ARJUN & ANR.  Vs UNIVERSITY OF DELHI & ORS.

LPA 10/202 1 Page 1 of 9

$~5

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decisio n : 8th January , 2021

+ LPA 10/2021
ARJUN & ANR. …..Appellant s
Through: Mr. Himanshu Sharma, Advocate

versus
UNIVERSITY OF DELHI & ORS. …..Respondent s
Through: Mr. Amit Bansal and Ms. Seema Dolo, Advocates for R -1.

CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE JYOTI SINGH

JUDGMENT

: D. N. PATEL, Chief Justice (Oral)

Proceedings in the matter have been conducted through video
conferencing.
CM APPL. 6 84/2021 (exemption)
Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
The application is disposed of.
1. The present appeal has been preferred by the appellants (original
petitioners) f eeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order
of the learned Single Judge dated 21st December, 2020 in W.P.(C)
No.10777/2020 . LPA 10/2021 , C.Ms.No. 683/2021 (stay)

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2. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants (original
petitioners) and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, what
emerges is that the appellants are in effect seeking amendment/addition to
the guidelines for admission process in the Delhi University based on sports
quota. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants (original p etitioners) has
drawn the attention of this Court to the “Bulletin of Information for
Admission to Under Graduate Courses (2020- 2021)” which is appended as
Annexure P/1 (page No. 71).

3. Relevant part of the aforesaid Bulletin with regard to Games or Sports
considered for admission on the basis of the spor ts quota, reads as under : –
“B. Games / Sports considered for Admission on the basis of
Sports

Team Games
Baseball (M), Basketball (M&W), Cricket (M&W), Football
(M&W), Handball (M&W), Hockey (M&W), Kabaddi (M&W),
Kho-kho (M&W), Netball (W), Softball (W) and Volleyball
(M&W)

Dual & Combat Sports
Badminton (M & W), Boxing (M&W), Judo (M&W), Squash
(M&W), Table Tennis (M&W), Taekwando* (M&W), Tennis (M&W) and Wrestling (M&W).
*Kyorugi

Individual Sports
Archery** (M&W), Athletics (M&W), Chess (M&W), Diving
(M&W), Gymnastics (M&W), Shooting***(M&W), Swimming (M&W) and Weight- lifting (M&W)
**Compound & Recurve
****10 Meter Air Pistol & 10 Meter Air Rifle”

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4. As per the aforesaid Guidelines, for admission on the basis of sports
quota, various games have been included for reservation of the seats. As an
illustration, Baseball is considered for admission on the basis of sports quota
for male candidates , Basketball is for both male as well as female
candidates. Similarly , Cricket is for both male as well as female candidates
and Netball is only for female candidates.

5. Learned c ounsel appearing for the a ppellants submits that the
appellants herein are sportsmen who have secured Gold Medals in N etball
game at Sub -Junior Nationals under 16, Junior Nationals under 1 9 and
Senior Nationals in Male Category . The grievance canvassed by counsel for
the appellants is that while the guidelines have included Netball as a game
for the female candidates, the same is not included for the male category and
no plausible explanation is forthcoming for not including Netball under the male category. The classification sought to be made is without a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved and is violative of Article 14 of
the Constitution of India. It is argued that the learned Single Judge has erred
in not allowing the prayer in the Writ Petition of issuing a writ of mandamus
to respondent No. 1 to include Netball in “Men Section” for admission to the Under Graduate Courses 2020 -21 in the Delhi University on the basis o f
sports quota.
6. We are not in agreement with the aforesaid contention of learned
counsel for the appellants (original petitioners) for the following reasons :
(i) Annexure P/1 which are the Guidelines for admission on the
basis of sports quota (releva nt page being 128), is a
policy decision of
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the Delhi University.
(ii) In our view, the learned Single Judge has rightly not exercised
his extra -ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India to interfere with the policy decision of t he respondent
University. Which game should be included for determining the
admission quota on the basis of sports and amongst them which game
should fall to the male/female category, is essentially a conscious
policy decision, based on the wisdom and expe rtise of the policy
maker. It is well settled that Courts should be extremely slow in
interfering with policy decisions, unless they are completely arbitrary, as formulation of policies is neither the domain nor the prerogative of
the Courts.
(iii) The appellants have participated in th e selection process in the
category of Basket Ball in terms of the Information Bulletin issued by
the Delhi University, completely aware of the guidelines including the
non-inclusion of Netball in the “Men Category”. They ca nnot now
turn around to challenge the guidelines to improve their ranking for
admission. It is well settled that once a candidate participates in the selection process, he cannot turn around and challenge the same, having been unsuccessful and in this context, the learned Single Judge
has rightly relied on the judgement in W.P.(C) 7832/2020 titled Ms.
Meenakshi & Ors. v s. AIIMS .

7. Having gone through the impugned judgement, we are of the view
that the aforesaid aspects of the matter have been properly appreciated by
the learned Single Judge while d eciding W.P.(C) 10777/2020 vide judgment
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and order dated 21st December, 2020.

8. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Mabel v. State of Haryana
and Others reported in (2002) 6 SCC 318 in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 as under :
“3. It is submitted by Mr K.V. Viswanathan, the learned counsel
for the petitioner that clause 18 of the Information Brochure
cannot be so interpreted as to debar her from seeking
admission to the course for all times to come and if the order is
not reviewed she would be precluded from seeking admission in
MBBS course forever, which is an unintended punishment. Mr
Sanghi would contend that clause 18 bars a student who has
taken admission in one course, to seek admission in another
course.
4. It will be useful to refer to clause 18 which reads as under:
“18. The candidates already admitted in any medical/dental
colleges will not be considered eligible for admission to the
course.”
5. A plain reading of the aforementioned clause shows that a
candidate who was already admitted in a medical or dental
college would be ineligible for admission in the other course.
The said clause at times will operate harshly as in the case of
the petitioner but it is meant to ensure that a candidate who has
already secured admission should not abandon the studies after
the commencement of that course to seek admission in another
course which is in public interest, for otherwise it would result
in the wastage of the seat in the course in which he has taken
admission, a nd further, such a change would deprive another
eligible candidate from seeking admission to the other course.
Obviously, the intention of the authority concerned in framing
clause 18 appears to be to ensure that a candidate who has
already secured admissi on with his free will in any course
(MBBS or BDS) should complete that course and should not
change his mind in midstream. It, therefore, follows that the bar
is intended to be operative during the period of the course in
which a candidate has taken admission . After completing that
course or in the event of abandoning the course (MBBS/BDS)
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and not studying for the normal period (4/5 years, as the case
may be) the candidate would become eligible after the end of
such period of the course to seek admission in the course of his
choice provided other conditions of admission are satisfied. In
other words, the bar under clause 18 in this case will cease
after the BDS course for the academic year 2000- 01, in which
the petitioner has taken admission comes to an end after 5
years.
9. It has been held by the Division Bench of this Court in Nidhi Goyal
v. Medical Sciences University of Delhi reported in (2015) SCC OnLine
Del 8347 in paragraph Nos.2, 9, 11 and 12 as under: – In the light of the above observations the petitioner will
be free to seek admission in the course of her choice after the
end of the BDS course which commenced in 2000 -01.”
(emphasis supplied )

“2. Clause 9.11 impugned in this petition is as under:
“9.11 A candidate who selects/is allotted a seat
in the last counseling shall have no right to
surrender the seat. If he/she does so, he/she
shall be debarred from appearing in the
subsequent PGMEM till the duration of the
course concerned is over.”
xx xx xx
9. We have considered the rival contentions. The h ard
fact of the matter is that the petitioner took admission
in the MS (Ophthalmology) course in the year 2014
knowing fully well of Clause 9.11 aforesaid. The
question is, whether she can now be relieved
therefrom. We are of the opinion that the petitione r,
after applying for appearing in AIPGMEE on the
terms and conditions contained in the Bulletin of
Information (supra) and after appearing in the
examination and securing admission, cannot be heard
to contend otherwise. The allegation, of some officials
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of the respondent having assured the petitioner that
upon paying the bond amount she would be entitled to
take the examination in the next year, is not only
vague as particulars of any official(s) have not been
given but unbelievable too. In fact, if the pe titioner
had been so assured, she would in her letter dated
17th July, 2014 of resigning from the seat would not
have sought the permission of the respondent to
appear in the next round of counselling. Admittedly,
no such permission was granted to the peti tioner.
xx xx xx
11. One of us (Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.) in Jyoti
Yadav v. Government of NCT of Delhi relying
on Gorak Nath Balu Shinde v. State of
Maharashtra and Amlan Jyoti Borooah v. State of
Assam (2009) 3 SCC 227 held that the terms and
conditions o f a brochure of admission are binding on
all persons in the conduct of examination and all are
expected to adhere thereto strictly in order to avoid
prejudice to any person and that candidates who take
part in selection process knowing fully well the
proce dure laid down therein, cannot be permitted to
turn back and assail the same after having been
declared unsuccessful. Mention may also be made
of Madan Lal v. State of Jammu & Kashmir (1995) 3
SCC 486 also laying down that if a candidate takes a
calculated chance and appears at the interview, then
only because the result of interview is not palatable,
he cannot turn around and subsequently contend that
process of interview was unfair or the Selection
Committee was not properly constituted; when the
petition er appears at the examination without protest
and when he finds that he would not succeed at the
examination, he files a petition challenging the
examination, the Court should not grant relief to the
petitioner. Reference in this regard may also be made
to Manish Kumar Shahi v. State of Bihar (2010) 12
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SCC 576. Recently also in Chandigarh
Administration v. Jasmine Kaur (2014) 10 SCC 521 it
was reiterated that if the candidate takes a calculated
risk/chance by subjecting himself/herself to the
selection proc ess, after knowing his/her non- selection
cannot turn around and contend that the process of
selection was unfair. It was further held that once the
candidate is aware that he/she does not fulfil the
criteria of the prospectus, he/she cannot be heard to
say that he/she chose to challenge the same only after
preferring the application and after the same was
refused on the ground of eligibility.

12. The Supreme Court in Mabel v. State of
Haryana (2002) 6 SCC 318 was concerned with a
clause which barred a stud ent who had taken
admission in any Medical/Dental College from
seeking admission in another course during the
period of the course in which the candidate had taken
admission. It was held that though such a condition
may appear to operate harshly but is mea nt to ensure
that a candidate who has already secured admission
should not abandon the studies to seek admission in
another course and that such a condition is in public
interest for otherwise it would result in the wastage of
the seat in the course in which the candidate had
taken admission and that further such a change would
deprive another eligible candidate from seeking
admission to other courses
10. In view of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, . It was also held that such
a condition could not be held unreasonable since the
bar was with respect to th at university/college only
and that too only for the duration of the course in
which the admission had been taken. ”
(emphasis supplied )

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no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge while passing the
judgement dated 21.12.2020 in W.P. (C) 10777/2020. Hence, there is no
merit in this appeal and the same is therefore dismissed with no order as to
costs.

CHIEF JUSTICE

JYOTI SINGH, J

JANUARY 8, 2021
sr
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