RAVINDER KUMAR vs GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of order: 3rd April, 2024
+ W.P.(C) 2433/2007
RAVINDER KUMAR ….. Petitioner
Through: Ms.K. Pallavi and Mr.Atul T.N., Advocates

versus

GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR ….. Respondents
Through: Mr.A.P. Singh and Ms.Akshada Mujwar and Mr.Varnit vashishta, Advocates
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE CHANDRA DHARI SINGH

ORDER

CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J (Oral)
CM APPL. 20675/2019 (Delay in filing restoration application)
1. The instant application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has been filed on behalf of the applicant/petitioner seeking condonation of delay in filing the restoration application and has sought the following reliefs:
“(a) Condone the delay of 1277 days in re filing the accompanying application.
(2)Pass any other/orders that is deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.”

2. The captioned writ petition was filed by the application/petitioner seeking quashing of the award dated 3rd September, 2001 passed in ID No. 259/1990, by virtue of which, the learned Labour Court had dismissed the petitioner’s claim seeking reinstatement on the account of illegal termination.
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant/petitioner submitted that the captioned writ petition was dismissed by the Predecessor Bench of this Court for non-prosecution vide order dated 29th October, 2015.
4. It is submitted that the applicant could not file the application seeking restoration within the stipulated time as he was not aware of the dismissal order. It is further submitted that the applicant got aware of the status of the present matter only on 25th March, 2019, i.e., when he approached the respondents for disbursement of his financial dues.
5. It is submitted that upon finding that the captioned petition has been dismissed, the applicant filed the accompanying application on 12th April, 2019, thereby, seeking restoration of the same, however, there was a delay of 1277 days in filing the restoration application.
6. It is submitted that the reasons for delay in filing the restoration application are bona fide since the applicant could not keep track of the status of the captioned writ petition as being the sole bread earner; he was occupied in taking care of the financial condition of his family.
7. It is submitted that the delay of 1277 days is unintentional and the applicant approached this Court as soon as he got aware of the dismissal of the captioned petition.
8. It is submitted that due to the above said reasons the delay of 1277 days occurred in filing the accompanying restoration application, the reasons for which are bona fide and establish sufficient grounds for condonation of delay in the interest of justice.
9. Therefore, in view of the foregoing submissions, it is submitted that the instant application for condonation of delay may be allowed and the delay of 1277 days may be condoned.
10. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the non-applicant/respondents vehemently opposed the present application submitting to the effect that the same being devoid of any merit, is liable to be dismissed.
11. It is submitted that the applicant/petitioner by way of the instant application is merely abusing the process of law and has approached this Court with mala fide intentions as he has failed to show sufficient cause behind the inordinate delay of 1277 days in filing the application seeking restoration.
12. It is submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a catena of judgments has reiterated the settled position of law that the reasons stated for condonation of delay must give a bona fide explanation for such delay and until the applicant proves sufficient cause beyond the control of the parties, the delay may not be condoned.
13. In view of the foregoing submissions, the learned counsel submitted that the delay may not be condoned and accordingly, the instant application, being devoid of any merit, may be dismissed.
14. Heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and perused the record.
15. In light of the facts of the instant matter, it is imperative to discuss the nature of delay, limitation provision provided under the Limitation Act, 1963 (“the Act” hereinafter) and also state the law as settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and various High Courts with regard to the principle behind condonation of delay.
16. The legislature has under Section 5 of the Act conferred upon the Courts discretionary powers to condone delays in order to impart justice to the parties under exceptional circumstances.
17. Section 5 of the Act provides for extension of the prescribed period of limitation for filling an application under any provision except Order XXI of the CPC, thereby, vesting discretionary powers to the Court to entertain an application that has transgressed the prescribed period of limitation by condoning the delay. The said provision is reproduced herein below:
“Section 5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.
Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

Explanation.-The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.”

18. Upon perusal of the aforesaid provision it can be clearly noted that the provision provides for a necessary condition i.e., “sufficient cause” in order to adjudicate upon whether or not the prescribed period of limitation shall be extended or not.
19. Therefore, the applicant/petitioner must first satisfy this Court that there arose a “sufficient cause” for delay in not preferring the restoration application within the prescribed period stated in this regard.
20. The term sufficient cause as provided for in the aforementioned provision constitutes that a sufficient cause cannot be conclusively laid down and hence, each case is different and has to be dealt with on its own merit and under the prevailing circumstances.
21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, dealt with the expression ‘sufficient cause’ as provided under Section 5 of the Act and held that the said expression must be construed liberally in order to advance justice and delays in preferring applications/appeals may be condoned in the interest of justice, where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking such relief. The relevant paragraph is reproduced herein below:
“11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
“605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.”
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party’s own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)
X X X X
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”

22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., 1961 SCC OnLine SC 39 further elucidated the interpretation of Section 5 of the Act. The relevant paragraph is reproduced herein below:
“7. In construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan [(1890) ILR 13 Mad 269] “Section 5 gives the court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words ‘sufficient cause’ receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant.”

23. The above stated judgements have been referred to by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in one of its recent judgment bearing Civil Appeal no. 7696 of 2021 titled Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao vs. Reddy Sridevi & Ors. order dated 16th December, 2021, wherein, the consideration of the Hon’ble Court was based upon inter alia the principles discussed in the aforesaid judgments as per which the statute of limitation is founded on public policy, with the aim to suppress fraud and to avoid any litigation which has, from the lapse of time, become stale.
24. Tersely said, in order to seek condonation of delay, the applicant must be able to show adequate and bona fide reasons which prevented him to approach the Court within the limitation period.
25. Upon perusal of the record of the instant matter, it is observed by this Court that the captioned writ petition was dismissed vide order dated 29th October, 2015 as the applicant/petitioner did not appear before the Court on the said date as well as on several other dates such as on 15th October 2015 and 29th October, 2015.
26. The applicant/petitioner has filed the instant application seeking condonation of delay of 1277 days in filing the accompanying restoration application. With regard to the delay, the applicant has submitted that since he was busy in taking care of his family’s financial condition, he could not keep track of the status of his case and therefore, he could not file the restoration application within time as he was not aware that his case had been dismsised in default.
27. In this backdrop, this Court is of the view that the applicant has failed to put forth any reasonable cause to substantiate the inordinate delay of 1277 days in filing the accompanying restoration application. It is pertinent to mention herein that the present application was filed on 12th April, 2019, i.e., after a considerable delay of time and the same highlights the lack of vigilance on behalf of the applicant/petitioner.
28. The judgments discussed hereinabove states that the intent behind the principle of condonation of delay is to cater to genuine cases and should not be extended to a person who is oblivious to his rights and entitlements. Applying the said principles, this Court is of the considered view that the applicant/petitioner like any other vigilant citizen was expected to assert his rights within a reasonable time, however he utterly failed to do the same.
29. light of the facts of the present case, it can be said that once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone, the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.
30. In view of the above discussions, it is held that there is no merit in the instant application and the applicant/petitioner has failed to establish any sufficient cause to condone the delay of 1277 days. The same is nothing but a gross misuse of process of law and this Court is not inclined to exercise its discretion.
31. Accordingly, the application stands dismissed.
CM APPL. 20674/2019 (Restoration)
In view of the order of even dated passed in CM APPL. 20675/2019, the instant application stands dismissed.
The order be uploaded on the website forthwith.

CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J
APRIL 3, 2024
dy/da/ryp Click here to check corrigendum, if any

CM APPLs. 20674/2019 & 20675/2019 in W.P.(C) 2433/2007 Page 10 of 10