ABHISHEK SINGH  Vs UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

LPA 209/2020 Page 1 of 7
$~33

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decisio n : 12th January , 2021

+ LPA 209/2020
ABHISHEK SINGH ….. Appellant
Through: Mr. Kamal Mehta, Advocate
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ….. Respondent s
Through: Mr. Vivekanand Mishra, Advocate
for R- 1
Mr. Apoorv Kurug & Ms. Nidhi Mittal, Advocates
for R- 2
Mr. Preet Pal Singh & Mr. Saurabh Sharma, Advocates for BCI

CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE JYOTI SINGH

JUDGMENT

: D. N. PATEL, Chief Justice (Oral)

Proceedings in the matter have been conducted through video
conferencing.
CM APPL. 1934 7/2020 (condonation of 237 days in preferring the appeal)
This application has been preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 for condonation of delay of 23 7 days in preferring the appeal.
Having heard the learned counsels for the parties and looking to the
facts stated in this application, there are reasonable reasons for condonation
of delay. We, therefore, condone the delay in preferring the appeal .
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The application is allowed and disposed of.
1. Being aggrieved and feeling dissatisfied by the judgment and order
dated 21st November, 2019 in W.P.(C) 12252/2019 (Anne xure A -1 to the
memo o f this appeal ) and order dated 29th January, 2020 (Anne xure A- 4 to
the memo of this appeal) passed in Review Petition No.37/2020, the original
petitioner has preferred the present Appeal. LPA 2 09/2020 & CM APPL. 19345 /2020 (Stay )
2. The issue involved in this appeal concerns granting one time waiver
of shortage of attendance in favour of the petitioner on medical grounds for
First Semester LL.B. D egree Course in Delhi University.
3. We have heard learned counsel s for the parties and looked into the
facts and circumstances of the case . Appellant /petition er was suffering from
Tuberculosis when he was in his First Semester of LL.B. Degree Course in
the respondent University. The First Semester of LL.B. Degree Course
commenced from 1st September, 2019 and concluded on 25th November,
2019 .
4. The minimum attend ance requirement in LL.B. Course is 70% . It
further appears from the facts of the case that because of the sickness of th e
appellant /petitioner , the attendance of the appellant in First Semester of
LL.B. Degree Course, Delhi University is zero percent . No Rule or
Regulation or any law has been brought to our notice which permits
concession by condoning shortage of 100% attendance. The learned Single
Judge while deciding the writ petition has rightly held that in professional
courses, requirement of attaining minimum of attendance is “non-
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negotiable”. It is an undisputed position that the attendance of the
appellant/petitioner in First Semester is NIL. The appellant seeks to appear
in the First Semester examination, LL.B. Degree Course , without attending
the classes and with zero percent attendance, which is impermissible in law .
Attend ing classes and having minimum 70% attendance is a sine qua non to
be eligible to appear in the examination. Since the appellant did not attend
the classes at all, the Rules w hich permit waiver of attendance will also not
inure to his advantage. These aspects of the matter have been correctly
appreciated by the learned Single Judge while passing the impugned order .
5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bar Council of India v. Aparna B asu
Mallick , (1994) 2 SCC 102 has held as under:
“14. …….
If the acquisition of a degree in law is essential for being
qualified to be admitted as an advocate on a State roll, it is
obvious that the Bar Council of India must have the authority to
prescribe the standards of legal education to be observed by
Universities in the country. On a conjoint reading of these
provisions of the Act with Rule 1(1)( c) in Part IV of the Rules
which prescribe the standards for legal education and
recognition of degrees in law as well as admission as advocates,
it is difficult to understand how one can say that the said Rule is
inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Act. What Rule
1(1)(c) requires is that the course of study in law must be
completed by regular attend ance at the requisite number of
lectures, tutorials and moot courts in a college recognised by a
University. As pointed out earlier, this Court in Baldev Raj
Sharma case [1989 Supp (2) SCC 91] pointed out that there was
a substantial difference between a c ourse of studies pursued as a
regular student and the course of studies pursued as a private
candidate. The policy underlying the relevant provisions of the
Rules is to lay emphasis on regular attendance of the law classes.
It is, therefore, clear that a c andidate desiring enrolment as an
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advocate must fulfil the conditions set out under the relevant
clause of Section 24 read with Rule 1(1)( c) of the Rules. In the
present case since both the candidates admittedly did not pursue
any regular course of study at any college recognised by the
University by attending the law classes, lectures, tutorials and
moot courts, they cannot be said to have complied with the
requirements for enrolment as an advocate. In that view of the
matter we think that the view taken by the Calcutta High Court
in Aparna Basu Mallick v. Bar Council of India [AIR 1983 Cal
461] is erroneous. ”
(emphasis supplied )
6. In Kiran Kumari v. University of Delhi and Ors. [W.P.(C)
9143/2007], a Division Bench of this Court has held as under:
“13. In the light of the above, we find it difficult to appreciate
as to how the requirements of 66% in each subject or as a
condition of eligibility for appearance in the examination or
the requirement of 66% attendance in the aggregate for
purposes of granting the benefit of condonation in the shortfall
can be said to be either illegal or arbitrary. The decisions
delivered by the Supreme Court and by this Court to which we
have referred above have in our view authoritatively held that
the LLB course was a professio nal course in which the
candidates have to ensure regular attendance of lectures and
those who do not attend the stipulated percentage of lectures
would not even be eligible for enrolment as members of the
Bar. Such being the importance given to the attendance of
lectures, there is no question of the requirement stipulated by
the Rules being either irrational, unconstitutional or illegal in
any manner. The quality of training which a candidate gets
during the time he undergoes the course is directly
proport ional to the number of lectures that he attends. The
failure of a candidate to attend the requisite number of
lectures as stipulated by the relevant rules can legitimately
disentitle him to claim eligibility for appearing in the examination.

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14. That bri ngs us to the contention vehemently urged by Mr.
Mittal that insistence upon 66% lectures in the aggregate as a
condition precedent for the exercise of the power of condonation was irrational, for it amounts to empowering the
competent authority on the one hand and denuding him of that
power on the other. We do not think so. What is the minimum
percentage of lectures which a candidate must attend in each subject or on the aggregate is a matter on which the academic bodies like the University and the Bar Council of India are entitled to take a decision. If in the opinion of the Bar Council
and the University, a candidate cannot be said to have taken
proper instructions or meaningfully undergone the course, unless he attends a minimum of 66% lectures in the ag gregate,
this Court cannot but respect that opinion. In matters relating to academics and standards of education, the Court would show deference to the opinion of the academicians unless a case of patent perversity is made out by the petitioners. The
prese nt is not, however, one such case where the requirement
of the rule can be said to be so perverse or irrational as to call
for the intervention of this Court.
As a matter of fact, the
minimum percentage of lectures having been fixed at 66%, still
gives to the students freedom to miss or abstain from 34% of
the such lectures. That is a fairly large percentage of lectures
which a student may miss for a variety of reasons including
sickness or such other reasons beyond his control. No student
can however claim that apart from 34% lectures which he is
entitled to miss even without a cause, the shortage to make up
66% should be condoned if he shows good cause for the
same
7. A Division Bench of this Court has held in Guru Gobind Singh
Indrapra stha University v. Naincy Sagar & Anr. [LPA 713/2019] as under: .”
(emphasis supplied )
“31. Thus, for the respondents/students to state that on
obtaining a minimum of 50% credit score as prescribed in an
academic year, they are entitled to be promoted to the next
academic year notwithstanding the fact that they did not cross
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the threshold of the minimum attendance prescribed, is found
to be untenable and liable to be rejected outright. A degree in
law cannot be treated as an empty formality. A law degree
encompasses all that a Un iversity stands for and is a reflection
of the nature of knowledge that it has imparted to its students.
8. In view of the aforesaid decisions also, no error has been committed
by the learned Single Judge in deciding the writ petition preferred by th e
appellant.
The process is not about simply cramming and disgorging
during the examinations. It is about assimilating, absorbing
and soaking up for being imprinted permanently in the mind of
a student. In this context, the condensed classes that the
respondents/students are presently rushing through, in
compliance of the directions issued in the impugned judgment,
that are going on from 8.30AM to 4.00PM on a daily b asis, till
the 9th semester end term examination are conducted at the
end of this month, can hardly be equated with the daily piecemeal knowledge transmitted by teachers spread over an entire academic session and assimilated slowly by the students. What is being done now, is nothing but an empty
formality which is impermissible. The Court may empathize with the respondents/students who would have to take an
academic break but empathy cannot translate into a positive
order in their favour when the legal posi tion is loaded against
them. ”
(emphasis supplied )
9. At this stage , learned counsel appearing fo r the appellant submits that
the appellant had appeared afresh in the examination for admission to the
LL.B. Degree Course, Faculty of Law, University of Delhi and having
cleared the examination has got admission, although he has lost out on a
crucial year. Learned counsel submits that he has been given admission in
Campus Law Centre , whereas he desires to be admitted in Law Centre – I,
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Faculty of Law, University of Delhi.
10. It is open to the petitioner to make a representation to the concerned
authority for change from CLC to Law Centre – I, enumerating therein the
reasons seeking a transfer. As and when such a representation is preferred,
the concerned authority look ing into the grievances of the appellant, in
accordance with law and applicable Rules, Regul ations and Policies .
11. With the aforesaid observations, this appeal is hereby disposed of
along with pending application.

CHIEF JUSTICE

JYOTI SINGH, J
JANUARY 12, 2021
ns

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