did not perform that duty satisfactorily so that he would have an opportunity to correct himself of the mistake. He should be given an opportunity in the cases where he did not work objectively or satisfactorily. Admittedly, no such opportunity was given. Even when he acted in a dilemma and lacked objectivity, in such circumstances, he must be guided by the authority as to the manner in which he acted upon. Since this exercise has not been done by the respondents, it would be obvious that the above adverse remark was not consistent with law.

6. Accordingly the appeal is allowed. The adverse remark stands expunged. No costs.

State Bank of India v Kashinath Kher14

37. On the aspect of confidential reports, and their writing, the Supreme Court held thus, in this case:

15. The object of writing the confidential report is twofold, i.e. to give an opportunity to the officer to remove deficiencies and to inculcate discipline. Secondly, it seeks to serve improvement of quality and excellence and efficiency of public service. This Court in Delhi Transport Corpn. v D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress15, pointed out the pitfalls and insidious effects on service due to lack of objectives by the controlling officer. Confidential and character reports should, therefore, be written by superior officers higher above the cadres. The officer should show objectivity, impartiality and fair assessment without any prejudices whatsoever with the highest sense of responsibility alone to inculcate devotion to duty, honesty and integrity to improve excellence of the individual officer. Lest the officers get demoralised which would be deleterious to the efficacy and efficiency of public service.

Sukhdeo v Commissioner Amaravati Division16

38. In Sukhdeo, the Supreme Court was concerned with the entries in the ACRs of the appellant before it for the years 1987-88 and 1988-89. On the basis of some remarks contained in the ACRs, the appellant Sukhdev was compulsorily retired. Paras 4 to 6 of the said report merit reproduction thus:

4. It is seen that when the compulsory retirement was sought to be made under Rule 65(1)(b) as indicated earlier, the Government exercises the power only for public purpose, namely, to augment efficiency in public service. We have called for the record and the same has been placed before us. The entries for the years 1987-88 and same remarks verbatim repeated for 1988-89 by the same officer would indicate that the appellant is an industrious man, his capacity to get work done by subordinates is good; his relationship with the colleagues and the public is good; general intelligence is satisfactory. However, in the column on technical ability (where relevant), he is reported as not satisfactory, special attitude (sic aptitude) is good, administrative ability including judgment, initiative and drive not satisfactory, integrity and character are good, fit to continue in service, fit for promotion, if due and general assessment irregular, rarely found at Headquarter, poor performance in a recovery work, bad in public image. On the basis of this last remark of general assessment, notice was given to him and he was compulsorily retired from service on that basis. The question is whether the said exercise of power, as has been stated earlier, is in the public interest and whether the appellant is not found to augment the efficiency in the service.

5. In view of the above remarks made by the officer, the conclusion reached is obviously incorrect and it is not in public interest. A man does not become poor in public image when his relationship with the public and subordinates is good and he is a man of integrity and honesty and he has got the satisfactory intelligence for discharging his duties and is fit for promotion. How can in such circumstances his performance would be held unsatisfactory when he is capable of coordinating with subordinates and get the work done. How his technical ability is not satisfactory. The remarks are mutually inconsistent and reasons are self-evident of lack of bona fides in making these remarks. Under these circumstances, it could be characterised that the remarks were not bona fide made in public interest but was a self-serving statement to weed him out from service.

6. It is settled law that when the Government resorts to compulsorily retire a government servant, the entire record of service, particularly, in the last period of service is required to be closely scrutinised and the power would be reasonably exercised. In State Bank of India v Kashinath Kher, this Court has held that the controlling officer while writing confidential and character roll report, should be a superior officer higher above the cadres of the officer whose confidential reports are written. Such officer should show objectivity, impartiality and fair assessment without any prejudice whatsoever with highest sense of responsibility to inculcate in the officer’s devotion to duty, honesty and integrity so as to improve excellence of the individual officer, lest the officers get demoralised which would be deleterious to the efficacy and efficiency of public service. In that case it was pointed out that confidential reports written and submitted by the officer of the same cadre and adopted without any independent scrutiny and assessment by the committee was held to be illegal. In this case, the power exercised is illegal and it is not expected of from that high responsible officer who made the remarks. When an officer makes the remarks he must eschew making vague remarks causing jeopardy to the service of the subordinate officer. He must bestow careful attention to collect all correct and truthful information and give necessary particulars when he seeks to make adverse remarks against the subordinate officer whose career prospect and service were in jeopardy. In this case, the controlling officer has not used due diligence in making remarks. It would be salutary that the controlling officer before writing adverse remarks would give prior sufficient opportunity in writing by informing him of the deficiency he noticed for improvement. In spite of the opportunity given if the officer/employee does not improve then it would be an obvious fact and would form material basis in support of the adverse remarks. It should also be mentioned that he had given prior opportunity in writing for improvement and yet was not availed of so that it would form part of the record. The power exercised by the controlling officer is per se illegal. The Tribunal has not considered this aspect of the matter in dismissing the petition. The appellant is entitled to reinstatement with all consequential benefits. The appeal is accordingly allowed with exemplary costs quantified at ? 10,000 recoverable by the State from the officer who made the remarks.
(Emphasis supplied)

State of U.P. v Yamuna Shanker Misra17

39. Paras 7 and 8 of this decision encapsulate the legal position, after considering S. Ramachandra Raju, Kashinath Kher, U.P. Jal Nigam and Sukhdeo, thus:

7. It would, thus, be clear that the object of writing the confidential reports and making entries in the character rolls is to give an opportunity to a public servant to improve excellence. Article 51-A(j) enjoins upon every citizen the primary duty to constantly endeavour to prove excellence, individually and collectively, as a member of the group. Given an opportunity, the individual employee strives to improve excellence and thereby efficiency of administration would be augmented. The officer entrusted with the duty to write confidential reports, has a public responsibility and trust to write the confidential reports objectively, fairly and dispassionately while giving, as accurately as possible, the statement of facts on an overall assessment of the performance of the subordinate officer. It should be founded upon facts or circumstances. Though sometimes, it may not be part of the record, but the conduct, reputation and character acquire public knowledge or notoriety and may be within his knowledge. Before forming an opinion to be adverse, the reporting officers writing confidentials should share the information which is not a part of the record with the officer concerned, have the information confronted by the officer and then make it part of the record. This amounts to an opportunity given to the erring/corrupt officer to correct the errors of the judgment, conduct, behaviour, integrity or conduct/corrupt proclivity. If, despite being given such an opportunity, the officer fails to perform the duty, correct his conduct or improve himself, necessarily the same may be recorded in the confidential reports and a copy thereof supplied to the affected officer so that he will have an opportunity to know the remarks made against him. If he feels aggrieved, it would be open to him to have it corrected by appropriate representation to the higher authorities or any appropriate judicial forum for redressal. Thereby, honesty, integrity, good conduct and efficiency get improved in the performance of public duties and standard of excellence in services constantly rises to higher levels and it becomes a successful tool to manage the services with officers of integrity, honesty, efficiency and devotion.

8. It is seen from the record that the respondent constantly maintained a good record earlier to the adverse remarks made for the aforesaid period. It would appear that subsequently also he had good confidential reports on the basis of which the clouds over his conduct were cleared and he was given further promotion. Mr Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Additional Advocate General, in fairness, therefore, has stated that since the respondent has been regularised after the subsequent good reports, the dispute does not survive for adjudication on merits. But the counter-comments made against him by the Secretary were warranted in view of the material on record. He brought to our notice that as on the date when the entries were made, the vigilance enquiry was pending against the respondent and, therefore, the adverse remarks came to be made. The findings recorded by the Tribunal of malice and arbitrariness on the part of the Secretary as affirmed by the High Court are not warranted for two reasons. Firstly, since the Secretary was not eo nomine to the proceedings and had no opportunity to explain the position, it would be violative of the principle of natural justice. Secondly, since the vigilance enquiry was pending, unless the officer was exonerated and cleared from the cloud, necessarily, the Secretary could not clear the conduct and integrity of the officer. Therefore, the adverse remarks cannot be said to be to smack of arbitrariness.
(Emphasis supplied)

U P Jal Nigam v Prabhat Chandra Jain18

40. This is a short judgment and may be reproduced in entirety thus:

1. What we say in this order shall not only cover the case of the first respondent but shall also regulate the system of recording annual confidential reports prevalent in the U.P. Jal Nigam the first petitioner herein.

2. The first respondent was downgraded at a certain point of time to which the Service Tribunal gave a correction. Before the High Court, the petitioners’ plea was that downgrading entries in confidential reports cannot be termed as adverse entries so as to obligate the Nigam to communicate the same to the employee and attract a representation. This argument was turned down by the High Court, as in its view confidential reports were assets of the employee since they weigh to his advantage at the promotional and extensional stages of service. The High Court to justify its view has given an illustration that if an employee legitimately had earned an outstanding report in a particular year which, in a succeeding one and without his knowledge, is reduced to the level of satisfactory without any communication to him, it would certainly be adverse and affect him at one or the other stage of his career.

3. We need to explain these observations of the High Court. The Nigam has rules, whereunder an adverse entry is required to be communicated to the employee concerned, but not downgrading of an entry. It has been urged on behalf of the Nigam that when the nature of the entry does not reflect any adverseness that is not required to be communicated. As we view it the extreme illustration given by the High Court may reflect an adverse element compulsorily communicable, but if the graded entry is of going a step down, like falling from very good to good that may not ordinarily be an adverse entry since both are a positive grading. All that is required by the authority recording confidentials in the situation is to record reasons for such downgrading on the personal file of the officer concerned, and inform him of the change in the form of an advice. If the variation warranted be not permissible, then the very purpose of writing annual confidential reports would be frustrated. Having achieved an optimum level the employee on his part may slacken in his work, relaxing secure by his one-time achievement. This would be an undesirable situation. All the same the sting of adverseness must, in all events, not be reflected in such variations, as otherwise they shall be communicated as such. It may be emphasised that even a positive confidential entry in a given case can perilously be adverse and to say that an adverse entry should always be qualitatively damaging may not be true. In the instant case we have seen the service record of the first respondent. No reason for the change is mentioned. The downgrading is reflected by comparison. This cannot sustain. Having explained in this manner the case of the first respondent and the system that should prevail in the Jal Nigam, we do not find any difficulty in accepting the ultimate result arrived at by the High Court.

4. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed.

Swatantar Singh v State of Haryana19

41. In Swatantar Singh, the following entries were made in the ACR of the appellant Swatantar Singh, when he was working as Sub-Inspector of Police, by the Superintendent of Police:

1. Honesty : Report of corruption

2. Reliability : Unreliable

3. Defects : For improving, called several times
and advised.

4. General Remarks : Can become a good police officer if
he can control corruption and temptation.

The appellant Swatantar Singh represented against the aforesaid remarks. His representation was rejected both by the Deputy Inspector General of Police and later by the Director General of Police. He approached the High Court. The High Court dismissed his writ petition. He, thereafter, appeal to the Supreme Court.

42. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant Swatantar Singh sought to contend that the High Court had erred in dismissing his writ petition as, where adverse remarks impinged upon the career prospect of an officer, the representation against the remarks required consideration and rejection of the representation had also to be supported by reasons. It was sought to be contended that the remarks were themselves vague and without any particulars and, therefore, that the petitioners representation could not have been rejected without reasons.

43. The Supreme Court did not find force in Swatantar Singhs contention. Paras 5 and 6 from the judgment of the Supreme Court read thus:

5. We find no force in the contention. It is true that in view of the settled legal position, the object of writing the confidential reports or character roll of a government servant and communication of the adverse remarks is to afford an opportunity to the officer concerned to make amends to his remissness; to reform himself; to mend his conduct and to be disciplined, to do hard work, to bring home the lapse in his integrity and character so that he corrects himself and improves the efficiency in public service. The entries, therefore, require an objective assessment of the work and conduct of a government servant reflecting as accurately as possible his sagging inefficiency and incompetency. The defects and deficiencies brought home to the officer, are means to the end of correcting himself and to show improvement towards excellence. The confidential report, therefore, would contain the assessment of the work, devotion to duty and integrity of the officer concerned. The aforestated entries indicate and reflect that the Superintendent of Police had assessed the reputation of the officer, his honesty, reliability and general reputation gathered around the officer’s performance of the duty and shortfalls in that behalf.

6. It is sad but a bitter reality that corruption is corroding, like cancerous lymph nodes, the vital veins of the body politic, social fabric of efficiency in the public service and demoralising the honest officers. The efficiency in public service would improve only when the public servant devotes his sincere attention and does the duty diligently, truthfully, honestly and devotes himself assiduously to the performance of the duties of his post. The reputation of being corrupt would gather thick and unchaseable clouds around the conduct of the officer and gain notoriety much faster than the smoke. Sometimes, there may not be concrete or material evidence to make it part of the record. It would, therefore, be impracticable for the reporting officer or the competent controlling officer writing the confidential report to give specific instances of shortfalls, supported by evidence, like the remarks made by the Superintendent of Police. More often, the corrupt officer manipulates in such a way and leaves no traceable evidence to be made part of the record for being cited as specific instance. It would, thus, appear that t