SAGA LIFESCIENCES LIMITED  Vs ARISTO PHARMACEUTICALS PVT. LTD. & ANR. -Judgment by Delhi High Court

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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 22nd April, 2022
+ CS(COMM) 240/2022
SAGA LIFESCIENCES LIMITED ….. Plaintiff
Through: Mr. Vikas Khera, Mr. Vishal Sharan, Mr. Ved Prakash, Ms. Vinita Bhagnani, Advocates (M:7834897828)
versus

ARISTO PHARMACEUTICALS PVT. LTD. & ANR…… Defendants
Through: Mr. Sagar Chandra, Ms. Surabhi Iyer, Ms. Mehek Dua, Advocates for D-1(M:9654923558)
CORAM:
JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH
Prathiba M. Singh, J. (Oral)
1. This hearing has been done through hybrid mode.
I.A. 5841/2022 (for stay)
2. The present suit under sections 134 and 135 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (hereinafter �Act�) for permanent injunction restraining passing off, rendition of accounts, damages, etc. has been filed by the Plaintiff-M/s Saga Lifesciences Limited. The Plaintiff seeks to protect the mark �ULTRAMOL� used by it in respect of pharmaceutical preparations. The products of the Plaintiff sold under the brand �ULTRAMOL� are paracetamol preparations in different dosage forms. The grievance of the Plaintiff in the present case is that Defendant No.1 is also selling identical products under the mark �ULTRAMOL� in different dosage forms of the same medicine, i.e., paracetamol.
3. The case of the Plaintiff is that it adopted the mark �ULTRAMOL� in several variants and obtained an approval from the Food and Drugs Control Authority (FDCA), Gujarat (hereinafter �Drug Authority�) for manufacturing and marketing of products under the mark �ULTRAMOL� as on 28th November, 1991. The Plaintiff launched the products under the said mark in the market in 1992. According to the Plaintiff, products under the mark �ULTRAMOL� are available/promoted on e-commerce platforms such as www.dawabazar.in and www.medindia.net. It is the case of the Plaintiff that the mark �ULTRAMOL� is associated exclusively with the Plaintiff. The mark �ULTRAMOL� has been continuously, uninterruptedly and voluminously used by the Plaintiff in the course of trade and business. The Plaintiff�s website www.sagalabs.com also details and lists the products bearing the mark �ULTRAMOL�. Thus, the pharmaceutical industry is well aware of the Plaintiff�s mark.
4. In the year 2007, the Plaintiff applied for the registration of the mark �ULTRAMOL 650 (LABEL)� vide application no. 1554974 claiming user since 22nd January, 1992. In the said application, an affidavit was filed by the Plaintiff claiming user in the mark from 1992. However, the said mark got abandoned due to some miscommunication with the Trademark Agent who was handling the matter. Upon abandonment of the first application, the Plaintiff filed another application bearing 4322467 dated 16th October, 2019 for the registration of the mark �ULTRAMOL� under class 5 claiming user since 1992. This application of the Petitioner has been opposed by Defendant No.1.
5. Defendant No.1- Aristo Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. is a company which is also selling identical products, i.e., paracetamol preparations under the mark �ULTRAMOL�. Defendant No.1 has also filed an application in the year 2005 bearing No. 1380082 in class-05 for the registration of the mark �ULTRAMOL� on �proposed to be used� basis. Currently, the application of Defendant No.1 is �opposed� by various third parties.
6. The case of the Plaintiff is that Defendant No.1 sought registration from the Drug Authority for products under the mark �ARISTO ULTRAMOL�. However, it is using �ULTRAMOL� on a standalone basis on its products, both on the blister packaging as also on the outer carton. The Plaintiff�s case is that it is the prior user of the mark �ULTRAMOL�. It has placed on record invoices, drug licence and sales figures since the year 1991 showing use of the mark �ULTRAMOL� though the trademark application filed by it earlier may have been abandoned.
7. On behalf of the Plaintiff, Mr. Khera, ld. Counsel submits that the Plaintiff being the prior user of the mark, since it is a case of identical marks on identical products, it is entitled to an injunction. Ld. Counsel, relies upon the fact that Defendant No.1 has no justification for adopting an identical mark for identical pharmaceutical preparations. Defendant No.1 being well aware of the mark �ULTRAMOL� being used by the Plaintiff has dishonestly adopted the mark. He further submits that Defendant No.1 is indulging in misbranding of the drug as the drug approval of the Defendant is for the mark �ARISTO ULTRAMOL� and not �ULTRAMOL�. Thus, action is liable to be taken against Defendant No.1 under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 as well. Ld. Counsel for the Plaintiff relies upon the following judgments:
i. Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. AIR 2001 SC 1952.
ii. Curewell Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ptd. v. Ridley Life Science Private Limited. 2019 (174) DRJ 711.
iii. M/s Power Control Appliances v. Summer Machines Pvt. Ltd. (1994) 2 SCC 448.
8. On the other hand, Mr. Sagar Chandra, ld. Counsel appearing for the Defendant No1- Aristo Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd, submits that the Plaintiff has no goodwill and reputation in the mark �ULTRAMOL� in India. The Plaintiff may have adopted the mark in 1992, however, it does not have any sales in India after 2014. It is his submission that the Plaintiff merely exports its products bearing the mark �ULTRAMOL� to foreign countries such as Philippines, Spain, and Nepal. In support of this submission, he relies upon the invoices filed by the Plaintiff which show that from the year 2014 onwards, there are only exports and no sales within India. It is further argued by Mr. Chandra, ld. Counsel that the two websites www.dawabazar.in and www.medindia.net, where the Plaintiff�s products are stated to be available are not e-commerce platforms but are merely listing platforms. None of them permits sale of products online and are content encyclopaedia for the pharmaceutical field.
9. Ld. Counsel Mr. Chandra, thereafter submits that in order for the Plaintiff to succeed in a passing off action, the Plaintiff has to have goodwill and reputation. If the mark is abandoned in a particular territory, the Plaintiff cannot claim rights in a passing off action. Moreover, it is submitted that there is no advertising material in India which has been shown by the Plaintiff except one brochure which is in Spanish language. He relies upon paragraph- 20-060 of Kerly�s Law of Trade Marks and Trade Name (16th Ed., page 763). He further submits that the adoption of the mark �ULTRAMOL� by Defendant No.1 is honest and the use has been concurrent. Ld. counsel submits that before adopting the said mark, Defendant No.1 conducted a trade mark search and it did not come across Plaintiff�s mark. He relies upon a search report issued by one M/s Asian Patent Bureau dated 19th August, 2005 which shows that when the mark was adopted by Defendant No.1, Plaintiff�s mark was not on the trademark Register inasmuch as the first application by the Plaintiff is of 2007 only, which was also abandoned later. He then relies upon the drug licences issued in favour of M/s Accent Pharma dated 7th March 2006, which was a contract manufacturer for the Defendant, for the manufacturing of various forms of �ULTRAMOL� suspensions, tablets, capsules, etc. Reliance is also placed upon the drug license issued by the Drugs Authority, Union Territory of Daman and Diu in favour of Defendant No.1 for the manufacturing of various forms of �ULTRAMOL� suspensions, tablets, capsules, etc.
10. On adoption of the mark �ULTRAMOL� by Defendant No.1 and explanation thereto, the ld. Counsel submits that the Defendant company had launched a combination of Tramadol Hydrochloride & Paracetamol. The said combination is stated to be of much higher effect and therefore the word �ULTRA�, which suggests �extreme� was affixed with the word �MOL� derived from Paracetamol. In view of the due diligence conducted and adoption being honest, it is Mr. Chandra�s submission that the Plaintiff does not make out a case for grant of an injunction, especially because there has been no sale of the Plaintiff within India since the last 8 years. Since there is no sale in India, there is no likelihood of confusion. He relies upon the Oxford Dictionary to show that that the meaning of the word �ULTRA� is �extreme� and �strong�, which was the purpose for which it was adopted in respect of Defendant No.1�s product. Finally, he submits that the Plaintiff�s drug license was not in the knowledge of Defendant No.1. The Plaintiff’s license was granted by the Drug Authority in Gujarat whereas Defendant No.1�s drug license was granted by the Drug Authority in Daman & Diu, and Pondicherry. Ld. Counsel for Defendant No.1 has finally submitted that the balance of convenience is in the favour of Defendant No.1 which is already using the mark �ULTRAMOL� and not in favour of the Plaintiff which is not selling products in India. Irreparable injury would be caused to Defendant No.1 if an injunction is granted by this Court.
11. Heard the ld. Counsel for both the parties and perused the record.
12. The present is a case of passing off filed by the Plaintiff. The suit was first listed on 13th April, 2022. On the said date, after recording the contentions of the parties, the court had made an observation to the effect that the Defendant No.1 was clearly aware of the existence of the Plaintiff�s mark �ULTRAMOL� and it sought to distinguish its own product by adding �ARISTO� before �ULTRAMOL�. The matter was then adjourned after appointing a Local Commissioner to make an inventory of the Defendant�s products. Adjournment was granted for the ld. Counsel for Defendant No.1 to seek instructions. The relevant part of the order reads as under:
�21. A perusal of the above facts would show that there can be no doubt that the Defendant NO.1 was clearly aware of the existence of the mark �ULTRAMOL� and the product �ULTRAMOL� of the Plaintiff. Therefore, it sought to distinguish itself by adding the word �ARISTO� before �ULTRAMOL�.
22. At this stage, Mr. Sagar Chandra, ld. Counsel submits that he would seek instructions in the matter.
23. List on 22nd April, 2022.�
13. Today, the submission on behalf of Defendant No.1 is that an offer was made to the Plaintiff�s counsel yesterday evening. However, the same has been rejected by the Plaintiff. On the other hand, Mr. Khera, ld. Counsel submits that after the last hearing before the Court, the first time the Defendant�s counsel contacted him was yesterday evening. He further submits that, in any case, the Plaintiff being the prior user of the mark �ULTRAMOL� ought to be protected by way of an injunction.
14. Without going into the question of any offers or counter offers made by the parties, since the case is at the interim stage and the parties have been heard, the Court has to adjudicate the issue on prima facie merits. The following significant facts stand out in this case:
* The mark is identical, i.e., �ULTRAMOL�.
* The medical preparations for which the mark is being used are also identical, i.e., paracetamol, and various dosages and forms of paracetamol.
* The Plaintiff is clearly the prior user of the mark �ULTRAMOL� since 1992.
* The drug license of the Plaintiff is of 1991 which has been placed on record.
* The sales figures of the Plaintiff which have been filed along with the documents show that the Plaintiff has adopted the mark in 1991 and has had continuous user till 2021. This user is disputed by Defendant No.1 by arguing that since 2014 there have only been exports by the Plaintiff, and no sale in India has been made since 2014.
15. Section 2(2) of the Act defines �use� of a mark in relation to goods as under-
�(2) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, any reference-
XXX XXX XXX
(c) to the use of the mark-
(i) in relation to goods, shall be construed as a reference to the use of the mark upon, or in any physical or in any other relation whatsoever, to such goods;
(ii) in relation to services, shall be construed as a reference to the use of the mark as or as part of any statement about the availability, provision or performance of such services;�

16. In Hardie Trading Ltd. v. Addisons Paint and Chemicals AIR 2003 SC 3377, the Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of �use� in relation to trade marks under Section 46(1)(b) of the erstwhile Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. It was the contention of one of the parties that the word �use� means �actually putting the mark in the business and utilising the same for selling the goods�. Rejecting the said contention, the Supreme Court held that meaning of the word �use� cannot be so limited. The Court examined the relevant provision of the said Act and held that the word �use� may encompass actions other than actual sale. The relevant part of the judgment reads as under:
�37. The word ‘use’ according to the respondent means ‘actually putting the mark in the business and utilizing the same for selling the goods’. It is said that there had been no use of the trade mark by Hardie and no efforts taken to manufacture goods using the trade mark since 1971 and, therefore, it must be taken that Hardie had abandoned the trade mark. It is also urged in the written submissions that the ‘plea of user’ had not been argued either before the Single Judge or the Division Bench of the High Court.
XXX XXX XXX
41. The question therefore is – is the word “use” in Section 46(1) so limited? The phrase used in Section 46 is “bonafide use thereof in relation to those goods”. The phrase has been defined in Section 2(2)(b) of the Act as:
“to the use of a mark in relation to goods shall be construed as a reference to the use of the mark upon, or in any physical or in any other relation whatsoever, to such goods”.
42. This shows that the use may be other than physical. It may be in any other relation to the goods. Given this statutory meaning, we see no reason to limit the user to use on the goods or to sale of goods bearing the trademark.
XXX XXX XXX
45. In Section 2(2)(b) of the Act, we have the additional words “any” and “whatsoever” qualifying the words �other relation” giving the words a much wider meaning. Reading this definition into Section 46(1). It is clear that the word ‘use’ in Section 46(1) may encompass actions other than actual sale.

17. Therefore, the argument of Defendant No.1 that since there has been no sales of Plaintiff�s product bearing the mark �ULTRAMOL� in India since 2014, no goodwill exists in the said mark is fallacious. The Plaintiff has been continuously manufacturing its products under the mark �ULTRAMOL� since 1992 in India and the said fact is sufficient for the Plaintiff to claim goodwill in the mark on account of long, uninterrupted and continuous usage. Moreover, this Court in Burger King Corporation v. Techchand Shewakramani & Ors 253 (2018) DLT 93, while examining the jurisdiction of the court under section 134 of the Act, has held that activities such as advertisement, manufacturing, assembly of products, export of goods from a particular territory would constitute �use of a mark.� The same reads as under:
21. Thus, jurisdiction of a Court in a trade mark action, could be invoked where there is use upon or in relation to goods. The phrase ‘in relation to’ has been interpreted to include advertising, promotion, publicity, etc. Thus, in addition to actual sale of goods and providing services, if a person advertises his or her business under the mark in a territory, promotes his or her business under the mark in a territory or for example invites franchisee queries from a particular territory, sources goods from a particular territory, manufactures goods in a particular territory, assembles goods in a particular territory, undertakes printing of packaging in a particular territory, exports goods from a particular territory, it would constitute ‘use of a mark’.

18. Insofar as the law in India is concerned, �use� in relation to marks includes manufacture, sale, offering for sale, advertising and promotion, use on electronic platforms including exports. The usage of the mark by the Plaintiff in the process of manufacturing, and exports, establishes goodwill of the Plaintiff in the mark �ULTRAMOL�. The mere fact that the Plaintiff is exporting the products bearing the mark in question in the last 6 to 7 years would not by itself take away or jettison the fact that prior to 2014, the mark has been used in India since 1991 and continues to be used on goods manufactured in India. The same may currently be used for the purpose of exports by the Plaintiff but the goodwill due to use since 1992 cannot be said to be eroded. The invoices which have been placed on record show extensive sales of the Plaintiff�s product across the country prior to 2014. It is not necessary that sales have to be in crores of rupees. The brochure and the packaging of the Plaintiff also show that even as on date, the Plaintiff is manufacturing the product in India and may also be exporting into different countries including Philippines and Spain. The prior user and goodwill of the Plaintiff�s mark is thus unquestionable and unequivocally established from the material available on record.
19. Insofar as the Defendant�s argument that there has been an abandonment of goodwill is concerned, the Defendant relies upon Para 20-060 of Kerly�s (supra) which reads as under:
�If a business ceases or suspends trading temporarily, there remains a residual goodwill which the claimant might wish to sell or use in a reopened business. If once the business is definitely abandoned, however, so that the claimant no longer owns goodwill, there can be no passing off. Where no positive decision is made to abandon goodwill, but trade under the mark has nonetheless ceased with no concrete plan for restarting operations, the question of whether any residual goodwill survives, and for how long, is question of fact in each case. This paragraph was cited with approval by the Appointed Person in Simmons. Cessation of production of goods or provision of services does not necessarily mean that there has been a cessation of business capable of sustaining goodwill, or that the goodwill which exists at the date of cessation has been abandoned or destroyed.�

20. A perusal of the above opinion in Kerly�s (supra) would show that the question of residual goodwill in every case, where no positive decision is made to abandon goodwill and there are no concrete plans to restarting operations, is a question of fact. Furthermore, it is categorically asserted that cessation of production of goods or provision of services does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that the goodwill which exists at the date of cessation has been abandoned or destroyed. In the Plaintiff�s case, the drug approval being from 1991, there has been continuous use of the mark �ULTRAMOL� in some form or the other till date. Continuous sales and advertising figures have been given to the extent that there is no need for this Court to doubt the use of the mark �ULTRAMOL� by the Plaintiff. The proposition relating to extinction or abandonment of goodwill, sought to be relied upon by Defendant No.1 would not therefore have any applicability in the present case.
21. It cannot be said by Defendant No.1 with confidence that the Plaintiff has no goodwill in India merely because its extent of sales may be smaller that Defendant No.1. Mr. Chandra, ld. Counsel also seeks to differentiate between goodwill and reputation. However, the goodwill of a brand that is sought to be protected in a passing off action is not the reputation which has to be known nationally. It is the reputation which is attached with the manufacturer and the sales of a product bearing the mark. So long as is established from the record that the manufacturing has been continuous, the use has been continuous and the same has been in the trade in some form or the other, the goodwill of a mark exists for the purpose of passing off. The mere fact that the Defendant No.1 is a much bigger company with higher sales cannot mean that the Plaintiff�s prior user rights can be sacrificed at the altar of Defendant No.1�s higher sales.
22. Coming to the question of whether there would be a likelihood of confusion. The marks of both the Plaintiff and Defendant No.1 are identical, used for identical products. Defendant No.1 has not been able to justify as to why there would be no possibility of misrepresentation or likelihood of confusion between the marks of the Plaintiff and Defendant No.1. The Defendant is clearly a subsequent user of the mark and the explanation given, in the opinion of this Court, is not satisfactory. Moreover, the fact that the mark ULTRAMOL is prefixed with ARISTO also shows that the Defendant was well aware of the Plaintiff�s mark and hence sought to distinguish itself by adding ARISTO. Therefore, this Court is of the prima facie opinion that there is possibility of misrepresentation by use of the mark �ULTRAMOL� by Defendant No.1. As far as the question- whether the mark which the Plaintiff is being used in India is concerned- there is no categorical stand which is taken on record by the Plaintiff that it does not intend to sell its products under the mark �ULTRAMOL� in India. It is also not the contention of Defendant No.1 that the Plaintiff does not intend to sell products under the said mark in future in India. In a passing off action, as held by the Supreme Court in Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhat Shah & Anr. AIR 2002 SC 275, the Court has to judge use of the mark not merely based on the position as it appears on the date when the suit is being heard, but also the position that can arise in future, while keeping in mind the future expansion as well. The relevant observations are as set out below:
8. It is common in the trade and business for a trader or a businessman to adopt a name and/or mark under which he would carry on his trade or business. According to Kerly (Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names, Twelfth Edition, para 16.49), the name under which a business trades will almost always be a trade mark (or if the business provides services, a service mark, or both). Independently of questions of trade or service mark, however, the name of a business (a trading business or any other) will normally have attached to it a goodwill that the courts will protect. An action for passing-off will then lie wherever the defendant company’s name, or its intended name, is calculated to deceive, and so to divert business from the plaintiff, or to occasion a confusion between the two businesses. If this is not made out there is no case. The ground is not to be limited to the date of the proceedings; the court will have regard to the way in which the business may be carried on in the future, and to its not being carried on precisely as carried on at the date of the proceedings. Where there is probability of confusion in business, an injunction will be granted even though the defendants adopted the name innocently.
23. The Plaintiff�s user being prior and the sales being continuous, there is no reason as to why the Plaintiff cannot scale up its own manufacturing and do extensive sales in India. The opportunity for the Plaintiff to expand has to be born in mind while dealing with such a case. Moreover, this Court has considered the fact that Defendant No.1 had a drug license dated 12th February, 2007. Even if the same is taken into consideration, the Plaintiff still continues to be the prior user of the mark �ULTRAMOL�. Moreover, all the drug licenses in favour of the Defendant No.1 are for �ARISTO ULTRAMOL� which clearly shows that, in some way, Defendant No.1 was well aware that the Plaintiff was using the mark �ULTRAMOL� for identical pharmaceutical preparations. Despite obtaining the licenses for �ARISTO ULTRAMOL� it is inexplicable as to how Defendant No.1 is using the mark �ULTRAMOL� on a standalone basis on its blister pack. On the outer carton packaging, the word �Aristo� is written in the minutest font and is hardly visible. This also establishes lack of bonafides on part of Defendant No.1. The packaging of Defendant No.1 is clear to effect that it is only using the mark �ULTRAMOL� as its essential and prominent feature, and not the word mark �ARISTO ULTRAMOL�.
24. Applying the test in Cadila (supra) where it has been held that confusion in respect of medicinal preparations is to be avoided completely in the market, the Court is convinced that Defendant No.1 ought not be allowed to continue using the mark �ULTRAMOL�. The relevant portion of Cadila (supra) reads as under:
40. The decisions of English Courts would be relevant in a country where literacy is high and the marks used are in the language which the purchaser can understand. While English cases may be relevant in understanding the essential features of trade mark law but when we are dealing with the sale of consumer items in India, you have to see and bear in mind the difference in situation between England and India. Can English principles apply in their entirety in India with no regard to Indian conditions? We think not. In a country like India where there is no single common language, a large percentage of population is illiterate and a small fraction of people know English, then to apply the principles of English law regarding dissimilarity of the marks or the customer knowing about the distinguishing characteristics of the plaintiff’s goods seems to over look the ground realities in India. While examining such cases in India, what has to be kept in mind is the purchaser of such goods in India who may have absolutely no knowledge of English language or of the language in which the trade mark is written and to whom different words with slight difference in spellings may sound phonetically the same. While dealing with cases relating to passing off, one of the important tests which has to be applied in each case is whether the misrepresentation made by the defendant is of such a nature as is likely to cause an ordinary consumer to confuse one product for another due to similarity of marks and other surrounding factors. What is likely to cause confusion would vary from case to case. However, the appellants are right in contending that where medicinal products are involved, the test to be applied for adjudging the violation of trade mark law may not be at par with cases involving non-medicinal products. A stricter approach should be adopted while applying the test to judge the possibility of confusion of one medicinal product for another by the consumer. While confusion in the case of non-medicinal products may only cause economic loss to the plaintiff, confusion between the two medicinal products may have disastrous effects on health and in some cases life itself. Stringent measures should be adopted specially where medicines are the medicines of last resort as any confusion in such medicines may be fatal or could have disastrous effects. The confusion as to the identity of the product itself could have dire effects on the public health.
25. The said test has been reiterated by this Court in the case of Curewell Drugs & Pharmaceuticals (supra) wherein the Court held that the issue of medicines being sold under identical marks not only concerns the rights of trade mark owners but also the health of public in general. The same reads as under:
�11. The issue of pharmaceutical preparations and medicines being sold under identical brand names has been a concern in a large number of disputes. The said issue is not just one which concerns statutory rights or trademark rights of a particular IP owner, but has a larger impact on the health of the patients. Stringent quality control mechanisms ought to be put in place and implemented in the manufacture and sale of medicines. If medicines are allowed to be sold with identical brand names and that too in identical packaging, it is not just violative of the rights of IP owners but dangerous for consuming patients.�
26. Applying the said tests, the Court is of the opinion that the Plaintiff has made out a prima facie case for grant of an ad-interim injunction. Once the Plaintiff has established that he is prior user and prior adopter of the mark and has been using the mark continuously, the balance of convenience would be in favour of the Plaintiff. If the relief of interim injunction is not granted in favour of the Plaintiff, the mark �ULTRAMOL� would be completely hijacked by Defendant No.1 in such circumstances causing irreparable injury to the Plaintiff.
27. The Local Commissioner has filed a report showing that Defendant No.1 has huge inventory of �ULTRAMOL� products. As per Mr. Chandra, ld. Counsel for Defendant No.1, the sales of Defendant No.1 are stated to be approximately Rs.3 crores annually. Since there is no dispute as to the quality of the Defendant No.1�s product, it is given time till 30th September, 2022 to exhaust the existing stock of �ULTRAMOL� products.
28. Further, Defendant No.1 shall stand restrained from manufacturing any fresh products under the mark �ULTRAMOL�, �ARISTO ULTRAMOL� or any other mark identical or deceptively similar to Plaintiff�s mark. This would, however, not prevent Defendant No.1 from obtaining drug registration for a mark which is not identically or deceptively similar to the mark �ULTRAMOL� and continue with the manufacturing of paracetamol preparations under the said non-identical/not deceptively similar trademark.
29. Mr. Chandra, ld. Counsel submits that since the matter has been considered in detail by the Court, the interim relief application of the Plaintiff being I.A. 5841/2022 be disposed of.
30. Accordingly, though no reply was filed as the suit was at the nascent stage, on the basis of the documents handed over by Defendant No.1 and the submissions made, as already been recorded hereinabove, the interim relief application being I.A. 5841/2022 is disposed of in the above terms.
31. Let the documents handed over today to the Court be filed with an index by Defendant No.1.
I.A. 5845/2022(u/O XXVI RULE 9)
32. This is an application under Order XXVI Rule 6 and Order XXXIX Rule 7 CPC for the appointment of a Local Commissioner. Report of the Local Commissioner has been received.
33. I.A. 5845/2022 is disposed of.
CS(COMM) 240/2022
34. List before the Joint Registrar on 14th July, 2022, date already fixed.
35. List before the Court on 5th September, 2022.

PRATHIBA M. SINGH
JUDGE
APRIL 22, 2022/aman/SK

CS(COMM) 240/2022 Page 2 of 2