MS SAVITA GUPTA  Vs INDIA POST PAYMENTS BANK LIMITED IPPB BOARD

LPA No.257.2020 Page 1 of 19
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Date of decision: 6th January, 2021.

+ LPA 257/2020 & CM APPL. 29331/2020 (of the appellan t for
directions).
SAVITA GUPTA ….. Appellant
Through: Ms. Tamali Wad & Ms. Aayushi
Singhal, Advocates along with
appellant.

versus

INDIA POST PAYMENTS BANK LIMITED
(IPPB BOARD) ….. Respondent
Through: Mr. Rajesh Kr. Gautam, Mr. Anant
Gautam & Mr. Nipun Sharma,
Advocates
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA

[VIA VIDEO CONFERENCING]
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J .
1. The appeal impugns the judgment dated 4 th August, 2020 of the
Single Judge, in W.P.(C) No.3113/2020 filed by the appellant, to the extent
the same declares the appellant as ‘a probationer’ and denies back wages to
the petitioner for the period she remained out of s ervice.
2. Although in an appeal there is no need for dupli cation of pleadings
and without leave of Court, no additional facts or factual pleas can be
urged, however, in the instant case, when the appea l was entertained it was
ordered that pleadings be completed in the present appeal. Pursuant thereto,
counter affidavit and rejoinder have been filed.
3. We have heard the counsel for the appellant and the counsel for the
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respondent Bank.
4. The writ petition, from which this appeal arises , was filed by the
appellant impugning the letter dated 27 th March, 2020 of the respondent
Bank whereby the service/employment of the appellan t with the respondent
Bank at the post of General Manager (Finance) was t erminated on the
ground of the appellant not meeting the mandatory e ligibility criteria of
having minimum three years experience in heading th e Finance and
Accounting Department of a Bank or one level below the Head of Finance
and Accounting Department in a Bank. The Single Jud ge, vide the
impugned judgment, has (i) set aside the letter/or der dated 27 th March,
2020 of termination of services of the appellant, for the reason of the same
being ex-facie stigmatic; (ii) directed the respondent Bank to rei nstate the
appellant with immediate effect; (iii) left it open to the respondent Bank to
take any further action as it may deem fit in accor dance with law and
further making it clear that “in view of findings a bove with regard to the
status of appellant as probationer, appellant will be reinstated as a
probationer from the date of her termination”; and, (iv) directed that the
period for which the appellant remained out of serv ice would be counted as
period spent on duty, for all purposes, but held th e appellant not entitled to
back wages but directed the respondent Bank to pay the rent of the premises
taken on rent by the appellant as a part of her ser vice condition.
5. In view of the order aforesaid in the writ petit ion from which this
appeal arises, we have at the outset enquired from the counsel for the
respondent Bank, (i) whether the respondent Bank ha s also appealed against
the subject order/judgment; and, (ii) whether the r espondent Bank has, after
the impugned judgment/order, taken any steps vis-a- vis the appellant.
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6. The counsel for the respondent Bank states that the respondent Bank
has accepted the judgment and not appealed against the same. It is further
informed that the Managing Director of the responde nt Bank has joined
recently and the decision with respect to the appel lant, pursuant to the
impugned judgment/order, is yet to be taken.
7. We may at the outset only notice that the counse l for the respondent
Bank, with respect to the challenge to the judgment of the Single Judge,
insofar as denying back wages to the appellant, has fairly stated that the
respondent Bank leaves the same to the discretion o f the Court.
8. At this stage, the factual controversy which is not in dispute may be
taken note of.
9. The respondent Bank issued a letter dated 16 th December, 2016 to the
appellant, offering to the appellant the post of Ge neral Manager (Finance)
in the respondent Bank. The said letter, besides ot her terms and conditions
contained therein, in Clause 3 titled “Probation an d Confirmation” thereof
provided as under:-
“3. Probation and Confirmation:
You shall be placed on probation for a period of one year,
during which your performance will be monitored wit h a view
to determining your suitability for confirmation as envisaged
and expected for the post you have been employed at . The
period of probation may be extended as deemed fit a nd as per
the discretion of the Competent Authority. You shal l be issued
a formal letter of confirmation on satisfactory com pletion of
probationary period or the extended period of proba tion, as
the case may be. You will be deemed to be on probat ion until
so confirmed in writing”

10. In pursuance to the aforesaid letter, the appel lant joined the
respondent Bank on 1 st March, 2017.
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11. The Service Rules of the respondent Bank, in Ru le 6 titled
“Probation and Confirmation” thereof, inter alia provides as under:-
“6. Probation and confirmation : Unless otherwise provided in
the terms of appointment or any other agreement or award,
the following rules shall govern the probation and
confirmation of an Officer:

6.1. All Officers on first appointment in the servi ce of the
Bank on the basis of an open selection, including
Officers appointed to a higher grade, shall be plac ed on
probation for a period of one year, during which th eir
performance will be monitored with a view to
determining their suitability for confirmation agai nst
the permanent post.

6.2. The following categories of Officers shall be exempted
from the requirement of probation:

6.2.1. Officers of Government and Semi-Government
Organisations who join initially on deputation/
Foreign Service for a period prior to their
permanent absorption in the service of the Bank.

6.2.2. Officers of Government and Semi-Government
organizations who are entitled to retain lien in
the previous posts as per rules of the said
organizations, provided they surrender their lien
on the service of the previous employer. Provided
that where an Officer chooses to retain lien on
the service of the previous organization he/ she
may do so subject to the condition that the Bank
shall bear no liability whatsoever on that
account.

6.2.3. An Officer who is on deputation/ Foreign Ser vice
or an Officer who retains lien on the service of
the previous employer shall be deemed to be
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confirmed as a permanent Officer with effect
from the date he/she surrenders his/her lien on
the service of the previous employer. Other
Officers who are exempted from probation under
these rules shall be deemed to be confirmed as
permanent Officers with effect from the date of
joining the service of the Bank.

6.3. The period of probation may be extended at th e
discretion of the Competent Authority, but will not be
extended by more than one year save for exceptional
reasons to be recorded in writing.

6.4. Unless exempted under these rules, every Offic er
appointed in the Bank’s service will be issued a fo rmal
order of confirmation on satisfactory completion of
probationary period or the extended period of
probation, as may be applicable. The Officer will b e
deemed to be on probation until so confirmed in
writing.

6.5. An order relating to confirmation or extension of
probation will normally be communicated within one
month from the date of completion of the probationa ry
period or extended period of probation. Non-
compliance with this stipulation will not, however,
result in automatic confirmation of the Officer.

6.6. An Officer shall be confirmed in the service of the Bank,
if, in the opinion of the Competent Authority, the Officer
has satisfactorily completed the training in any
institution to which the Officer may have been depu ted
for training, and the in-service training in the Ba nk.

6.7. If during the probationary period or extended period of
probation, the performance, progress and general
conduct of the Officer are not found satisfactory o r up
to the standard required for the post, his/ her ser vices
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are liable to be terminated at any time by giving s uch
notice or payment of emoluments in lieu thereof wit hout
assigning any reason provided hereinafter. In case of a
promotee from the Bank’s service, he/she may be
reverted to the grade from which he/she was promote d .”

12. Finding no provision, neither in the Letter of Appointment nor in the
Service Rules, of automatic/deemed confirmation, we have enquired from
the counsel for the appellant, whether the appellan t was confirmed at any
time prior to the termination.
13. The counsel for the appellant states that, (i) there is no letter of
confirmation; at the relevant time none of the empl oyees of the respondent
Bank had been confirmed; and (ii) the Recruitment A dvisory Committee of
the Board of Directors of the respondent Bank, on 1 8 th March, 2019
resolved as under:-
“1.Approval on change in Confirmation Process

The committee was appraised about nature and types of
verifications done for regular IPPB employees. The committee
was informed that many IPPB employees are due for
confirmation. Significant delay is observed in most of
confirmation cases where verification could not hap pen on
time due to interdependency at various levels. This may
hamper morale and performance of employees.

Post the Discussion Committee members passed the
following resolution:

RESOLVED THAT Committee members of the Bank be and
is approved the proposal to change the confirmation process
as below

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a) All employees who have completed one year in serv ice
are proposed to be confirmed subject to satisfactor y
performance.

b) This confirmation is subject to completion of due
verification process. Confirmation of employee will
be reversed in case of any adverse remarks or
findings are observed in verification reports and
suitable action may be taken as appropriate.”

14. It is not the case of either party that the afo resaid Resolution of the
Recruitment Advisory Committee of the Board of Dire ctors, if required to
be ratified, was not ratified by the Board of Direc tors of the respondent
Bank. Both counsels have relied thereon.
15. The respondent Bank, on 13 th September, 2019 sought clarification
from the appellant with regard to her scale in the previous employment vis-
a-vis the Public Sector Banks (PSBs) and work experience . It was inter alia
stated therein that, (i) in the advertisement for r ecruitment pursuant to
which the appellant had applied, the eligibility fo r the post for which the
appellant applied and had been recruited was that “ The candidate should at
least be working in scale-VI of a PSB or equivalent scale in a Private Bank
or similar level in any other organisation” and tha t the applicant should
have minimum 18 years of experience of which a mini mum three years was
required to be of heading a Finance and Accounting Department of a Bank
or one level below the Head of a Finance and Accoun ting Department in a
Bank; (ii) the appellant, in her application for re cruitment had confirmed
that she fulfilled the said requirements; (iii) on the basis of the said
representations and documents furnished, the appell ant had been offered the
subject post; and, (iv) during the process of verif ication, it had transpired
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that the appellant was not drawing Pay Scale VI of a PSB or equivalent
scale and which was a mandatory requirement for eli gibility, and, the
experience certificate produced by the appellant al so did not conclusively
state the petitioner fulfilled experience requireme nt of minimum three years
as heading a Finance and Accounting Department of a bank or one level
below the Head of Finance and Accounting Department in a Bank, as also
required. Clarification was thus sought from the ap pellant and the appellant
was asked to also furnish documentary evidence of p ossessing minimum
three years of experience heading a Finance and Acc ounting Department of
a Bank or one level below the Head of Finance and A ccounting Department
in a Bank. The appellant was also informed that if no reply was received
from the appellant within seven days, the matter wi ll be placed before the
Competent Authority, without clarification of the a ppellant.
16. The appellant, vide her response to the aforesa id letter of the
respondent Bank, while expressing shock and surpris e, inter alia stated that,
(i) her eligibility was considered at the time of scrutiny of applications for
recruitment/appointment, at the time of interview a nd prior to issue of offer
of appointment; therefore there was no question of the appellant being not
eligible; (ii) if any clarification was required, i t should be obtained from the
personnel who had conducted the said scrutiny and s elected the appellant;
(iii) the appellant had made honest and correct dis closures in her
application and it was for the respondent Bank to c arry out a due diligence;
(iv) the period of probation was one year and her a ppointment should have
been confirmed and on this ground alone, the letter seeking clarification
from her should be withdrawn; (v) if the appellant was not eligible, she
should not have been interviewed and appointed and she could not have
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been appointed merely on the basis of her own asses sment and opinion of
her eligibility; and, (vi) the clarifications sough t were an afterthought and to
malign the petitioner and affect her career.
17. As aforesaid, the respondent Bank thereafter, vide letter dated 27 th
March, 2020, impugning which the writ petition from which this appeal
arises was filed, terminated the services of the ap pellant with the respondent
Bank stating:
“You were offered the post of General Manager (Fina nce)
vide offer letter dated December, 16, 2016 and you
subsequently joined the services of the Bank on Mar ch 01,
2017.
In pursuance of the terms and conditions stated in clause
5(a) of your offer letter dated December 16, 2016, as per
the direction of the Board, your services from the Bank are
terminated with immediate effect for the reason of not
meeting the mandatory eligibility criteria of havin g
minimum 3 years of experience heading a finance and
accounting department of a Bank or one level below the
head of a finance and accounting department in a Ba nk.
You shall be paid one month’s emoluments in lieu of one
month’s notice period as per clause 5(a) of your of fer letter
dated December 16, 2016.
This is being issued under the directions of the Co mpetent
Authority.”

18. The appellant filed the writ petition from whic h this appeal arises,
inter alia pleading that, (i) the appellant had not been serv ed with any show
cause notice before issuance of termination letter dated 27 th March, 2020;
(ii) the termination was in violation of principles of natural justice since the
appellant was not given reasonable opportunity to r epresent her case and to
adduce evidence; (iii) the respondent Bank had fail ed to abide with clauses
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6.3 and 6.5 of the Service Rules; and, (iv) “…… . although the probation
period has expired in March 2018 however no letter has been issued to the
petitioner thereby intimating about extension of pr obation period….”, and
seeking declaration that her termination vide lette r dated 27 th March, 2020
was non est for non-compliance of procedure and seeking reinst atement in
service.
19. The Single Judge, in the impugned order/judgmen t has noted that it
was inter alia the contention of the appellant, that (i) at the t ime of
termination the appellant was no longer a probation er as her services stood
confirmed prior thereto because in the recruitment advertisement it was not
provided that there would be probation period and p robation clause was
inserted for the first time in the offer letter; (i i) alternatively, that the
appellant became due for confirmation on 1 st March, 2018 and though
Clause 6.3 of the Service Rules entitled the respon dent Bank to extend the
period of probation but for maximum one year only i n exceptional
circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in wri ting; no reasons in
writing for extending the probation period had been shown and thus the
appellant even if appointed on probation stood conf irmed and mere non-
issuance of the confirmation letter was of no avail ; (iii) the Recruitment
Advisory Committee of the respondent Bank in the me eting held on 18 th
March, 2019 approved confirmation of all employees who had completed
one year in service; (iv) since the appellant was a confirmed employee,
Clause 5(a) of the offer letter could not have been invoked to terminate the
services; (v) without prejudice to the aforesaid, e ven assuming that the
appellant was a probationer, her services could not have been terminated
without an inquiry; and, (vi) the order of terminat ion, even if as a
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probationer, was punitive.
20. The Single Judge, in the impugned order/judgmen t,
found/observed/held that, (i) the first issue which arose for consideration
was, whether the appellant continued to be a probat ioner or she was a
confirmed employee in terms of the Resolution dated 18 th March, 2019 of
the Recruitment Advisory Committee of the Board of Directors of the
respondent Bank; (ii) it was settled law that proba tion does not end
automatically at the end of period of probation unl ess the Rules expressly
provide so; even where a maximum period is provided beyond which
probation cannot be extended and the probationer co ntinues in the said
status beyond the said period, he does not get conf irmed unless the Rules
provide so; (iii) in law there is no deemed confirm ation of a probationer
unless expressly provided by a Rule; (iv) the Rules of the respondent Bank,
on the contrary provided for an officer to be deeme d to be on probation,
unless confirmed in writing; (v) the second issue f or consideration was,
whether the termination order was a termination sim pliciter or it was
punitive and stigmatic, requiring an inquiry; (vi) the termination of the
appellant was not a termination simpliciter because , as had come on record,
the trigger for the action against the appellant wa s a complaint alleging
irregularity in the recruitment of the appellant; ( vii) the termination of the
services of the appellant was founded on serious al legations of irregular
recruitment of the appellant, CAG Audit, queries ra ised by the Department
of Posts, investigation by the Chief Vigilance Offi cer and alleged
misrepresentation and suppression by the appellant; (viii) the appellant,
admittedly was not subjected to an inquiry nor giv en a chance to defend
herself; (ix) the order of termination was punitive and in the absence of a
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regular inquiry, deserved to be set aside; (x) the respondent Bank for
terminating the services of the appellant had also relied upon a letter
received from IDBI but no opportunity had been give n to the appellant to
meet the same; and, (xi) the termination order bein g ex-facie stigmatic, was
liable to be set aside.
21. As aforesaid, in this appeal, the challenge by the appellant is twofold,
firstly to the finding of the Single Judge, that t he status of the appellant till
her termination vide letter dated 27 th March, 2020 was of a probationer
and, secondly qua the denial of back wages.
22. With respect to denial of back wages, the couns el for the appellant
has argued that no reason has been given therefor a nd since the termination
had been held to be illegal and has been set aside, axiomatically, back
wages should have followed.
23. We have considered the aforesaid contention. Th ough undoubtedly
the Single Judge has not given any reason for denia l of back wages but
from the factum of the Single Judge having directed the respondent Bank to
pay the lease rental of the residence of the appell ant and which was a part
of the emoluments of the appellant, it is evident t hat the Single Judge, while
denying the back wages, has balanced the equities. It thus cannot be said
that the denial of back wages is in toto or without any basis. In our
understanding of the law, grant of back wages in en tirety for the period for
which the employee had admittedly not done any work for the employer,
does not automatically follow an order of setting a side of termination and of
reinstatement.
24. Though ordinarily the said discretion exercised by the Single Judge,
in the matter of back wages is not interfereable in exercise of jurisdiction
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under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 and/or the Letters
Patent of this Court, unless found to have been exe rcised perversely, and
which we do not find in the present case, but since we are told that the back
wages concerned are for a period of about four mont hs only i.e. for the
period 27 th March, 2020 to 10 th August, 2020 when the appellant was
reinstated, we are inclined to allow the said claim of the appellant.
25. That brings us to the question on which argumen ts for over one and a
half hours were addressed by the counsel for the ap pellant i.e. whether the
Single Judge erred in holding the status of the app ellant to be as a
probationer only. The counsel for the appellant, in this context has argued,
that (i) once the Selection Committee constituted f or recruitment had found
the appellant to be eligible, her eligibility could not be questioned; the
Selection Committee comprised of highly experienced senior officials of
the banking industry; (ii) in the advertisement pur suant to which the
appellant had applied for recruitment, there was no provision for probation
and could not have been introduced as an afterthoug ht in the offer of
appointment; (iii) since no letter of extension of probation, as required to be
issued under the Service Rules, was issued, the app ellant was deemed to be
confirmed; (iv) circulars/office memorandums issue d by the Department of
Personnel & Training (DoPT) of the Ministry of Pers onnel, Public
Grievances and Pensions of Government of India on t he subject of
probation and confirmation, had also not been follo wed; (v) the termination
of the services of the appellant was a fruit of a p oisonous tree (because of
owing it’s initiation to an anonymous/pseudonymous complaint which, as
per DoPT circulars was not entertainable) and thus once the termination
was set aside, the appellant automatically stood co nfirmed; (vi) once no
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merit was found in the reason for which services of the appellant were
terminated as a probationer, it automatically follo wed that the appellant is
to be confirmed; (vii) the respondent Bank, for som e reason is inimical to
the appellant and if the liberty as granted by the Single Judge to the
respondent Bank to take any further action it deems fit in accordance with
law is allowed to stand, the same will be misused b y the respondent Bank to
harass the appellant; and, (viii) though no declara tion was sought by the
appellant in the writ petition from which this appe al arises, of the appellant
having been confirmed but the said question directl y arose for adjudication
and has been wrongly decided by the Single Judge.
26. Per contra the counsel for the respondent Bank has argued, that (i) in
the writ petition as filed, there were no allegatio ns of mala fide in the
matter of termination of the services of the appell ant and allegations of
mala fide were made as an afterthought, for the first time i n the rejoinder to
the counter affidavit of the respondent Bank and to which the respondent
Bank had no opportunity to respond and the Single J udge has not, for this
reason considered the allegations of mala fide made in the rejoinder and
the appellant cannot be permitted to argue the same now; (ii) that the Single
Judge, in the impugned judgment has referred to ple thora of case law
including to the judgment of three Judge Bench of t he Supreme Court in
High Court of Madhya Pradesh through Registrar Vs. Satyanarayan
Jhavar 2001 (7) SCC 161 and the recent judgment of the Su preme Court in
Durgabai Deshmukh Memorial Sr. Sec. School Vs. J.A. J. Vasu Sena
(2019) 17 SCC 157 to hold that there is no deemed c onfirmation in service
jurisprudence; and, (iii) the respondent Bank had m ade enquiry with respect
to eligibility of the appellant from IDBI with whic h the appellant was
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earlier employed and has acted on the basis of the reply of IDBI; however
since the appellant was not given an opportunity to respond to the said
reply, the Single Judge though finding the appellan t to be having the status
of a probationer, has held that since reason was gi ven in the termination
letter, the termination was stigmatic.
27. The counsel for the appellant, in rejoinder has argued, that (i) as per
the Resolution dated 18 th March, 2019 of the Recruitment Advisory
Committee of the Board of Directors of the responde nt Bank also, the
decision on confirmation was subject to satisfactor y performance and
completion of due verification process; and, (ii) f rom all the Annual
Performance Appraisal Reports of ‘outstanding’ of the appellant, it is
evident that performance of the appellant has been satisfactory and
verification cannot be with respect to qualificatio ns for appointment with
respect whereto the respondent Bank had satisfied i tself at the time of
issuing offer of appointment.
28. No merit is found in any of the contentions afo resaid of the counsel
for the appellant.
29. The Single Judge has taken pains to support her reasoning by a
plethora of judgments and no dent even has been mad e by the counsel for
the appellant thereon. Once the counsel for the app ellant also admits that
there is no document of confirmation of services of the appellant, in the
absence of any provision in her letter of appointme nt and/or in the Service
Rules, of deemed confirmation, the status of the ap pellant continued, as on
probation, and the mistake of the respondent Bank i n, while terminating the
probation of the appellant, imputing reasons, canno t become a ground for
the appellant to gain confirmation, which, in the a bsence of a contract or
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Rules, cannot be but by an overt act of confirmatio n. It is significant that
the Single Judge was not required to, and has not r eturned any findings with
respect to the eligibility of the appellant for the post for which she applied
and was recruited. It is for this reason only that the Single Judge, while
setting aside termination for the reason of having been made done without
inquiry, has left it open to the respondent Bank, i f so desires, to, in
accordance with law proceed to determine the eligib ility of the appellant.
30. As far as the argument, of the counsel for the appellant, of the
eligibility of the appellant for recruitment having been determined before
issuing letter of appointment to her and the respon dent Bank being not
entitled to go into it again at the time of confirm ation, is concerned, suffice
it is to refer to Clause 13 titled “Disclaimer” of the recruitment
advertisement pursuant to which the appellant appli ed, to the effect that “In
case it is detected at any stage of recruitment tha t a candidate does not
fulfill the eligibility norms and/or that he/she ha s furnished any
incorrect/false information or has suppressed any m aterial fact(s), his/her
candidature will stand cancelled. If any of these s hortcomings is/are
detected even after appointment, his/her services a re liable to be
terminated” . The appellant having applied on the s aid condition, cannot be
heard to contend to the contrary.
31. We may also add/observe that appointment to any post, particularly a
public post as of General Manager (Finance) in the respondent Bank,
dealing with public monies, and the incumbent where in is trusted with
safety and security monies in the saving and curren t accounts of public at
large, without fulfilling the conditions prescribed for eligibility to the said
post, is illegal and liable to be set aside/quashed at any time and the
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incumbent thereto cannot take the pleas, as are bei ng taken by the appellant,
of the respondent Bank being estopped from verifyin g her eligibility
because of having at the time of issuance of offer of appointment to the
appellant having considered the appellant eligible. Even if before issuing of
the offer of appointment, eligibility of the appell ant for the post was
considered and even if by a Selection Committee of senior experienced
officers of the banking industry, if the same is er roneous, the same will not
bind the respondent Bank and the respondent Bank wi ll remain entitled to
annul the said appointment on the said ground. Publ ic interest does not
permit a person not eligible for such a post, to co ntinue on the said post.
32. The conduct of the appellant of, notwithstandin g clarification having
been sought from her, instead of furnishing the sai d clarification, blaming
the members of the Selection Committee who had foun d her eligible and
offered appointment to her, does not inspire confid ence and left the
respondent Bank with no option but to presume that the appellant had no
other explanation/clarification to give and to term inate her employment.
Inspite thereof the Single Judge has granted opport unity to the appellant.
33. As far as the argument, of the counsel for the appellant of the
advertisement for recruitment not referring to any probation and the
provision for probation having been added as an aft erthought in the offer of
appointment, is concerned (a) the advertisement ref erred to the Service
Rules, which provide for probation; (b) the appella nt claiming to have
earlier served IDBI at a senior position, was not a novice at the time of
applying and before applying is deemed to have sati sfied herself; and, (c)
the appellant did not protest to the condition of p robation even if not found
in the recruitment advertisement and inserted for t he first time in the offer
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of appointment and accepted the same and now cannot be heard to
complain.
34. No merit is found in any of the other argument s either of the counsel
for the appellant. The reliance on the circulars/me morandum of DoPT is
made for the first time in the appeal and inspite o f being asked to show,
how the same are applicable to the respondent Bank, no answer has been
forthcoming. No explanation is offered also to, how the same will overrule
the express Service Rules to the contrary. Similarl y the argument of
termination being the ‘fruit of a poisonous tree’ i s made without the same
having any application to the controversy. Not only is the argument of an
anonymous complaint being not actionable is made wi thout any
basis/provision therefor in the respondent Bank and referring again to the
DoPT circulars for whose application to the respond ent Bank there is no
explanation but even otherwise once an explanation had been sought from
the appellant and which the appellant chose not to give, the appellant
cannot hide behind such pleas.
35. The argument of the appellant having been confi rmed pursuant to the
Resolution dated 18 th March, 2019 of the Recruitment Advisory Committee
of the Board of Directors of the respondent Bank, i s also by misreading the
said Resolution. Vide the said Resolution, the empl oyees of the respondent
Bank were not confirmed but were “proposed to be co nfirmed subject to
satisfactory performance” and “subject to completio n of due verification
process” with confirmation being ‘reversed in case of any adverse remarks
or findings are observed in verification reports” a nd suitable action being
resolved to be taken otherwise. The appellant faile d in the verification
process and for which reason she was not confirmed.
2021:DHC:40-DB
LPA No.257.2020 Page 19 of 1 9
36. The only other argument of the appellant having been deemed to be
confirmed because of her period of probation being not extended, is also
contrary to the Service Rules and against the law a s dealt in detail in the
judgment of the Single Judge.
37. Thus the appeal, to the extent impugning the or der of the Single
Judge holding the appellant to be a probationer, is dismissed.
38. Resultantly, the appeal is only partly allowed, directing the
respondent Bank to, within eight weeks, pay to the appellant the back
wages for the period the services of the appellant remained terminated i.e
from 27 th March, 2020 to 10 th August, 2020. If the back wages are not paid
within the said time, they shall also incur interes t after eight weeks, at 7%
per annum.
The appeal is disposed of.

RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J

SANJEEV NARULA, J

JANUARY 6, 2021
‘pp’..

2021:DHC:40-DB